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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the determinants of bank equity risk and credit risk as well 
as providing an analysis of the change in bank equity risk following the formation of 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It is motivated by the increasing interest in bank 
risk research particularly since the formation of EMU and the global financial crisis. The 
topic of bank risk is also growing in importance as banks have become larger, more 
diversified and complex.  
This study addresses the following research questions (RQ1A, RQ1B and RQ2): 
RQ1A: Do bank regulation, off-balance sheet activities and market discipline 
explain the bank risk, in particular equity risk and credit risk? 
RQ1B: Does bank risk sensitivity to bank regulation, off-balance sheet activities 
and market discipline change with creation of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU)? 
RQ2: Is there a structural change in European bank equity risk with the 
formation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)? 
With regard to RQ1A and RQ1B, the study considers a range of financial 
institutions including bank holding companies (BHCs), commercial banks, cooperatives 
and savings banks across two data sets. The first dataset used in analysis of this question 
consists of 15 Western European countries for the period 1996-2005. For both euro-zone 
and non-euro-zone Western European countries the total number of listed shares stands at 
117 resulting in the bank-year sample of 1029 observations. The second dataset includes 
banks from 36 countries in addition to the Western European countries. The total number 
ix 
of listed banks stands at 758 in the final version of the second dataset resulting in the 
final bank-year sample observation to 4,680. 
With regard to RQ2, the study constructs a sample of 96 euro-zone European 
banks and 85 non-euro zone European banks from the DataStream International database 
from January 1995 to April 2006 periods. Approximately, 64 banks are eliminated from 
the first dataset (European banks) due to lack of accounting information.  
In terms of methodology, the primary estimation method for the regression 
equations was pooled-OLS and two stage least squares (2SLS) with robust standard 
errors. The robustness of the findings was also tested by other estimation methods such as 
random effects and fixed effects panel data analysis.  
With regard to research question 1 (RQ1A and RQ1B), the findings on European 
bank analysis show: (i) off-balance sheet activities are positively associated with equity 
risk (total risk, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk) and credit risk; (ii) charter value is 
positively associated with equity risk but negatively related to credit risk; (iii) bank 
capital is non-linearly related with systematic risk and credit risk; (iv) uninsured deposits 
are negatively associated with systematic risk while positively related to credit risk, total 
risk and idiosyncratic risk; (v) large banks exhibit greater systematic risk and total risk 
but lower credit risk and idiosyncratic risk. While these bank characteristics are important 
in explaining bank risk, the findings also confirm that civil-law country banks tend to be 
less risky than common-law country banks over the period of the study. Similar findings 
are also evident in separate world and regional analysis. 
As to the possibility of structural change between the pre-EMU and post-EMU 
x 
periods, the results show the magnitude of charter value fell dramatically in the post-
EMU period with regard to equity risk and credit risk. The findings also confirm that the 
non linearity between bank capital and systematic risk is most evident after the formation 
of EMU. The findings generally show an increase in the importance of off balance sheet 
activities in the post-EMU period. These results were robust to various estimation 
specifications. 
With regard to research question 2 (RQ2), the findings reveal that, with the 
exception of Germany, there was a decline in bank risk across the euro zone countries. 
Total risk decreased for 70% of the euro zone banks with a statistically significant decline 
in total risk observed for 51% of the sample. A similar result is evident for systematic 
risk and idiosyncratic risk. These findings are robust to financial crisis effect and test 
specifications. Moreover, this study finds evidence of a decrease in bank equity risk for a 
sample of neighboring non-euro zone European countries, consistent with the existence 
of some spill-over effects.  
This study contributes to the existing bank risk literature by showing that bank 
regulation (bank capital and charter value), off-balance sheet activities and market 
discipline are important determinants of bank equity risk and credit risk. In addition, it is 
one of the first studies to provide evidence of changes in the importance of factors 
affecting bank risk between the pre- and post-EMU periods. This is also one of the first 
studies to provide empirical evidence of bank capital non linearity for European banks as 
well as for the broader world bank analysis. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis investigates the determinants of European bank equity risk and credit 
risk. Particularly, it examines the relevance of regulatory discipline (i.e., bank capital and 
charter value), off-balance sheet activities, and market discipline (subordinated debt and 
uninsured deposits) to both equity risk and credit risk. It also explores the determinants of 
bank risk for the world banking system with separate regional analysis. Finally, the study 
analyses the structural changes in European bank equity risk with the formation of 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 2007-09 highlights the inherent weaknesses in 
the existing banking system around the world particularly in developed countries in 
controlling excessive risk taking by banks.1 Both bank regulators and investors consider 
bank risk to be important. The systemic problems with the sub-prime crisis indicate the 
importance of an improved understanding of the determinants of bank risk. Yet, the 
                                                 
1
 For example, in the U.S., the collapse of one of the world’s oldest investment bank Lehman Brothers in 
2008. The Merrill Lynch, once high-profile Wall Street firm, made an overall loss of USD 27.6 billion 
and eventually was sold to Bank of America to avoid bankruptcy. In Europe, United Bank of Switzerland 
wrote down USD 42.5billion on its sub-prime related assets since the beginning of the turmoil. Further, in 
the UK, the government took control 84% of the Royal Bank of Scotland in 2008 and guaranteed some 
USD 62 billion in toxic assets. In September 2008, Lloyds-TSB took over Halifax Bank of Scotland 
(HBOS) and subsequently in October 2008, the British government bailed out the Lloyds-HBOS. The 
nationalization of Northern Rock in 2007 is also well-publicized. Hong Kong Shanghai Banking 
Corporation, the largest bank in Europe by market value, reported approximately 70% drop in their 
profits in 2008. However, in the mid of GFC, the World Economic Forum (2008) proclaims the banking 
system in Canada to be the safest in the world, followed by Sweden, Luxembourg and Australia 
Typically, banks in Canada maintain a larger capital reserves compare to those in the U.S. and even more 
so than those in Europe. Although the Imperial Bank of Commerce in Canada sold USD 2.94 billion 
worth of shares to cover its losses, there were basically no government bailouts. 
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change in bank equity risk is important because changes in equity risk can have 
repercussions for investors, borrowers and regulators. While decreases in the systematic 
risk of bank equity may be associated with increased market value, an increase in 
idiosyncratic risk is of importance to regulators who are very much concerned with the 
performance of individual banks. Generally, well-diversified investors focus on 
systematic risk while undiversified investors are more concerned with total risk including 
idiosyncratic (bank-specific) risk. Banks benefit from both economies of scale and 
economies of scope and larger cost reduction leads to greater diversification. However, 
the GFC teaches us that there could be an optimum size beyond which larger size and 
greater diversification increases bank idiosyncratic risk (Stelzer 2009). Since bank 
regulators are responsible for ensuring a stable and sound financial system, they 
(including implicit and explicit safety net providers) are interested in total risk. Interest 
rates have also become more volatile in recent decades and this additional funding risk 
(Flannery and James 1984) is certainly worthy of further analysis. 
To that end, evidence is sought on the effect of bank discipline, off-balance sheet 
activities and market discipline on each of the five bank risk measures (systematic, 
idiosyncratic, total, interest rate and credit risks) for 15 European countries in analysis of 
the impact of the formation of EMU. The result of the multivariate regression analysis 
reveals that off-balance sheet activities increase all bank risk measures. However, the 
results for market discipline (as proxied by uninsured deposit), and bank discipline 
(capital ratio and charter value) are mixed. For instance, uninsured deposits is negatively 
related to systematic risk while positively related to both credit risk and idiosyncratic 
risk. There is also some evidence of a non-linear relation between bank capital and bank 
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risk. 
With regard to bank risk for the world sample, evidence is also sought for the 
existence of a relation between bank discipline, off-balance sheet activities and market 
discipline with bank risk. Similar to the findings for European banks, the results present a 
positive association between off-balance sheet activities and bank risk while there is no 
evidence of the bank disciplinary effect of charter value for bank equity risk for the 
world. These results are robust to different estimation techniques.  
In relation to structural changes in European bank equity risk with the formation 
of EMU, multivariate regression analysis shows mainly a decrease in bank equity risk for 
euro-zone countries except for Germany. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides the 
background and motivation of this thesis. This helps to identify the research objectives 
and the associated research questions discussed in Section 1.3. The data, methodology 
and major findings are then summarized in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 outlines the academic 
contribution and implications. Finally Section 1.6 concludes the chapter, describing the 
structure of the remaining chapters of this thesis. 
1.2 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
Financial intermediaries such as banks are a major part of an economy in their 
own right. They influence securities markets and promote economic growth by providing 
liquid financial markets. Banks also encourage diversification and specialization 
(Diamond and Dybvig 1983). The background and motivation of this thesis is discussed 
below in the following sub sections. Section 1.2.1 presents the changes in International 
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banking system. Section 1.2.2 discusses the aspects of the banking system in recent 
times. Section 1.2.3 presents the growth of off-balance sheet activities and market 
discipline. Finally, Section 1.2.4 presents a discussion on the impact of the formation of 
EMU. 
1.2.1 Changes in international banking system 
The European markets have become more integrated since EMU and this has 
allowed the banks to expand their activities through increased cross-border/domestic 
branch networks. However, it is possible that, continued macroeconomic stability, strong 
regulatory and supervisory framework, greater international cooperation, and strong bank 
risk management have contributed to the resilience of the European Union (EU) banking 
sector over the last decade (Trichet 2004). 
It has been argued that formation of EMU was the most important systemic 
change in world financial markets in recent times.2 This change has been associated with 
increased competition across the European banking sector. It is argued that it compelled 
the banks to reassess their strategic orientation, leading to greater internationalization, 
greater geographical diversification and further bank consolidation, particularly in the 
euro-area banking industry (ECB 2005). Thus, analysis of bank risk is particularly 
important given the current level of European banking industry concentration and the 
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 The establishment of EMU and the commencement of a single currency the Euro, was meant to ease 
trade, eliminate exchange rate risk, remove transaction costs incurred in exchanging currencies, enhance 
globalization through increased integration and competition along with maintenance and preservation of 
fiscal policy among the European markets. This modification has had a significant impact on the 
European financial system (banking industry and financial market) in terms of competition and 
consolidation (Francis and Hunter 2004). 
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decline in the number of banks since 1985 (ECB 2005).3 For example, in the euro-area 
the bank concentration ratio (measured by the share of five largest banks as a percentage 
of total assets of the banking sector) increased from 46% in 1997 to 59% in 2006 (ECB 
2007). The degree of concentration is particularly prevalent in smaller European 
countries such as Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands where a small number of banks 
dominate the national market. In these countries, the concentration ratio as a percentage 
of total banking assets is high (86% in 2007). Among the non-euro zone European 
countries, the UK banking market is relatively concentrated with a concentration ratio 
(measured by the share of five largest banks in terms of total assets) increasing from 34% 
in 2003 to 40.70% in 2007.  
Moreover, the total number of mergers from 1995 to 2004 in euro area was 901, 
of which only 23.2 % were cross-border acquisitions. Total banking assets have 
continued to increase and a 54% increase in total banking assets is observed in EU-27 
member countries by 2007. However, Germany, with a fragmented banking system,4 
continues with some 518 different savings bank institutions which continue to perform 
well-below European averages However, the big banks like Deutsche bank, 
Commerzbank and HVB are not considered to be the core problem or solution. Inability 
to consolidate appears to be a critical issue in Germany (The Banker 2004). 
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 Indeed, the largest acquisition in the history of the European banking industry took place on 17 October 
2007 with the Royal Bank of Scotland, through RBS Holdings, and its acquisition of ABN AMRO 
Holding NV. 
4
 The characteristics of a fragmented German banking system includes the five largest credit institutions 
account for only 20% of the total assets, lags behind their European peers in terms of returns and 
efficiency. Consolidation has been urged for years but the banks seem to be unwilling to change their 
age-old banking structure. 
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Among emerging countries, the banking sector also faces major reorganization. 
For example, there has been considerable merger activity in South East Asian countries in 
the wake of Asian Financial Crisis 1997. The financial deregulation in Korea created 24 
merchant banks. Among twelve (12) largest Korean banks, five (5) are majority foreign-
owned and another two have foreign ownership participation (Park and Lee 2005). In 
early 2009, the Korean authorities decided to privatize Korea’s biggest state-owned bank, 
the Korea Development Bank, by 2012. The two Asian exceptions to this crisis-driven 
distress scenario are Singapore and Taiwan. In particular, Singapore banks have been 
active in cross-border mergers in Asia. However, the banks in Taiwan have also 
expanded into Asia and the US. Similarly, Indian banks have acted on the opportunities 
to expand globally. 
1.2.2 Aspects of banking regulation  
Regulators have relied on charter value to reduce the moral hazard problem that 
arises in presence of an explicit and implicit safety net. In the face of increased 
competition, bank disciplinary tools such as charter value can help regulators to prevent 
banks from taking excessive risk. The deregulatory forces that increase bank competition 
may also reduce bank incentives to act prudently with respect to risk taking (Keeley 
1990) and the following analysis provides further insight into the impact of this trade-off 
following the formation of EMU. The bank deregulation literature generally deals with 
USA banks and while it is found that deregulation can result in increased bank risk it can 
also foster better risk management (Craig and Santos 1997; Houston and Stiroh 2006). 
Perhaps, one of the important objectives of the EMU is to achieve greater levels of 
competition and it has been argued that a consequence of increased competition is 
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increased bank risk as banks seek out more risky high yielding investments in order to 
maintain profit margins (Bundt, Cosimano and Halloran 1992; Park 1994; Galloway, Lee 
and Roden 1997). Thus, the formation of EMU provides an opportunity to study the 
impact of EMU driven deregulation and bank charter value on European bank equity risk. 
A further motivation for this thesis concerns the move to change capital adequacy 
requirements, particularly the new directive or new capital adequacy requirements.5 The 
new directive supports a risk-sensitive supervisory framework with greater reliance on 
market discipline to encourage effective capital allocation and increase competition in the 
European banking industry. However, the recent sub-prime crisis questions whether 
capital requirement is adequate to prevent banks from taking excessive risk. However, 
subsequent to the sub-prime crisis the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) 
encouraged banks to increase their capital requirement and boost the standards for the so 
called “tier 1” capital requirement which refers to the quality of the assets that banks have 
on their books in relation to their deposits. It is argued that banks should focus on prudent 
risk taking6 and so from a regulators perspective, banks with high credit risk should hold 
a relatively high level of bank capital. Nevertheless, it has been argued that more risk 
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 In parallel with the revision of the capital adequacy requirements regulatory bodies are considering 
revision of the directive on the deposit guarantee scheme. More importantly, the Lamfalussy process for 
the banking sector is still under review. This process includes regulation that can adapt to new market 
developments and practices and support integration, enhance competitiveness and strengthen cross-border 
cooperation among supervisory authorities (Thomopoulos 2006). 
6
 As of 2008, the tier 1 ratio in developed economies ranged from 6.1% to 13.6% between periods 1996-
2006. Interestingly, the Japanese tier 1 ratio is as high as 16.6% in 2006, yet it is 2.71% in 1999. Among 
the emerging markets, the Thai banks show a dip in the tier 1 ratio during 1997-1999, for example Siam 
City Public Bank LTD maintained 2.91% in 2000 and then increased to 13% in 2001. Yet, the top three 
Malaysian banks (Hong Leong Financial Group Bhd, Public Bank Berhad and Maybank) maintained tier 
1 ratio above average and over 10%. 
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sensitive capital adequacy regulation may reduce banks willingness to take on risk.7  
In addition, as this study is based on multi-country analysis, it is essential to 
account for bank heterogeneity. In a number of European countries the savings and 
cooperatives provide similar services to their customers to those provided by the 
commercial banks. For example, in Norway, there is relatively large number of locally 
based savings banks and a smaller number of large commercial banks. In general, the 
average buffer capital for these savings banks has been higher than their commercial 
counterparts. While the capital of these savings banks, consist of accumulated retained 
earnings and hybrid capital, the capital of commercial banks includes equity capital, 
subordinated debt and accumulated retained earnings. Banks are also different from non-
bank corporations in that they fall under a safety net based on the deposit insurance and 
specific capital adequacy based regulation. These institutional characteristics can 
complicate analysis of the association between bank capital and risk taking. Hence it is 
important to understand how the capital ratio of different banks, different groups and 
different countries relate to bank risk. 
1.2.3 Growth of off-balance sheet activities and market discipline 
Innovations in the European banking industry such as growth in securitization, 
expansion in the derivatives area and changes in technology also affect bank risk. Off-
balance sheet activities have both risk increasing and risk decreasing attributes. However, 
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 If banks are able to risk-adjust their total capital more than that implied by Basel I, then replacing Basel I 
with Basel II may have little impact on the capital to asset ratio or risk profile of banks portfolio 
(Lindquist 2004). It is critical to understand the relationship between bank capital and bank risk before 
the new capital requirement becomes effective. 
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while market making in derivatives is mainly limited to large banking organizations, 
small to medium banks have also increased their reliance on fee income. By 2007, the 
average exposure to off-balance sheet financial vehicles across the euro-zone was around 
6% of total loans and it has been reported that the 21 largest euro-zone banks had off-
balance sheet exposures in the region of USD 359 billion, or 3% of GDP (ECB 2007). 
Indeed, according to ECB, risk to euro-zone financial system stability has increased 
significantly by the end of December 2007 and that the growth in these risky activities is 
of major concern. Consistent with these concerns, regulators have proposed including 
off-balance sheet activities as part of bank minimum capital requirements.  
Some of the big losses reported in Europe include the failure of Baring bank in 
1995, losses (£77 million) of NatWest bank in 1996, unquantifiable derivative losses by 
UBS reported in 1998 and loss from foreign exchange trades by Allied Irish Bank in 
2001-2002. Off-balance sheet activities (OBS) are also observed outside Europe. In the 
USA, the majority of large banks are involved in off -balance sheet activities. For 
example in 2003, 530 of over 7800 US banks held the off-balance sheet derivatives 
exposure while the largest 25 banks held 99.5% of the derivatives outstanding. In 2001, 
J.P Morgan and Chase Manhattan were exposed to USD 2.25 billion on credit 
derivatives. Moreover, US banks total loan commitment grew from USD 2000 billion to 
USD 5000 billion from 1994 to 2003 and in 2005, 80% of all commercial and industrial 
lending in USA was made under loan commitments. In Australia the OBS activities 
increased from only a fraction of GDP (0.50% in 1995) to 1.05% in 2006. 
The recent debate on market discipline raises concern as to its effect on bank risk. 
Market discipline is a market based incentive in which investors in bank liabilities such 
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as subordinated debt and uninsured deposits penalize banks for taking excessive risk. 
These market based disciplinary tools can make risk-taking by the banks more costly. For 
example, policy initiatives have included mandatory issue of subordinated debt (Evanoff 
and Wall 2002). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) also supports the 
use of market discipline as banking activities become increasingly complex. The revised 
Basel Accord II incorporates the view to encourage more disclosure in Pillar 3 in order to 
strengthen market discipline. Hence, it becomes critical to evaluate whether market 
discipline is related to bank risk.  
It has been argued that subordinated debt has the most influence on major bank 
credit supply (Horiuchi and Shimizu 1998). For example, Japanese banks in the early 
1990s issued subordinated debt to support their declining capital base. This helped them 
to recapitalize in the face of increasing non-performing loans.8 From a banker’s view 
point issuing subordinated debt may be a convenient substitute for direct recapitalization 
through the issuing of stock which can entail substantial agency cost under information 
asymmetry (Myers and Majluf 1984). However, while large banks are engaged in issuing 
subordinated debt it may be difficult for small banks to issue subordinated debt. This 
makes it even more crucial to ascertain the relation between bank risk and subordinated 
debt to better understand whether subordinated debt can be treated as a substitute to bank 
capital. 
1.2.4 Impact of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
Although the literature dealing with European banks provides little guidance as to 
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 Japanese bank tier II capital included 47% of subordinated debt. 
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the expected impact of EMU on listed banks, Allen and Song (2005) argue that some 
fundamental economic changes accompany EMU. In particular, they find that euro-zone 
banks, compared with banks, in Asia or the USA, exhibit greater levels of financial 
integration with the formation of EMU. It is important to analyze the impact of EMU on 
bank equity risk because the banks play a key role in the allocation of resources, 
mobilization of savings, and diversification of risk (Williams and Gardener 2003). These 
institutions have an important impact on the profitability of investment and productivity 
of an economy (Francis and Hunter 2004).  
Given the relevance of the above factors on bank risk taking, there is a gap in 
understanding of the determinants of bank risk both in European banking industry as well 
as in the international banking literature. This study focuses on this gap by investigating 
the relation that exist between charter value, capital adequacy, off-balance sheet 
activities, market discipline and bank risk (both equity risk and credit risk). A gap in the 
literature also exists in relation to the structural changes in European bank equity risk that 
occurred with the formation of EMU. The research question, data, methodology and 
findings and contribution and policy implications of this study are discussed in the 
following Sections. 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As mentioned previously in Section 1.1, this thesis investigates the determinants 
of bank equity risk and credit risk. With regard to the determinants of bank equity risk, 
the key research aim is to assess whether bank systematic risk, total risk, idiosyncratic 
risk, interest rate risk and credit risk are influenced by bank regulation (bank capital and 
charter value), market discipline and off-balance sheet activities after controlling for 
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other bank specific and country specific factors. Further, it examines the changes in bank 
equity risk with a fundamental change in an economic system, Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). The analysis focuses on banking in Europe as well as across the world. 
Thus, the first set of research questions that this thesis addresses are: 
RQ1A: Do bank regulation, off-balance sheet activities, market discipline and 
explain the bank risk, in particular equity risk and credit risk? 
RQ1B: Does bank risk sensitivity to bank regulation, off-balance sheet activities 
and market discipline change with creation of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU)? 
The second research question assesses the impact of structural change in bank 
equity risk that occurs with the formation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The 
increased number of consolidations and concentration in the European banking industry 
further motivates this study. The main focus is to explore whether bank equity risk, 
particularly in the euro-zone countries, increased or decreased with the formation of 
EMU. Thus the second research question addresses the impact of EMU on bank risk: 
RQ2: Is there a structural change in European bank equity risk with the formation 
of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)? 
1.4 DATA, METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS 
This section discusses data, methodology and the empirical findings. Section 1.4.1 
discusses the data and methodology considered in this study. Section 1.4.2 presents a 
summary of the findings of the three empirical analyses.  
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1.4.1 Data and methodology 
With respect to the two research questions discussed earlier in Section 1.3, a large 
amount of data has been collected from the BankScope and Osiris database provided by 
Bureau Van Djik and Compustat. This data is then matched with market information 
extracted from DataStream International from Thomson Reuters. Ultimately, there is a 
focus on listed bank shares across 36 countries. In relation to the first research question 
(RQ1), cross-country bank-level data, over the period from 1996 to 2005, is used in 
analysis of bank equity risks and bank credit risk. A range of financial institutions are 
considered including bank holding companies, commercial banks, cooperatives and 
savings banks across 15 Western European countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). With respect to the world analysis, 36 countries 
are examined in addition to the Western European countries. The initial bank-year 
observations collected from BankScope resulted in a total sample of 7,843. However, the 
final bank-year sample is reduced to 4,680 with the loss of 3,163 observations due to the 
lack of market discipline information, particularly for US banks.  
The fundamental assumption for consistency of least squares estimators is that 
model residuals are uncorrelated with the regressors. However, if this assumption fails 
the OLS estimator is inconsistent. Considering, bank capital and charter value could be 
endogenous, two stage least squares (2SLS), pooled-OLS with both lagged bank capital 
and lagged charter value and pooled-OLS analysis (considering bank capital and charter 
value as exogenous variables) are all used in the analysis.  
In relation to research question 2 (RQ2), a test for structural change in bank 
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equity risk is conducted for the major banks in both euro-zone and non-euro-zone 
Western European countries. The study constructs a sample of 95 euro-zone European 
banks and 85 non-euro zone European banks from the DataStream International database 
for the end of the period from January 1995 to April 2006.  
1.4.2 Summary of findings 
The following discussion focuses on some of the major findings on European 
bank risk analysis, research question 1 (RQ1A and RQ1B) and research question 2 (RQ2) 
as mentioned in Section 1.3. 
The empirical results indicate the relevance of including off-balance sheet 
activities in the calculation of bank capital for regulation purposes. More specifically, the 
findings show that higher the off-balance sheet activities the higher are bank equity risk 
and credit risk. Further, there is support for the argument that bank capital is non-linearly 
related to bank systematic risk and credit risk. This finding is consistent with the 
theoretical work of Calem and Rob (1999) suggesting that banks initially reduce risk with 
the increase in bank capital but at higher levels of capital, there is a tendency for banks to 
take on higher levels of risk.  
Regulators often argue that non-insured deposits or creditor claims can encourage 
creditors to monitor bank risk behavior. Creditors can impose market discipline, 
particularly, on risky institutions through withdrawal of deposits, requiring collateral for 
guarantees against deposits or seek higher interest rates corresponding to risk. Yet, the 
findings from this thesis suggest that market discipline may not be related to the equity 
and credit risk measures used in this thesis in the way expected by regulators.  
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There is mixed evidence of charter value disciplining bank risk. Although there is 
evidence of a disciplinary role with regard to credit risk, this disciplinary role diminishes 
with regard to equity risk (total risk, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk).  
Size plays an important role in explaining bank risk levels. It would appear that 
large banks are more capable of diversifying idiosyncratic risk and credit risk both 
geographically and by industry compared to small banks. However, it is also evident that 
large banks differ from small banks in the composition of their asset portfolio and thus 
large banks have higher total risk and systematic risk compared to the small banks. 
Further, European commercial banks exhibit greater credit risk, systematic risk 
and total risk compared to other bank classifications. It is also apparent that euro-zone 
banks exhibit lower equity risk and credit risk than non-euro zone European banks.  
Research question 1 (RQ1A), is also examined by extending the analysis to a 
broader sample of international banks. Some of the major findings are discussed below. 
This broader analysis provides evidence, bank around the world show that higher risk is 
associated with evolving and expanding bank activities. Thus, off-balance sheet activities 
are associated with higher equity risk and credit risk and this effect is generally evident in 
regions like Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Middle-East and Africa 
(MENA) and North America. 
The findings from the world analysis confirm that charter value deters banks from 
increasing credit risk. Similar results are evident in separate regional analysis (Asia-
Pacific, Middle East and Africa, North America and Western Europe). With regard to 
equity risk (systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk and total risk), banks, in the Middle-East 
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and Africa region behave as if they charter value has some disciplinary effect. Yet, it is 
evident that the disciplinary role of charter value diminishes with regard to equity risk in 
regions like Eastern Europe, North America, South America and Western Europe.  
The empirical evidence in this thesis suggests that higher capital levels are 
associated with reduced bank equity risk and credit. This result provides some support for 
capital regulation by various regulatory authorities. This finding is observed in the world 
analysis as well as in the separate regional analysis, particularly, the Asia-Pacific, 
Middle-East and Africa, North America and Western European regions. The world 
analysis also supports the existence of a non linear association between bank capital and 
systematic risk. There is no appreciable evidence of non-linearity with regard to total risk 
and idiosyncratic risk in either the world analysis or separate regional analysis. Finally, 
bank capital is negatively related with credit risk particularly, in the regional analysis for 
Asia-Pacific, North America and Western Europe.  
With regard to total risk, the world analysis supports the argument that because 
subordinated debt and interbank deposits are not explicitly insured, investors will demand 
a higher return from banks that take on more risk. Thus, there is a market disciplinary 
role of uninsured deposits. Similar evidence is also observed for idiosyncratic risk and 
credit risk. The regional analysis also presents similar findings with regard to equity risk 
in Middle East and Africa region. Developed economies including North America and 
Western Europe experience the market discipline effect of subordinated debt and 
interbank deposits with respect to systematic risk and credit risk. However, there are 
some contradictory findings across the regions.  
Large banks tend to exhibit greater levels of systematic risk in this analysis. This 
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finding is evident both in world analysis and regional analysis, particularly, Asia-Pacific, 
Middle-East and Africa, North America and Western European regions. Similar evidence 
is also observed with regard to total risk and idiosyncratic risk. Further, with regard to 
credit risk, the world analysis supports the argument that large banks are more capable of 
reducing credit risk. This finding is also observed in Asia-Pacific, South America and 
Western European regions. The findings indicate that large bank in the transition (Eastern 
Europe) and developing (Middle East and Africa) economies exhibit greater levels of 
credit risk, suggesting that these economies may provide insufficient access to capital 
markets. 
Deposit insurance is associated with increased bank equity risk and credit risk. 
This finding is evident in both the world analysis and the regional analysis. Further, 
market-based systems tend to have riskier banks on average with evidence at the regional 
level particularly for Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, banks in market-based systems 
within European tend to be less risky on average with regard to equity risk.  
It is also found that commercial banks exhibit lower total risk and idiosyncratic 
risk in the world analysis as well as in regional analysis. North American commercial 
banks are also more aggressive in the credit market compared to their counterparts in 
Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe and South American regions. Finally, the empirical results 
suggest that common-law country banks exhibit greater equity risk and credit risk. 
In answer to research question 1 (RQ1B), it is evident that while bank charter 
value decreased in the post-EMU period, bank capital increased in the post-EMU period. 
Likewise, the importance of bank off-balance sheet activities and uninsured deposits 
increased in the post-EMU period. In general, it is evident that the formation of the EMU 
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has had an impact on the sensitivity of bank risk to some of the key variables included in 
the model though the variation in the findings is associated more with changes in the 
magnitude of coefficients rather than their sign. 
The findings relating to research question 2 (RQ2), indicate that there is a decline 
in bank risk across euro-zone countries with the formation of EMU. It is interesting to 
find that total risk declined in 70% of the euro-zone banks in the sample with a 
statistically significant decrease in total risk observed for 51% of the banks. Similar 
findings are also observed for idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk. These results are 
robust to different test specifications. Moreover, consistent with some spill-over effects, 
the results show a decline in bank equity risk in neighboring non-euro-zone European 
countries. 
1.5 CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
As far as it could be ascertained, this is the first study to test for structural change 
in European bank equity risk with the formation of EMU in 1999. The period is marked 
by increasing competition, changes in regulation, and increased numbers of mergers and 
acquisitions both in euro-zone and non-euro-zone countries. With regard to the 
determinants of bank equity risk and credit risk, as far as it could be ascertained, no prior 
study has examined the effect of bank regulation (bank capital and charter value), off 
balance sheet activities and market discipline on bank risk across the world with 
additional regional analysis This study explores the impact of bank capital and charter 
value on bank risk. Moreover, few studies have attempted to compare the factors 
explaining bank equity risk across the pre-EMU (before 1999) and post-EMU (post 1999) 
periods. This study also provides an attempt to test for changes in the importance of the 
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factors affecting bank equity risk with the formation of EMU. 
Market based risk measures provide a clear view of the impact on risk of various 
bank-specific factors such as bank capital, charter value and market discipline. This study 
also considers credit risk using an accounting based risk measure, to capture this bank-
specific characteristic. Although some argue that accounting based risk measures are 
backward-looking (Stiroh 2006), credit risk is an important risk measure for the banking 
industry and has became more important since the Basel Accord I came into place.9 
Moreover, banks across the world have increased their exposure to credit risk and while 
bank lending has expanded, loan loss provisions have declined and credit standards have 
not been tightened.  
This study is perhaps the first to provide international evidence of a non-linear 
relationship between bank risk and bank capital. Based on the theoretical underpinnings 
proposed by Calem and Rob (1999), this study hypothesizes that banks with low capital 
tend to reduce risk as capital is increased though if capital is further increased risk will 
eventually start to increase with further capital increases.  
The answers to the two research questions mentioned earlier in Section 1.3 should 
prove useful to policymakers, bank regulatory bodies and supervisory agencies that 
exercise regulatory authority over financial institutions and also to potential bank 
investors as well as academics. Particularly for European banks, policymakers should 
perhaps focus on gaining a better understanding of what European bank capabilities 
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 From 1988 which required banks to put greater emphasis on the banks’ internal credit risk measures Yet, 
the revised version, Basel Accord II proposed in 2000, recognizes the role of the market, and this leads to 
banks adopting  capitalization level consistent with risk profile (Sironi and Zazzara 2003). 
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helped them to reduce equity market risk while adapting to a rapidly changing economic 
climate. From the point of view of EMU, the major policy implication of this analysis is 
perhaps one of unintended consequences. While there was little academic discussion 
concerning the impact of EMU on the banks, it appears that EMU has tended to reduce 
European bank equity risk. An important exception is Germany.10  
Analysis of the behavior of banks across the world provides policymakers with 
further insight into the impact of capital on bank risk. This may be of interest to 
regulators who use bank capital in their management of risk. The results also reveal that 
off-balance sheet activities increase bank risk and hence with the banks around the world 
moving towards greater levels of fee income generating activity, investors and 
policymakers need to seek more transparency regarding bank non-interest income 
generating activity. Further, evidence on market discipline suggests that subordinated 
debt may not be a good substitute for bank capital. Indeed, subordinated debt may not be 
particularly useful in managing agency problems. It appears that banks may engage in 
excessive risk taking even when subordinated debt levels are high.  
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
This section outlines the structure of the remainder of the thesis. Chapter 2 
presents a critical review of both theoretical and empirical studies of bank risk for 
European banks and banks around the world. This discussion further highlights research 
                                                 
10Evidence suggests an increase in bank equity risk for the German banking industry. Germany is 
dominated by Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe which includes savings and Landesbanken. This peculiarity of 
the German banking system is said to have limited bank consolidation, lowered market concentration, and 
facilitated continuing fragmentation in the market and may well explain the risk increases that is observed 
in this study.  
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gaps in the literature and formulates hypotheses relating to the research questions.  
Chapter 3 discusses the empirical research design used to test these hypotheses. It 
starts with sample selection including, data source and sampling procedures. It then 
presents the selected variables used in hypothesis testing. It also provides discussion on 
the estimation techniques used in the analysis. The chapter concludes with univariate 
analysis, including descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlation analysis for the 
variables used in later analysis. 
Chapter 4 provides the first empirical analysis and this focuses on research 
question 1(RQ1A and RQ1B) with respect to European banks. This is followed by 
discussion of robustness analyses and a summary of the results. 
Chapter 5 documents the results from the empirical analysis relating to research 
question 2 (RQ2). This chapter focuses on tests for structural changes in bank equity risk 
for both individual banks and bank portfolios. Again robustness analyses are then 
reported and a summary concludes the chapter. 
Chapter 6 discusses the final empirical analysis. This focuses on the first research 
question but uses a large sample covering banks drawn from across the world. Discussion 
of the results and robustness tests are followed by a summary at the end of the chapter.  
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the thesis. It revisits the research questions, and 
provides a synopsis of the hypotheses, methodology and findings. The academic 
contributions and policy implications of the findings are then identified. The chapter ends 
with a discussion of the limitations of the study as well as identification of directions for 
future research. 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the literature and hypothesis development in relation to 
the two research questions developed earlier in Chapter 1. This chapter is structured into 
six sections. Section 2.2 presents a theoretical discussion on bank risk theory and 
evidence. Section 2.3 discusses the determinants of bank risk. Section 2.4 discusses other 
variables such as size and additional bank-specific and country-level variables. Section 
2.5 identifies determinants of bank risk with the formation of EMU. Section 2.6 focuses 
on the impact of EMU on European bank risk. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes the Chapter.  
2.2 BANK RISK THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
Banks are defined as financial intermediaries as they provide liquidity services to 
depositors in the form of liquidity insurance (Diamond and Dybvig 1983). As an 
intermediary, a bank also designs securities to protect uninformed investors from the 
costs they incur when trading with investors who have superior information (Gorton and 
Pennachi 1990). Further, banks provide monitoring services as they are delegated 
monitors for investors and thus mitigate duplication of monitoring costs (Diamond 1984). 
Economies of scale, in terms of savings in screening and monitoring costs due to 
diversification, may also allow large banks to reduce risk relative to small banks 
(Diamond 1984; Boyd and Prescott 1986; Williamson 1986).  
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Bank shareholders are subject to limited liability and benefit from upside risk and 
are protected from downside risk. Yet, the bank depositors are generally entitled to an 
implicit and explicit safety net. The numbers of bank failures in past decades have 
created a debate over the risk portfolio of the banking industry. It is well known that 
banks prefer to invest in more risky assets because of inappropriate pricing of deposit 
insurance. Increased attention has been directed toward bank motives to undertake risk as 
well as possible changes in regulation to maintain stability in the banking system (Kim 
and Santomero 1988).  
Analysis of the moral hazard problem arising from the classical agency conflict 
between shareholders and debt holders in a levered firm is the first step in explaining 
bank shareholder incentives for risk taking. This moral hazard problem refers to the 
possibility that the agent (i.e shareholders) may take actions ex-post that are a detriment 
to the principal (i.e. debtholders). Banks have small dispersed depositors (debt holders), 
who cannot restrain bank shareholders from undertaking risky investment by initiating 
“complete” debt contracts on an ex-ante basis due to information asymmetry 
(Dewatripoint and Tirole 1994).  
Further, with respect to bank risk, bank deposit insurance has proven successful in 
protecting banks from runs, but this is not without cost, arising from the moral hazard 
problem. Deposit insurance protects depositors but diminishes the depositor’s incentive 
to monitor the bank and to demand an interest payment proportionate to the bank risk. 
Further, the banks generally pay a flat rate premium under deposit insurance but do not 
internalize the full cost of risk and thereby tend to take on excessive risk.  
A number of theoretical papers suggest that banks take less risk in absence of 
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deposit insurance. Further, Kareken and Wallace (1978) argue that under the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) type deposit insurance scheme, where bank 
liabilities are insured, the banking industry is inclined to hold more risky assets. One of 
the regulatory requirements within these schemes is the requirement to hold a minimum 
capital to asset ratio. Thus, the authors argue this regulation in itself cannot reduce the 
risk of bankruptcy though regulation is a necessary support to deposit insurance schemes. 
Ronn and Verma (1986) suggest that in absence of deposit insurance, riskier banks incur 
a higher cost of funding via higher deposit rates. This higher cost of funding acts as 
“built-in market-regulation” which provides incentive to limit excessive risk taking by 
banks. 
The bank failures and losses to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
in US have increased sharply and low capital ratios have proven to be sustainable only 
under increased government intervention (Kaufman 1991). A majority of the literature on 
deposit insurance analyses whether the flat rate premium charged by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in US represents the fair value of the insurance. For 
example, Merton (1977) shows that increased risk is achieved through increased asset 
risk or decreased capital to asset ratio. Merton’s (1977) argument is based on the premise 
that markets are complete and the provider of deposit insurance has full knowledge of the 
risk of the bank’s assets. Under this situation, there is no question of bank run or panic. 
Merton (1977) analyzes the bank moral hazard problem associated with bank deposit 
insurance using an option pricing model. In this approach deposit insurance is viewed as 
a put option written on the value of the bank’s assets with a strike price equal to the 
promised maturity value of its debt. When the insurance risk premium is risk insensitive, 
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the bank can increase the value of the put option by increasing asset risk or decreasing the 
capital to asset ratio. Thus, “fair” deposit insurance is equal to the value of the put option. 
In contrast, Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1992) argue that, under information 
asymmetry, the insurance provider requires that banks maintain certain capital to asset 
ratios and that the banks charge a given insurance premium per unit of deposits. In the 
presence of adverse selection, it is almost impossible to set incentive compatible deposit 
pricing because banks become indifferent to their capital structure when insurance is 
priced fairly. Thus, the banks prefer a lower level of insurance premium for any positive 
level of deposits. This results in high risk institutions choosing contracts similar to those 
chosen by low risk institutions as long as these institutions choose a positive level of 
deposits. 
Buser, Chen and Kane (1981) argue that the explicit deposit insurance premium 
charged by FDIC is deliberately under-priced and that bank capital regulation and other 
regulations and supervisory activity are put in place with the intention of serving as an 
additional implicit premium. Yet, Marcus and Shaked (1984) using an option-pricing 
based model, found empirical evidence of over-pricing on the part of the FDIC. 
Nevertheless, economists have argued in favour of risk-adjusted deposit insurance as it 
proves to be more efficient and more equitable than the flat rate premiums (Ronn and 
Verma 1986).  
2.3 DETERMINANTS OF BANK RISK 
This section discusses the literature and develops the hypotheses in relation to 
research question 1 (RQ1). In the following sub sections, bank discipline measures 
including charter value and bank capital are discussed. These measures are relied upon to 
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manage the moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance schemes as 
discussed in Section 2.2. Next, the literature and hypotheses in relation to off- balance 
sheet activities and market discipline are covered. 
2.3.1 Charter/franchise value 
Bank charter value is defined as the present value of the future profits that a bank 
earns as a going concern (Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan 1996). Charter value helps to 
reduce the moral hazard problem in relation to an explicit or implicit safety net (Acharya 
1996). Consistent with this argument, it is evident that charter value has a negative 
relationship with total risk, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk (Demsetz, Saidenberg 
and Strahan 1996; Anderson and Fraser 2000; Konishi and Yasuda 2004). 
In contrast, other studies identify a positive relationship between charter value and 
bank risk. Perhaps, this positive relationship indicates the possibility that charter value 
captures growth opportunities. Indeed, a bank’s charter value may originate from taking 
on more risky, though positive NPV, activities and so if limits are placed on individual 
bank risk this could restrict the bank’s charter value (Saunders and Wilson 2001). 
Charter value, which varies across banks, can only act as an efficient tool when it 
is complemented with effective regulation (Galloway, Lee and Roden 1997; Park 1997). 
Thus, charter value is not a substitute for bank regulation and if less regulation 
encourages banks to build-up charter value this could have an adverse impact on the 
banking sector. It is evident that bank risk taking increased with deregulation in the US in 
the 1980s and the 1990s.  
Empirical studies provide an alternative explanation for this positive association 
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between charter value and bank-specific risk. It is argued that this reflects the impact of 
financial liberalization and increased competition which may have diminished the 
disciplining effect of charter value (Marcus 1984; Keeley 1990; Hellmann, Murdock and 
Stiglitz 2000; Matutes and Vives 2000). For instance, Marcus (1984) and Keeley (1990) 
state that higher charter value makes it easier for regulators to prevent banks from taking 
advantage of deposit insurance. US banks during the 1980s increased risk to recover from 
bank losses that damaged their capital level and to deal with competition that reduced 
their bank charter value. Further, Gonźalez (2005) demonstrate that banks in countries 
with fewer regulatory restrictions have higher charter value which provides banks with an 
incentive to decrease risk particularly, credit risk and total risk. Lower charter value 
encourages banks to increase risk, particularly in countries with strict regulation. Hence, 
a private incentive for banks to act prudently appears to be absent in highly regulated 
countries where regulators actively limit bank opportunities to undertake risk.  
It has been also argued that ‘excessive competition’ may lead to socially 
undesirable events such as bank runs, panics and, eventually, banking crises leading to 
overall financial instability (Boyd and de Nicolo 2005). Competition may also tend to 
diminish bank charter value11 (Staikouras and Fillipaki 2006). There is more recent 
evidence of a negative relation between charter value and risk. While increased 
competition has been noted among the Spanish banks with liberalization of the European 
banking industry, the greater level of European bank competition accompanying 
liberalization has been associated with a reduction in European bank charter value as well 
                                                 
11Maintenance of bank charter value may act to discipline banks and avoid excessive risk taking. 
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as increases in bank risk taking (Salas and Saurina 2003; Gropp and Vesala 2004). 
Similar results are also observed in the US banking industry (Galloway, Lee and Roden 
1997; Park 1994). Yet, Stolz (2005) does not find any evidence that increased 
competition led to erosion of charter value or increased bank risk taking by European 
banks. The findings show that while charter value fell, banks raised their capital buffers 
such that increasing competition did not appear to have weakened the European banking 
industry.  
While there are divergent views with respect to charter value as a bank 
disciplinary mechanism the first testable hypothesis related to research question 1 (RQ1) 
is stated as follows: 
Hypothesis H1: Bank risk (equity risk and credit risk) decreases with charter value. 
2.3.2 Capital adequacy requirement 
For the past two decades bank capital regulation and supervision have been 
addressed by both academics and policymakers. The focus is on the relationship between 
bank capital and bank risk. Given moral hazard, banks can enhance shareholder wealth 
by increasing the return of their portfolio beyond that which they would choose in an 
unprotected environment (Milne and Whalley 2001). However, where deposit insurance 
is in place, it is generally accepted that banks invest in higher risk portfolios in order to 
achieve greater returns, and so the regulators require banks to maintain a capital buffer to 
allow the banks to absorb greater losses associated with these riskier portfolios. Thus, the 
development of risk-based capital regulation provides an upper bound on the probability 
of insolvency and that the weights attached to bank capital are independent of bank 
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preferences which provide an effective means of meeting regulator safety goals (Kim and 
Santomero 1988; Furlong and Keeley 1989; Keeley and Furlong 1990; Rime 2001).12 
Yet, risk based capital standards can contribute towards a credit crunch where banks are 
encouraged to invest in government securities or mortgaged backed securities which 
require low levels of capital rather than making business loans which have higher capital 
requirements (Kaufman 1991).  
The effect of capital requirements on bank asset portfolios has been challenged by 
Furlong and Keeley (1987, 1989) and Keeley and Furlong (1990). The authors argue that 
imposition of tighter capital controls may decrease total risk for well-capitalized banks 
and leave the optimal asset composition unchanged. Tightened bank capital could 
motivate some banks to lower their capital requirement and compensate this lower capital 
from investments in less risky assets (Park 1997).  
The preservation of higher capital requirements for banks is not without dispute. 
For example, higher capital levels may induce banks to increase asset portfolio risk and 
the probability of default, thereby defeating the original purpose of capital controls 
(Kahane 1977; Koehn and Santomero 1980; Orgler and Taggart 1983; Gennotte and Pyle 
1991; Shrieves and Dahl 1992; Berger, Herring and Szegö 1995; Besanko and Kanatas 
1996; Blum 1999). The authors reason that regulatory constraints on bank leverage lead 
to substitution from debt into more risky assets. Thus, banks that maintain increased 
capital due to regulation can attain their desired level of total risk by increasing asset risk. 
                                                 
12Thus, a higher level of capital buffer may result in bank shareholders being exposed to greater levels of 
downside risk. 
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This view suggests a positive relationship between bank capital and risk among banks 
which operate at or near the minimum regulatory capital requirement. This is also evident 
in a dynamic framework; a capital requirement can actually increase risks thereby 
increasing the insolvency risk of banks (Blum 1999). Thus, capital adequacy 
requirements reduce bank profits and, if future profits are low banks may not be 
motivated to avoid default (Blum 1999).13 However, a contrary result occurs when 
applied to non-US banks. For example, Rime (2001) applied a modified version of the 
model developed by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) to Swiss commercial banks and they 
found that while regulatory pressure has a positive and significant impact on bank 
financial leverage there was no discernable impact on bank risk taking. Moreover, Swiss 
banks exhibit a positive and significant relationship between changes in risk and changes 
in bank capital to total assets but there is no relationship observed between changes in 
risk and changes in risk based bank capital. These results suggest that banks may choose 
to increase their bank capital to total assets ratio following an increase in bank risk to 
keep their risk-based bank capital constant. Hence, it has been argued that setting 
minimum capital standards may improve bank stability but it increases potential costs, 
some of which may be rather subtle, and this will lead to inefficiency (Bhattacharya, Boot 
and Thakor 1998).  
The capital requirement or ‘forcing policy’ allows regulators to impose 
constraints on bank use of financial leverage (Boyd and de Nicolo 2005). The Basle 
standards are almost universally employed by bank regulators although a continuing 
                                                 
13Alternatively, the leverage effect of capital increases the value of equity. So, in order to raise the equity 
tomorrow it may be optimal for the bank to increase risk today.  
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debate concerns the effectiveness of such policy standards (Boyd and de Nicolo 2005). 
For example, Blum (1999) and Stanton (1998) show that capital adequacy regulation may 
actually increase bank risk. Blum (1999) identifies two major effects of this regulation: 
first, capital requirements may decrease profits, which may motivate banks to increase 
risk as these banks have less to lose in the event of default and, second, the leverage 
effect of capital increases the value of bank equity and encourages the bank to invest in 
more profitable though more risky assets. Similarly, Calem and Rob (1999) derived a 
more complex and novel relationship between bank capital and bank risk taking. Under a 
dynamic model, where bank capital varies among individual banks the model shows a U 
shaped relationship between bank capital and bank risk which implies that both 
undercapitalized and well capitalized banks take more risk. Undercapitalized banks can 
afford to increase their risk level because on default they can easily transfer the costs of 
default to the authorities. The risky investments of these banks are subsidized, which 
reflects the moral hazard problem arising from deposit insurance. Well-capitalized banks 
increase risk only if they believe that the probability of bank default is very remote. The 
authors argue that risk based capital standards lead well-capitalized banks to increase 
both risk and capital to meet the standards. This theoretical argument is also supported by 
prior empirical work for US banks (e.g., Berger and Udell 1994; Hancock and Wilcox 
1994). 
Early empirical work by Saunders, Strock and Travlos (1990) find no significant 
relationship between bank capital and bank risk (total risk, idiosyncratic risk, systematic 
risk and interest rate risk) during the period, 1978-1985, for U.S. bank holding 
companies. In contrast, Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) find that interest rate risk is 
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positively and significantly related to bank capital while credit risk is negatively related 
to bank capital irrespective of bank size. Similar results are also observed for Japanese 
and Australian commercial banks (Dennis and Jeffrey 2002; Konishi and Yasuda 2004) 
and for US bank holding companies (Galloway, Lee and Roden 1997).14  
From the above discussion it is evident that, capital regulation is designed to 
reduce bank risk. However, it is also feasible that following Calem and Rob (1999), bank 
risk may initially reduce with increases in bank capital, but as the capital buffer builds-up 
banks may eventually choose to increase their risk levels. Thus, the two sets of testable 
hypotheses with respect to bank capital in relation to research question 1 (RQ1) is as 
follows: 
Hypothesis H2A: Bank risk (equity risk and credit risk) decreases with bank capital 
Hypothesis H2B: Bank risk (equity risk and credit risk) initially decreases and then 
increases with increases in bank capital  
2.3.3 Off-balance sheet items as non-interest generating activity 
Off-balance sheet activities are a contingent liability to the banks and it becomes 
important for the banks to honor such guarantees (Boot 2003). This non-interest 
generating activity includes commercial letters of credit, loan commitments and stand-by 
letters of credit. Although, financial institutions are involved in providing traditional 
banking services and interest generating activities, recently, the banks particularly in 
developed economies have moved towards taking on greater levels of off-balance sheet 
                                                 
14This result may imply either the regulatory authorities have met the desired goal of regulating bank 
capital without increased risk or that Japanese banks have changed their attitude towards bank risk due to 
the credit crunch that occurred during 1993-1999.  
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activities. These activities help banks, particularly in times of increased competition, to 
expand their revenue sources without altering their capital structure (Yildirim and 
Philippatos 2007a). Banks with higher levels of off balance sheet items are found to be 
more cost and profit efficient (Yildirim and Philippatos 2007a) and it has been argued 
that off-balance sheet exposures promote a more diversified, margin generating asset-
base compared to deposits or equity financing (Angbazo 1997). Off balance sheet 
exposures may also induce banks to reduce their risk (total risk and systematic risk) 
(Brewer, Koppenhaver and Wilson 1986; Lynge and Lee 1987; Boot and Thakor 1991; 
Hassan, Karels and Peterson 1994; Angbazo 1997).15 Similarly, Esty (1998) argues that 
contingent liabilities can reduce equity and asset volatility as they have an impact on 
asset allocation and bank capital requirements. Thus, even at low levels of net worth 
(charter value) the banks with lower level of contingent liabilities hold a smaller 
proportion of risky assets.16  
The increase in the amount of off-balance sheet activities and the increased 
escalation in bank failures have raised concern about the possible relationship that exists 
between bank risk and off-balance sheet items. US commercial banks exhibited a positive 
correlation between bank interest rate risk and off-balance sheet activities including 
letters of credit, options and net securities lent (Angbazo 1997). This supports the moral 
hazard hypothesis that off-balance sheet activities increase bank risk (Wagster 1996; 
                                                 
15Lynge and Lee (1987) and Hassan, Karels and Peterson (1994) focused on US commercial banks and 
found that off-balance sheet activities are significantly negatively related to bank total risk but they found 
no relationship with bank systematic risk. 
16Brewer, Koppenhaver and Wilson (1986) found that standby letters of credit reduce systematic risk while 
loan commitments and commercial letters of credit do not affect systematic risk. 
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Fraser, Madura and Weigand 2002).  
In essence, based on increased bank competition, and divergent capital rules, the 
banks across the world have shifted towards non-traditional activity. These activities do 
not appear on the balance sheet and they involve the creation of contingent assets and 
liabilities. Hence, due to the nature of these activities and the fact that they have become 
increasingly widespread it is difficult for investors and regulators to identify the actual 
level of risk a bank faces in a given period of time. Given the potential losses (Barings 
bank failure in 1995 etc.) that can be derived from excessive off-balance sheet activities, 
the regulator approach has been to incorporate these items in the calculation of capital 
adequacy requirements. In this regard, the proposed hypothesis in relation research 
question1 (RQ1) is as follows: 
Hypothesis H3: Bank risk (equity risk and credit risk) increases with bank off-balance 
sheet activities. 
2.3.4 Uninsured liabilities/market discipline 
Both regulators and academics consider ‘uninsured liabilities’ of banks as another 
important market disciplinary device. Two of the critical components of uninsured 
liabilities are inter-bank deposits and subordinated debt. Inter-bank deposits are the 
deposits received from other banks that are not covered by explicit or implicit insurance 
schemes. Almost 70% of unsecured deposits are interbank deposits accounted in the 
euro-zone (ECB 2005). Likewise, Rochet and Tirole (1996) develop a model of interbank 
lending which explains that the existence of the interbank exposure and the incentives for 
interbank monitoring. They further argue that there is a trade-off between the negative 
35 
effect on bank risk due to peer monitoring and a positive effect on bank systematic risk 
due to increased inter-bank linkages. 
The European bank subordinated debt market is concentrated. The largest 
European banks issue subordinated debt on average twice a year and the average ratio of 
outstanding subordinated debt to total assets is approximately 2%. This debt is traded in 
an illiquid secondary market, with few infrequent large transactions (Sironi 2003). 
However, some effort has been put into the implementation of market discipline 
mechanisms which help to prevent banks from undertaking excessive risk. For example, 
in the early 1980s a mandatory subordinated debt policy (MSDP) was drafted by 
academics and regulators and forms part of the 2000 Basel Capital Accord II revised 
proposal. The importance of market discipline is clear in both the documents. 
The arguments supporting subordinated debt are two-fold. First, the yield spreads 
of subordinated debt contain information about bank riskiness. Second, and more 
importantly, subordinated debt provides direct market discipline. Subordinated debt 
holders require a higher premium from riskier banks and thus risky banks face higher 
costs of debt financing. It is argued that this higher debt financing cost will encourage 
banks to maintain a lower level of risk (Blum 2002; Nier and Baumann 2006).  
The market disciplinary role of subordinated debt is evident as banks move into 
riskier activities (Morgan and Stiroh 2001). It has been argued that subordinated debt 
directly affects bank risk through the higher funding costs that riskier banks face and 
through derived discipline and from the tax benefits of debt (Estrella 2000; Evanoff and 
Wall 2002). These benefits include; the provision of a signal of bank riskiness or asset 
quality to market regulators and investors. Based on the signal the banks can lower their 
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cost of capital and/or increase their capital requirements. Regardless, rational 
subordinated debt holders require a higher premium from riskier banks as compensation 
for the higher risk they bear. This in turn means market prices and interest rates should 
reflect individual bank riskiness.  
There are alternate arguments, for example Blum (2002) argues that if a bank is 
committed to a level of risk then the presence of subordinated debt can help to reduce 
bank risk but if the bank is not committed to a specific level of risk, the issue of 
subordinated debt may flag higher risk than under a full deposit insurance regime. This is 
possible because in the case of default, the banks do not cover the full costs of default due 
to limited liability. For example, after having set a low interest rate corresponding to a 
low level of risk, a bank has some incentive to increase its risk. Rational creditors 
anticipate this behavior and demand a higher interest rate. This higher interest payment 
induces bank to take even higher risk because the “option to go bankrupt” becomes more 
valuable. Thus, if a bank can adjust its level of risk in response to changes in interest 
rates, subordinated debt may actually raise the level of bank riskiness. Demirguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga (2004) empirically support this argument.  
Avery, Terrence and Goldberg (1988) examine the relationship between market 
discipline and bank risk. They measure bank risk in terms of Moody’s ratings, Standard 
and Poor’s ratings and the FDIC index. Market discipline is measured in terms of the 
option-adjusted interest rate spread between subordinated debt and treasury securities for 
year-end 1983 and 1984. Their results show a weak relationship between Moody’s and 
Standard and Poor’s ratings and subordinated debt and little relationship with the FDIC 
index. Similarly, Gorton and Santomero (1990) find little evidence of market discipline 
37 
effects in the subordinated debt market. Their study uses contingent claims valuation in 
order to obtain an explicit pricing model for subordinated debt.  
Flannery and Sorescu (1996) criticized the work of Avery, Terrence and Goldberg 
(1988) and Gorton and Santomero (1990). Flannery and Sorescu (1996) argue that the 
prior two studies used a relatively small data set focusing on shorter time periods and that 
bank spreads were fairly homogenous across the banks in early periods such as 1983-
1984. Flannery and Sorescu (1996) identified correlation between market discipline and 
bank risk over a longer time period. They propose that asset risk and leverage should 
affect subordinated debt in a non-linear manner rather than the linear relationship tested 
for in previous studies. Finally, they argue that the use of option adjusted subordinated 
debt measures and Black–Cox’s closed form valuation approach may induce large 
measurement errors. Flannery and Sorescu (1996) find that both asset quality and market 
leverage have an impact on subordinated debt while there is little evidence of a relation 
between interest rate risk and subordinated debt. However, these arguments should be 
judged with some caution as Calem and Rob (1999) show that subordinated debt may 
have little impact on the portfolio allocation decision of a well-capitalized bank. Further, 
Imai (2006) showed that the risk-return sensitivity of bank subordinated debt is closely 
related to regulatory regime and the conjectural guarantee of uninsured debt. For example 
in Japan the regulatory regime changes frequently and hence subordinated debt may not 
be an appropriate regulatory tool in this environment. 
Empirical evidence exists in relation to the market disciplinary effect of 
subordinated debt. For example, Sironi (2003), Gropp and Vesala (2004) and Nier and 
Baumann (2006) find that subordinated debt investors in the European banking industry, 
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excluding government owned or guaranteed institutions, are sensitive to bank risk. Nier 
and Baumann (2006) use a number of market discipline variables including uninsured 
liabilities (sum of subordinated debt and inter-bank deposits) and they find that uninsured 
liabilities are positively related to bank capital ratios which create an incentive for the 
banks to limit their risk of insolvency by choosing a higher capital buffer for a given level 
of risk.  
Hence, market discipline offers a way of enhancing the effectiveness of bank 
capital regulation at a lower cost as it deters regulatory arbitrage and rewards the bank for 
managing their overall risk of insolvency (Herring 2004). Based on the above discussion 
the fourth testable hypothesis in relation to research question 1 (RQ1) is as follows: 
Hypothesis H4: Bank risk (equity risk and credit risk) decreases with bank uninsured 
deposits.  
2.4 OTHER EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
This section discusses other bank-specific variables and macro economic 
variables used in the analysis of research question 1 (RQ1). The relevant bank- specific 
determinants are bank size, loan to total assets, dividend yield and operating leverage. 
The macro-economic variables are the Economic Freedom Index, bank specialization, 
legal origin, explicit deposit insurance, governance quality (such as creditor rights index 
and anti-director rights index) and the level of bank development variables (such as bank 
concentration and net interest margin). Variables also include market liquidity frequently 
proxied by stock market turnover ratio. 
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2.4.1 Size 
The European banking industry faced profound changes with the merger waves 
that followed EMU. The most obvious outcome of the mergers and acquisitions that 
occurred in the period is a sharp increase in the average size of the banking organizations. 
This leads to the empirical question of whether large banks are more risky than small 
banks. However, size is one of the motivations for mergers. Another important incentive 
for bank consolidation is to take advantage of diversification benefits. It is evident that 
large banks are internally diversified and this provides one means of reducing bank 
idiosyncratic risk (Konishi and Yasuda 2004; Stiroh 2006). However, diversification does 
not typically lessen risk (Acharya, Hasan and Saunders 2002). Nevertheless, banks may 
offset these gains by undertaking riskier activities (like commercial and industrial 
lending) and by employing more financial leverage. A shift toward risky non-interest 
generating activity is a way that large banks may choose to apply the benefits created 
from their internal diversification advantages (Saunders, Travlos and Strock 1990; Boyd 
and Runkle 1993; Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan 1996; Demsetz and Strahan 1997). A 
similar result is also expected for bank total risk that appears to explain the diversification 
effect (Stiroh 2006)  
Moreover, regulatory environment can affect the relationship between bank size 
and bank risk. Deregulatory periods can encourage a positive relationship between bank 
size and bank total risk. Further, the imposition of “too-big-to-fail” policies can increase 
the incentive of large banks to take on risk during periods of greater regulation (Saunders, 
Travlos and Strock 1990; Galloway, Lee and Roden 1997). Finally, large banks with 
greater sensitivity to the general market movements may exhibit a positive relationship 
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with bank systematic risk (Saunders, Travlos and Strock 1990; Anderson and Fraser 
2000). The positive relation between systematic risk and bank size may also result from 
large banks pursuing a different mix of activities, lending to different sectors and holding 
less equity capital compared to smaller banks (Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan 1996). 
Based on the above arguments that bank size could have differential effect on bank risk, 
the two testable hypotheses related to bank size to address research question (RQ1) are as 
follows: 
Hypothesis H5A: Bank systematic risk increases with bank size. 
Hypothesis H5B: Bank credit risk, interest rate risk, idiosyncratic risk and total risk 
decrease with bank size. 
2.4.2 Other bank-specific variables 
The other variables of concern that form part of the following analysis include the 
ratio of loans to total assets, dividend yield and operating leverage. It is expected that 
loans to total assets is positively related to bank risk measures. This is because 
commercial banks tend to be more aggressive in credit markets (García-Marco and 
Robles-Fernandez 2008).  
Dividend yield could also relate to bank risk-taking. Dividend payments provide a 
signal concerning bank expectations about future income. Further, it could also indicate 
high growth banks tend to retain a proportion of their net income which implies that more 
risky banks will pay less dividends. Accordingly, Lee and Brewer (1987) find that low 
dividend yield reflects greater bank risk. Hence, in this thesis a negative association 
between dividend yield and bank risk measures is predicted. With regard to operating 
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leverage, Mandelker and Rhee (1984) and Saunders Strock and Travlos (1990) consider 
operating leverage in a similar way to financial leverage with increases in operating 
leverage resulting in increases in bank risk. Thus, the analysis considers that operating 
leverage will be positively related to our bank risk measures. Based on the above 
discussion the following three hypotheses are formulated: 
Hypothesis H6: Bank risk (equity risk and credit risk) increases with total loans. 
Hypothesis H7: Bank risk (equity risk and credit risk) decreases with dividend yield. 
Hypothesis H8: Bank risk (equity risk and credit risk) increases with operating leverage. 
2.4.3 Macroeconomic variables 
There is no theoretical support for a particular relationship between regulatory 
restrictions and bank risk taking. The Economic Freedom Index (EFI) is used to measure 
the regulatory restrictions, with higher EFI scores reflecting reduced level of regulation. 
Higher levels of the EFI may result in greater stability of the banking system through 
greater diversification. Alternatively, it could reflect banks taking on greater risk where 
regulation is inadequate (Gonźalez 2005). Claessens and Laeven (2004) find that lower 
restrictions lead to higher competition. In turn, this increase in competition can have 
negative effect on profits and charter value of the banks encouraging greater risk taking.  
The hypothesis is developed on the assumption that high EFI scores are associated 
with deregulation, implementation of legislation such as EU directives in 1992, formation 
of EMU in 1999 and increasing merger and acquisitions in the European banking 
industry. Thus, a negative relationship is predicted between bank risk and EFI.  
Ownership type or bank specialization could also affect bank risk. The ownership 
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or bank specialization dummy indicates whether the institution is a commercial bank. 
Commercial banks are the largest group of depository institutions measured by asset size 
in Denmark, France, Greece and Spain where as in Italy savings banks prevail. The 
German banking industry is dominated by Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe which includes 
savings and Landesbanken. Further, bank holding companies (BHCs) and commercial 
banks dominate in the U.S. and U.K. respectively. It could reasonably be expected that 
commercial banks would involve higher bank equity risk, interest rate risk and credit risk 
compared to other institutions as they do invest in risky loans. 
A legal origin dummy variable is also incorporated in the model. The theoretical 
work by Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Hart and Moore (1992, 1994), proposed that the 
risk taking behaviour of banks is affected by country legal origin and the prevailing 
structure in terms of more openness in banking practice. Specifically, in countries with 
better legal protection the banks have an incentive to take on higher portfolio risk since 
they face less risk of expropriation by borrowers. In other words, banks can extend more 
risky loans due to the lower expected loss per loan in common-law countries or British 
legal origin because of the superior creditor protection in these countries. 
Civil-law countries generally provide weak investor protection relative to 
common-law countries (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1998). Yet, the quality 
of law enforcement tends to be highest in Scandinavian and German civil law countries 
and lowest in French civil-law countries while common-law countries fall somewhat 
between the two groups (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1998; González 2005). 
Thus, a negative relationship is predicted between bank risk and the legal origin dummy 
reflecting that, due to strict law enforcement, the civil-law country banks have lower 
43 
bank risk compared to common-law country banks.  
Another variable of interest is the geographical proximity. It can be reasonably 
hypothesized that with the formation of EMU, the euro-zone banks have better ability to 
deal with risk and hence it can be expected that bank credit risk and equity risk will be 
lower in this region (Haq and Heaney 2009) compared to non-euro zone countries. 
Furthermore, the nature of governance quality in a country could also be relevant 
to bank risk. Hence, following existing literature, this thesis considers two proxies of 
governance quality that broadly measure investor protection - a creditor rights index and 
an anti-director rights index (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1998)17. In 
countries where shareholder control is greater than managerial control, bank risk, 
specifically bank total risk and idiosyncratic risk, is considered to be high. This is 
consistent with the notion that bank shareholders have incentives to take on more risk due 
to moral hazard problem arising from deposit insurance. Creditor rights are captured 
using a specific index while an anti-director rights index is used to capture the level of 
protection provided to minority shareholders relative to managers and dominant 
shareholders. Thus, this study anticipates that bank equity risk and credit risk negatively 
relate to both anti-director rights and creditor rights index.  
A number of additional country level factors could also be important in relation to 
bank risk taking such as stock market liquidity, market-based vis-à-vis bank-based 
                                                 
17With respect to research question 1 (RQ1), Bangladesh, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Mauritius have no 
information on creditor rights index and anti director rights index. Bulgaria, Lithuania, Morocco, 
Romania do not have information on anti- director rights index only. Hence, the analysis will be based on 
a sub-sample of banks.  
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economy and nature of safety net. Stock market turnover ratio is used to capture stock 
market liquidity which is crucial for economic growth (Levine and Zervos 1998). This 
variable captures the proxies for the speed at which information is reflected in the stock 
price (Demsetz and Strahan 1997; Anderson and Fraser 2000; Konishi and Yasuda 2004). 
Liquidity has been found to be positively associated with the variance of equity price. 
Hence, the expectation for the sign of this coefficient is positive suggesting that those 
banks whose shares are more frequently traded are exposed to a higher level of risk.  
Further, the long standing debate on the relative importance of market-based and 
bank-based systems is also relevant for bank risk analysis. A market (arm’s length)-based 
versus bank (relationship)-based dummy is incorporated in order to capture this effect. 
Financial intermediaries are often considered to be delegated monitors who reduce the 
costs of acquiring and processing information and thus, reduce agency costs (Diamond 
1984; Boyd and Prescott 1986) and eliminate wasteful duplication in collecting 
information. Bank monitoring can also help to eliminate the moral hazard problem (Boot 
and Thakor 1997; Chakraborty and Ray 2006). Thus, financial intermediaries can 
promote growth by pooling risks, providing liquidity and monitoring risky innovations 
(Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990; Bencivenga and Smith 1991; de la Fuente and Marin 
1996). It is often argued that market-based systems convey price signals which help firms 
in making meaningful investment decisions while bank-based systems may lead to 
encourage weak firms to undertake imprudent investments (Rajan and Zingales 1998, 
1999).18 Policymakers have advocated a shift toward financial markets, particularly in 
                                                 
18Market-based systems are observed in USA and UK while Germany and Japan have advocated bank-
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Eastern Europe and Latin America, similar to those operating in the USA (Allen and Gale 
2000). These considerations suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis H9: Bank risk (equity risk and credit risk) is lower in a bank based system 
than in a market based system. 
Two other bank development related variables include net interest margin and 
bank concentration. Net interest margin provides a control for the degree of efficiency in 
bank operations. Bank concentration provides a control for competition. Essentially, 
firms specializing in granting of loans are more exposed to credit risk and, hence, a 
positive relationship may be expected with net interest margin. Further, banks that 
assume greater market risk work with higher interest margins as banks require higher 
premium at the margin.19 Similarly, the greater the uncertainty on the loans granted 
(credit risk) the greater will be the margin (Maudos and Fernández de Guevara 2004). 
Bank concentration ratio can show a positive or a negative relationship with bank risk 
depending on the intensity of bank competition. A brief literature review is provided for 
bank concentration and bank risk in Section 2.5. 
Every country is subject to some level of implicit safety net. It is observed that in 
1995 only 49 countries were subject to explicit deposit insurance schemes while by 2003 
the number stood at 87. This increase is particularly evident in Eastern European 
countries where EU Directives encouraged these countries to adopt explicit deposit 
insurance. Deposit insurance benefits risky banks if these banks can opportunistically 
                                                                                                                                                 
based systems. 
19Increased competition and concentration can lead banks to reduce net interest margin and thereby can 
reduce credit risk and interest rate risk (Maudos and Fernández de Guevara 2004). 
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exploit loopholes in the risk control features of the system to extract net subsidies from 
tax payers and safer banks which provide implicit capital by accepting responsibility for 
helping to recapitalize the system (Demirguc-Kunt, Kane and Laeven 2006). Indeed, 
credible deposit insurance can enhance financial stability by reducing the probability of 
depositor runs, however, if insured institution capital position and risk taking is not 
supervised this can lead to instability in the financial system. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragaiche (2002) and Beck and Laeven (2006) argue that deposit insurance is likely to 
increase banking crises for countries whose contracting environment structure is weaker 
than countries whose contracting environment is stronger. For example, Mexico 
introduced a deposit insurance scheme during 1991-2004. The scheme maintained 
minimum capital regulation but had a weak governance system in place. This encouraged 
banks to undertake excessive risk which led to higher default rates that required tax-payer 
bailouts. Bank runs on loss making banks in Germany and the United Kingdom (example 
Northern Rock) highlighted inadequacies in the European safety net system. Moreover, 
over-insurance among the EU accession countries could exacerbate moral hazard 
problems by distorting the incentives of poorly capitalized domestic banks (Nenovsky 
and Dimitrova 2003). Based on the above discussion, it could be reasonably hypothesized 
that deposit insurance increases both bank equity risk and credit risk. 
Hypothesis H10: Bank risk (equity risk and credit risk) increases with deposit insurance. 
2.5 THE IMPACT OF EMU ON THE DETERMINANTS OF BANK RISK AND 
THE RELEVANT HYPOTHESES 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, no prior research has studied the impact of 
EMU on determinants of bank risk. Thus, this thesis proposes to fill the gap in the 
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literature by addressing question “Does bank risk sensitivity to bank regulation, off-
balance sheet activities and market discipline change with the creation of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU)?” 
It is evident that the formation of EMU is one of the most dramatic change in the 
world financial market. Increasing integration is observed not only among the EU 
countries but also between EU and non-euro-zone European countries. Yet, the focus of 
the consolidation process has gradually shifted from domestic to cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions. The banking sector consolidation accelerated in early 1990s and peaked 
in 2000. It resulted in a reduction of the number of banks and an increase in average size 
and concentration of the European banking sector suggesting that integration has been 
significantly stimulated with the formation of EMU (Baele, Ferrando, Hördahl, Krylova 
and Monnet 2004).  
With regard to charter value, deregulation, financial liberalization and increased 
competition can decrease bank charter value (Marcus 1984; Keeley 1990; Hellmann, 
Murdock and Stiglitz 2000; Matutes and Vives 2000). Thus, given the discussion above 
in sub-section 2.3.1 on charter value, it is possible that it may have decreased in the post-
EMU period. Further, with respect to bank capital (as discussed above in sub-section 
2.3.2) it is reasonable to hypothesize that the importance of bank capital will increase 
with the formation of EMU due to the forces shaping the world banking industry 
including consolidation, advances in information and communication technology, new 
capital adequacy requirement and in case of EMU, the ongoing economic and monetary 
integration.  
The European banks in particular have moved towards increased concentration in 
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non-traditional banking business (Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara 2004; CarbÓ and 
Fernandez 2005). This trend is observed because integration and liberalization of 
European financial markets has placed considerable pressure on the banks traditional line 
of business (Goddard, Molyneux, Wilson and Tavakoli 2007). Thus, banks have engaged 
in re-engineering value chains through securitization of their loan portfolio. For instance, 
ECB reports the securitization issue amounted to over €245 billion in 2004 of which 
nearly one half is related to residential mortgages. As a consequence of financial 
innovation banks conducted a growing proportion of their business activity off-balance 
sheet. Thus, it is reasonable to hypothesize that with the formation of EMU, off-balance 
sheet activities have grown in importance. Market discipline (including subordinated debt 
and inter-bank deposits) is an important mechanism in controlling bank risk (a discussion 
is provided above in sub-section 2.3.4). Hence, with financial deregulation market 
discipline increases resulting increase market based monitoring of bank risk. This leads to 
the hypothesis that market discipline increases in the post-EMU period.  
Therefore, based on the above discussion the following hypotheses are 
formulated: 
Hypothesis H11A: Bank charter value decreased in the post-EMU period. 
Hypothesis H11B: Bank capital decreases then increases in the post-EMU period. 
Hypothesis H11C: Bank off-balance sheet activities increased in the post-EMU period. 
Hypothesis H11D: Bank uninsured deposits increased in the post-EMU period. 
2.6 STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN EUROPEAN BANK EQUITY RISK 
This section focuses on research question 2 (RQ2). Section 2.5.1 presents the 
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theoretical and empirical evidence on bank competition and Section 2.5.2 discusses 
literature in relation to European bank consolidation and diversification and then 
develops the related hypotheses.  
2.6.1 Bank competition-theory and evidence 
The commonly held view regarding bank consolidation is that it generates a more 
concentrated banking system and a less competitive one. However, the literature fell short 
in providing an unequivocal analytical support to this view. From a theoretical 
perspective the relationship between bank concentration and bank competition is 
ambiguous.20 The first theoretical strand is the structure-conduct-performance paradigm. 
This paradigm states that increased concentration facilitates collusion and anti-
competitive behaviour (Gual and Neven 1993). The second strand of theory draws on 
contestability theory which argues that a concentrated banking industry can behave 
competitively if the restrictions on market entry can be surmounted by new entrants to the 
market (Baumol 1982). This theory stresses that with high price elasticity a contestable 
market is effectively competitive even if it has a small number of active firms. Finally, 
the efficiency theory states that if a bank enjoys a higher degree of efficiency than its 
competitors it can adopt two different strategies. First, the bank can maximize profits 
given the present level of prices and firm size. Second, profit maximization can be 
achieved through reducing prices, expanding firm size and market share. The most 
                                                 
20Empirically, Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Schaeck, Cihak and Wolfe (2009) find that concentration 
and competition describe different characteristics of the banking system. Thus, concentration cannot be a 
proxy for bank competition, as it gives rise to misleading inferences and measurement problems. For 
example, measures like the concentration ratio tend to overstate the level of concentration in small 
countries and become increasingly unreliable when the number of banks is small (Bikker 2004).  
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efficient banks gain market share and greater bank efficiency leads to market 
concentration. The contestability theory and the efficiency theory assume that the overall 
competitive environment does not necessarily depend on the degree of market 
concentration.  
Theoretically, from a bank risk perspective, higher competition may have a 
harmful impact on financial system stability if it leads to erosion of charter value. 
Further, while increased competition makes borrowers and depositors better off, bank 
shareholders are left worse-off (Besanko and Thakor 1993). Hence, greater competition 
encourages banks to undertake greater risk due to the moral hazard problem associated 
with a deposit insurance scheme which requires a flat rate premium (Boot and 
Greenbaum 1993; Cerasi and Daltung 2000; Matutes and Vives 2000). Further, greater 
competition can lead to an increased likelihood of banking crises (Uhde and Heimeshoff 
2009; De NicolÓ, Bartholomew, Zaman and Zephirin 2004). However, prudent regulation 
can reduce bank risk taking incentives. For example, with risk-adjusted deposit insurance 
premiums, deposit rates and asset risk are lower compared to a flat-rate pricing scheme 
and thereby banks can credibly commit to a lower cost of fund and lower asset risk 
(Matutes and Vives 2000; Cordella and Yeyati 2002). 
According to the classical “concentration fragility” view it is argued that a 
concentrated banking system is more likely to display the “too big to fail problem 
(TBTF)” whereby large banks increase their risk exposure anticipating a bailout (Boyd 
and Runkle 1993; Hughes, Lang, Mester and Moon 1999; Mishkin 1999). Further, banks 
with more loan market power could demand high interest rates from their clients. This 
leads to difficulties in repayment of the loan by the borrowers, thereby exacerbating the 
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bank moral hazard problem by shifting into riskier activities and possibly choosing riskier 
clients due to adverse selection (Boyd and De NicolÓ 2005). However, it is possible that 
banks can increase their equity capital or other risk mitigating techniques and hence, 
prevent charter value erosion (Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss 2009).  
Empirical evidence of the relationship between bank concentration and financial 
stability in the banking literature is however, inconclusive. For instance, consistent with 
the above argument Salas and Saurina (2003) found greater competition among Spanish 
banks, with the liberalization in the European banking industry, resulting in a reduction in 
the market power and the economic profits of these institutions. Similar results were also 
reported for US bank holding companies (Bundt, Cosimano and Halloran 1992; Dickens 
and Philippatos 1994; Park 1994; Galloway, Lee and Roden 1997). Typically, high 
competition increases bank costs while lowering their income. This could encourage 
banks to undertake high risk, high yield projects to recover their lost profit margins. 
Several studies also examine the effect of banking market structure on bank risk 
based on the “charter value hypothesis”. It is suggested that banks try to protect their 
charter value, created by market power and associated with high concentration, by 
keeping their risk level low (Keeley 1990). For example, banks in a concentrated local 
market such as that observed in the US market, have smaller portfolio shares in 
construction and land development loans, a relatively risky type of lending (Bergstresser 
2001). Further, Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) argue that regulatory devices such 
as deposit rate control would increase bank charter values and encourage banks to act 
prudently. Yet, it is often argued higher charter value increases the opportunity cost of 
going bankrupt and so bank managers and shareholders may not accept risky investments 
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that will reduce their future profit levels (Park and Peristiani 2007).  
With regard to the effect of bank concentration, several multi-country analyses 
support the “concentration stability” view (Allen and Gale 2000; Kwast and De Nicoló 
2002; Boyd, De Nicoló and Smith 2004; Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2006; Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine 2007).21 That is, a concentrated banking system with few large 
institutions is more stable because banks are profitable, well-diversified and easier to 
monitor and therefore more resilient to the macro economic shocks and liquidity shocks. 
Yet, it has been argued that competitive environment can help to halt a long term credit 
crunch (Kaufman 1991).22 Staikouras and Wood (2000), Schaeck and Cihák (2007) and 
Schaeck, Cihak and Wolfe (2009) examined the impact of bank concentration and 
competition and bank stability for European banks. Their findings show no evidence of a 
trade-off between market competition and bank risk taking behavior. However, the banks 
tend to hold more capital when operating in a more competitive environment. 
Comparable results are also observed for the US and Canada (Bordo, Redish and Rockoff 
(1995). However, Hoggarth, Milne and Wood (2000) report a trade-off between 
competition and stability in a comparative analysis of banks in the U.K. and Germany. 
With regard to the risk implication of the EMU, the effect of deregulation on the 
health of the European banking sector remains an important concern. Although the core 
objective of the formation of EMU includes increased competition and integration, the 
                                                 
21Further, Rhodes and Rutz (1982) found that bank concentration is negatively related to the risk proxies 
including non-performing loans ratio, debt-to-assets ratio and profit volatility. 
22Thus, a competitive, profitable banking industry that is not excessively risky should be able to attract 
capital (Kaufman 1991). 
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European banking literature provides little guidance to the impact of EMU on euro-zone 
bank equity risk.23 Greater competition through financial deregulation and integration 
may affect bank incentives for prudent risk taking (Smith 1984; Keeley 1990; Repullo 
2004). Compared to banks in other countries, US banks operate in a more deregulated 
environment with the enactment of Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980, Garn St. Germain Depository Institutions Act (GDIA) 
of 1982, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 
1994, and the Gramm-Leach-Bililey Act (GLBA) of 1999. The bank risk implications of 
these acts are mixed. For example, DIDMCA 1980 enables banks to reduce their 
systematic risk and hence contributes to bank shareholders wealth (Aharony, Saunders 
and Swary 1988). Yet, deregulation including the relaxation of entry barriers could 
improve the welfare of the borrowers and savers at the expense of bank shareholders 
(Besanko and Thakor 1993). Some mixed findings are evident. For example, Hogan, 
Sharpe and Volker (1980) for the Australian banking sector, and Hogan and Sharpe 
(1984), Brooks, Faff and McKenzie (2000) for the US bank industry, found a negative 
relationship between systematic risk and regulation. Yet, Brooks, Faff and Ho (1997) 
observed an increase in the systematic risk of banks over the period from 1976 to 1994 
but this increase was not related to the level of regulation. A similar result was observed 
for Australian and Canadian banks (Harper and Scheit 1992; Amoako-Adu and Smith 
1995). Indeed, deregulation of the bank industry not only generated opportunities to 
                                                 
23The degree of competition is comparable between Canadian and European banks (Nathan and Neave 
1989; Bikker and Groeneveld 1998) while the degree of competition is higher in European banks relative 
to Japanese banks (Lloyd-Williams, Molyneux and Thornton 1994; Bikker and Groeneveld 1998). 
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increase risk but also better equipped the banks to control, share and manage risk 
(Smirlock 1984; Amoako-Adu and Smith 1995; Houston and Stiroh 2006).  
2.6.2 Consolidation and diversification 
European bank diversification increased with the merger waves that followed 
EMU. Craig and Santos (1997) and Hogan and Sharpe (1984) also argue that bank 
mergers reduce risk as a result of diversification benefits through more extensive bank 
branching. For example, it has been argued that increased diversification led large 
Spanish commercial banks to lower their risk levels (García-Marco and Robles-
Fernandez 2008). In contrast, Demsetz and Strahan (1997) argue that despite large US 
bank holding companies being better diversified (than small ones), this does not 
necessarily lower bank risk. They showed that both the asset side and the liability side of 
the balance sheet can adds to the risk of many of the US banks, with risky loans and 
higher leverage respectively. With regard to systematic risk for European banks, this 
thesis argues that there will be a decrease in bank systematic risk as bank concentration 
increases with formation of EMU due to mergers and acquisitions. It is evident that 
domestic mergers lead to an increase in market concentration through reduced costs, 
reduction in branch overlap and increase or maintenance of market power. European 
Union wide branching allows banks to diversify geographically and lessen the risk of 
unfavorable local economic conditions which could result in bank failure. Hence, it is 
suggested that large banks engage in cross border activities that provide additional 
economies of scale and scope through geographical risk diversification (Meon and Weill 
2005). Further, large banks can achieve functional diversification as they enjoy higher 
levels of economies of scale and economies of scope and thus can reduce loan-portfolio 
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risk more efficiently (Boyd and Prescott 1986).  
The establishment of EMU has had a significant impact on the European bank 
industry in terms of competition and consolidation (Altunbas and Ibanez 2008; Francis 
and Hunter 2004). The development of this new financial system with the introduction of 
the European Central bank (ECB) and Euro-bond market, along with the steps taken to 
harmonize and assimilate the securities markets, has given the banking system greater 
access to funds. Moreover, bank consolidation could result from an increase in the 
substitutability of banking services leading to stiffer competition (Matutes and Vivas 
2000; Cordella and Yeyati 2001). 
There has been little change in the euro-zone banking legislation over the period 
of the study as much of the critical regulation was in place by 1992. The banking industry 
is often considered to be one of the more regulated industries in Europe and elsewhere 
with the impact of the Basel Accord, adopted in 1988 and designed to monitor bank risk 
exposures (Francis and Hunter 2004), and the more recent European Union (EU) Bank 
Directives. Even with these regulatory frameworks in place, bank failures occur and these 
include the sub-prime mortgage crisis (2007-present), the Scandinavian (Norway, 
Sweden and Finland) Banking Crisis (1988-1992)24 and the Barings bank debacle (1995). 
Further, the past two decades includes the broader economic crises that accompanied the 
Russian rouble crisis (1998), the internet bubble (2000) and the economic downturn that 
                                                 
24During 1983-1985 the Norwegian banks were willing to lend as much as 85% of Norway’s GDP. In turn, 
this led to a moral hazard problem and ultimately to a banking crisis. The Norwegian banking crisis was 
systemic (this crisis spread to Sweden and Finland) and economically significant (Ongena, Smith and 
Michalsen 2003). It has been argued that the deregulatory banking environment may have encouraged the 
Norwegian banks to increase their risk as competition increased (Benink and Benston 2005). 
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followed this collapse. While these events have led banking regulators to be more 
cognizant of bank risk taking activity, it has been argued that the liberalization of the 
European banking industry via the abolition of interest rate restrictions, credit controls 
and barriers to entry (Francis and Hunter 2004) may have allowed European banks to 
better deal with greater levels of competition and the crises that have occurred during the 
period of our study. The formation of EMU may also have had a spill-over effect into 
neighboring non euro-zone European countries. It is evident that financial institution 
consolidation that has occurred with EMU has also played an important role in financial 
integration between euro-zone and non-euro-zone countries and contributed to the 
integration of European financial markets more generally (Allen and Song 2005; 
Bartram, Taylor and Wang 2007). 
There have been recent takeover waves in Europe with the formation of the EMU, 
particularly the dramatic increase in merger and acquisition activity from 1998 onwards. 
While it is possible that some common factor is responsible for both the change attributed 
to EMU and the observed increase in takeovers that has occurred with EMU this seems 
unlikely.25  Euro-zone bank consolidations have been quite profitable for the acquiring 
banks, particularly cross-border acquisitions, which have been simplified with EMU 
(Altunbas and Ibanez 2008). Bank consolidation has also had a dramatic impact on the 
banking systems of a number of the euro-zone countries. For example, Staikouras and 
Fillipaki (2006) report a 17% reduction in the number of credit institutions for the EU-15 
group of nations over the period 1998 to 2002. There is considerable cross country 
                                                 
25The need to maintain bank franchise value could provide an alternative explanation for mergers and 
acquisitions. 
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variation with EMU. For example, while an increase in the number of credit institutions 
of 3.4% is reported for Greece, there was a 27% decrease in the number of credit 
institutions in Germany over the same period.  
Bank consolidation can lead to diversification, particularly with cross border 
acquisitions, and it is often argued that the more extensive the bank branch network the 
lower the bank risk (Hogan and Sharpe 1984; Craig and Santos 1997). In particular, 
increased diversification led large Spanish commercial banks and US bank holding 
companies to lower their systematic risk exposure (Mamun, Hassan and Lai 2004; 
García-Marco and Robles-Fernandez 2008)  
While diversification arguments generally predict that bank risk decreases, 
Demsetz and Strahan (1997) propose that despite large US bank holding companies being 
better diversified (than small ones) this does not necessarily lower their risk level. They 
showed that the asset side and the liability side of the balance sheet of many of the large 
US banks consist of risky loans and higher leverage respectively. This may mask the true 
risk of these banks. Hughes, Lang, Mester and Moon (1996) also observe that increased 
diversification (geographic and/or depositor diversification), while correlated with 
decreases in the price of risk, could motivate US bank holding companies to undertake 
greater levels of risk to increase their returns.  
2.6.3 Hypotheses related to research question 2 (RQ2) 
Bank total risk is important for bank regulators, borrowers and managers as they 
are concerned about the possibility of bank failure. Changes in total bank equity risk may 
be either due to changes in systematic or idiosyncratic risks. In this regard, EMU has 
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allowed banks to increase their lending and maintain customer-banking relationship, 
diversify human capital and, overall, increase efficient allocation of resources. Thus, 
these benefits suggest a decrease in bank total risk. The total risk hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis H12: Total bank equity risk (increases) decreases with EMU.  
It is also important to look into how idiosyncratic and systematic risk change in 
the post-EMU period. With regard to idiosyncratic risk, it is possible that idiosyncratic 
risk may increase with the formation of the EMU. This could arise from diversification of 
bank activities and increased competition. With greater competition banks may choose to 
increase leverage to increase profits but this will also increase idiosyncratic risk because 
the shareholders bear a greater share of the diversifiable cash flow risk of the firm 
(Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu 2001)26. Moreover, financial innovation linked to 
EMU may increase idiosyncratic risk (Stein 1987). It is also likely that increased 
derivative instrument exposure increases bank idiosyncratic risk where troubled banks 
facing greater competition use derivatives to bolster profits but at the cost of increase 
diversifiable bank risk (Dewatripont and Tirole 1994). 
Yet, Altunbas and Ibanez (2008) suggest that large efficient European banks have 
tended to merge with relatively small well-capitalized banks resulting in more diversified 
sources of income. This may help the European banks to decrease their idiosyncratic risk. 
Similarly, for the US banks, it is evident that revenue diversification and ease of 
investment opportunities that arise from deregulation reduced the idiosyncratic risk of the 
                                                 
26However, Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001) find during 1990s the decrease in US corporate 
leverage led to an increase in idiosyncratic risk.  
59 
US commercial banks after 1998 (Houston and Stiroh 2006). Thus, the formation of 
EMU has given the European banking industry the opportunity to diversify risk by 
varying their activities, which may allow banks to reduce their idiosyncratic risk. This 
leads to formulate the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis H13: Bank equity idiosyncratic risk (increases) decreases with EMU.  
With regard to systematic risk, it can be argued that there will be a decrease in 
bank systematic risk as European bank concentration increases due to increased domestic 
merger activity following the formation of EMU. It is often argued that domestic mergers 
lead to increased market concentration through reduced costs, reduction in branch overlap 
and increased market power. For example, Europe wide branching would lessen the risk 
of bank failure arising from unfavorable local economic conditions. Yet skeptics have 
argued that increased competition following the introduction of the EMU, which could 
have an unfavorable impact on the European banking industry (Carletti and Hartman 
2003; Marquez 2002). 
Moreover, mergers can create an internal money market, either through 
diversification or internationalization that aids banks in dealing with future 
macroeconomic shocks (Carletti, Hartmann and Spagnolo 2006). Furthermore, 
deregulation (such as the Depository Institutions Deregulatory and Monetary Control Act 
1980 introduced in the US) can benefit bank shareholders resulting in a reduction in 
systematic risk (Aharony, Saunders and Swary 1988). Further, Akihgbe and Whyte 
(2004) examine the long-term shift in risk after the passage of Gramm-Leach-Bililey Act 
1999 in the US. They find that increased financial integration led to a decrease in bank 
systematic risk. In essence, financial integration helped the banking system to cope with 
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local shocks through diversification (Strahan 2006). Thus, reduces the relative risk of the 
industry. 
It is possible to argue that, bank systematic risk need not decrease with bank 
concentration. If mergers are cross-border mergers, then banks will spread their activities 
geographically and, as a result, banks may be more exposed to Europe wide shocks as 
distinct from country specific shocks. Furthermore, the easing of barriers to entry and exit 
and the increased competition that accompanies these changes may lead to banks 
investing in riskier projects. Since EMU, a number of investment banks have entered the 
euro-zone and there has been rapid development of Euro-bond markets and securities 
markets. This could lead to increased competition and may threaten future bank 
profitability. Based on the above discussion the third hypothesis can be formulated as 
follows: 
Hypothesis H14: Systematic bank equity risk (increases) decreases with EMU. 
2.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter provides a literature review and develops hypotheses in relation to 
the two research questions identified earlier in Chapter 1. In relation to research question 
1(RQ1), this literature review provides insights into bank equity risk and credit risk and 
their determinants including bank regulation (including charter value and bank capital), 
market discipline and off-balance sheet activities. With respect to bank capital and 
charter value, their importance derives from the role these characteristics play in banks 
soundness and risk taking incentive. The Basel Capital Accord has been endorsed by 
banks across the world and the literature review highlights its importance. But although 
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banks should maintain the regulatory capital buffer in order to maintain safety and 
soundness of the financial system as bank capital builds-up the banks may have incentive 
to engage in excessive risk-taking. This is observed for well-capitalized as well as under-
capitalized banks. 
It is also evident from the literature that off-balance sheet activities are considered 
to be both risk increasing and risk decreasing in their effect. Earlier research mostly 
considered off-balance sheet activities to be risk reducing while in the past two decades 
the explanation for these activities has become complex and hence the Basle Accord I 
and II requires that banks should incorporate these activities in their risk-adjusted bank 
capital requirement. There has been a long-standing debate on market discipline. And this 
literature review provides further discussion about their relation that exist between 
market discipline and bank risk. The findings in the literature are mixed concerning 
whether subordinated debt can truly reflect the market disciplinary behaviour. 
The above discussion also focuses on important macro economic variables such 
as bank concentration, competition, deregulation and its relation to bank risk and overall 
financial stability that could affect variations in bank risk. Yet, there is mixed findings on 
the effect of bank concentration and competition on bank risk taking and overall financial 
stability. A number of country-specific variables are also discussed including, bank 
concentration, economic freedom index, net interest margin, stock market turnover ratio 
have been discussed. Finally, in relation to research question 2 (RQ2) the literature 
review addresses the structural changes in European bank equity risk with the formation 
of EMU, particularly focusing on the literature related to bank competition, 
consolidation, and deregulation. A summary of the research questions and relevant 
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hypotheses are provided in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1 
Summary of research questions and hypotheses development 
RQ1A: Do bank regulation, off-balance sheet activities and market discipline explain the bank risk, 
in particular equity risk and credit risk? 
H1: Bank risk (equity risk and credit risk) decreases with charter value. 
 
H2: Bank risk (equity risk and credit risk) relates to bank capital. 
 
H2A: Bank risk (equity risk and credit risk) decreases with bank capital (linear expectation). 
 
H2B: Bank risk (equity risk and credit risk) initially decreases and then increases with bank capital (non-
linear expectation). 
 
H3: Bank risk (equity risk and credit risk) increases with bank off-balance sheet activities.  
 
H4: Bank risk (equity risk and credit risk) decreases with bank uninsured deposits. 
 
H5: Bank risk (equity risk and credit risk) relates to bank size  
 
H5A: Bank systematic risk increases with bank size  
 
H5B: Bank credit risk, interest rate risk, idiosyncratic risk and total risk decrease with bank size  
 
H6: Bank risk (equity risk and credit risk) increases with total loan. 
 
H7: Bank risk (equity risk and credit risk) decreases with dividend yield. 
 
H8: Bank risk (equity risk and credit risk) increases with operating leverage. 
 
H9: Bank risk (equity risk and credit risk) decreases in a bank based system and increases in a market based 
system. 
 
H10: Bank risk (equity risk and credit risk) increases with deposit insurance. 
 
RQ1B: Does bank risk sensitivity to bank regulation, off balance sheet activities and market 
discipline change with the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)? 
H11A: Bank charter value decreased in the post-EMU period. 
H11B: Bank capital increased in the post-EMU period. 
H11C: Bank off balance sheet activities increased in the post-EMU period. 
H11D: Bank uninsured liabilities increased in the post-EMU period 
RQ2: Is there a structural change in European bank equity risk with the formation of Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU)? 
H12: Total bank equity risk decreases with EMU.  
 
H13: Bank equity idiosyncratic risk decreases with EMU. 
 
H14: Systematic bank equity risk decreases with EMU. 
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CHAPTER 3  
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the data and methodology for testing the hypotheses 
associated with two research questions developed earlier in Chapter 2. The remainder of 
this chapter is divided into five sections. Section 3.2 provides detail on the sample, data 
sources, sampling procedure, composition and coverage. Section 3.3 presents definition 
of variables selected for the analysis. Section 3.4 is devoted to research methodology. In 
particular, Sub-section 3.4.1 specifies the regression model and estimation method used 
for testing hypotheses related to research question 1 (RQ1A and RQ1B). Sub-section 
3.4.2 then covers the methodology applied to test hypotheses related to the second 
research question (RQ2). Section 3.5, presents descriptive statistics and correlation 
analysis for the variables used in the empirical analysis and finally Section 3.6 provides a 
summary of the chapter. 
3.2 SAMPLE SELECTION 
This section discusses sample selection for the thesis. In relation to the first 
research question (RQ1), the study uses cross-country bank-level data over the period 
from 1996 to 2005. The study considers a range of financial institutions including bank 
holding companies (BHCs), commercial banks, cooperatives and savings banks across 
two data sets. The first dataset consists of 15 Western European countries (Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
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Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom).27 For both euro-zone and non-euro-zone 
Western European countries the total number of listed shares stands at 117. The sample 
composition is reported in Table 3.1 on the next page. The complete sample is dominated 
by commercial banks followed by savings banks, bank holding companies (BHCs) and 
cooperatives. The total number of banks in euro-zone countries is 61, which include 4 
bank holding companies (BHCs), 51 commercial banks, no cooperatives and 6 savings 
banks. The total number of banks in non-euro-zone European countries is 56, comprising 
8 bank holding companies, 40 commercial banks, 1 cooperative and 7 savings banks. The 
non-euro-zone commercial bank sample is dominated by Danish banks.  
One critical contribution of this study is the careful selection of the sample banks. 
The annual reports of each of the banks are checked to ensure that subsidiaries are not 
double counted. For example, subsidiaries are excluded from the sample where they are 
reported separately in the data base as well as being included in the consolidated 
statements of another financial institution. Bank level information, including the balance 
sheet and income statement are extracted from the BankScope28 and the Osiris databases. 
The initial sample is based on bank list from BankScope which provides data on 
254 listed banks. From this sample 97 banks are eliminated due to inadequate market data 
or have less than two years of bank level accounting information. 
                                                 
27
 While European commercial banks are a critical part of the European economy it is important to note that 
the study specifically include publicly listed cooperatives and savings banks that offer similar commercial 
banking services.  These institutions are important in countries like Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and 
Switzerland. 
28The comprehensive data provided by BankScope is consistent with the European Central Bank (ECB) 
declaration of the number of banks and is often used by the ECB in its cross- country analysis. 
66 
Table 3.1 
Sample composition of Western European countries  
This table presents the sample composition of Western European countries in relation to research question 
1 (RQ1). The sample includes 91 listed bank shares from both euro-zone and non-euro-zone European 
countries. These includes bank holding companies (BHCs), commercial banks, savings banks and co-
operatives from Belgium, Finland, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The complete sample is 
dominated by commercial banks followed by savings banks, bank holding companies and cooperatives. 
The total number of banks in euro-zone countries stands at 61 which include 4 bank holding companies, 51 
commercial banks, no cooperatives and 6 savings banks. The total number of banks in non-euro-zone 
European countries stands at 56, comprising 8 bank holding companies, 40 commercial banks, 1 co-
operative and 7 savings banks. The non-euro-zone commercial bank sample is dominated by Danish banks. 
The list of banks is provided in Appendix in Table A3.1.  
Country  Bank 
Holding  
Company 
Commercial 
banks  
Co-
operatives 
Savings 
bank 
Total 
Euro zone countries      
Belgium 1 0 0 0 1 
Finland 0 2 0 0 2 
France 0 6 0  0 6 
Germany 0 4 0 0 4 
Greece 0 9 0 0 9 
Ireland 0 3 0 0 3 
Italy 0 13 0 6 19 
Netherlands 1 0 0 0 1 
Portugal 2 0 0 0 2 
Spain 0 14 0 0 14 
Total 4 51 0 6 61 
Non euro zone European countries      
Denmark 0 36 0 0 36 
Norway 1 0 0 5 6 
Sweden 1 1 0 0 2 
Switzerland 1 3 1 2 7 
United Kingdom 5 0 0 0 5 
Total 8 40 1 7 56 
Total number of listed shares for both 
Euro-zone and non-euro-zone countries 
12 91 1 13 117 
 
A further 40 financial institutions are excluded that are legally controlled by other 
institutions (subsidiaries).This leaves 117 listed banks29 observed over a 10 year sample 
period from 1996 to 2005, giving an unbalanced panel of 1029 bank-year observations in 
the final sample. The time period, 1996-2005, is chosen to include the formation of EMU 
                                                 
29
 The sample is not survivorship bias free, since dead or de-listed bank shares are not available on either 
the BankScope or the Osiris databases. 
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in 1999 and so the sample period is divided into two comparable periods, pre-euro period 
(1996-1998) and post-euro period (1999-2005) in order to facilitate the study of the 
impact of changes in regulation on bank risks arising from the EMU.  
The second data set includes banks from 36 countries in addition to the Western 
European countries that make up the final dataset. The initial bank-year observations are 
collected from BankScope resulting in a total sample of 7,843. However, the final bank-
year sample observation is reduced to 4,680. The loss of 3,163 (=7843-4680) 
observations is due to the lack of market discipline information particularly for US banks.  
For this study the sample collection phase is extended by a year and hence the 
coverage is from 1996-2006.30 To incorporate this additional year the study rearranges 
the European bank sample set by incorporating year 2006 and three additional European 
countries which are Cyprus, Luxembourg and Turkey. This gives a total of 1400 bank-
year observations. Due to merger and acquisition activities there could be some 
differences in the number of banks across the two samples.  
The study now explains the sample unit for each region. The break-down of the 
sample is provided in Table 3.2 in the next page. 
                                                 
30
 Similar to the European dataset as mentioned in footnote 3, this broad sample set is not survivorship bias 
free as both BankScope and DataStream International eliminate banks which have been acquired, failed 
or delisted. 
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Table 3.2 
Sample composition of Western Europe and rest of the world 
This table represents the sample size for the banks around the world. The sample includes 758 listed bank 
shares. These include bank holding companies, commercial banks, savings banks and co-operatives across 
Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Middle East and Africa, Western Europe and North America. 
The total sample consists of 258 financial institutions from Asia–Pacific, 25 from Africa and Middle East, 
18 from Eastern Europe, 133 from Western Europe, 42 from South America and finally 282 from North 
America. The complete sample is dominated by United States of America with 274 bank holding 
companies followed by Japan with 82 commercial banks. The list of banks is provided in Appendix in 
Table A3.1. 
Country  Bank Holding  
Company 
Commercial 
banks  
Cooperatives Savings 
bank 
Total 
Asia Pacific      
Australia 0 8 0 0 8 
Bangladesh 0 19 0 0 19 
China  0 5 0 0 5 
Hong Kong 4 7 0 0 11 
India 0 32 0 0 32 
Indonesia  0 18 0 0 18 
Japan 7 82 0 0 89 
Korea 2 7 0 0 9 
Malaysia 6 3 0 0 9 
Pakistan  0 16 0 0 16 
Philippines 0 12 0 2 14 
Singapore 1 2 0 0 3 
Sri Lanka 0 6 0 0 6 
Taiwan 0 9 1 0 10 
Thailand 0 9 0 0 9 
Total 20 235 1 2 258 
Middle-East and Africa      
Egypt 0 6 0 0 6 
Israel 0 8 0 0 8 
Mauritius 0 1 0 0 1 
Morocco 0 5 0 0 5 
South Africa 5 0 0 0 5 
Total 5 20 0 0 25 
Eastern Europe       
Czech Republic 0 1 0 0 1 
Bulgaria 0 1 0 0 1 
Hungary 0 1 0 0 1 
Lithuania 0 2 0 0 2 
Poland 0 10 0 0 10 
Romania 0 3 0 0 3 
Total 0 18 0 0 18 
Western Europe      
Belgium  1 0 0 0 1 
Cyprus 0 3 0 1 4 
Denmark 0 36 0 0 36 
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Country  Bank Holding  
Company 
Commercial 
banks  
Cooperatives Savings 
bank 
Total 
Finland 0 2 0 0 2 
France 0 6 0 0 6 
Germany 0 4 0 0 4 
Greece 0 9 0 0 9 
Ireland 0 3 0 0 3 
Italy 0 13 0 6 19 
Luxembourg 1 0 0 0 1 
Netherlands 1 0 0 0 1 
Norway 1 0 0 5 6 
Portugal  2 0 0 0 2 
Spain 0 14 0 0 14 
Sweden 1 1 0 0 2 
Switzerland  1 3 1 2 7 
Turkey  0 11 0 0 11 
United Kingdom 5 0 0 0 5 
Total 13 111 1 8 133 
South America      
Argentina 1 4 0 0 5 
Brazil 2 7 0 0 9 
Chile  0 4 0 0 4 
Colombia 0 5 0 0 5 
Ecuador 0 5 0 0 5 
Mexico 2 0 0 0 2 
Peru 0 4 0 0 4 
Venezuela 1 7 0 0 8 
Total 6 36 0 0 42 
North America      
Canada 0 8 0 0 8 
United States of America 274 0 0 0 274 
Total 274 8 0 0 282 
Total number of listed 
bank shares 
318 428 2 10 758 
 
The initial search in the BankScope database returns a total of 108 banks in 
Eastern Europe. However, the sample size is reduced by 90 banks in countries such as 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia and 
Ukraine due to lack of market return and market index data in DataStream International 
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database. Thus, the final sample includes 18 banks for this region mainly from Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. This gives a total number of 
bank-year observations of 169.The bank list for South and Central America as generated 
from the BankScope identifies a total of 145 banks. Due to a lack of market information 
the study eliminates 102 banks from countries such as Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, 
Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. This 
leaves a final sample size of 43 banks with a total of 382 bank-year observations drawn 
from countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and 
Venezuela.  
The sample composition for Asia-Pacific is dominated by the Japanese banks 
followed by India, Bangladesh and Indonesia. Japanese banks accounted for 89 of the 
258 banks across the Asia-Pacific region. The total number of bank-year observations for 
this region is 2,769.  
For Middle-East and Africa the study mainly focus on countries such as Egypt, 
Israel, Mauritius, Morocco and South Africa. Although BankScope provides information 
on banks in countries such as Bahrain, Botswana, Ghana, Jordan, Kuwait, Ivory Coast, 
Lebanon, Kenya, Muscat, Namibia, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, UAE 
and Zimbabwe, these countries could not be included in the study due to incomplete 
market information. Hence, from a total of 1,000 bank-year observations the sample size 
is reduced by 730 observations leaving a final sample of 270 bank-year observations for 
Middle East and Africa.  
Finally, this study considers North American banks including Canadian 
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commercial banks and U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs). A search in the EDGAR 
filings reveals those BHCs with standard industrial classification (SIC) code 6021 and 
6022 for which the top tiered subsidiary is either a national or a state commercial bank.  
This criteria is chosen to create a more homogenous sample such that commercial 
banking is the primary business of the entire regional sample. This results in a sample of 
2,869 bank-year observations for North America region. The sample size is reduced to 
1,093 due to lack of market discipline data for many of the US bank holding companies. 
In relation to research question 2 (RQ2), that is, to test the structural changes in 
bank equity risks for the major banks in both euro-zone and non-euro-zone Western 
European countries, the study constructs a sample of 96 euro-zone European banks and 
85 non-euro zone European banks from the DataStream International database from 
January 1995 to April 2006 periods Both the A and B shares for one Finnish bank are 
incorporated in the sample, giving a total of 97 listed banking shares that make up the 
final sample. Hence, the total number of listed bank shares is 182 (total number of banks 
is 181). The sample composition is reported in Table 3.3. The complete list of banks 
incorporated in the study is reported in Appendix in Table A3.1. 
The sample includes commercial banks, savings banks, and bank holding 
companies. Continuously compounded monthly returns are estimated for the major banks 
in euro-zone Western European countries Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands and Spain and non euro zone European 
countries Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. The sample 
considers survivorship bias and includes delisted and merged banks in the sample, 
particularly for country bank portfolio construction. All returns before and after the 
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formation of EMU are calculated in Euro. 
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Table 3.3 
Sample composition of Western European countries 
This table presents the sample composition of western European countries in relation to research question 
2(RQ2). The sample includes 181 listed bank shares from both euro-zone and non-euro-zone European 
countries. These includes bank holding companies, commercial banks, savings banks and co-operatives 
from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The sample consists of savings banks, 
bank holding companies and cooperatives. The complete sample is dominated by Danish commercial 
banks. The total number of banks in euro-zone Western European countries stands at 96 and the total 
number of banks in non-euro-zone European countries stands at 85.  
Country Total number of bank shares 
Euro zone countries 
 
Austria 5 
Belgium 3 
Finland 6 
France 7 
Germany 11 
Greece 9 
Ireland 4 
Italy 28 
Netherlands 3 
Portugal 6 
Spain 14 
Total 96 
Non euro zone European countries 
 
Denmark 44 
Norway 2 
Sweden 5 
Switzerland 26 
United Kingdom 8 
Total 85 
Total number of listed shares for both Euro-zone and 
non-euro-zone countries 
181 
 
In addition, the MSCI individual country equity market index, MSCI Europe 
equity market index and the MSCI world equity market index have been extracted from 
DataStream International for estimation of equity systematic risk. 
3.3 SELECTED VARIABLES 
This section discusses the selected variables related to the research questions 
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mentioned earlier in Chapter 1. Sub-section 3.3.1 discusses the risk measures underlying 
the research questions. Sub-section 3.3.2 presents bank-specific and country-specific 
variables related to research question 1 (RQ1A and RQ1B) for the European bank sample 
and Sub-section 3.3.3 deals with variables that make up the second data set that spans 
banks across the world. Finally, Sub-section 3.3.4 presents the variables for research 
question 2 (RQ2).  
3.3.1 Bank equity risk and credit risk measures 
The study focuses on bank equity risk and credit risk of European banks as well 
as banks from the rest of the world. The bank risk variables, broadly referred to as Risk in 
the following sections, cover both bank equity risk and credit risk. The bank equity risk 
measures include systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk, interest rate risk and total risk. 
Following Lynge and Zumwalt (1980), Flannery and James (1984) and Kane and Unal 
(1988), two factor market model as presented in equation (1), is used to estimate 
systematic risk, interest rate risk and idiosyncratic risk for each individual bank. The risk 
estimates are calculated each year for each bank using weekly return observations 
available during the year of interest.  
This provides a set of risk estimates for each bank for each year over the study 
period. The two factor model takes the form: 
itItIMtmiit RRR εββα +++=        (1) 
where itR  = weekly stock return of bank i  at date t ;  
MtR  = weekly return on the market. Based on the geographical exposure either the 
MSCI country index or the MSCI world index or the MSCI Europe index is 
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used.31 
ItR  = weekly change in the long term interest rate for each country at date t  and;   
itε  = residual term. 
The equity market beta, mβ , is used as a proxy for systematic risk and the interest 
rate beta, Iβ , captures equity interest rate risk. The equity market beta is estimated using 
either the MSCI country index, the MSCI world index or the MSCI Europe index 
depending on the banks business exposure. Where the bank business is focused in one 
country, as occurs with the Danish banks, the study uses the country equity market index 
for beta (systematic risk) calculation, where the bank business is focused in the European 
region a Europe index and where a bank has a more international focus a world index is 
used in estimating its systematic risk.32 
The study follows the work of Kane and Unal (1988) and chooses the long term 
interest rate in the model because long term interest rates are considered to better explain 
bank returns.33 The natural log of the residual variance from the two factor market model 
is used as an estimate of idiosyncratic risk for each of the banks and the natural log of the 
variance of bank equity returns is used as a proxy for total risk. The variance of bank 
                                                 
31
 MSCI stands for Morgan Stanley Composite Index (MSCI).  
32
 Systematic risk is also estimated using the local country index for each of the banks in the sample with 
little change in the results.   
33
 However, there are debates on whether to use a two factor market model or to use a one factor market 
model. Due to multicollinearity between interest rates and market factors some authors orthogonolize 
changes in the interest rate factor (Chance and Lane 1980; Flannery and James 1984). Giliberto (1985) 
argues that this approach can bias the t-statistics against one or other of the two factors. As a result, this 
study follows the work of Kane and Unal (1988) and Maher (1997), who do not attempt to orthogonalize 
the interest rate factor.  
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equity returns is calculated each year for each bank using weekly return data available in 
that year and is defined as follows: 
2
1
2 )(/1 RRN tNtri −∑= =σ         (2) 
where 2riσ  = the total risk or variance of bank returns for bank i ; 
Ri = bank i return per week;   
R  = the average bank i return and; 
N = the number of observations.  
Bank credit risk34 is defined as: 
tjitjitji TALLPCR ,,,,,, /=           (3) 
where 
tjiCR ,,  = the credit risk measure for bank i  in country j in period t ;   
tjiLLP ,,  = the loan loss provision for bank i  in country j in period t  and bank i;  
tjiTA ,,  = the total assets of bank i  in country j in period t .  
The analysis uses weekly individual bank equity returns, MSCI market index 
values,35 market value of equity observations and 10 year government bond yields. All 
market data are extracted from the DataStream International database. For comparability 
purpose, the market value of equity is converted into euro currency for non-euro-zone 
countries such as Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. For 
instance, a cross rate has been applied to convert from local currency (that is Danish 
                                                 
34
 The loan loss reserves as a credit risk measure could not be used due to lack of information in the 
BankScope database, particularly for Danish banks.  
35
 In some cases the analysis includes MSCI price indices where MSCI total return indices are unavailable. 
The correlation between MSCI price index and MSCI return index ranges from 96% to 98.99% for those 
countries where both indices  are available and so this should result in little bias in the risk estimates. 
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Krone, Norwegian Krone, Swedish Krona, Swiss France, British Pound) to USD and then 
the EM exchange rate-US$ per Euro (average) was applied to convert the pre-euro 
market value of equity into euro and then the US$ to Euro (GTIS)-exchange rate to 
convert the post-euro market value of equity into euro for non-euro-zone European 
countries. Tests of research question 2 (RQ2) also rely on these risk measures.  
Due to lack of data, particularly, weekly interest rate information for emerging 
markets in DataStream International, the study applies a one factor market model 
(Smirlock 1984; Bundt, Cosimano and Halloran 1992) for equity risk estimation for 
larger banks from across the world dataset, the second dataset used in analysis of research 
question 1 (RQ1). 
itMtmiit RR εβα ++=         (4) 
where itR  = weekly stock return of bank i  at date t ;  
MtR  = weekly return on the market. Based on the geographical exposure either the 
MSCI country index or the MSCI world index or the MSCI Europe index is used; 
itε  = residual term.   
The equity market beta, mβ , is used as a proxy for systematic risk. The equity 
market beta is estimated using the MSCI market index for all developed countries except 
for Cyprus where Cyprus DataStream market index has been used. S&P/IFC market 
index has been used for all developing countries except for Bangladesh, China, Czech 
Republic, Egypt Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Israel, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Malaysia, 
78 
Morocco, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Thailand where the study uses the MSCI 
market index36. 
3.3.2 Explanatory variables for European bank sample 
The empirical analysis related to research question 1 (RQ1A and RQ1B) uses two 
data sets, one for European banks and the other draws on banks from across the world. 
This section discusses the common dataset for both analyses. The study uses independent 
variables which include bank discipline variables such as bank charter value and bank 
capital and market discipline variables such as uninsured deposits. The variables are 
described below. 
Following Keeley (1990), charter value is the sum of the market value of equity 
and book value of liabilities divided by the book value of total assets. Bank capital is 
proxied by the ratio of total capital to total assets. Given the possibility of a non-linear 
relationship (Calem and Rob 1999) between bank capital and bank risk, a squared bank 
capital term is also included in the analysis. The key measures of market discipline are 
uninsured deposits and off-balance sheet activities. Uninsured deposits are the sum of the 
subordinated debt and inter-bank deposits divided by total liabilities. Off-balance sheet 
activities are proxied by the ratio of the total value of off-balance sheet activities to total 
liabilities. Bank asset management is estimated using the ratio of loans to total assets. The 
natural logarithm of bank market capitalization is used to capture the impact of bank size. 
The list of explanatory variables and macroeconomic variables with their detailed 
                                                 
36
 However, for Bangladesh and Cyprus the market index used are Bangladesh Stock Exchange All Shares 
and Cyprus DataStream market index respectively. 
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definitions and sources are provided on next page in Table 3.4. 
Other bank-specific variables included in the analysis of the European analysis 
are operating leverage, defined as the ratio of fixed assets (assumed to mimic fixed costs) 
to total assets (Saunders, Strock and Travlos 1990; Galloway, Lee and Roden 1997) and 
dividend yield (total dividend divided by share price) and these are extracted from 
DataStream International for individual banks.  
Furthermore, a dummy variable representing bank specialization is also used with 
one of two values, 1 = commercial banks, 0 = other sample institutions. To consider 
differences in bank regulation and supervision across euro-zone and non-euro-zone 
European countries the analysis incorporates an Economic Freedom Index (EFI). This 
variable captures a range of factors that might affect the efficiency of the banking sector. 
Higher scores indicate greater freedom in bank regulation and supervision. Other 
country-level governance variables such as legal origin (with a one of four values, 1 = 
English common-law countries, 2 = French civil law countries, 3 = German civil-law 
countries and 4 = Scandinavian civil law countries)37, geographical dummy variable (one 
of two values, 1 = euro-zone countries, 0 = non-euro-zone European countries), creditor 
rights index (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1998) and anti director 
rights index (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1998) are also included in 
the analysis of research question 1 (RQ1). 
                                                 
37The study uses a scaled variable for legal origin in an attempt to capture the variation that is evident 
across the civil law countries. 
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Table 3.4 
Definition of selected variables 
This table defines risk measures as well as bank specific and country specific variables used in analysis. The variable column presents the dependent 
variables, explanatory variables and control variables used in the models. The dependent variables consist of four alternate equity based risk measures 
which are the total risk, systematic risk, interest rate risk, idiosyncratic risk and a variable to capture credit risk. The base model for study includes 
uninsured deposits, charter value, bank capital and bank capital squared, off-balance sheet activities, loan to total assets and control variables such as 
size and economic freedom index. The extended model includes the additional variables, operating leverage, dividend yield, ownership dummy, legal 
origin dummy, geographical dummy, creditor rights index and shareholder rights index. The table also presents potential references for these variables 
and the source of data. 
 
Variables Definition Reference Source 
Dependent variables     
Total risk  standard deviation of the bank return Lynge and Zumwalt (1980); Flannery and 
James (1984); Kane and Unal (1988); 
Anderson and Fraser (2000); Konishi and 
Yasuda (2004). 
DataStream 
Interest rate risk  estimated from equation 1  Lynge and Zumwalt (1980); Flannery and 
James (1984); Kane and Unal (1988); 
Anderson and Fraser (2000); Konishi and 
Yasuda (2004). 
DataStream 
Systematic risk  estimated from equation 1 and equation 4 Lynge and Zumwalt (1980); Flannery and 
James (1984); Kane and Unal (1988); 
Anderson and Fraser (2000); Konishi and 
Yasuda (2004). 
DataStream 
Idiosyncratic risk variance of the residual from the two index 
model from equation 1and equation 4 
Lynge and Zumwalt (1980); Flannery and 
James (1984); Kane and Unal (1988); 
Anderson and Fraser (2000); Konishi and 
Yasuda (2004). 
DataStream 
Credit risk  loan loss provision /total liabilities = ex-post 
realized risk  
 BankScope and 
Osiris 
Bank- specific variables    
Operating leverage(OPL) fixed assets/total assets  Saunders, Strock and Travlos (1990); 
Galloway, Lee and Roden (1997). 
BankScope 
Dividend yield (DY) dividend per share divided by price per share  DataStream 
Uninsured deposits(UD) (subordinated debt+ inter-bank deposits)/total 
liabilities 
Nier and Baumann (2004) BankScope and 
Osiris 
Charter value 
(endogenous variable) 
(CV) 
(market value of equity +book value of 
liabilities)/book value of total assets  
Keeley (1990); Konishi and Yasuda (2003) BankScope and 
Osiris 
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Bank capital or financial 
leverage (endogenous 
variable) (BC) 
Capital or equity/total assets  Berger, Herring and Szegö (1995); Saunders, 
Strock and Travlos (1990) 
BankScope and 
Osiris 
Bank capital squared 
(endogenous variable) 
(BC^2) 
(Capital or equity/total assets)2 Calem and Rob (1999) BankScope and 
Osiris 
Off-balance sheet items 
(OBS) 
This includes contingent liabilities, loan 
commitments, standby letters of 
credit,(acceptances, guarantees, documentary 
and commercial Letter of credits and operating 
leasing commitments) 
Angbazo (1997) BankScope and 
Osiris 
Loans/total assets (LTA) Total loans/total assets   BankScope and 
Osiris 
Size  Natural logarithm of total market value of 
equity 
 DataStream 
Country specific 
variables 
   
Economic freedom index 
(EFI) 
The overall score is considered for the analysis. 
The score includes: business freedom, trade 
freedom, fiscal freedom, freedom from 
government, monetary freedom, investment 
freedom, financial freedom, property rights, 
freedom from corruption and labor freedom. 
Gonźalez (2005) Heritage foundation, 
WBRS, Barth Caprio 
and Levine (2004) 
Ownership dummy (D1) D1=1 if commercial banks and D1=0 otherwise   
Legal origin (D2) The legal origin dummy. D=1 for common law 
countries or English origin countries, D=2 for 
French civil-law countries, D=3 German civil 
law countries and D=4 for Scandinavian civil 
law countries. 
Reynolds and Flores (1989); La Porta, Lopez 
de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998); 
Gonźalez (2005). 
 
 
Geographical proximity 
(D3) 
D3=1 if euro zone countries and D3=0 otherwise   
Creditor rights (D4) The index is formed taking into account (1) the 
country imposes restrictions such as creditor’s 
consent or minimum dividends to file for 
reorganization, (2) secured creditors are able to 
gain possession of their security once the 
reorganization petition has been approved, (3) 
secured creditors are ranked first in the 
distribution of the proceeds that result from the 
disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm, (4) 
La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998); Levine et al (2000), Levine 
(1998), Beck et al (2000); Gonźalez (2005) 
Bankruptcy and 
reorganization laws 
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the debtor does not retain the administration of 
its property pending the resolution of the 
reorganization.  A score is calculated by adding 
one for each of these characteristics.  The index 
ranges from 0 to 4.  
Anti-director rights (D5) Legal protection for minority shareholders is 
calculated taking into account whether a 
country protects minority shareholders, has one 
share-one vote score, allows proxy by mail 
allowed, shares are not blocked before meeting, 
allows cumulative voting, rights exist for 
oppressed minority, allows preemptive rights to 
new issue, a percentage of share capital allowed 
to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting. 
These six rights are scored (1 if allowed or 0) 
and added to give an aggregate score. The anti 
director rights index ranges from 0 to 6.  
La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998); Gonźalez (2005). 
Company law or 
commercial code 
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The creditor rights index is an index aggregating different creditor rights. The 
index is formed by adding 1 when (1) the country imposes restrictions, such as creditors’ 
consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganization, (2) secured creditors are able to 
gain possession of their security once the reorganization petition has been approved (no 
automatic stay), (3) secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds 
that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm and (4) the debtor does not 
retain the administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization. A 
score is calculated by adding one for each of these characteristics. The index ranges from 
zero to four (4).  
The anti-director rights index measure how strongly the legal system favors the 
minority shareholders against managers or dominant shareholders in the corporate 
decision making process including voting process. The index is formed by adding 1 when 
(1) the country allows the shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (2) 
shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to their general shareholders’ 
meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board 
of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the 
minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an 
extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent, and (6) 
shareholders’ have pre-emptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote. 
This index ranges from zero to six. However, in this study the sample ranges from zero to 
five. 
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3.3.3 Explanatory and country-level variables for banks from across the 
world 
The bank equity risks and credit risk measures along with bank-level variables are 
already described in sub-section 3.3.1 and summarized in Table 3.4. Further, the study 
takes into account some additional country-level variables in order to answer research 
question 1 (RQ1A and RQ1B) using the sample of banks from across the world.  
Table 3.5 presents the institutional characteristics of sample countries and detail 
description of the variables and sources are provided in Table 3.6. 
Following Beck and Al-Hussainy (2007), the study incorporates variables such as 
net interest margin, bank concentration ratio and stock market turnover ratio. The net 
interest margin represents an efficiency measure and is calculated as the accounting value 
of bank's net interest revenue as a share of its interest-bearing (total earning) assets. 
The break down by country income level in Table 3.5, shows that transition 
economies have the highest net interest margin at 8.3% while developed and developing 
economies have the lowest at approximately 3.5%. The regional breakdown shows that 
South America has the highest net interest margin at 9.8% while Asia-Pacific has the 
lowest at 2.8%. 
The bank concentration ratio represents the structure of financial markets. It is 
measured by assets of three largest banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks. 
The break down by region in Table 3.5, reveals that bank concentration ratio is the lowest 
in North America at 26.4% and the highest in the Middle East and Africa region at 71.2% 
and similar approximation in Western Europe region. It is lowest for banks operating in 
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industrialized countries at 40.7% and highest for developing countries at 52.1%. 
Finally stock market turnover ratio representing market liquidity is estimated by 
the ratio of the value of total shares traded to average real market capitalization. The 
denominator is deflated using the following method (Beck and Al-Hussainy 2007):  
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where T is total value traded, M  is stock market capitalization, 
te
P is end-of 
period CPI, 
1−te
P is beginning of period CPI and 
ta
P
 is average annual CPI. 
Table 3.5 
Market structure, Efficiency and Regulation, Selected Aggregates 1996-2006 
 Bank 
concentration 
Net interest 
margin 
Stock market 
turnover ratio 
Economic 
Freedom index 
All banks  0.442 0.038 1.054 69.168 
Country income     
Developed  0.407 0.035 1.166 73.506 
Transition 0.494 0.083 0.233 60.905 
Developing  0.521 0.034 0.993 59.998 
Region      
Asia Pacific  0.458 0.028 0.959 64.068 
Eastern Europe 0.599 0.048 0.382 59.672 
Middle East and 
Africa 
0.712 0.034 0.305 60.578 
North America 0.264 0.041 1.478 77.620 
South America 0.450 0.098 0.171 61.419 
Western Europe 0.710 0.037 0.850 66.802 
 
The stock market turnover ratio is the highest for the industrialized nations 
followed by developing nations. Region wise break-down in Table 3.5, reveals that North 
America has the highest stock market turnover ratio at 1.478 followed by Asia Pacific 
region 0.959. The lowest ratio is observed for Middle East and Africa region at 
approximately 0.31. Table 3.6 presents the detail definition, reference and source of this 
ratio.  
The final column in Table 3.5 is the Economic freedom index, which is one of the 
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institutional variables used in the analysis as mentioned in Section 3.3.2. Developed 
economies have the highest score followed by the transition economies. North America 
region has the highest score at 78% followed by Western Europe at 66.80. Eastern 
Europe and Middles East and Africa regions have the lowest score at approximately 60. 
In addition, the study includes a deposit insurance dummy, market based dummy 
and high income country dummy. Table 3.6 presents the detail definition, reference and 
source of these country-level variables.  
Table 3.6 
Definition of additional country-level variables 
Variables Definition Reference Source 
Net interest 
margin (NIM) 
Accounting value of bank's net interest 
revenue as a share of its interest-bearing 
(total earning) assets. 
 
Beck and Al-
Hussainy (2007) 
http://econ.worldbank.org/
staff/tbeck 
Bank 
concentration 
(BKC) 
Assets of three largest banks as a share 
of assets of all commercial banks. 
 
Beck and Al-
Hussainy (2007) 
http://econ.worldbank.org/
staff/tbeck 
Stock market 
turnover 
ratio(STurn) 
Ratio of the value of total shares traded 
to average real market capitalization, 
the denominator is deflated using the 
following method:  
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where is total value traded,  is 
stock market capitalization, is 
teP − end-of period CPI, 1−− teP is 
beginning of period CPI and 
taP − is 
average annual CPI 
Beck and Al-
Hussainy (2007) 
http://econ.worldbank.org/
staff/tbeck 
Deposit 
insurance 
(DIN)  
Explicit deposit insurance=1 otherwise 
=0 
Demirguc-Kunt 
and Sobaci 
(2001); 
Demirguc-Kunt, 
Kane and Levine 
(2006) 
http://econ.worldbank.org 
Market based 
dummy(MB) 
Market based =1 otherwise=0 Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine 
(1999); Levine 
(2002)  
http://econ.worldbank.org 
High income 
dummy (HI) 
High income countries dummy=1 
otherwise=0 
Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine 
(1999) 
http://econ.worldbank.org 
The deposit insurance dummy=1 if a country has explicit deposit insurance or 
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otherwise the dummy =0. Almost all developed and developing nations have explicit 
deposit insurance in place. Yet, some nations like Australia, China, Egypt, Hong Kong, 
Israel, Mauritius, Morocco, Pakistan Singapore and South Africa have no explicit deposit 
insurance but an implicit safety net is effective during the period of the study.  
This study incorporates a dummy which takes a value of 1 (one) if the country is 
market-based and takes a value of 0 (zero) if the countries are bank-based (Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine 1999; Levine 2002). The study uses the “structure index” as developed 
by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 1999. 
In the sample, the market-based countries are Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, 
Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hong Kong, Korea,38 Malaysia, Peru, Singapore, 
South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America. Interestingly, among the emerging markets Chile, Mexico, 
Philippines and Turkey reflect significant development of their stock markets since the 
second half of 1980s thus they are termed as the market based country (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine 1999). The bank based countries are Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Morocco, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka and Venezuela. Yet, India, Indonesia and Pakistan have seen 
some development in their stock markets but they are classified as bank based since 
banks still play a major role in their respective financial system. 
                                                 
38
 Park (1993) considers Korea to be dominated by large banks however; Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(1999) define Korea as market based because the total value traded to GDP ratio is high for Korea. Non 
banks issue more credit to the private sector than banks in Korea. Hence non banks share the centre stage 
with banks.  
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Finally, the analysis could not incorporate the creditor rights index and anti-
director rights index for the whole sample due to lack of information for countries such as 
Bangladesh, Cyprus, Lithuania, Romania, Luxembourg and Mauritius. The definitions of 
these two variables are the same as mentioned earlier in Table 3.4. Yet, the study includes 
a sub-sample analysis to incorporate these two variables. The empirical results are 
reported in Chapter 6. 
3.3.4 Variables related to research question 2 (RQ2) 
In relation to research question 2, the study uses the one factor market model as 
explained by equation 4 in sub-section 3.3.1. The definitions of the risk measures such as 
systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk and total risk are already discussed in sub-section 3.3.1 
and summarized in Table 3.4. The study extends the market model by introducing a 
dummy variable to capture the possibility of a structural change in systematic risk. In the 
analysis, the dummy variable takes on a value of zero for the months from January 1995 
to December 1998, and a value of one from January 1999 to April 2006.  
3.4 METHODOLOGY 
This section discusses the methodology applied in the empirical analysis to test 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 related to the two research questions mentioned in 
Chapter 2. Sub-section 3.4.1 discusses the estimation method used for analysis. Sub-
section 3.4.2 presents the methodology in relation to research question 1. Sub-section 
3.4.3 describes the method used in the analysis of research question 2.  
3.4.1 Empirical model related to research question 1 (RQ1A and RQ1B)  
The study uses pooled-OLS, two stage least squares (2SLS) and pooled OLS with 
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lagged bank capital and charter value. The fundamental assumption for consistency of 
least squares estimators is that the model error is uncorrelated with the regressors. 
However, if this assumption fails the OLS estimator is inconsistent. The two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) estimator provides a consistent estimator under the assumption that valid 
instruments exist and the instruments are variables that are correlated with the regressors. 
This estimation method accounts for endogenous regressors39. Practically, it can be 
difficult to identify valid instruments. Even where such instruments exist these may be 
weakly correlated with endogenous regressors. This study incorporates the lag value of 
the two endogenous variables (bank capital and charter value) and is called the just-
identified case, where the number of instruments exactly equals the number of regressors. 
Additionally, under the 2SLS estimation technique the instruments must be 
relevant. This means after controlling for remaining exogenous variables, the instruments 
must account for significant variation in dependent variable. The stronger the 
identification between instruments and endogenous variables the stronger will be the 
identification of the model. A test for endogeneity is conducted using the Wu-Hausman 
test and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Cameron and Trivedi 2009). This provides a test 
of whether a regressor is endogenous. If there is little difference between OLS and 2SLS 
then there is no need to use instruments and hence the regressors are exogenous. 
Moreover, as part of robust testing, panel techniques are applied to control for 
individual bank heterogeneity. As panel data suggests individual banks, or countries, are 
                                                 
39
 A variable is considered to be endogenous meaning it arises within a system that influences the error 
term, while exogenous variable arises outside the system and is unrelated to the error term.  
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heterogeneous, time series and cross sectional methods that do not control for this 
heterogeneity can result in biased results (Baltagi 2005). However, the fixed effects or 
least squares dummy variable approach (LSDV) may not provide feasible estimation if 
N  is very large since the model incorporates 1−N dummies. Fixed effects estimator 
cannot estimate the effect of time invariant variables like explicit deposit insurance, legal 
origin, geographical proximity or regulation and supervision index. These time invariant 
variables must be eliminated from the regression40 
Given large N the random effects model is a more appropriate specification if N 
individuals are drawn from the population randomly. Under this model, the individual 
effect is characterized as random. Taylor (1980) found that feasible GLS is more efficient 
than LSDV for all but the fewest degrees of freedom. However, it is daunting task to 
decide which method to apply. A specification test proposed by Hausman (1978) is 
widely used to identify between the fixed and random effects estimators. In this regard, 
Mundlak (1978) argued that the random effects model assumes exogeneity of all the 
regressors while fixed effects allows for endogeneity of all the regressors. This study 
incorporates a number of time invariant variables and thus the resulting model focuses a 
random effects approach. 
The initial model considered for the study includes a large number of explanatory 
variables based on the literature survey. Both t-tests and F-tests are used to reduce this 
very general model down to a more parsimonious model. This process is repeated for 
                                                 
40Hence, as ∞→T , the fixed effects estimator is consistent. However, if T  is fixed and ∞→N  then 
the fixed effects estimator of the individual effects not consistent since the number of these parameters 
increases as N  increases (Baltagi 2005; Lancaster 2000).  
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each of the 10 cross-sectional analyses (from 1996 through to 2005). The final 
parsimonious model arising from this process is represented in equation (5). In estimation 
of this final model each of the risk measures is regressed on bank-specific and country-
specific variables. Both two-stage least squares (2SLS)41 and pooled-OLS are used in 
estimation of the model to account for possible endogeneity problems noted in the 
literature (e.g., Galloway, Lee and Roden 1997; Saunders and Wilson 2001; Gonzalez 
2005). 
The test hypotheses discussed in Chapter 2, that the following model (equation 5) 
of European bank equity risk and credit risk is used.  
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         (5) 
where 
tjiUD ,,  = natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j  at period 
t  
1,, −tjiCV  = natural log of charter value for bank i , country j  at period t ; 
1,, −tjiBC  = natural log of bank capital for bank i , in country j  at period t ; 
1,,
2
−tjiBC  = square of the natural log of bank capital for bank i , in country j  at 
period t ;  
tjiOBS ,,  = natural log of off-balance sheet activities for bank i , in country j  at 
                                                 
41
 As noted by Intriligator (1978), 3SLS can be sensitive to specification or measurement error, under these 
condition 2SLS may be preferred. 
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period t ;  
tjiLTA ,,  = loan to total assets for bank i , in country j  at period t ;  
tjiSize ,,  = natural log of market value of equity for bank i , in country j , period t ;  
tjEFI ,  = economic freedom index for country j  at period t , 
tiiY ,φ  = year dummies for period 1997 to 2005 and; 
tji ,,ε  = random error term.  
Log transformation is used for all explanatory variables as well as for credit risk, 
idiosyncratic risk and total risk (Section 3.3, sub-section 3.3.1). The White (1980) 
consistent variance-covariance is used to adjust for heteroscedaticity. 
An extended version of the base model (equation 5) is also used in the analysis 
(see equation 6 below). This includes the impact of operating leverage and dividend yield 
as well as various country specific factors that could explain cross-sectional variation in 
bank risk. The base model is expanded by introducing operating leverage and dividend 
yield as well as a number of dummy variables.  
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where 
tjiOPL ,,  = natural logarithm of operating leverage for bank i , country j
 
at period t ;  
tjiDY ,,  = dividend yield for bank i , country j at period t ;  
jD1  = bank specialization dummy where jD1 =1 if commercial banks or 
otherwise 0;   
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jD2  = legal origin variable where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 2 if French 
civil law countries, 3 if German civil-law countries and 4 if Scandinavian civil 
law countries;   
jD3  = geographical dummy where jD3 =1 if euro-zone countries or otherwise 0; 
jD4  = creditor rights index and; 
jD5  = anti-director rights index. 
Analysis of research question 1 (RQ1A) using data from around the world also 
relies on the variables in equation (5) along with a series of dummy variables as well as 
country–level variables. The model is given below: 
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where,  
jD1  = bank specialization dummy where jD1 =1 if commercial banks or 
otherwise 0;   
jD2  = legal origin variable where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 2 if French 
civil 
tjBNC ,  = Bank concentration for country j  at period t ;  
tjNIM .  = Net interest margin for country j  at period t ; 
tjSTurn .  = Stock market turnover ratio for country j  at period t ;   
tjDIN .  = explicit deposit insurance dummy =1, otherwise=0; 
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tjMB .  = market based country dummy =1, otherwise=0; 
tjHI .  = High income country dummy =1, otherwise=0; 
With regard to research question 1 (RQ1B) using both data sets (European and the 
world samples), it is important to test for the general fit of the model. Given the 10 year 
span of the analysis it is also important to test for the possibility of structural change, 
particularly given the formation of EMU. For this reason the sample is split into two, 
with 1999 being the year most associated with the formation of EMU chosen as the break 
point. This facilitates tests for structural change between the pre-EMU period (1996-
1998) and the post-EMU period (1999-2005). Both pooled-OLS and panel techniques are 
used in testing for structural change using the following model: 
ijtttijttijtijt YXDXRisk εδββα +Σ+∗++= ∆    (8) 
where, tjiX ,,  = bank-specific characteristics for bank i  in country j  at period t . 
These variables are same as the explanatory variables identified in equation (5) 
and equation (6) for research question 1. tD  = time dummy, where tD = 1 for 
post-euro period and tD = 0 for pre-euro period;  
tjit XD ,,∗  = interaction term between each bank-specific variable tjiX ,,  with the 
time dummy and;  
tY  is year dummy variable.  
3.4.2 Empirical model related to research question 2 (RQ2)  
Following Binder (1985) and Bundt Cosimano and Halloran (1992) the market 
model in equation (1) is extended by introducing a dummy variable to capture the 
possibility of a structural change in systematic risk. In the analysis the dummy variable 
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takes on a value of zero for the months of January 1995 to December 1998 and a value of 
one from January 1999 to April 2006.42 The model is written as: 
( ) ( ) ittmtprepostmtpretprepostpreit DRRDR εβββααα ~~~~ +−++−+=   (9) 
where, tD = 0 pre-euro period January 1995 - December 1998 and tD =1 post -
euro January 1999 – April 2006.  This model is estimated using individual bank returns 
as well as the returns from an equally weighted bank portfolio and a market-value 
weighted bank portfolio. The study also applies equation (9) to FTSE world bank indices 
for each country to measure the change in systematic risk with the EMU.  
In addition, following Kane and Unal (1988) this study uses the unorthogonalized 
two index model.43 The model is as follows:  
itttmtmttpreit IDRRDR εββββα ~~~~ 4321 +++++=    (10) 
where, =tI  10 year benchmark bond for each euro zone country. =2β pre-euro 
beta, =3β  changes in systematic risk , =4β interest rate risk,  It= monthly change in the 
interest rate on the 10 year government bond and itε = disturbance term on the individual 
and on the portfolio on month t.  
3.5 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
This section discusses the descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for the 
                                                 
42One exception is Greece where the analysis considers January 1995- December 2000 as the pre euro 
period and January 2001 – April 2006 as the post euro period. 
43Chane and Lane (1980) among others have orthogonalized the two index model but Kane and Unal (1988) 
show orthogonalization procedure provides bias t-statistics. In addition, following Kane and Unal (1988) 
the thesis uses the long term government bonds as a proxy for the interest rate.  
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variables used in the analysis. Sub-section 3.5.1 discusses descriptive statistics and 
correlation for data used in the test of research question 1(RQ1). Sub-section 3.5.2 
presents the descriptive statistics for data covering research question 2 (RQ2). 
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix related to research question 1 
(RQ1)  
With respect to research question 1 (RQ1A and RQ1B), the descriptive statistics 
for the sample used in this study are reported in Panels A and B of Table 3.7 for the 
European bank sample. The mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness 
and kurtosis for each of the bank risk measures (credit risk, systematic risk, total risk, 
interest rate risk and idiosyncratic risk) are reported in Panel A of Table 3.7. 
The average credit risk value (the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets) is 
1% with a standard deviation of 1%. The average equity market beta for the sample is 
0.39, with standard deviation of 0.50 and the average interest rate risk parameter is 0.17, 
with a standard deviation of 0.20. The idiosyncratic risk and total risk measures are 
expressed in terms of natural logs though the underlying average standard deviation per 
annum is around 18% for total risk and 16% for idiosyncratic risk.44 
Mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness and kurtosis are also 
reported for the explanatory variables in Panel B of Table 3.7. There is some variation in 
the European bank off-balance sheet activities with average off-balance sheet activities 
                                                 
44Given a natural log of total risk of -7.35 per week then the variance is 0.000643 per week and the standard 
deviation per annum estimate is sqrt(0.000643)*sqrt(52) or 0.1828 per annum. Given a natural log of 
idiosyncratic  risk of -7.62 per week then the variance is 0.000491 per week and the standard deviation 
per annum estimate is sqrt(0.000491)*sqrt(52) or 0.1597 per annum. These estimates appear reasonable, 
particularly given the use of a two factor model and the nature of the underlying distributions. 
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amounting to 52% of total assets. Financial leverage, or bank capital, ranges from 2% to 
95% and charter value ranges from 0.87 to 1.79 with an average value of 1.02. Uninsured 
deposits measured as a proportion of total liabilities averages 0.16 with a minimum of 
zero and a maximum of 0.97.  
The economic freedom index is obtained for each country for each of the years in 
the study period. The highest economic freedom index value is observed for Ireland and 
the lowest is for Greece. The creditor rights index ranges from 0 to 4, with a maximum 
for the United Kingdom and the minimum for France. 
99 
 
Table 3.7 
Descriptive statistics for European bank sample (RQ1) 
This table presents descriptive statistics for bank risks and explanatory variables. The study uses annual 
observations of bank specific variables and time invariant variables for listed bank shares in euro-zone and 
non-euro-zone countries. The total number of observations across the sample is 910, with 10 years of data 
for 91 banks. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of bank equity risk, interest rate risk and credit risk. 
The total risk and idiosyncratic risk are expressed in terms of natural logs. Panel B presents the descriptive 
statistics of the bank specific and country specific variables. Skew presents skewness and kurt presents 
kurtosis. Natural log of risk measures are reported for all risk measures except for systematic risk.  
 
Panel A Descriptive statistics of bank risk measures 
 Mean Std. dev Min Max Skew Kurt 
Credit risk 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.06 3.57 27.63 
Systematic risk 0.39 0.50 -1.27 3.32 0.99 1.35 
Natural log of total risk -7.35 1.23 -12.01 -3.37 -0.19 0.53 
Interest rate  risk  0.173 0.20 0.00 2.11 2.98 16.00 
Natural log of idiosyncratic risk -7.62 1.10 -12.05 -3.40 -0.18 1.38 
 
Panel B Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables 
 Mean Std. dev Min Max Skew Kurt 
Bank level variables       
Dividend yield (DY) 3.00 1.97 0 13.16 1.43 3.37 
Operating leverage (OPL) 0.02 0.20 0.00 5.71 28.86 835.08 
Uninsured deposits (UD) 0.16 0.14 0.00 0.97 2.53 10.56 
Charter value (CV) 1.02 0.07 0.87 1.79 4.41 35.68 
Bank capital (BC) 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.95 6.38 84.13 
Bank capital squared (BC2) 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.90 20.40 447.46 
Off balance sheet activities (OBS) 0.52 1.37 0.01 21.51 9.98 126.99 
Loan to total assets (LTA) 0.60 0.15 0.01 0.92 -0.65 0.85 
Size 5.77 2.50 1.17 11.33 0.36 -0.91 
Country level variables       
Economic freedom index (EFI) 68.65 5.77 55.60 82.40 0.00 -0.67 
Bank specialization dummy (D1) 0.77 0.42 0 1 -1.31 -0.28 
Legal origin dummy (D2) 3.04 1.03 1 4 -0.33 -1.51 
Euro-zone dummy(D3) 0.46 0.50 0 1 0.14 -1.98 
Creditor rights index(D4) 2.12 1.01 0 4 -0.59 -0.82 
Anti-director rights index(D5) 2.35 0.96 0 5 0.57 0.03 
The anti-director rights index ranges from 0 to 5 with a maximum value of 5 for 
the United Kingdom and a minimum value of 0 for Belgium.  
The pair-wise correlation coefficients are also calculated and reported in Table 3.8 
for the independent variables with just two large correlation coefficients evident in this 
analysis though most are statistically significantly different from zero at 5% significance 
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level. 
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Table 3.8 
Correlation Analysis for European bank sample (RQ1) 
The table represents the pairwise correlation analysis among the choice of variables. The correlation among the explanatory variables is as low as 0% 
between the operating leverage and economic freedom index and as high as -66% between size and bank capital squared. **Correlation is significant at 
the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). OPL=operating leverage, DY=dividend yield; UD=uninsured deposits; 
CV=charter value; BC=bank capital; BC2=bank capital squared; OBS=off-balance sheet activities;; LTA=loan to total assets; EFI=Economic freedom 
index; D1= ownership dummy; D2= legal origin dummy; D3= euro zone dummy; D4= creditor rights index; D5= anti director rights index.  
 
 OPL DY UD CV BC BC 2 OBS LTA Size EFI D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 
OPL 1 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.06 .06 0.01 0.01 -0.04 .00 .03 .04 -.04 .04 -.02 
DY -0.02 1 0.01 -0.14** -0.09* -.10** -.13** .12** -0.03 -.13** -.12** .01 .00 -.16** .27** 
UD -0.03 .01 1 0.14** -0.27** -.32** .18** -.13** .42** -.07 -.05 -.23** .29** -.11** .07* 
CV -0.04 -0.14** 0.14** 1 -0.04 -.10** .06 .03 .45** -.12** .10** -.42** .32** -.20** .25** 
BC 0.06 -.09* -0.27** -.04 1 .88** .05 .18** -.53** .05 .32** .31** -.33** .28** .02 
BC2 0.06 -.10** -0.32** -.10** .88** 1 .11** .21** -.66** .13** .26** .45** -.48** .39** -.15** 
OBS 0.01 -.13** 0.18** 0.06 .05 .11** 1 -.19** .01 -.22** .19** .19** -.05 .16** -.28** 
LTA 0.01 .12** -0.13** 0.03 .18** .21** -.19** 1 -.19** .20** -.09* .17** -.27** .12** .20** 
Size -0.04 -.03 0.42** 0.45** -.53** -.66** .01 -0.19** 1 -.09** -.16** -.63** .56** -.35** .21** 
EFI 0.00 -.13** -0.07 -0.12** .05 .13** -.22** .20** -.09** 1 .02 .36** -.55** .40** .02 
D1 0.03 -.12** -0.05 0.10** .32** .26** .19** -0.09* -.16** .02 1 .24** -.18** .09** .25** 
D2 0.04 .01 -0.23** -0.42** .31** .45** .19** .17** -.63** .36** .24** 1 -.84** .66** -.29** 
D3 -0.04 .00 0.29** 0.32** -.33** -.48** -.05 -.27** .56** -.55** -.18** -.84** 1 -.68** .14** 
D4 0.04 -.16** -0.11** -0.20** .28** .39** .16** .12** -.35** .40** .09** .66** -.68** 1 -.27** 
D5 -0.02 .27** 0.07* 0.25** .016 -.15** -.28** .20** .21** .02 .25** -.29** .14** -.27** 1 
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The two correlation coefficients are for bank capital and size (-53%) and squared 
bank capital and size (-66%). Given the magnitude of these coefficients the empirical 
analysis is repeated both with and without the size variable with little impact on the 
reported results.45 
The descriptive statistics in relation to research question 1 (RQ1) using banks 
from across the world are reported in Panel A and Panel B of Table 3.9. With the 
exception of systematic risk, all variables are converted into natural logarithms. Mean, 
standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness and kurtosis are reported for the 
explanatory variables in Panel B of Table 3.9. There is some variation in the off-balance 
sheet activities as a percentage of total liabilities with average off-balance sheet activities 
amounting to approximately 29%. Financial leverage, or bank capital, ranges from -
1.21% to 98.6% and charter value ranges from 0.03 to 5.9 with a mean value of 1.05. 
Uninsured deposits measured as a proportion of total liabilities averages 0.07 with a 
minimum of -2.67 and a maximum of 22.80.  
Bank concentration ratio ranges from 0.163 to 1 while net interest margin ranges 
from a minimum 0.006 to a maximum 0.235. USA has the lowest bank concentration 
while South Africa has the highest ratio. Net interest margin is the lowest for Ireland and 
the highest for Venezuela. The stock market turnover ratio shows an average of 1.05 with 
a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 4.95. The highest turnover ratio is observed in 
Pakistan. 
                                                 
45No change was made to the base model, or the extended model, given that there is little evidence of 
multicollinearity problems in the data. 
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Table 3.9 
Descriptive statistics of the sample related to research question 1 (RQ1) 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the second set of data for all risk measures and explanatory 
variables used in relation to research question 1 (RQ1) for the world. Panel A describes the descriptive 
statistics of bank equity risk and credit risk measures. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of the 
explanatory variables including bank level variables and country level variables. Skew presents skewness 
and kurt presents kurtosis. Natural log of risk measures are reported for all risk measures except for 
systematic risk.  
Panel A Descriptive statistics of bank risk measures-world analysis 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skew Kurt Obs 
Natural log of Credit risk (LLP/TA) -2.499 0.482 -6.188 -0.111 -0.407 5.116 7222 
Natural log of Credit risk (LLR/TA) -1.901 0.365 -4.275 0.172 0.077 6.701 7125 
Systematic risk 0.489 0.518 -3.168 4.070 0.472 4.918 6670 
Natural log of Total risk -2.856 0.560 -10.987 0.001 -1.941 26.033 6712 
Natural log of Idiosyncratic risk -2.959 0.550 -10.995 0.001 -1.537 23.654 6656 
Panel B Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables-world analysis 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Skew Kurt Obs 
Bank-level variables        
Dividend yield (DY) 2.575 12.841 0 716.810 46.577 2412.786 6935 
Operating 
leverage(OPL) 
0.022 0.099 0 6.537 60.268 3754.085 7823 
Uninsured deposits 
(UD) 
0.068 0.405 -2.668 22.801 42.408 2094.865 7720 
Charter value(CV) 1.046 0.161 0.031 5.904 19.380 717.321 7139 
Bank capital (BC) 0.082 0.053 -0.012 0.986 -0.242 111.097 7833 
Off balance sheet  
activities  (OBS) 
0.287 1.460 -3.968 81.366 30.305 1404.424 7425 
Loan to total assets 
(LTA) 
0.598 0.150 0 1.491 -0.811 4.282 7830 
Size 7.698 2.973 -3.912 17.970 0.369 2.899 7126 
Country-level  
variables 
       
Bank concentration 
(BNC) 
0.442 0.209 0.163 1 0.812 2.567 7838 
Net interest margin 
(NIM) 
0.038 0.022 0.006 0.235 3.403 20.629 7837 
Stock market  
Turnover (STurn) 
1.054 0.745 0 4.948 1.324 5.909 7840 
Deposit insurance  
Dummy(DIN) 
0.904 0.295 0 1 -2.737 8.493 7842 
Economic freedom 
 Index (EFI) 
69.168 9.850 38.716 90.512 -0.533 2.481 7758 
market based=1 vs  
bank based=0 (MB) 
0.584 0.493 0 1 -0.339 1.115 7842 
Legal origin (D2) 0.556 0.497 0 1 -0.227 1.052 7842 
Creditor rights (D4) 1.848 1.167 0 4 0.680 2.325 7561 
Anti-director rights 
(D5) 
3.854 1.339 0 5 -0.779 2.224 7464 
Commercial bank=1, 
otherwise=0 (D1) 
0.592 0.492 0 1 -0.373 1.139 7842 
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High income 
economies=1 
otherwise=0 (HI) 
0.710 0.454 0 1 -0.924 1.854 7842 
The economic freedom index is the highest in Hong Kong in 1996 at 90.5 while 
the lowest is observed for Bangladesh at 38.15 in 1995 followed by Venezuela at 45.04 in 
2006. The creditor rights index ranges from 0 to 4, with a maximum for Egypt, Hong 
Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore and the United Kingdom 
and the minimum for China, Colombia, France, Mexico, Philippines and Peru. The anti-
director rights index ranges from 0 to 5 with a maximum value of 5 for Canada, 
Colombia, Hong Kong, India, Pakistan, South Africa, the United States of America and 
the United Kingdom and a minimum value of 0 for Belgium.  
Commercial banks are dominated in Australia, Europe and Canada while bank 
holding companies are dominated in the USA. Explicit deposit insurance is present in all 
countries except for Australia, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Hong Kong, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Pakistan, Singapore and South Africa where it could be argued that implicit safety net 
exists. 
The pair-wise correlation matrix reported in Table 3.10 on next page, shows no 
particularly high correlation among the independent variables such as bank capital, 
charter value, off-balance sheet activities, market discipline and loan to total assets 
though most coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero. Size and bank 
capital correlation is -39% while size and charter value is only 7%. The commercial bank 
dummy, legal origin dummy and market based dummy are highly correlated among each 
other. High income economy dummy and economic freedom index show a correlation of 
65%. Similar results are also observed between market based dummy and economic 
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freedom index. 
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Table 3.10 
Correlation analysis for banks across the world (RQ1) 
This table presents the correlation matrix for the second set of data for the explanatory variables used in relation to research question 1 (RQ1) for the 
world analysis The table presents the pair-wise correlation matrix for the bank specific and country specific variables. *Correlation is significant at the 
0.01 level (2-tailed). +Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). DY=dividend yield; OPL=operating leverage, BC=bank capital; BC2=bank 
capital squared; CV=charter value; OBS=off-balance sheet activities; UD=uninsured deposits; LTA=loan to total assets; CONC=bank concentration; 
NIM=net interest margin; TURN= stock turnover ratio; DIN=deposit insurance; EFI=economic freedom index; MD=market based system; CL=common 
law country dummy; CB=commercial bank dummy; HI=high income country dummy. 
 
 DY OPL BC BC2  CV OBS  UD Size LTA CONC NIM Turn DIN EFI MD CL 
OPL  0.01 1.00               
BC 0.02+ 0.21* 1.00              
BC2 -0.02+ -0.18* -0.97* 1.00             
CV  -0.03+ -0.09* 0.05* -0.06* 1.00            
OBS  0.03+ -0.01 -0.01 0.03+ -0.04* 1.00           
UD  0.02 -0.07* 0.05* -0.04* 0.00 0.38* 1.00          
Size -0.06* -0.14* -0.39* 0.37* 0.07* 0.14* -0.19* 1.00         
LTA  0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.03* 0.01 -0.13* -0.08* -0.10* 1.00        
CONC  0.06* -0.03+ -0.05* 0.06* -0.10* 0.47* 0.35* 0.12* -0.15* 1.00       
NIM  0.07* 0.32* 0.36* -0.31* -0.05* 0.11* 0.00 -0.32* -0.20* -0.05* 1.00      
TURN  -0.03+ -0.07* -0.01 0.00 0.10* -0.25* -0.06* -0.16* 0.10* -0.37* -0.11* 1.00     
DIN  -0.08* 0.04* 0.04* -0.04* 0.04* -0.15* -0.15* -0.08* 0.05* -0.35* 0.11* 0.03* 1.00    
EFI  -0.01 -0.04* 0.22* -0.24* 0.06* -0.47* -0.14* -0.26* 0.27* -0.35* -0.12* 0.26+ 0.07* 1.00   
MD  -0.01 0.05* 0.38* -0.36* 0.08* -0.22* -0.05* -0.40* 0.10* -0.24* 0.19* 0.29* 0.08* 0.65* 1  
CL  0.03+ -0.13* 0.14* -0.16* 0.14* -0.20* -0.07* -0.38* 0.12* -0.44* -0.07* 0.35* -0.18* 0.35* 0.43* 1 
CB  0.01 0.03* -0.29* 0.29* -0.18* 0.46* 0.13* 0.44* -0.15* 0.54* -0.10* -0.38* -0.19* -0.63* -0.60* -0.59* 
HI 0.00 -0.15* -0.01 -0.03* 0.06* -0.41* -0.09* -0.16* 0.25* -0.20* -0.32* 0.20* 0.16* 0.65* 0.29* 0.12* 
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3.5.2 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix related to research 
question 2 (RQ2)  
The descriptive statistics for the individual European banks in euro-zone and non- 
euro-zone European countries are reported in Table 3.11. The mean return for banks in 
euro-zone countries ranges from 0.60% per month for German banks to 2.00% per month 
for Irish banks whereas the return variability ranges from 4.40% per month for Austrian 
banks to 17.00% per month for Finnish banks. The bank returns in euro-zone countries 
show positive kurtosis in all cases. Average excess kurtosis ranges from 1.33 for Irish 
banks to 19.45 for the Dutch banks. Both maximum and minimum average returns are 
generated by banks from Finland.  
The cross-country correlation is reported in Table 3.12. Panel A to Panel C of 
Table 3.12, show the correlation among bank equity market returns in euro-zone 
countries over the period of January 1995 to April 2006. Panel A shows high correlation 
among banks in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain. The highest correlation is 95.80%, between Austria and Finland 
banks and between banks from France and Ireland. The lowest correlation is observed 
between Portugal and Spain banks at 14.00%.  
The total sample period is also divided between the pre-euro period and the post-
euro period. Panel B of Table 3.12, presents the correlation among the euro-zone bank 
index returns pre-euro period (January 1995 to December 1998). Relatively high 
correlation is found among the euro-zone bank returns. The highest correlation is 
reported at 90.90% between Italian and Portuguese banks. 
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Table 3.11 
Descriptive statistics for European bank sample (RQ2) 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the sample in relation to research question 2 (RQ2). The 
table reports descriptive statistics for monthly returns for the equity markets used in the data analyses for 
the euro-zone countries Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom). All returns are in the 
local currency. The number of banks included in the sample from each country is reported. It should be 
noted that for the Finnish bank, Alandsbanken, both the A and the B shares are included in the sample. This 
leads to a total number of 96 banks with 97 listed shares that are subject to analysis.  
NOB = number of banks.  
 
 Mean Median St.Dev Max. Min. Skew Kurt Obs. NOB 
Euro zone          
Austria 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.23 -0.21 0.70 6.57 613 5 
Belgium 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.26 -0.39 -0.65 3.00 385 3 
Finland 0.01 0.00 0.17 1.10 -1.14 -0.02 18.74 753 6 
France 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.30 -0.52 -1.12 8.28 1035 7 
Germany 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.83 -0.67 0.12 12.33 1468 11 
Greece 0.02 0.01 0.14 1.01 -0.67 0.97 5.99 1360 9 
Ireland 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.31 -0.28 -0.21 1.33 544 4 
Italy 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.94 -0.56 0.89 8.86 3773 28 
Netherlands 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.95 -0.41 1.48 19.45 544 4 
Portugal 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.44 -0.28 0.66 5.05 774 6 
Spain 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.41 -0.40 0.13 5.26 816 14 
Total listed 
shares 
        97 
Non euro-zone           
Denmark 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.91 -0.41 2.78 34.78 6056 44 
Norway 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.23 -0.40 -0.92 5.59 272 2 
Sweden 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.46 -0.63 -0.75 6.65 638 5 
Switzerland 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.55 -0.55 -0.21 13.08 3621 26 
United 
Kingdom 
0.01 0.01 0.09 0.44 -0.45 -0.49 3.05 986 8 
Total listed 
shares 
        85 
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Table 3.12 
Correlation analysis for European banks (RQ2) 
This table presents the correlation matrix of the sample in relation to research question 2 (RQ2). Panel A provides correlations of bank equity returns for 
the full period, January 1995 to April 2006. Panel B presents the correlations of bank equity market returns before the formation of Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) (January 1995 to December 1998. Panel C represents the correlations of bank equity market returns after the formation of EMU 
(January 1995 to April 2006). For Finland the DataStream bank index is used as no other bank indexes were available.  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Panel A: Correlation of bank equity market returns, January 1995 to April 2006 
 Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain 
Austria 1 .423** .958** .855** .161 .244* .842** .484** .407** -.369** .681** 
Belgium .423** 1 .543** .582** .815** .676** .633** .839** .890** .730** .753** 
Finland .958** .543** 1 .932** .301** .269** .937** .640** .551** -.345** .813** 
France .855** .582** .932** 1 .459** .328** .941** .781** .671** -.258* .926** 
Germany .161 .815** .301** .459** 1 .711** .376** .796** .904** .879** .686** 
Greece .244* .676** .269** .328** .711** 1 .157 .597** .818** .608** .521** 
Ireland .842** .633** .937** .941** .376** .157 1 .777** .645** -.414** .903** 
Italy .484** .839** .640** .781** .796** .597** .777** 1 .875** .599** .939** 
Netherlands .407** .890** .551** .671** .904** .818** .645** .875** 1 .748** .845** 
Portugal -.369** .730** -.345** -.258* .879** .608** -.414** .599** .748** 1 .140 
Spain .681** .753** .813** .926** .686** .521** .903** .939** .845** 0.140 1 
Panel B: Correlation of bank equity market return, January 1995 to December 1998 
 Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain 
Austria 1 .564** .373** .546** .586** .650 .392** .456** .632** .863* .559** 
Belgium .564** 1 .362* .601** .591** .330 .391** .543** .534** .355 .470** 
Finland .373** .362* 1 .400** .624** .717 .639** .353* .475** .467 .443** 
France .546** .601** .400** 1 .723** .758* .540** .651** .712** .782* .709** 
Germany .586** .591** .624** .723** 1 .770* .523** .559** .718** .795* .581** 
Greece .650 .330 .717 .758* .770* 1 .714 .811* .646 .778* .834* 
Ireland .392** .391** .639** .540** .523** .714 1 .421** .539** .270 .588** 
Italy .456** .543** .353* .651** .559** .811* .421** 1 .525** .909** .655** 
Netherlands .632** .534** .475** .712** .718** .646 .539** .525** 1 .778* .547** 
Portugal .863* .355 .467 .782* .795* .778* .270 .909** .778* 1 .787* 
Spain .559** .470** .443** .709** .581** .834* .588** .655** .547** .787* 1 
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Panel C: Correlation of bank equity market return, January 1999 to April 2006 
 
 
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain 
Austria 1 .406** .088 .294** .416** .229* .247* .198 .426** .217* .241* 
Belgium .406** 1 .288** .683** .689** .421** .445** .517** .824** .585** .631** 
Finland .088 .288** 1 .225* .265* .194 .197 .285** .222* .283** .279** 
France .294** .683** .225* 1 .721** .434** .452** .487** .766** .471** .670** 
Germany .416** .689** .265* .721** 1 .496** .342** .592** .717** .552** .703** 
Greece .229* .421** .194 .434** .496** 1 .383** .270* .385** .355** .475** 
Ireland .247* .445** .197 .452** .342** .383** 1 .353** .490** .212* .545** 
Italy .198 .517** .285** .487** .592** .270* .353** 1 .592** .276** .733** 
Netherlands .426** .824** .222* .766** .717** .385** .490** .592** 1 .512** .744** 
Portugal .217* .585** .283** .471** .552** .355** .212* .276** .512** 1 .463** 
Spain .241* .631** .279** .670** .703** .475** .545** .733** .744** .463** 1 
 
111 
 
112 
Further, Panel C of Table 3.12 shows the correlations between bank index returns 
are generally lower during the post-euro period (January 1999 to April 2006). Austria, 
Finland and Ireland bank equity market indices exhibit lower correlations with the 
countries in the sample. For instance, Austria exhibits the lowest correlation at 9% with 
Finland. Lower correlations are also evident for Greek banks, perhaps consistent with its 
late entry to the EMU in 2001 (Ferreira and Ferreira 2006).  
It is also found the bank returns correlation between Belgium and other major 
countries including France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain 
increased with the introduction of euro. For example, the correlation between Belgium 
and the Netherlands is 82.40%. Similarly, German bank returns show evidence of 
increased correlation with Spanish and Italian bank returns during the post-euro period. 
However, the correlation has decreased for French and Dutch banks after the introduction 
of euro but it remains high at 76.6%. The less than perfect positive correlation among the 
banks suggests that there is potential to reduce risk through diversification (Akhigbe and 
Whyte 2004). Thus, the decline in correlation among banks suggests that the benefits of 
portfolio diversification may have increased over the time for this group of banks. 
3.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the data and methodology proposed to test the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 2 to address the research questions identified in Chapter 1. Section 
3.2 described the sample units, data sources, sampling procedure, sample composition 
and data coverage. The main source of bank specific data is extracted from BankScope 
database, with corresponding market return and market index obtained from DataStream 
International. All macroeconomic/country-level data are extracted from the Heritage 
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Foundation and World Bank IFC statistics.  
Section 3.3 discussed the measure of the bank risk and its determinants in relation 
to the research questions 1 (RQ1A and RQ1B) and research question 2 (RQ2). Section 
3.4 discussed the methodology and then extended it to define the multivariate regression 
equation models used to test the hypotheses discussed in Chapter 2. Finally, Section 3.5 
provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. 
The next three chapters will describe the results of testing the hypotheses laid out 
in Chapter 2 using the empirical methods proposed in this chapter. Specifically, Chapter 
4 is devoted to the identifying determinants of European bank equity risk. Chapter 5 then 
discusses the structural changes in European bank equity risk and Finally, Chapter 6 
focuses more broadly on the determinants of bank risk at the world banking system level. 
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CHAPTER 4  
FACTORS DETERMING EUROPEAN BANK RISKS: 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the results in relation to research question 1 (RQ1) using 
the European bank sample. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 
4.2 represents the main results on effects of risk factors related to the base model 
(equation 5 as mentioned in Chapter 3, Section 3.4). Section 4.3 discusses the extended 
model (equation 6 as mentioned in Chapter 3, Section 3.4) where additional bank-specific 
variables and country-specific variables are included. Section 4.4 repeats the results from 
analyses of the impact of EMU on the risk factors. This also provides a check of the 
stability of the estimated models over the 10 year period of the study. Section 4.5 
discusses the robustness tests and analysis. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 EFFECTS OF RISK FACTORS: BASE MODEL 
Table 4.1 reports the empirical results for all five risk measures. The table 
represents the results under both pooled-OLS and two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimation methods. It seems that the results are not generally sensitive to the estimation 
methods. However, the Hausman chi-square test is statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level and hence 2SLS estimation is preferable to pooled-OLS. 
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Table 4.1 
Determinants of European Bank Equity Risks and Credit Risk  
This table represents the pooled-OLS and two-stage least squares regression results for bank characteristics. The following equation has been applied to 
generate the results.  
 
tjitjtjitjitjitjitjitjitjiijt EFISizeLTAOBSBCBCCVUDRISK ,,,1..7,,6,,5
2
,,4,,3,,2,,10 εγβββββββα +++++++++=  
(1) 
tjiRISK ,, presents the bank equity risks and credit risk. The bank equity risks include systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk, interest rate risk and total risk for 
individual bank i  in country j at period t . All bank equity risks are measured using the two index market model. The estimation techniques are provided 
in equation (3) and equation (4). Further, the credit risk includes the credit risk which is measured using 
tjitjitji TALLPCR ,,,,,, /= .where; tjiCR ,,  is the credit risk 
measure for bank i  in country j in period t ; or the ex-post realized risk. 
tjiLLP ,,
 is the loan loss provision for bank i  in country j in period t ; 
tjiTA ,,  is the 
total assets of bank i  in country j in period t . The explanatory variables such as 
tjiUD ,, is the natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at 
period t , 
tjiCV ,,  is the natural log of charter value for bank i , country j in period t tjiBC ,,  is the natural log of bank capital for bank i , in country j  in 
period t , tjiBC ,,2  is the natural log of bank capital squared for bank i , in country j  in period t , 
tjiOBS ,,  is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities for 
bank i , in country j  at period t ,
tjiLTA ,, is the loan to total assets for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiSize ,, is the natural log of market value of equity for 
bank i , in country j , in period t and 
tjEFI ,
 is the economic freedom index for country j  at period t . Finally, ti,ε  is the random error term. The joint F-
test for the year dummies are statistically significant for all risk measures. All results are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † indicates the coefficients of 
the explanatory variables and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
 
    Pooled-OLS regression       Two-Stage Least Square regression 
 
Credit risk Systematic  
risk 
Total risk Interest 
rate risk 
Idiosyncratic 
risk 
Credit risk Systematic 
risk 
Total risk Interest rate 
risk 
Idiosyncratic 
risk 
Intercept 0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.746*** 
(0.206) 
-5.990*** 
(0.615) 
0.370*** 
(0.117) 
-6.314*** 
(0.614) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.617*** 
(0.250) 
-3.494*** 
(0.490) 
-0.032 
(0.178) 
3.728*** 
(.310) 
Uninsured 
deposits  
0.001*** 
(0.018)† 
-0.050*** 
(0.014) 
0.050** 
(0.025) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
0.070** 
(0.032) 
0.004†** 
(0.002)† 
-0.042*** 
(0.019) 
0.034** 
(0.014) 
0.003 
(0.017) 
0.056** 
(0.025) 
Charter value -0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.505** 
(0.208) 
3.691*** 
(0.610) 
0.204 
(0.173) 
3.091*** 
(0.627) 
-0.005†*** 
(0.002) 
0.603** 
(0.254) 
2.926*** 
(0.586) 
-0.221 
(0.295) 
2.614*** 
(0.382) 
Bank capital -0.031†** 
(0.015)† 
-0.131** 
(0.059) 
-0.097 
(0.146) 
-0.002 
(0.033) 
-0.010 
(0.155) 
-0.025** 
(0.012) 
-0.122*** 
(0.045) 
-0.290* 
(0.167) 
-0.005 
(0.067) 
-0.203* 
(0.119) 
Bank capital 
squared 
0.146***† 
(0.045)† 
0.086** 
(0.036) 
-0.166* 
(0.092) 
-0.033 
(0.020) 
-0.186** 
(0.096) 
-0.012†** 
(0.006)† 
0.075** 
(0.034) 
-0.115* 
(0.064) 
0.010 
(0.030) 
-0.098** 
(0.050) 
Off-balance 
sheet 
0.033***† 
(0.013)† 
0.050*** 
(0.012) 
0.106*** 
(0.030) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.067** 
(0.030) 
0.063***† 
(0.016)† 
0.062*** 
(0.014) 
0.084*** 
(0.025) 
-0.017* 
(0.009) 
0.067*** 
(0.015) 
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activities 
Loan to total 
assets 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.218*** 
(0.073) 
-0.588** 
(0.246) 
0.025 
(0.045) 
-0.235 
(0.242) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.245*** 
(0.079) 
-0.162 
(0.196) 
-0.012 
(0.062) 
0.032 
(0.124) 
Size -0.03***† 
(0.01)† 
0.149*** 
(0.008) 
0.087*** 
(0.028) 
-0.041† 
(0.006) 
-0.026*** 
(0.010) 
-0.040***† 
(0.015)† 
0.148*** 
(0.011) 
0.065†*** 
(0.022) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
-0.053*** 
(0.014) 
Economic 
freedom  
index 
-0.007*† 
(0.004)† 
-0.013*** 
(0.003) 
-0.041*** 
(0.007) 
-
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.034*** 
(0.007) 
0.003† 
(0.003)† 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.025*** 
(0.010) 
0.038† 
(0.002) 
-0.028*** 
(0.003) 
Year dummy 
1996-2005 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj R2 
Model test 
Breusch Pagan χ2 
Joint F-test for 
year dummies  
Hausman chi-sq 
Number of obs. 
0.23 
F[17,1011]=14 
558.70 
 
2.48*** 
- 
1029 
0.59 
F[17,1011]=69 
257.32 
 
7.61*** 
 
1029 
0.35 
F[17,1011]=23 
103.87 
 
6.91*** 
- 
1029 
0.10 
F[17,1011]=5 
356.60 
 
1.89*** 
- 
1029 
0.20 
F[17,1011]=11 
100.44 
 
5.32*** 
 
1029 
0.22 
F[17,995]=5 
- 
- 
0.34 
16.65∗∗∗ 
1012 
0.57 
F[17,1011]=69 
- 
- 
6.87*** 
9.07∗∗∗ 
1015 
-0.57 
F[17,1011]=23 
- 
 
5.70*** 
19∗∗∗ 
1015 
0.08 
F[17,1014]=4 
- 
- 
3.18*** 
6.50∗ 
1015 
0.20 
F[17,1014]=10 
- 
- 
3.93*** 
31∗∗∗ 
1015 
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The findings show a positive and statistically significant association between off-
balance sheet items and bank risks. The result is consistent with hypothesis H3 (Chapter 
2, Section 2.3.3). This supports the argument that off-balance sheet activities are 
contingent claims or contracts that generate fee income for banks but also create a 
balance sheet or portfolio risk. This is definitely a concern for bank regulators as the risk 
of off-balance sheet activities, if not managed properly, can squeeze liquidity and create 
sudden losses. However, Basel Accord I & II proposals have also considered off-balance 
sheet activities to be risky and have included them in the risk-weighted bank capital ratio.  
There is mixed evidence with regard to the association between bank risk and 
charter value. A negative relationship is observed between bank charter value and credit 
risk. This result is consistent with the disciplining effect of charter value and hence 
supports hypothesis H1 (Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1). However, contentious findings are 
observed with regard to bank charter value and bank equity risk. A positive association is 
found between charter value and bank equity risk. This is inconsistent with hypothesis 
H1, though this result is in accordance with the theoretical considerations of prior studies 
(Park 1997; Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz 2000; Saunders and Wilson 2001). One 
possible explanation for this relation is that charter value enhancing expansion took place 
over the study period and this may have resulted in increased European bank systematic 
risk, leading to greater losses during the business cycle contraction that occurred after 
2000 (Demsetz and Strahan 1996; Hughes, Lang, Mester and Moon 1996; Saunders and 
Wilson 2001; Konishi and Yasuda 2004).  
The other bank discipline variable is bank capital. The relationship between bank 
capital and both credit risk and systematic risk appears to be non-linear given the 
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statistically significant squared bank capital coefficients. Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 
represent the estimated bank capital effect. The Y axis presents systematic risk (Figure 
4.1) or credit risk (Figure 4.2) and X axis presents bank capital. This finding is in line 
with prior studies (e.g., Gennotte and Pyle 1991; Blum 1999; Calem and Rob 1999).  
 
Figure 4.1 Relationship between bank capital and systematic risk 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Relationship between bank capital and credit risk 
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It emerges that the higher the bank capital buffer the lower the bank risk 
consistent with the argument that careful management of bank capital can facilitate 
stability of the banking system (Furlong and Keeley 1987; Kim and Santomero 1988; 
Furlong and Keeley 1989; Keeley and Furlong 1990). However, with the build-up of 
bank capital banks tend to increase their level of risk (Calem and Rob 1999) Thus, the 
result supports hypothesis H2B as mentioned earlier in Chapter 2 (sub-section 2.3.2). 
Further, with respect to total risk and idiosyncratic risk, the coefficients on bank capital 
and bank capital squared are both negative and marginally statistically significant at the 
10% significance level. The findings do not support hypothesis H2B.  
The measure of market discipline, uninsured deposits, exhibits a negative and 
statistically significant association with systematic risk and a positive and significant 
association with credit risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk. While the results for 
systematic risk support hypothesis H4, (Chapter 2; sub -section 2.3.4), the hypothesis is 
not supported for the other risk measures. This suggests that while market discipline may 
decrease risk relative to the market it could increase diversifiable bank-specific risks. The 
negative systematic risk coefficient could be interpreted as implying that an increase in 
bank liabilities and subordinated debt provides a superior market discipline strategy, 
reducing the effects of explicit or implicit deposit insurance. However, the positive 
relationship with credit risk and idiosyncratic risk suggests that increasing the level of 
longer maturity liabilities such as subordinated debt could also result in bank investments 
that carry greater levels of idiosyncratic, rather than systematic risk (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). While idiosyncratic risk and individual bank credit risk might be diversified away 
by the investor, the bank still needs to manage these risks if it is to remain solvent.  
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Size is negatively related to credit risk and idiosyncratic risk. This finding is 
consistent with the work of Demsetz and Strahan (1997) and Demsetz, Saidenberg and 
Strahan (1996). This supports hypothesis H5B developed in earlier chapter (Chapter 2 
sub-section 2.4.1).The relationship between systematic risk and size is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This result is consistent with previous studies 
particularly on US bank holding companies (Saunder, Strock and Travlos 1990; Demsetz, 
Saidenberg and Strahan 1996; Anderson and Fraser 2000) and also supports hypothesis 
H5A (Chapter 2 sub-section 2.4.1). Moreover, a positive association is observed for total 
risk and bank size. This finding is contrary to hypothesis H5B (Chapter 2 sub-section 
2.4.1). This relationship suggests bank risk taking may be consistent with the “too-big –
to-fail-policy”, where large banks have greater incentive to take higher risk as they enjoy 
a comprehensive safety net. 
Another variable of interest is loans to total assets. The finding on credit risk is in 
the predicted direction, that is loans to total assets is positively associated with bank 
credit risk and thus, supports hypothesis H6 (Chapter 2 Section 2.4.2). However, loans to 
total assets is negatively related to systematic risk. This finding is contrary to hypothesis 
H6. This could come about where additional loans taken on by the banks are less risky 
than the existing pool of assets on bank balance sheets, resulting in decreased overall 
equity risk levels.46 There is some variation across the two estimation techniques. For 
example, with regard to total risk, a negative and statistically significant relationship is 
observed under pooled-OLS but a negative and insignificant coefficient is noted under 
                                                 
46
 The study leaves further analysis of this question to future research. 
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2SLS estimation method. However, this negative coefficient is inconsistent with 
hypothesis H6. 
In terms of macro-economic variables, the economic freedom index (EFI) is 
negatively associated with bank equity risk (systematic, total and idiosyncratic) measures 
and is statistically significant at the 1% level. This result implies that greater levels of 
economic freedom, particularly in terms of lower levels of regulation and government 
intervention, generate lower bank equity risk and credit risk. Hence, the result is 
consistent with predictions (Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3). Yet, there is some variation across 
the two methods. Although credit risk and interest rate risk exhibit a negative and 
statistically significant association with EFI under pooled-OLS, the relationship is not 
significant for 2SLS estimation technique. However, this negative association is 
consistent with the prediction (Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3). Table 4.2 below provides 
summary of the results as discussed above. 
Table 4.2 
Summary of the Result 
This table represents a summary of the result as discussed in Section 4.2. The results reported in column 3 
under the term “Actual Sign” in the following table are statistically significant at the 5% significance level 
or better.  
Variables Predicted sign Actual sign 
Off-balance 
sheet activities 
Positive (+) Positive (+) with all risk measures except 
interest rate risk. 
Charter value Negative (-) Negative (-) with credit risk only. Positive (+) 
with total, systematic and idiosyncratic risk 
Bank Capital  Non-linear Non-linear with systematic risk and credit 
risk. No appreciable evidence of non-linearity 
with total and idiosyncratic risk. 
Uninsured 
deposits 
Negative (-) Negative (-) with systematic risk. Positive (+) 
with credit, total and idiosyncratic risk. 
Size Positive (+) with systematic risk. 
Negative (-) with credit, total, interest 
rate and idiosyncratic risks 
Negative (-) with credit and idiosyncratic 
risks. Positive (+) with systematic risk and 
total risk. 
Loans to total 
assets   
Positive(+) Positive (+) with credit risk. Negative (-) with 
systematic risk 
Economic 
freedom index 
Negative (-) Negative (-) with all risk measures. 
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4.3 EFFECTS OF ADDITIONAL RISK FACTORS: EXTENDED MODEL 
Table 4.3 on the following page reports on tests of hypotheses H7 and H8 (as 
developed in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2) concerning bank risk determinants by estimating 
regression Equation 6 (mentioned in Chapter 3, Section 3.4) using pooled–OLS and two 
stage least squares (2SLS). This section discusses the results of the additional variables as 
the results for the base variables are little changed.  
There is a negative relationship between dividend yield and bank equity risk. This 
result is in line with the predictions in the literature (Lee and Brewer 1987) and thus 
supports hypothesis H7 (developed in Chapter 2, in sub section 2.4.2). Moreover, the 
findings exhibit a positive and statistically significant association between credit risk and 
dividend yield. This implies banks with high dividend yield do not necessarily exhibit 
lower credit risk. This is an unexpected outcome, though this study leaves further 
discussion of this result to future research. 
Operating leverage has a positive (statistically significant at the 5% or higher) 
effect on bank equity risk (total risk, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk) and credit 
risk. This is an expected outcome given the work of Mandelker and Rhee (1984); 
Saunders, Travlos and Strock (1990), Galloway, Lee and Roden (1997). It is argued that 
operating leverage acts in a similar manner to financial leverage, in increasing risk. This 
also lends support to hypothesis H8 (mentioned in Chapter 2 in sub-section 2.4.2). A 
negative association is observed between interest rate risk and operating leverage. This 
outcome is opposite to the predicted sign and this negative and statistically significant 
coefficient suggests that increasing income producing assets, all else held constant, could 
reduce financial leverage and thus reduce financial risk. 
124 
Table 4.3 
Summary of the Result 
This table represents a summary of the result of the additional variables as discussed in Section 4.3. The 
results reported in column 3 under the term “Actual Sign” in the following table are statistically significant 
at the 5% significance level or better.  
Variables Predicted sign Actual sign 
Dividend yield Negative (-) Negative with systematic, total and idiosyncratic risk and positive 
with credit risk. 
Operating leverage  Positive (+) Positive with all risk measures except for interest rate risk. 
Ownership dummy (D1) Positive (+) Positive with credit risk, systematic and total risk 
Legal origin dummy( D2) Positive (+) Negative with credit risk, total risk, systematic risk and interest 
rate risk. Positive with idiosyncratic risk. 
Geographical dummy (D3) Negative (-) Negative with all risk measures 
Creditor rights dummy (D4) Negative (-) Positive with credit risk. Negative with total risk and idiosyncratic 
risk. 
Anti-director rights (D5) Negative (-) Negative with all risk measures except interest rate risk. Positive 
with interest rate risk. 
 
There is evidence that commercial banks ( )1D exhibit greater credit risk, 
systematic risk and total risk than other bank classifications. The results are statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level or better. These findings are consistent with 
prediction (Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3).  
Given the negative legal origin ( )2D  coefficients, common-law country banks 
exhibit greater credit risk, systematic risk and total risk than the more heavily regulated 
civil-law country banks. The higher levels of common-law country bank risk may reflect 
the greater level of market discipline operating in civil-law countries which acts to 
constrain bank risk levels. This finding is consistent with the predictions (Chapter 2, 
Section 2.4.3). 
The estimated coefficients for the geographical dummy ( )3D  variable suggests that 
euro-zone country banks show lower levels of credit risk and bank equity risk. The 
results are statistically significant at the 5% level or better and are consistent with the 
predictions. However, with respect to interest rate risk, the findings show euro zone 
125 
banks have a higher level of interest rate risk. It can be argued that increased levels of 
financial market integration over the last decade may have affected interest rate 
processes. Financial market integration increases the speed with which interest rates 
change and associated volatility is transmitted among countries, making the control of 
interest rates by the authorities (central banks) more difficult and uncertain. Hence, 
increased globalization of financial market flows in recent years has made the 
measurement and management of interest rate risk a prominent concern (Saunders and 
Cornett 2006). 
Enforcement of creditor rights (creditor rights variable) and anti-director rights 
(anti-director rights variable) seem to be important in explaining the variation in bank 
total risk and idiosyncratic risk. The results support the predictions (Chapter 2, Section 
2.4.3). With regard to credit risk, the coefficient on anti-director rights and creditor rights 
is negative and positive respectively and statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
result is consistent with prediction for anti-director rights index, but is contrary to the 
predictions for creditor rights. Further, the coefficient for anti-director rights is negative 
and statistically significant with respect to systematic risk. This finding is in line with 
prediction (La Porta et al 1998).  
Yet, anti-director rights index and interest rate risk is positively associated at the 
5% or better significance level. This finding is however, contrary to that predicted 
(Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3). 
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Table 4.4 
The Determinants of European Bank Equity Risks and Credit Risk 
The tables represents the pooled-OLS regression and two stage least squares regression results to estimate the extended model of bank risk.  
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                (2) 
tjiRISK ,, presents the bank equity risks and credit risk. The bank equity risks include systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk, interest rate risk and total risk for 
individual bank i  in country j at period t . All bank equity risks are measured using the two index market model. The estimation techniques are provided 
in equation (3) and equation (4). Further, the credit risk includes the credit risk which is measured using 
tjitjitji TALLPCR ,,,,,, /= .where; tjiCR ,,  is the credit risk 
measure for bank i  in country j in period t ; or the ex-post realized risk. 
tjiLLP ,,
 is the loan loss provision for bank i  in country j in period t ; 
tjiTA ,,  is the 
total assets of bank i  in country j in period t . The explanatory variables such as 
tjiUD ,, is the natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at 
period t , 
tjiCV ,,  is the natural log of charter value for bank i , country j in period t tjiBC ,,  is the natural log of bank capital for bank i , in country j  in 
period t , tjiBC ,,2  is the natural log of bank capital squared for bank i , in country j  in period t , 
tjiOBS ,,  is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities for 
bank i , in country j  at period t ,
tjiLTA ,,
is the loan to total assets for bank i , in country j  at period t , 
tjiSize ,, is the natural log of market value of equity for 
bank i , in country j , in period t and 
tjEFI ,
 is the economic freedom index for country j  at period t . tjiOPL ,,  = natural logarithm of operating leverage 
for bank i , country j at period t ; 
tjiDY ,,  = dividend yield for bank i , country j at period t ; jD1  = bank specialization dummy where jD1 =1 if 
commercial banks or otherwise 0;  jD2  = legal origin variable where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 2 if French civil law countries, 3 if German civil-
law countries and 4 if Scandinavian civil law countries; jD3  = geographical dummy where jD3 =1 if euro-zone countries or otherwise 0; jD4  = creditor 
rights index and; jD5  = shareholder rights index. Finally, ti,ε  is the random error term. The joint F-test for the year dummies are statistically significant 
for all risk measures. All results are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † indicates the coefficients of the explanatory variables and standard errors are scaled by 
100. 
 Pooled-OLS analysis  Two-stage least squares 
  
Credit risk Systematic 
risk 
Total risk Interest rate 
risk 
Idiosyncratic 
risk 
Credit risk Systematic 
risk 
Total risk Interest rate 
risk 
Idiosyncrati
c risk 
0.027*** 1.13*** -8.251*** 0.105 -8.665*** -0.008 1.050** -5.027*** 0.154 -6.507*** Intercept 
(0.004) (0.266) (0.781) (0.162) (0.762) (0.016) (0.538) (0.624) (0.352) (0.749) 
0.001*** 0.03*** 0.016** -0.009** 0.003*** 0.020†** 0.022**  0.020** -0.004* 0.004*** Operating 
leverage  (0.040)† (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.001) (0.010)† (0.010) (0.009) (0.017) (0.001) 
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0.002*** -0.019** -0.009*** -0.008 -0.021*** 0.002** -0.114** -0.101*** -0.057 -0.127*** Dividend yield 
(0.070)† (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.052) (0.030) (0.031) (0.048) 
0.001*** -0.04*** 0.054** -0.012 0.036*** 0.020†** -0.055** 0.050*** -0.011 0.037*** Uninsured 
deposits  (0.018)† (0.014) (0.025) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)† (0.025) (0.020) (0.02) (0.013) 
-0.008** 0.264** 2.202*** -0.046 1.695*** 0.012*** 0.941** 2.854*** -0.662* 3.132*** Charter value 
(0.003) (0.120) (0.585) (0.188) (0.622) (0.002) (0.450) (0.640) (0.397) (0.707) 
0.036†*** -0.147** -0.352** -0.049 -0.356** -0.003*** -0.242** -0.689*** 0.069 -1.284*** Bank capital 
(0.013)† (0.069) (0.164) (0.036) (0.169) (0.001) (0.120) (0.235) (0.135) (0.274) 
0.136***† 0.089** 0.038 -0.006 0.022 0.004*** 0.106** 0.302*** -0.046 0.447*** Bank capital 
squared (0.045)† (0.039) (0.094) (0.021) (0.098) (0.001) (0.052) (0.109) (0.062) (0.131) 
Off balance 
sheet  
0.002** 0.07*** 0.219*** 0.013** 0.176*** 0.085***† 0.091*** 0.129*** -0.029*** 0.122*** 
activities 0.001 -0.013 -0.033 -0.007 -0.033 (0.031)† -0.022 -0.024 -0.013 -0.023 
0.004** -0.191** -0.500** 0.041 -0.191 0.006** -0.398*** -0.23 0.146* -0.064 Loan to total 
assets  (0.002) (0.082) (0.243) (0.045) (0.239) (0.003) (0.111) (0.17) (0.085) (0.185) 
-0.001*** 0.13*** 0.039** -0.007 -0.071*** -0.001*** 0.111*** 0.010*** 0.002 -0.080*** Size 
(0.020)† (0.010) (0.017) (0.006)  (0.027) (0.031)†  (0.016)  (0.003) (0.011) (0.022) 
-0.04***† -0.01*** -0.010*** -0.002** -0.004** 0.02 -0.003*** -0.020*** -0.004** -0.033*** Economic 
freedom index (0.010)† (0.003) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.016) (0.001)  (0.008)  (0.002) (0.008) 
Ownership  0.002** 0.084** 0.043** 0.009 -0.051 0.004*** 0.145** 0.073** 0.012 0.087 
dummy D1 (0.001) (0.034) (0.018) (0.019) (0.087) (0.001) (0.061) (0.035) (0.038) (0.074) 
Legal origin  -0.002*** -0.16*** -0.015** -0.006 0.040** -0.003*** -0.232*** -0.007** 0.006 0.062** 
dummy D2 (0.030)† (0.072) (0.007)  (0.015) (0.020) (0.073)† -0.523 (0.003) (0.036) (0.030) 
-0.003*** -0.18*** -0.56*** -0.082*** -0.656*** -0.047** -0.268*** -0.348*** -0.024*** -0.519*** Geographical 
dummy D3 
(0.004)† (0.047) (0.137) (0.028) (0.134) (0.023) (0.080) (0.096) (0.010) (0.133) 
Creditor rights  0.001*** -0.007 -0.202*** -0.002 -0.160*** 0.002*** 0.006 -0.069** -0.002 -0.037*** 
dummy D4 (0.010)† (0.018) (0.049) (0.010) (0.048) (0.001) (0.030) (0.034) (0.018) (0.014) 
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Anti-director 
rights 
-0.001*** -0.033* -0.150*** 0.030*** -0.184*** -0.002*** -0.105*** -0.035** 0.021** -0.048*** 
 D5 (0.020)† (0.020) (0.046) (0.011) (0.044) (0.001) (0.040) (0.018) (0.010) (0.015) 
Year Dummy 
96-05 
yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj R2 0.26 0.62 0.38 0.10 0.26 0.21 0.56 0.18 0.10 0.28 
Model test 12*** 52*** 22*** 5*** 12*** 25*** 35*** 9*** 12*** 25*** 
Breusch Pagan 
χ
2
 
809.62 410.8 111.43 514.08 114.27 - - - - - 
Joint F-test for 
year dummies 
F[9,1004] 
3*** 7*** 8*** 2** 6*** 0.34 6*** 7*** 3*** 5*** 
Number of 
obs. 
1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1013 1015 1015 1015 1015 
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4.4 IMPACT OF EMU ON RISK FACTORS: A TEST FOR STABILITY OF THE 
MODEL 
The impact of EMU on variation in bank risk is also analyzed. Table 4.5 presents 
the result for this analysis. Both pooled-OLS and panel techniques are applied in this 
analysis but the Lagrange-multiplier test supports the pooled-OLS approach. A Wald F-
test is employed to assess the possibility of structural change with EMU. The tests 
confirm the existence of structural change for all risk measures suggesting that the 
formation of EMU had an important impact on bank risks for the sample of banks used in 
this thesis. The year dummies are jointly significant for all risk measures.  
The magnitude of the charter value coefficients fell dramatically with EMU for all 
risk measure models. This outcome is interpreted in terms of the decline in the 
importance of charter value with the formation of EMU and increasing levels of 
competition. The most statistically significant decline is observed for charter value 
relative to systematic risk with a change in the coefficient of -1.431. This finding is 
consistent with the hypothesis H11A as mentioned in Chapter 2. 
The coefficient on bank capital is negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level for systematic risk. This finding supports hypothesis H11B (See Chapter 2 Section 
2.5). It is apparent that the non-linear relationship between bank capital and systematic 
risk may be driven by the post-EMU period. Further, evidence of non-linearity between 
bank capital and interest rate risk is also observed supporting hypothesis H11B, although 
the result is marginally significant. With regard to total risk and idiosyncratic risk, there 
is no evidence of non-linearity and thus the hypothesis H11B is rejected. 
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Further, the findings generally show a statistically significant (at the 1% level) 
increase in the effect of off-balance sheet activities on risk with the formation of EMU, 
consistent with hypothesis H11C. However, the importance of off-balance sheet activities 
with respect to credit risk has declined in the post-EMU period and the hypothesis H11C 
is rejected. 
The importance of uninsured deposits has increased for bank systematic risk, total 
and idiosyncratic risk in the post-EMU period. This is consistent with hypothesis H11D 
(Chapter 2, Section 2.5 and Section 2.3.4). With respect to interest rate risk, the findings 
show a decline in importance of uninsured deposits in the post-EMU period, though the 
result is marginally significant.  
The size variable has increased in importance following 1999 for all risk measures 
while being statistically significant for credit risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk. The 
loan-to-total asset ratio coefficient also generally increases after 1999 with respect to 
bank equity risk though the change in the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
Finally, the economic freedom index coefficient shows a statistically significant 
decline with respect to credit risk and interest rate risk after 1999.  
In summary, the formation of the EMU has had an impact on the sensitivity of 
bank risk to some of the key variables included in the model. While some of the variation 
is due to changes in sensitivity to bank capital the remaining variation is associated more 
with changes in the magnitude of coefficients rather than their sign (See Section 4.2). 
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Table 4.5 
Impact of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) on bank equity risk, interest rate risk and credit risk 
This table represents the impact of EMU on bank equity risk and credit risk. Pooled-OLS and random effects is used in estimation of these models as per 
Equation (8) discussed in Chapter 3. The sample is split into two, with 1999 being the year most associated with the formation of EMU chosen as the 
break point. This facilitates tests for structural change between the pre-EMU period (1996-1998) and the post-EMU period (1999-2005). The following 
model is used to test for structural changes with the formation of EMU: 
ijtttijttijtijt YXDXRisk εδββα +Σ+∗++= ∆            (3) 
where, 
tjiX ,,  = bank-specific characteristics for bank i  in country j  at period t . These variables are same as the explanatory variables identified in 
Equation (5) in Chapter 3. 
tD  = time dummy, where tD = 1 for post-euro period and tD = 0 for pre-euro period;  
tjit XD ,,∗  = interaction term between each bank-specific variable tjiX ,,  with the time dummy and; tY  is year dummy variable. All results are corrected 
for heteroscedasticity and the adjusted standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. † indicates the coefficients of the explanatory variables and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
 
  Credit risk  Systematic risk   Total risk  Interest rate risk  Idiosyncratic risk 
 
Pre EMU Difference Pre EMU Difference Pre EMU Difference Pre EMU Difference Pre EMU Difference 
Intercept 0.004 
(0.003) 
- 0.409 
(0.372) 
- -5.401*** 
(1.292) 
- -0.128 
(0.170) 
- -5.120 
(1.250) 
- 
Uninsured deposits 0.044*† 
(0.026)† 
0.029† 
(0.036)† 
-0.041*** 
(0.010) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
0.017 
(0.058) 
0.021*** 
(0.005) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
-0.027* 
(0.016) 
0.069 
(0.056) 
0.041*** 
(0.008) 
Charter value -0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
1.711*** 
(0.566) 
-1.431** 
(0.611) 
5.806*** 
(1.735) 
-1.32*** 
(0.456) 
0.529* 
(0.283) 
-0.394* 
(0.215) 
5.273*** 
(1.693) 
-1.285*** 
(0.356) 
Bank capital 0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.101 
(0.119) 
-0.276** 
(0.136) 
-0.123 
(0.317) 
0.099* 
(0.054) 
0.063 
(0.106) 
-0.079* 
(0.041) 
-0.234* 
(0.126) 
0.223** 
(0.114) 
Bank capital 
squared 
0.007† 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.064 
(0.067) 
0.182** 
(0.078) 
-0.327* 
(.194) 
0.227** 
(0.114) 
-0.096* 
(0.055) 
0.082* 
(0.044) 
-0.239* 
(0.129) 
0.085** 
(0.042) 
Off balance sheet 
activities 
0.001*** 
(0.014)† 
-0.001*** 
(0.024)† 
0.046*** 
(0.017) 
0.023*** 
(0.008) 
0.065*** 
(0.020) 
0.066** 
(0.030) 
-0.015 
(0.009) 
0.021* 
(0.012) 
0.040** 
(0.020) 
0.050** 
(0.025) 
Loan to total assets 0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.394*** 
(0.137) 
0.220 
(0.162) 
-1.011** 
(0.422) 
0.692 
(0.522) 
0.048 
(0.080) 
-0.053 
(0.098) 
-0.674* 
(0.405) 
0.734 
(0.507) 
Size -0.001*** 
(0.021)† 
0.001** 
(0.025)† 
0.130*** 
(0.017) 
0.023*** 
(0.008) 
0.009 
(0.050) 
0.125** 
(0.059) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.012) 
-0.099** 
(0.047) 
0.115** 
(0.058) 
Economic freedom  
index 
0.009*† 
(0.005)† 
-0.02***† 
(0.007) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.054*** 
(0.016) 
0.020** 
(0.010) 
0.005† 
(0.002) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.053*** 
(0.016) 
0.027** 
(0.013) 
Year dummy 1996-
2005 
yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Adj R2 
Model test 
Breusch Pagan χ2 
Lagrange Multiplier test 
Wald F-test for joint 
0.25 
F[25,1003]=11 
648.57 
58.66*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.61 
F[25,1003]=46 
278.65 
406.89*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.33 
F[25,1003]=16 
145.194 
384.89*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.12 
F[25,1003]=4 
454.54 
57.24*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.21 
F[25,1003]=8 
134.186 
320*** 
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significance for 
differences 
Joint significance F-test 
for year dummies 
 
 
 
5.53 
 
2.54 
 
 
 
2.71 
 
3.62 
 
 
 
5.24 
 
2.23 
 
 
 
2.89 
 
2.50 
 
 
 
4.65 
 
2.15 
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4.5 ROBUSTNESS 
In this section, the robustness of the findings from testing hypotheses H1 to H8 in 
Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 is checked using panel techniques (both random effects and 
fixed effects). The results under this method is discussed in Section 4.6.1 Section 4.6.2 
reports the result excluding Danish and German commercial banks. Section 4.6.3 
describes the result for alternative risk measures. Finally, Section 4.6.4 discusses the 
result in relation to an additional analysis in order to explain a more complex relationship 
that may affect bank risk measures.  
4.5.1 Effect of risk factors controlling for heterogeneity 
This section reports the results of the analysis of the risk measures under random 
effects and fixed effects models. These standard methods are chosen to capture 
unobservable heterogeneity in the data. Table 4.6 reports both Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 
test and Hausman test. The results show Hausman test is statistically significant at the 1% 
level and hence fixed effects is the preferred method. However, due to large number of 
dummy variables at individual bank level and country level, it may be unreasonable to 
expect a reliable result on only 117 banks under fixed effects estimation technique. 
However, this study reports the result under both the estimation technique in 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 4.6. Table 4.6 Panel A presents the results with random 
effects. One important finding that is robust to the change in estimation method relates to 
off-balance sheet activities. The coefficients for this variable remain positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% significance level or better reflecting the relation 
between off-balance sheet activities and the various measures of bank riskiness.
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Table 4.6 
Comparison of bank risk measures using panel techniques 
This table represents the results when panel techniques are applied to determine the relationship between 
bank risk and bank characteristics. The following equation has been applied to generate the results.  
tjitjtjitjitjitjitjitjitjiijt EFISizeLTAOBSBCBCCVUDRisk ,,,1,,7,,6,,5
2
,,4,,3,,2,,10 εγβββββββα +++++++++=  
(4) 
tjiRISK ,, represents the bank equity risks and credit risk. The bank equity risks include systematic risk, 
idiosyncratic risk, interest rate risk and total risk for individual bank i  in country j at period t . All bank 
equity risks are measured using the two index market model. Credit risk is measured using 
tjitjitji TALLPCR ,,,,,, /= .where; tjiCR ,,  is the credit risk measure for bank i  in country j in period t ; or the ex-
post realized risk. 
tjiLLP ,,
 is the loan loss provision for bank i  in country j in period t ; tjiTA ,,  is the total 
assets of bank i  in country j in period t . The explanatory variables such as 
tjiUD ,, is the natural log of 
uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at period t , 
tjiCV ,,  is the natural log of charter value for bank i , 
country j  in period t ;. 
tjiBC ,,  is the natural log of bank capital for bank i , in country j  in period t ; tjiBC ,,2  
is the natural log of bank capital squared for bank i , in country j  in period t ; tjiOBS ,,  is the natural log of 
off-balance sheet activities for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiLTA ,, is the loan to total assets for bank i , 
in country j  at period t , tjSizei ,, is the natural log of market value of equity for bank i , in country j , in 
period t ;.and 
tjEFI ,
 is the economic freedom index for country j  at period t . Finally, ti,ε  is the random 
error term. Panel A and Panel B presents the results under the random effects and fixed effects respectively. 
The Hausman test and the Lagrange Multiplier test are reported. All results are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † indicates the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
 
Panel A: Random effects analysis 
 
Credit  risk Systematic  
risk 
Total risk  Interest rate 
risk 
Idiosyncratic 
risk 
Intercept 0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.514** 
(0.225) 
-7.708*** 
(0.710) 
-0.205 
(0.137) 
-7.833*** 
(.688) 
Uninsured deposits  0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.045*** 
(0.015) 
0.047** 
(0.023) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.075** 
(0.036) 
Charter value -0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.205** 
(0.105) 
2.035*** 
(0.670) 
-0.117 
(0.167) 
1.631** 
(0.656) 
Bank capital -0.021** 
(0.009) 
-0.225*** 
(0.067) 
-0.283 
(0.210) 
0.057 
(0.040) 
-0.164 
(0.204) 
Bank capital 
squared 
0.015***† 
(0.004)† 
0.096** 
(0.040) 
0.078** 
(0.036) 
-0.022 
(0.024) 
0.028*** 
(0.010) 
Off balance sheet 
activities 
0.003***† 
(0.001)† 
0.045*** 
(0.014) 
0.100** 
(0.043) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
0.069** 
(0.032) 
Loan to total assets 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.108** 
(0.050) 
-0.626** 
(0.304) 
0.031 
(0.064) 
-0.288 
(0.329) 
Size -0.053***† 
(0.011)† 
0.119*** 
(0.010) 
0.142*** 
(.033) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
0.051*** 
(0.021) 
Economic freedom 
index 
-0.003***† 
(0.001)† 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
Lagrange 
Multiplier test 
58.92 
(prob.=0.00)  
375.42 
(prob.=0.00) 
355.04 
(prob.=0.00) 
32.22 
(prob.=0.00) 
305.55 
(prob.=0.00) 
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Panel B: Fixed effects analysis  
 
Credit risk Systematic risk Total risk Interest rate 
risk 
Idiosyncratic risk 
Uninsured 
deposits  
-0.014**† 
(0.006)† 
-0.049** 
(0.025) 
0.014 
(0.046) 
-0.008 
(0.011) 
0.067** 
(0.031) 
Charter value -0.012*** 
(0.005) 
-0.018 
(0.218) 
1.583** 
(0.662) 
-0.023 
(0.147) 
0.975** 
(0.452) 
Bank capital -0.001† 
(0.065) † 
-0.199* 
(0.114) 
-0.443* 
(0.270) 
-0.209*** 
(0.053) 
-0.308 
(0.289) 
Bank capital 
 squared 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.120** 
(0.062) 
0.292** 
(0.148) 
0.120*** 
(0.031) 
0.225 
(0.162) 
Off balance 
sheet  
activities 
0.046**† 
(0.020)† 
0.035** 
(0.015) 
0.062** 
(0.031) 
0.017* 
(0.015) 
0.050** 
(0.024) 
Loan to total 
assets 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.382** 
(0.162) 
-0.067 
(0.418) 
0.072 
(0.100) 
-0.421** 
(0.212) 
Size -0.046*† 
(0.010) † 
0.024*** 
(0.008) 
0.065*** 
(0.018) 
0.020 
(0.015) 
0.072*** 
(0.032) 
Economic 
freedom 
 index 
-0.004†** 
(0.002) † 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.038*** 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.036*** 
(0.011) 
Adj.R2 
Model test 
Hausman test  
 
Lagrange 
Multiplier  test 
0.35 
F[91,1011]=6 
16.32 
(prob=0.04) 
58.92 
(prob=0.000) 
0.73 
F[91,1011]=25 
74.79 
(prob=0.00) 
375.42 
(prob=0.00) 
0.58 
F[91,1011]=12 
46.50 
(prob=0.000) 
355.04 
(prob=0.00) 
0.21 
F[91,1011]=5 
32.22 
(prob=0.00) 
32.22 
(prob=0.00) 
0.53 
F[91,1011]=10 
43.52 
(prob=0.000) 
305.55 
(prob=0.000) 
 
Further, the findings on bank charter value and uninsured deposits using random 
effects remain unchanged (as discussed in Section 4.2). With regard to the non-linear 
bank capital result some variation is observed under random effects. For instance, there is 
less evidence of a statistically significant non-linear relationship between bank risk 
(idiosyncratic risk and total risk) and bank capital though statistical significance remains 
for credit risk and systematic risk (as illustrated in Section 4.2). 
The loans to total assets ratio results remain little changed when the model is 
estimated using random effects. Credit risk is positively related while total risk and 
systematic risk is negatively related to loans to total assets. Given the sample is 
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dominated by commercial banks this result suggests that deregulation and increased 
involvement in non-interest generating activity may have helped the banks in this sample 
to be less aggressive in the credit market, resulting in reduced total risk.  
The study also finds that large banks have higher systematic risk, total risk and 
idiosyncratic risk (Stiroh 2006) and lower credit risk. This outcome is consistent with the 
results reported in Section 4.2 except for idiosyncratic risk. Finally, the economic 
freedom index (EFI) coefficient is negative for all bank risk measures and is statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level. This is consistent with the results reported earlier 
in Section 4.2. 
Table 4.6 Panel B reports the results with fixed effects. Consistent with 
hypothesis H3 off-balance sheet activities is positively related with each of the bank risk 
measures consistent with the findings discussed in Section 4.2. With regards to charter 
value, the findings are consistent with that discussed in Section 4.2 for credit risk, total 
risk and idiosyncratic risk. The coefficient of uninsured deposits and size remain 
unchanged. One point of difference is the non-linear association between bank capital 
and interest rate risk.  
4.5.2 Excluding Danish and German banks  
The study re-runs the models excluding the 36 Danish commercial banks from the 
original sample, as this group of banks accounts for a substantial proportion of the bank 
sample. The findings are little changed with this additional analysis. Further, given the 
unusual nature of the German banking industry (Haq and Heaney 2009), the study 
constructs another unbalanced panel excluding German banks from the sample. The study 
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re-runs the base model and extended model after eliminating the three (3) German banks 
from the sample. The results remain unchanged both for the base model and the extended 
model though it is found that with exclusion of the three German banks there is evidence 
supporting a non-linear relationship between bank risk (total risk and idiosyncratic risk) 
and bank capital. The results are reported in Table A4.1 and Table A4.2 in Appendix. 
4.5.3 Proportional risk measures 
The analysis is repeated using proportional risk measures, where systematic risk, 
idiosyncratic risk and interest rate risk are measured as a proportion of total equity market 
risk rather than actual risk estimates. The proportional risk measures are calculated in the 
following manner. 
itItIMtmiit RRR εββα +++=  ;         (11) 
222222 )cov(2 εσββσβσβσ +++= ImImIImmri RR       (12) 
222 /risk alrisk / tot systematic rimm σσβ= ;  
222 /risk alrisk / tot rateInterest riII σσβ= and 
22 /risk alrisk / tot ticIdiosyncra riσσ ε=  
The original results, as discussed in Section 4.2 and Section 4.3, are robust to this 
alternative specification. The results are reported in Table A4.3 in Appendix. 
4.5.4 Additional analysis- incorporating interaction terms 
Finally, the study re-runs the analysis with the inclusion of various interaction 
terms to test for the possibility of more complex relationships explaining the various 
measures of bank risk. The following model applies the pooled-OLS estimation 
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technique.  




+++++
+++++++++
=
−−−−−−
−−−−
tjitjitjitjitjitjitjitjitjitjitji
tjtjitjitjitjitjitjitji
ijt SizeCVBCOBSCVOBSCVUDBCUD
EFISizeLTAOBSBCBCCVUD
RISK
,,1,,1,,51,,,,41,,,,31,,,,21,,,,1
,11,,7,,6,,5
2
1,,41,,31,,2,,10
***** εδδδδδ
γβββββββα
 
           (13) 
where, 
1,,,, * −tjitji BCUD  interaction between uninsured deposits and bank capital, 
1,,,, * −tjitji CVUD  interaction between uninsured deposits and charter value, 
1,,,, * −tjitji CVOBS interaction between off-balance sheet activities and charter value, 
1,,,, * −tjitji BCOBS interaction between off-balance sheet activities and bank capital,  
1,,1,, * −− tjitji SizeCV  interaction between charter value and bank size. 
Table 4.7 reports the findings. The statistical significant negative coefficient (δ1) 
for the interaction term indicates that the impact of charter value is decreasing in presence 
of uninsured deposits. However, uninsured deposits increase the influence of charter 
value on credit risk. Given the level of uninsured deposits, the interaction term between 
uninsured deposits and bank capital is positive and statistically significant for bank equity 
risk. This implies bank capital is unable to reduce bank risk in presence of market 
discipline. Perhaps this finding reinforces the argument that bank capital may not 
compliment market discipline.47 The impact of charter value increases on equity risk 
(with the exception of interest rate risk) and decreases in credit risk in off balance sheet 
activities. The coefficient (δ4) for the interaction term between off-balance sheet activities 
and bank capital exhibits that the impact of bank capital on equity risk (except interest 
                                                 
47
 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to further analyze this finding and thus is left for future research.  
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rate risk) decreases in off-balance sheet activities although it increases in credit risk.
141 
 
Table 4.7 
Analysis of the interaction terms 
This table represents the results when pooled-OLS is applied to determine the relationship between bank 
risk and bank characteristics with interaction terms. The following equation has been applied to generate 
the results.  




+++++
+++++++++
=
−−−−−
−−−
tjitjitjitjitjitjitjitjitjitjitji
tjtjitjitjitjitjitjitji
ijt SizeCVBCOBSCVOBSCVUDBCUD
EFISizeLTAOBSBCBCCVUD
RISK
,,,,1,,51,,,,41,,,,31,,,,21,,,,1
,1,,7,,6,,5
2
1,,41,,31,,2,,10
***** εδδδδδ
γβββββββα
           (5) 
tjiRISK ,, represents the bank equity risks and operational risk. The bank equity risks include systematic risk, 
idiosyncratic risk, interest rate risk and total risk for individual bank i  in country j at period t . All bank 
equity risks are measured using the two index market model. The estimation techniques are provided in 
equation (3) and equation (4). Further,  the credit risk is measured using 
tjitjitji TALLPCR ,,,,,, /=
.where; 
tjiCR ,,  is 
the credit risk measure for bank i  in country j in period t ; or the ex-post realized risk. 
tjiLLP ,,
 is the loan 
loss provision for bank i  in country j in period t ; 
tjiTA ,,  is the total assets of bank i  in country j in period t . 
The explanatory variables such as 
tjiUD ,, is the natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at 
period t , 
1,, −tjiCV
 is the natural log of charter value for bank i , country j lagged one period. 1,, −tjiBC  is the 
natural log of bank capital for bank i , in country j  lagged one period, 1,,2 −tjiBC  is the natural log of bank 
capital squared for bank i , in country j  lagged one period, tjiOBS ,,  is the natural log of off-balance sheet 
activities for bank i , in country j  at period t ,
tjiLTA ,, is the loan to total assets for bank i , in country j  at 
period t , 
tjiSize ,, is the natural log of market value of equity for bank i , in country j , at period  t and tjEFI ,  is 
the economic freedom index for country j  at period t . 1,,,, * −tjitji BCUD  is the interaction between uninsured 
deposits and bank capital for  bank i , in country j . 1,,,, * −tjitji CVUD  is the interaction between uninsured 
deposits and bank charter value for  bank i , in country j . 1,,,, * −tjitji CVOBS  is the interaction between off-
balance sheet activities and bank charter value for  bank i , in country j . 1,,,, * −tjitji BCOBS  is the interaction 
between off balance sheet activities and bank capital for  bank i , in country j . tjitji SizeCV ,,1,, *−  is the 
interaction between charter value and bank size for  bank i , in country j .  Finally, ti,ε  is the random error 
term. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † 
indicates the coefficients of the explanatory variables and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
 Credit risk Systematic 
risk 
Total risk Interest 
rate risk 
Idiosyncra
tic risk 
Intercept 0.021∗∗∗ 
(0.005) 
0.887∗∗∗ 
(0.315) 
-5.360∗∗∗ 
(0.823) 
0.571∗∗∗ 
(0.204) 
-6.006∗∗∗ 
(0.857) 
Uninsured deposits 0.002∗ 
(0.001) 
0.053 
(0.109) 
0.377 
(0.236) 
0.089 
(0.064) 
0.251 
(0.250) 
Charter value 
-0.067∗∗∗ 
(0.017) 
1.112∗∗ 
(0.562) 
1.415∗∗∗ 
(0.556) 
-0.072 
(0.548) 
1.958∗∗∗ 
(0.658) 
Bank capital 0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.036 
(0.137) 
0.307 
(0.273) 
0.093 
(0.069) 
0.081 
(0.297) 
Bank capital squared 0.001∗∗ 
(0.000) 
0.068∗ 
(0.041) 
-0.227∗∗ 
(0.099) 
-0.038∗ 
(0.023) 
-0.228∗∗ 
(0.104) 
Off balance sheet activities 0.010∗∗∗ 
(0.004) 
0.090∗∗ 
(0.046) 
0.555∗∗∗ 
(0.222) 
0.029 
(0.044) 
0.208∗∗ 
(0.101) 
Loan to total assets 0.004∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.556∗∗ 0.007 -0.195 
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(0.001) (0.076) (0.256) (0.050) (0.253) 
Size 0.003∗∗∗† 
(0.001)† 
0.145∗∗∗ 
(0.009) 
0.085∗∗∗ 
(0.029) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.033 
(0.030) 
Economic freedom index 0.000∗ 
(0.000) 
-0.013∗∗∗ 
(0.003) 
-0.040∗∗∗ 
(0.007) 
-0.006∗∗∗ 
(0.001) 
-0.035∗∗∗ 
(0.007) 
Uninsured deposits*bank capital 
(δ1) 
-0.007∗ 
(0.004) 
0.200∗∗ 
(0.100) 
1.338∗∗ 
(0.562) 
0.080 
(0.203) 
1.375∗∗∗ 
(0.523) 
Uninsured deposits∗charter value 
(δ2) 
0.003∗∗∗ 
(0.001) 
-0.042∗∗∗ 
(0.008) 
-0.148∗∗ 
(0.070) 
0.041 
(0.029) 
-0.068∗∗∗ 
(0.021) 
Off-balance sheet activities*charter 
value (δ3) 
-0.004∗∗ 
(0.002) 
0.173∗∗ 
(0.085) 
0.481∗∗ 
(0.230) 
-0.083 
(0.125) 
0.483∗ 
(0.285) 
Off-balance sheet activities*bank 
capital (δ4) 
0.003∗∗∗ 
(0.001) 
-0.011∗∗ 
(0.005) 
-0.066∗∗ 
(0.029) 
0.008 
(0.015) 
-0.069∗∗ 
(0.035) 
Charter value*size   (δ5) 0.005∗∗∗ 
(0.001) 
0.211∗∗∗ 
(0.072) 
0.582∗∗∗ 
(0.227) 
0.037 
(0.043) 
0.465∗∗ 
(0.225) 
Adj R2 0.27 0.57 0.35 0.10 0.25 
Model test  F[ 22, 1011] 20.22*** 56.03*** 27.22*** 4.05*** 12.12*** 
Breusch Pagan χ2 625 401 120 503 138 
Joint F-test for year dummies  2.45*** 4.25*** 3.16*** 1.72* 3.09*** 
NOBS 1012 1015 1015 1015 1015 
 
Thus, this implies that given a fixed level of off balance sheet activities, bank 
capital is able to exhibit the disciplinary effect for equity risk but not for credit risk. The 
positive and significant estimates of δ5 suggest holding bank charter value fixed, larger 
banks exhibit greater credit risk, systematic risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk. It seems 
that for a given level of bank charter value, larger banks are more sensitive to credit risk, 
systematic risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk than smaller banks. 
4.6 SUMMARY 
This study analyzes the determinants of bank equity risk and credit risk measures. 
The sample consists of 117 listed financial institutions across 15 European countries from 
the period 1996-2005. The study focuses on five risk measures, total risk, systematic risk, 
interest rate risk, idiosyncratic risk and credit risk, on a number of bank- specific and 
country-specific variables. The study applies pooled-OLS and two-stage least square 
estimation techniques as well as panel analysis in robustness tests. With regard to bank 
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capital, the findings show a non- linear relationship for credit risk and systematic risk. 
This result supports hypothesis H2B (Chapter 2). However, this non linear relationship 
does not hold for other risk measures. Further, the results show that off-balance sheet 
activities are in general positively related to all risk measures. This result is consistent 
with the hypotheses H3 (reported in Chapter 2) and is robust to the various specifications 
reported in Section 4.6. This result has important policy implications.  
Further, consistent with the hypothesis H4, the results show uninsured deposits 
are negatively related with bank systematic risk. This is consistent with the existence of a 
market discipline effect. This is an important result because it suggests that the level of 
uninsured deposits should have a direct impact on bank share price through its impact on 
systematic risk. The findings show a positive and statistically significant relation between 
uninsured deposits and credit risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk. Perhaps, uninsured 
deposits are not a good market disciplinary tool for reduction of bank-specific risk.  
The other important factor is bank charter value. Consistent with the hypothesis 
(H1) a negative and statistically significant relationship is observed between bank charter 
value and credit risk, which implies a charter value discipline effect with respect to bank 
credit risk. However, the findings also provide evidence of a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between charter value and bank equity risk (total risk, 
idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk). This relationship is contrary to hypothesis H1. 
One possible explanation is that this relationship reflects the growth opportunities 
implicit in charter value. Further, with respect to systematic risk (supports hypothesis 
H5A) and total risk (rejects hypothesis H5B) the coefficients of size are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. However, a negative and statistically significant 
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(at the 1% level) association is observed for both idiosyncratic risk and credit risk. The 
results are robust to different specifications.  
It is important to note variation in the various measures of bank risk between 
common-law country and civil-law country banks and between euro-zone and non-euro-
zone banks. These findings are statistically significant at the 5% significance level or 
better. 
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CHAPTER 5  
EUROPEAN BANK EQUITY RISK 1995-2006 - EMPIRICAL 
RESULTS48 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on research question 2 (RQ2) that is structural changes in 
European bank equity risks. Section 5.2 discusses the main results in relation to changes 
in bank equity risk. Section 5.3 focuses on the robust of the results and, finally, Section 
5.4 provides a summary of this chapter. 
5.2 RESULTS IN RELATION TO RESEARCH QUESTION 2 (RQ2) 
It is important to first identify whether the changes in risk are economy wide 
movements or whether these shifts in risk are more localised. Total risk, idiosyncratic 
risk and systematic risk are estimated for the European non-financial sector and the 
European banking sector using equity market indices with the MSCI European and world 
indices being used to capture market effects. While changes in risk that occur with EMU 
are not generally statistically significant at the broad European economy level, analysis 
shows that banking sector risk generally falls while non-financial sector risk generally 
rises with EMU. 
It is found that a majority of the country bank sectors exhibit decreased risk with 
                                                 
48The analysis in this chapter draws heavily on the paper: Haq and Heaney (2009) European Bank Equity 
Risk: 1995-2006. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Vol 19 (2), 274-
288. 
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EMU, while increases and decreases are fairly evenly spread amongst the individual 
euro-zone country non-financial sectors (Table 5.1). For example, focusing on total risk, 
there are decreases (increases) in six (five) of the eleven country non-financial sectors 
with only three of these being statistically significant at the 10% level or better. Yet, it is 
important to note that for the bank sectors in these countries there are decreases 
(increases) in seven (four) of the eleven countries and in six of these seven cases the 
decline is statistically significant at the 10% level or better. The euro-zone country sector 
based results suggest that important changes have occurred in the banking sectors of 
these countries that are not closely reflected in non-financial sectors. 
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Table 5.1 
European bank sector risk versus European non-financial sector risk 
This table reports the results of total, idiosyncratic and systematic risk estimation based on DataStream indices for the European region. The study 
calculates changes in risk using the non-financial sector index and the banking sector index to provide an indication of the different effects observed 
with EMU for these two sectors. The total risk and idiosyncratic risk estimates are expressed as standard deviation. The systematic and idiosyncratic risk 
estimates are calculated using two MCSI indices, the MSCI Europe index and the MCSI World index. F-test Prob is the probability attached to the F-test 
for change in variance and t-stats refers to the t-test on the change in systematic risk across the period. To provide some indication of the change in risk 
exhibited across the euro-zone countries the analysis is repeated at the country level with a count of the number of countries reporting a decrease in risk 
(CN*) or an increase in risk (CN+) as well as the number of countries with a statistically significant decrease in risk (CN**) or a statistically significant 
increase in risk (CN++).  These counts appear in the Difference columns of the table with the count of the statistically significant changes reported in 
parentheses.   
*, + significant at 5% (10%) significance level.  
 
 
 Total risk   Idiosyncratic risk    Systematic 
risk 
 
MSCI Indexes Pre 
EMU 
Post 
EMU Difference 
F test 
Prob 
Pre 
EMU 
Post 
EMU Difference 
F test 
Prob 
Changes 
in β t-stats 
Europe Index           
Non Financial sector 0.037 0.048 0.011 0.054+ 0.019 0.022 0.003 0.261 0.205 2.66* 
CN* (CN**)   6 (3)    5 (2)  6 (3)  
CN+ (CN++)   5 (2)    6 (2)  5 (1)  
Banking sector 0.063 0.056 -0.007 0.372 0.031 0.030 -0.001 0.790 -0.198 -1.28 
CN* (CN**)   7 (6)    7 (5)  9 (5)  
CN+ (CN++)   4 (1)    4 (1)  2 (0)  
World Index           
Non Financial sector 0.037 0.048 0.011 0.054+ 0.024 0.026 0.002 0.645 0.287 2.68* 
Banking  sector 0.063 0.056 -0.007 0.372 0.044 0.035 -0.009 0.052* -0.040 -0.210 
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To gain a better idea of the impact of the EMU period on individual banks the 
study repeats the analysis using individual bank total risk, idiosyncratic risk and 
systematic risk and it is found that these individual risk measures have reduced 
substantially with EMU for a majority of the euro-zone banks in the sample. This finding 
supports the three hypotheses, H12, H13 and H14, as mentioned in Chapter 2 (See 
Section 2.6.3) and this support is evident at both the individual bank level and the bank 
sector level (proxied by equally weighted and value weighted portfolios of the banks in 
the sample) for decreased risk with EMU. The decrease in risk is particularly evident for 
French, Italian, Greek, Portuguese and Spanish banks (See Table 5.2 and Table 5.3). 
From Table 5.2, Panel A, 67 of the 96 euro zone banks (70% of the sample) exhibit a 
decline in total risk on average of 19% on average, with more than half of these declines 
being statistically significant. Further, bank idiosyncratic risk (Panel B, Table 5.2) 
declined 10%, on average, with 58 of the 96 banks (60% of the sample) exhibiting 
decreased risk.  
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Table 5.2 
Estimates of total risk and idiosyncratic risk of European banks 
This table reports results of tests for change in bank equity total and idiosyncratic risk. The average of 
individual bank total risk estimates for pre EMU and post EMU periods for each country are reported in 
Panel A along with counts of the number of statistically significant individual bank total risk estimate 
changes. F tests is used to estimate the change in variance. Similar results are reported in Panel B for 
individual bank idiosyncratic risk estimates. N is the total number of banks that are included in risk 
calculations for the country. N* is the number of banks with a decrease in total risk. N** is the total 
number of banks with a statistically significant decrease in risk. N+ is the number of banks with an increase 
in total risk and N++ is the number of banks with a statistically significant increase in total risk at the 5% 
level of significance. Note that N could exceed the sum of N* and N+ where the risk estimates (to four 
decimal places) are unchanged. In this regard, N0 shows the number of banks that exhibit no change in risk 
estimates to four decimal places. Total risk is defined: 2
1
2 )(/1 RRN tNtri −∑= =σ  where 2riσ  is the variance of the 
return for bank i, Ri return of bank i and R  average bank i return.  Idiosyncratic risk is defined as 
2222
rmri σβσσ ε −=  where 2riσ  is the total risk for bank i , 2εσ  bank return idiosyncratic risk and 22 rmσβ  
reflects the impact of systematic risk. Panel C presents the estimates of idiosyncratic risk and total risk for 
equally weighted (equal wgt.) and market value weighted (MV wgt.) portfolios.  
+ Statistically significant at the 10% level of significance, * statistically significant at the 5% level of 
significance.  
 
Panel A Estimates of total risk for individual banks using country index 
Country Average 
Pre 
EMU 
Average 
Post 
EMU 
Average 
Change N N0 N* N** N+ N++ 
Euro zone          
Austria  0.063 0.045 -0.018 5 1 4 3 0 0 
Belgium  0.071 0.077 0.006 3 0 1 0 2 1 
Finland  0.164 0.182 0.018 6 0 5 4 1 0 
France  0.1 0.063 -0.037 7 1 5 5 1 1 
Germany  0.21 0.114 -0.096 11 0 1 0 10 7 
Greece  0.152 0.134 -0.018 9 0 7 4 2 1 
Ireland  0.071 0.077 0.006 4 0 0 0 4 0 
Italy  0.11 0.084 -0.026 28 0 22 17 6 1 
Netherlands 0.089 0.084 -0.005 3 0 3 1 0 0 
Portugal 0.095 0.063 -0.032 6 1 5 4 0 0 
Spain  0.084 0.055 -0.029 14 0 14 11 0 0 
Total euro zone 0.11 0.089 -0.021 96 3 67 49 26 11 
Non euro zone           
Denmark  0.049 0.055 0.006 44 0 18 6 26 15 
Norway 0.077 0.067 -0.01 2 0 2 0 0 0 
Sweden 0.092 0.093 0.001 5 0 4 3 1 1 
Switzerland   0.07 0.06 -0.01 26 1 16 11 9 4 
United Kingdom 0.095 0.079 -0.016 8 0 6 3 2 1 
Total non euro zone 0.077 0.071 -0.006 85 1 46 23 38 21 
151 
 
Panel B Estimates of idiosyncratic risk for individual banks using country index 
Country Average 
Pre 
EMU 
Average 
Post 
EMU 
Average 
Change 
 
N 
 
N0 
 
N* 
 
N** 
 
N+ 
 
N++ 
Euro zone          
Austria  0.045 0.032 -0.013 5 0 5 2 0 0 
Belgium  0.055 0.055 0.000 3 1 2 1 0 0 
Finland  0.155 0.179 0.024 6 0 4 2 2 0 
France 0.077 0.055 -0.022 7 0 5 5 2 1 
Germany  0.055 0.100 0.045 11 0 2 1 9 7 
Greece  0.114 0.032 -0.082 9 0 5 3 4 2 
Ireland  0.055 0.063 0.008 4 0 0 0 4 0 
Italy  0.084 0.071 -0.013 28 4 17 11 7 4 
Netherlands  0.063 0.063 0.000 3 0 1 1 2 0 
Portugal 0.071 0.055 -0.016 6 1 4 3 1 0 
Spain  0.063 0.045 -0.018 14 0 13 11 1 1 
Total euro-zone 0.076 0.068 -0.008 96 6 58 40 32 15 
Non euro zone          
Denmark 0.047 0.051 0.004 44 0 15 5 29 17 
Norway 0.059 0.055 -0.004 2 0 1 - 1 - 
Sweden 0.071 0.066 -0.005 5 0 3 3 2 1 
Switzerland   0.054 0.052 -0.002 26 0 13 9 13 6 
United Kingdom 0.069 0.062 -0.007 8 0 5 3 3 1 
Total  non euro zone 0.060 0.057 -0.003 85 0 37 20 48 25 
 
Panel C Estimates of idiosyncratic risk and total risk using equally weighted and market value 
weighted portfolios of the banks for each of the countries in the sample 
  Idiosyncratic risk Total risk 
Country Portfolio Pre EMU 
Post 
EMU Change 
F-test 
Prob. 
Pre 
EMU 
Post 
EMU Change 
F-test 
Prob. 
Euro zone          
Austria  Equal wgt 0.032 0.000 -0.032* 0.00 0.032 0.000 -0.032* 0.00 
 MV wgt 0.032 0.032 0.000 0.55 0.045 0.045 0.000 0.82 
Belgium  Equal wgt 0.032 0.032 0.000 0.63 0.045 0.055 0.010 0.81 
 MV wgt 0.032 0.032 0.000 0.16 0.063 0.063 0.000 0.54 
Finland  Equal wgt 0.071 0.084 0.013 0.20 0.071 0.084 0.013 0.29 
 MV wgt 0.071 0.063 -0.007 0.50 0.089 0.071 -0.019* 0.03 
France  Equal wgt 0.032 0.032 0.000* 0.00 0.071 0.032 -0.039* 0.00 
 MV wgt 0.055 0.045 -0.010* 0.00 0.105 0.055 -0.050* 0.00 
Germany  Equal wgt 0.032 0.045 0.013* 0.00 0.110 0.095 -0.015 0.34 
 MV wgt 0.032 0.045 0.013+ 0.09 0.130 0.089 -0.041* 0.00 
Greece  Equal wgt 0.055 0.045 -0.010* 0.01 0.110 0.095 -0.015 0.34 
 MV wgt 0.045 0.032 -0.013 0.13 0.130 0.089 -0.041* 0.00 
Ireland Equal wgt 0.032 0.045 0.013 0.14 0.063 0.071 0.007 0.70 
 MV wgt 0.045 0.055 0.010 0.25 0.071 0.071 0.000 0.73 
Italy  Equal wgt 0.045 0.032 -0.013* 0.00 0.071 0.055 -0.016* 0.01 
 MV wgt 0.032 0.032 0.000 0.84 0.089 0.063 -0.026* 0.01 
Netherlands Equal wgt 0.045 0.032 -0.013 0.24 0.071 0.063 -0.007 0.37 
 MV wgt 0.045 0.045 0.000 0.57 0.084 0.084 0.000 0.75 
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Portugal  Equal wgt 0.045 0.032 -0.013* 0.00 0.077 0.032 -0.046* 0.00 
 MV wgt 0.045 0.032 -0.013* 0.01 0.084 0.045 -0.039* 0.00 
Spain  Equal wgt 0.032 0.032 0.000* 0.00 0.055 0.032 -0.023* 0.00 
 MV wgt 0.032 0.032 0.000* 0.00 0.084 0.055 -0.029* 0.00 
Non-Euro zone         
Denmark Equal wgt 0.020 0.022 0.002* 0.01 0.022 0.024 0.002 0.47 
 MV wgt 0.030 0.032 0.002 0.59 0.052 0.036 -0.016* 0.00 
Norway Equal wgt 0.046 0.041 -0.005 0.41 0.066 0.054 -0.012 0.11 
 MV wgt 0.066 0.056 -0.010 0.21 0.088 0.075 -0.013 0.20 
Sweden Equal wgt 0.056 0.042 -0.013* 0.02 0.076 0.068 -0.008 0.34 
 MV wgt 0.057 0.040 -0.017* 0.01 0.075 0.064 -0.011 0.19 
Switzerland Equal wgt 0.017 0.017 0.000 0.47 0.036 0.026 -0.010* 0.01 
 MV wgt 0.064 0.035 -0.029* 0.00 0.111 0.067 -0.044* 0.00 
United  
Kingdom 
Equal wgt 0.030 0.036 0.006 0.22 0.066 0.060 -0.006 0.51 
 MV wgt 0.028 0.033 0.005 0.35 0.066 0.062 -0.004 0.63 
 
Further, there was a 19% decrease in systematic risk (Table 5.3) on average with 
declines observed in 63 of the banks in the sample (64% of the sample). Regardless of 
risk measure, almost half of the declines are statistically significant. The sample includes 
both commercial banks and bank holding companies with the declines evident broadly 
across the sample. Regardless, there are a few banks, particularly the German banks that 
show an increase in total risk and idiosyncratic risk in particular. However, this finding 
on German banks is in contrary to the hypotheses H12 and H13 mentioned in Chapter 2 
(See Section 2.6.3). 
Given the important links that exist between the euro-zone countries and the 
neighboring non euro-zone countries an analysis of the change in risk for banks in the 
countries, Denmark, Sweden and United Kingdom is conducted. There is a general 
decrease in all bank equity risk in Sweden and United Kingdom but an increase in total 
risk and idiosyncratic risk in Denmark. One possible explanation for this result is that 
formation of EMU led to an increase in European financial market integration (Allen and 
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Song 2005). 
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Table 5.3 
Estimates of Systematic risk for European banks 
Average individual bank systematic risk estimates (β) are reported by country for both the euro-zone and 
the non euro-zone countries. The β estimates are reported for total sample period and pre-EMU period 
along with the change in systematic risk that occurred with EMU in Panel A. These estimates are calculated 
using country equity market indices for both individual banks and bank portfolios. N is the number of 
banking shares in the sample that are listed for the country. N* is the number of banks with a decrease in 
systematic risk and N** refers to the total number of banks with a statistically significant decrease in 
systematic risk at the 5% level of significance. N+ is the total number of banks that show an increase in 
systematic risk and N++ is the total number of banks that show a statistically significant increase in 
systematic risk at the 5% level of significance. Note that N could exceed the sum of N* and N+ where the 
risk estimates (to four decimal places) are unchanged.  Bank portfolio results are reported in Panel B and 
these include both equally weighted (equal wgt.) and market value weighted (MV wgt.) portfolios. The 
standard market model is used to measure systematic risk:
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  (see equation (4)) 
where, 
itR  is the return on security i at time period t, mtR  is the return on an equity market index at time 
period t. The systematic risk estimate for each bank or portfolio of banks is 
iβ (systematic risk) and itε  is a 
random shock term. The market model in equation (1) is extended by introducing a dummy variable to 
capture the structural changes in systematic risk. The dummy variable (D) takes on a value of zero (0) for 
the months of January 1995 to December 1998 and a value of one (1) from January 1999 to April 
2006. ( ) ( ) ittmtprepostmtpretprepostpreit DRRDR εβββααα +−++−+=  (See equation (9)). 
Note. + Statistically significant at the 10% level of significance, * statistically significant at the 5% level of 
significance. 
 
Panel A Estimates of systematic risk for individual banks 
 Country Average 
full 
period 
Average 
pre-
EMU 
Average 
Change N N* N** N+ N++ 
Euro zone         
Austria  0.250 0.310 -0.120 5 4 2 1 0 
Belgium  0.940 1.010 -0.110 3 1 1 2 0 
Finland  0.170 0.490 -0.340 6 4 3 2 0 
France  0.630 0.930 -0.480 7 5 4 2 0 
Germany  0.560 0.560 0.010 11 7 3 4 1 
Greece  1.110 0.990 0.220 9 3 1 6 1 
Ireland  0.940 1.100 -0.230 4 4 0 0 0 
Italy  0.820 0.800 0.040 28 15 5 13 4 
Netherlands  0.990 0.860 0.030 3 3 0 0 0 
Portugal  0.640 0.900 -0.450 6 6 3 0 0 
Spain  0.510 0.620 -0.210 14 11 4 3 0 
Total euro-zone 0.687 0.779 -0.149 96 63 26 33 6 
Non euro zone         
Denmark  0.120 0.202 -0.123 44 33 9 11 0 
Norway  0.622 0.702 -0.129 2 2 0 0 0 
Sweden  0.734 0.916 -0.232 5 4 3 1 1 
Switzerland   0.485 0.511 -0.040 26 14 4 12 1 
United Kingdom  1.322 1.603 -0.375 8 5 4 3 0 
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Total non euro-zone 0.657 0.787 -0.180 85 58 20 27 2 
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Panel B Estimates of systematic risk for equally weighted and market value weighted portfolios 
Country  Portfolios Full period t-stat Pre-EMU t-stat change t-stat 
Euro zone        
Austria  Equal wgt 0.23* 6.19 0.28* 5.94 -0.08 -1.46 
 
MV wgt 0.47* 8.35 0.38* 5.09 0.19+ 1.72 
Belgium  Equal wgt 0.94* 24.64 1.02* 12.48 -0.12 -1.26 
 
MV wgt 1.22* 30.57 1.27* 10.45 -0.07 -0.52 
Finland  Equal wgt 0.17* 2.77 0.26* 2.00 -0.11 -0.73 
 
MV wgt 0.34* 6.13 0.68* 3.93 -0.44* -2.42 
France Equal wgt 0.66* 12.25 1.04* 7.73 -0.59* -3.96 
 
MV wgt 1.05* 13.02 1.54* 6.52 -0.77* -2.97 
Germany  Equal wgt 0.57* 11.70 0.57* 8.53 0.00 0.02 
 
MV wgt 0.95* 17.93 1.02* 10.38 -0.08 -0.60 
Greece  Equal wgt 1.11* 22.50 0.99* 6.62 0.22 1.31 
 
MV wgt 1.23* 29.90 1.30* 16.99 -0.14 -1.34 
Ireland Equal wgt 0.94* 13.06 1.10* 8.84 -0.23 -1.33 
 
MV wgt 0.99* 12.49 1.15* 8.98 -0.23 -1.30 
Italy Equal wgt 0.81* 18.63 0.80* 8.70 0.05 0.40 
 
MV wgt 1.12* 26.11 1.12* 17.73 0.00 -0.02 
Netherlands Equal wgt 0.99* 17.12 1.11* 7.51 -0.18 -1.03 
 
MV wgt 1.23* 18.67 1.32* 7.71 -0.13 -0.62 
Portugal Equal wgt 0.67* 12.56 0.94* 8.18 -0.49* -3.73 
 
MV wgt 0.88* 16.49 1.07* 10.67 -0.37* -2.70 
Spain Equal wgt 0.51* 13.24 0.62* 6.28 -0.21+ -1.86 
 
MV wgt 1.01* 26.35 1.11* 13.04 -0.19+ -1.82 
Non euro zone       
Denmark Equal wgt 0.12* 3.22 0.20* 3.04 -0.12 -1.60 
 
MV wgt 0.47* 6.47 0.79* 7.76 -0.51* 3.87 
Norway Equal wgt 0.62* 7.73 0.70* 5.18 -0.13 -0.81 
 
MV wgt 0.88* 7.52 0.91* 4.31 -0.05 -0.18 
Sweden Equal wgt 0.74* 10.21 0.90* 6.13 -0.22 -1.28 
 
MV wgt 0.70* 11.26 0.88* 6.00 -0.24 -1.49 
Switzerland Equal wgt 0.49* 12.10 0.52* 9.07 -0.04 0.57 
 
MV wgt 1.43* 9.41 1.54* 5.35 -0.15 0.52 
United Kingdom Equal wgt 1.35* 14.54 1.67* 15.22 -0.45* -2.70 
 
MV wgt 1.42* 17.91 1.69* 15.40 -0.38* -2.50 
 
Furthermore, Europe is fairly unique in terms of the level of bank consolidation 
that occurred in its banking system during the period from 1999 to 2003, particularly 
when compared to other regions such as the USA and Asia (Allen and Song 2005). 
Regional integration between euro-zone and non euro-zone European countries may help 
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to explain this effect over the last ten years (Allen and Song 2005).  
This study applies chi-square tests to test for statistical significance of the 
proportion of banks with decreases in risk relative to those with increases in risk. Under 
ordinary circumstances it would be expected that individual banks risk is as likely to rise 
as it is to fall over time (null hypothesis) and on the basis of this a chi-square tests of the 
proportion of banks that exhibited a change in risk with EMU was constructed. These 
tests show that a statistically significant proportion of the euro-zone bank sample 
exhibited a decrease in total risk (Prob. = 0.00), idiosyncratic risk (Prob. = 0.01) and 
systematic risk (Prob. = 0.00) with introduction of EMU. This provides further support 
for the hypotheses H12, H13 and H14 with respect to the euro-zone banks as mentioned 
in Chapter 2. This test was also performed using the neighboring non-euro-zone banks. 
Although the chi-square test for systematic risk was statistically significant (Prob. = 
0.00), the null could not be rejected for either total risk (Prob. = 0.38) or idiosyncratic 
risk (Prob. = 0.23). There are a significant proportion of the euro-zone banks with 
decreased risk, though the decreases in risk are not so widespread in the neighboring non 
euro-zone country sample, particularly for total risk and idiosyncratic risk. The test 
supports only hypothesis H14 for the non euro-zone banks. 
It is possible that the recent wave of bank mergers and acquisitions 
(Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2006) are unrelated to EMU and that the results observed in 
this study are due entirely to bank consolidations. This argument would certainly find 
support in the work of Amihud, DeLong and Saunders (2002), who find that cross-border 
mergers do not increase the risk of either the domestic bank or the host bank. Yet, it is 
difficult to see how the formation of the EMU and the recent merger and acquisition 
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activity in Europe can be separated. Indeed, Altunbas and Ibanez (2008) state that the 
mergers and acquisition growth “ …increased in parallel with the introduction of the 
Monetary Union” (p. 7). Thus, there is no attempt in this study to disentangle the 
relationship that exists between EMU and the recent merger and acquisition activity. 
5.3 ROBUSTNESS  
There are number of further tests that have been conducted to assess the 
robustness of the results reported so far. First, a test for change in risk is conducted using 
sub-samples of the original bank sample, particularly commercial banks. Second, an 
analysis is performed to observe the changes in systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk and 
total risk using the MSCI world index and MSCI Europe index for both individual bank 
and bank portfolios using both the one-factor market model and two-factor market model. 
The Fama-French three factor model is also used to assess the impact on the market risk 
after adjustment for size and value characteristics of the bank equity returns. Third, 
systematic risk is examined using dummy variables to adjust for some of the critical 
events that have occurred during the study period such as the Asian Crisis 1997, the 
Russian rouble crisis 1998 and the internet bubble 2000. Fourth, all of the country wide 
results are re-estimated using individual country commercial bank indices. Fifth, an 
analysis is performed to compare the change in risk for banking and non-financial 
indices, Sixth, test is conducted to see whether this is a purely euro effect or whether 
similar changes in bank risk are observed for neighboring non euro-zone banks. Seventh, 
a test is also performed to assess the impact of excluding the Italian savings banks from 
the sample. Eighth, a test is conducted to see whether changes in the level of economic 
growth could explain the decrease in bank risk. Finally, CUSUM square graphs are 
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plotted to check the timing of structural breaks to see whether these are aligned with the 
date when the EMU was put into place. In all care, the main results are little changed 
Bank risk has tended to fall following EMU. These issues are discussed in greater detail 
below. 
5.3.1 Commercial banks 
A sample of 51 commercial banks is used as the robustness check. These banks 
are drawn from the original sample and divided into foreign exposure banks, regional 
exposure banks and local exposure banks. The MSCI world index is used for the foreign 
exposure banks, the MSCI Europe index is used for the regional banks and the MSCI 
country index is used for the local exposure banks. The risk measures are then re 
estimated using the alternate indices with both one factor market model and two-factor 
market model. It is found that 84% of the banks show a decline in idiosyncratic risk and 
total risk (statistically significant at the 1% significance level). It is also evident that 71% 
of the commercial banks show a decline in systematic risk with 14 of these being 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level. It should be noted that the decline in 
bank equity risk is mainly observed in foreign and regional exposed banks. The results 
are reported in Appendix Table A5.1. 
5.3.2 Equity market index choice and equity pricing model 
Systematic risk is re-estimated using the MSCI world index and the results are 
consistent with the previous estimates. One exception is found with the world index 
where a statistically significant risk reduction is observed for the Bank of Ireland. The 
results for total risk and idiosyncratic risk for the individual banks and the portfolios of 
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banks also support previous results. Similar results are also obtained when the European 
market equity index is used as the market portfolio proxy. The majority of the euro-zone 
banks report a decrease in equity risk over the period and a large proportion of these 
banks show a statistically significant decrease in equity risk regardless of the index 
chosen to capture market risk.  
In addition, a two-factor model, including interest rates and equity market index, 
and the Fama-French three factor model are fitted to the individual bank and bank 
portfolio returns to provide a further check. While there is little change in the results 
when using the two-factor model, the implementation of the Fama-French model needs a 
little more explanation. In order to construct the excess market return (Rm-Rf) and 
BE/ME (HML) French’s website.49 The size premium (SMB) is calculated using the 
MSCI small capital index and MSCI benchmark index. The French’s website data does 
not include Greece or Portugal and so the SMB and HML premiums and the excess 
market return were calculated separately for Greece and Portugal. The HML premium is 
calculated using the top and bottom 30% of the firms sorted by BE/ME (book value of 
equity to market value of equity) and the size premium is calculated using the top and 
bottom half of the sample sorted by ME (market value of equity). The market excess 
return is calculated using the 10 year bond benchmark as the risk-free rate and the MSCI 
benchmark index. 
Even after adjusting for HML and SMB, there are 51 banks that exhibit a decline 
in systematic risk, with 22 of these banks showing a statistically significant decline in 
                                                 
49
 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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risk. Consistent with the previous analysis few of the banks showed a statistically 
significant increase in systematic risk. The results are reported in Appendix Table A5.2. 
5.3.3 Controlling for different events 
The impact of episodes such as Asian crisis 1997, Russian ruble crisis 1998 and 
internet bubble 2000 on bank systematic risk are also assessed using country wide market 
indices. It is important to note that the analysis excludes 6 banks from the sample due to 
data limitations.50 The results are little changed from the previous analysis. There is also 
a possibility that the true break in the data occurred at some time other than 1999. As a 
result the literature is searched for possible alternative break points and June 1998 is 
identified as the most natural alternative date. This is the date when the introduction of a 
single currency was announced. Analysis was repeated with this alternate break point 
though here is little support for a break in bank risk at this date. A further discussion on 
the issue of structural change is provided in Section 5.3.9. The results are reported in 
Appendix Table A5.3. 
5.3.4 Commercial bank indices 
Systematic risk is estimated for the banking industry for each country using 
commercially available bank industry indices extracted from DataStream International. 
Analysis includes results for single market model and two-factor market model. Support 
is again evident for the finding that bank equity risk for the banking industry in the euro-
zone declined with EMU. The results are reported in Appendix Table A5.4. 
                                                 
50The banks that have been excluded are: Erste bank in Austria, Mandatum bank in Finland, CIC ‘A’ in 
France, Banca Naz Lavoro and Banca Ppo di Verona Novara in Italy and Finibanco in Portugal. 
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5.3.5 Banking and Non-banking industry risk 
The change in banking industry and non-banking industry risk is also analysed 
over the period. This comparison is made on an individual country basis as well as on a 
regional basis. While the individual country analysis shows that eight (8) out of eleven 
(11) country banking industries exhibit reduced total risk (seven countries show a 
statistically significant decline) around half of the country non-financial industry indices 
exhibit increased risk. These results are also apparent with idiosyncratic and systematic 
risk measures and are robust to index choice. While there is generally a decrease in bank 
risk over the period for euro-zone banks this is not evident for the remainder of the 
industries in Europe. Similar results are evident for European banking sector indices 
when compared with European non financial sector indices. For example, using the 
MSCI world index and MSCI Europe index, a decline in each of the three measures of 
risk is evident for the banking sector industry but this decline is not evident in the non-
banking sector. Indeed, there is a statistically significant increase in equity risk for the 
non banking sector. The results are reported in Appendix Table A5.5 and Table A5.6. 
5.3.6 Euro-zone and non-euro-zone banking industries 
It is also of interest to determine whether the decrease in bank risk is focused 
solely on the banks trading within euro-zone countries or whether it is also evident in the 
neighboring non-euro-zone banks. The results are reported in Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4 
Estimates of Bank Equity Risk for Non-euro-zone European Banks 
This table reports results of tests for change in bank equity risk: total, idiosyncratic and systematic risk. The 
average of individual bank total risk estimates for pre EMU and post EMU periods for each non euro zone 
European country are reported in Panel A along with counts of the number of statistically significant 
individual bank total risk estimate changes. Similar results are reported in Panel B for individual bank 
idiosyncratic risk estimates. Panel C presents the change in total and idiosyncratic risk for bank portfolios. 
Panel D and Panel E represent the change in individual bank systematic risk and change in systematic risk 
for bank (both equally weighted and market value weighted portfolios) respectively. N is the total number 
of banks that are included in risk calculations for the country. N* is the number of banks with a decrease in 
total risk. N** is the total number of banks with a statistically significant decrease in risk. N+ is the number 
of banks with an increase in risk and N++ is the number of banks with a statistically significant increase at 
the 5% level of significance. Total risk is defined: 2
1
2 )(/1 RRN tNtri −∑= =σ  where 2riσ  is the variance of the 
return for bank i, Ri return of bank i and R  average bank i return. Idiosyncratic risk is defined as 
2222
rmri σβσσ ε −=  where 2riσ  is the total risk for bank i , 2εσ  bank return idiosyncratic risk and 22 rmσβ  
reflects the impact of systematic risk.  
***statistically significant at the 1% level of significance, **statistically significant at the 5% level of 
significance. 
 
Panel A Total risk measures for individual countries  
Country Pre EMU 
(avg.) 
Post EMU 
(avg.) N N* N** N+ N++ 
Denmark 0.0024 0.0030 44 18 6 26 15 
Norway 0.0059 0.0045 2 2 - - - 
Sweden 0.0084 0.0087 5 4 3 1 1 
Switzerland 0.0049 0.0036 26 16 11 9 4 
United Kingdom 0.0090 0.0062 8 6 3 2 1 
Total number of  bank shares   85 46 23 38 21 
 
Panel B Idiosyncratic risk measures for individual countries  
Country Pre EMU 
(avg.) 
Post EMU 
(avg.) N N* N** N+ N++ 
Denmark 0.0022 0.0026 44 15 5 29 17 
Norway 0.0035 0.0030 2 1 - 1 - 
Sweden 0.0050 0.0044 5 3 3 2 1 
Switzerland 0.0029 0.0027 26 13 9 13 6 
United Kingdom 0.0047 0.0039 8 5 3 3 1 
Total number of  bank shares   85 37 20 48 25 
 
Panel C Total risk and idiosyncratic risk for bank portfolios 
     Total risk    Idiosyncratic risk 
Portfolios Pre EMU Post EMU F test Pre EMU Post EMU F test 
Denmark       
Equally weighted  0.0005 0.0006 0.4712 0.0004 0.0005 0.0999 
Market value weighted  0.0027 0.0013 0.0018 0.0009 0.0010 0.5864 
Norway       
Equally weighted  0.0043 0.0029 0.1129 0.0021 0.0017 0.4062 
Market value weighted  0.0078 0.0057 0.1978 0.0043 0.0031 0.2051 
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Sweden       
Equally weighted  0.0058 0.0046 0.3392 0.0031 0.0018 0.0205 
Market value weighted  0.0057 0.0041 0.1868 0.0032 0.0016 0.0089 
Switzerland       
Equally weighted  0.0013 0.0007 0.0104 0.0003 0.0003 0.4657 
Market value weighted  0.0124 0.0045 0.0000 0.0041 0.0012 0.0000 
United Kingdom       
Equally weighted  0.0043 0.0036 0.5050 0.0009 0.0013 0.2221 
Market value weighted  0.0043 0.0038 0.6248 0.0008 0.0011 0.3544 
 
Panel D Systematic risk measures for individual countries  
Country Full 
period 
average 
β 
Pre EMU 
average β 
Average changes 
in β N N* N** N+ N++ 
Denmark .120 0.202 -0.123 44 33 9 11 - 
Norway .622 0.702 -0.129 2 2 - - - 
Sweden .734 0.916 -0.232 5 4 3 1 1 
Switzerland .485 0.511 -0.040 26 14 4 11 1 
United Kingdom 1.322 1.603 -0.375 8 5 4 3 - 
Total number of bank shares    85 58 20 26 2 
 
Panel E Systematic risk measures for bank portfolios 
Portfolios Full 
period 
β 
t-stats 
Pre EMU 
β 
t- stats 
Changes in 
β 
t- stats 
Denmark       
Equally weighted  0.120 3.22 0.202 3.04 -0.123 -1.60 
Market value weighted  0.468 6.47 0.786 7.76 -0.508 -3.87*** 
Norway       
Equally weighted  0.622 7.73 0.702 5.18 -0.129 -0.81 
Market value weighted  0.875 7.52 0.905 4.31 -0.045 -0.18 
Sweden       
Equally weighted  0.739 10.21 0.899 6.13 -0.215 -1.28 
Market value weighted  0.700 11.26 0.880 6.00 -0.240 -1.49 
Switzerland       
Equally weighted  0.487 12.1 0.515 9.07 -0.044 -0.57 
Market value weighted  1.430 9.41 1.535 5.35 -0.154 -0.52 
United Kingdom       
Equally weighted  1.347 14.54 1.668 15.22 -0.449 -2.70*** 
Market value weighted  1.420 17.91 1.688 15.40 -0.3766 -2.49** 
 
Analysis of the neighboring non-euro-zone countries shows that the banks in 
neighboring countries also exhibit a decline in risk, regardless of the measure chosen. For 
example, using both MSCI world index and MSCI Europe index, all three measures of 
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risk decline in the banking sector industry for both the euro-zone banks and the 
neighboring non euro-zone banks. This finding is consistent with the argument that EMU 
has facilitated regional integration to such an extent that there was some spill-over from 
euro-zone into neighboring non euro-zone countries.51 
5.3.7 Excluding savings banks from the Italian sample 
The study re-examines the Italian bank effect by excluding six (6) savings banks 
from the total bank sample. The results for the equally-weighted and market value 
weighted portfolio remains unchanged. Further, on an individual bank analysis, the 
average results also remain essentially unchanged. More than 70% of the banks decrease 
their idiosyncratic and systematic risk while approximately 80% of the banks reduce their 
total risk over the sample period. The results are reported in Appendix Table A5.7. 
5.3.8 Bank risk and business cycle 
The model is re-estimated in order to capture the impact of the recent economic 
downturn around 2001 and 2002. Theories of imperfect capital markets (Bernanke and 
Gertler 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore 1997) suggest that asymmetric information and agency 
costs are high during business cycle downturns and relatively low during booms. 
However, the pro-cyclical behaviour of banking business may be augmented by the 
tendency for the banks to lend more during economic upturns and to adopt more cautious 
lending standards during economic downturns (Altman, Brady, Resti and Sironi 2005). 
                                                 
51Further, that approximately 83% of the value of bank merger and acquisition deals in Europe involved the 
acquisition of stakes in western European banks (Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2006) and so it is expected 
that decreases in euro-zone equity risk will affect both the target bank and the acquirer bank. Regardless, 
given the size of the euro-zone banking sector relative to neighboring non euro-zone banking sectors it is 
unlikely that this decrease in risk is driven by non euro-zone banks. 
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Further, a positive correlation between risk and GDPs growth has been noted and this 
arises from the tendency for banks to increase their riskiness by lowering their lending 
standards during economic upturns (Vennet, Jonghe and Baele 2005).  
The correlation between GDP and the change in risk with EMU is estimated and 
reported in Table 5.5 below. It is observed that while changes in total risk and 
idiosyncratic risk are negatively correlated with changes in GDP, changes in systematic 
risk are positively correlated with changes in GDP. The inconsistency in estimated 
correlation sign suggests that GDP growth does not provide a complete explanation for 
the decrease in risk across all three risk measures used in this study across the period. 
Table 5.5 
Correlation between Bank Equity Risk and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
This table presents the correlation between the changes in bank equity risk and change in GDP. Using 
MSCI indices the change in equity risk is measured by taking the difference between pre-EMU and post 
EMU period.  
 Country Change in 
GDP 
Change 
in total 
risk 
Change in 
idiosyncratic 
risk 
Change in 
systematic 
risk 
Euro-zone countries      
Austria 0.489 0.005 0.002 -0.561 
Belgium 0.579 -0.001 0.000 0.318 
Finland 1.654 0.008 0.005 -0.934 
France 0.021 0.006 0.003 -0.575 
Germany 0.468 -0.002 0.000 0.579 
Greece -1.354 0.028 0.009 -1.162 
Ireland 2.904 -0.001 -0.002 -0.371 
Italy 0.429 0.004 0.003 -0.428 
Netherlands 1.368 0.001 0.002 0.218 
Portugal 2.054 0.009 0.006 -0.239 
Spain 0.054 0.003 0.001 -0.471 
Non Euro-zone countries      
Denmark 0.982 0.001 -0.001 -0.338 
Norway 2.007 0.002 0.001 -0.576 
Sweden -0.143 0.003 0.002 -0.483 
Switzerland -0.057 0.009 0.009 -0.288 
United Kingdom -0.168 0.001 0.000 -0.257 
Correlation between change in risk and - -0.479 -0.413 0.184 
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5.3.9 Structural Change  
CUSUM square analysis allows further analysis of whether the structural breaks 
in the data do align with the starting date for EMU. 90% of the banks show a clear break 
around the time that EMU was introduced. For example the graph for SAMPO ‘A’ in 
Finland shows a break just after the introduction of euro. The Belgium banks show 
evidence of structural change in period from 1999 to 2001. There is also support for a 
structural break around the introduction of the EMU for Ireland and Portugal. In Italy, 
both Banca Lombardo and Unicredito Italiano present a break point around the 
establishment of EMU. Moreover, risk measures for the Spanish banks such as Banco de 
Castilla, Banco Espanol de Credito, Banco Popular Espanol and Bankinter ‘R’ also 
appear to be directly affected by EMU around 1999. 
Yet, there is no direct link for large German banks like the Bankgsellschaft 
Berlin, the Bayer Hypo-Und-Vbk, the Commerz bank with the EMU though Cusum-
square graphs suggest that there is a structural break closer to the middle of 1996 and the 
impact of the Asian Crisis around 1997. It is important to note that some of the relatively 
smaller German banks like the Oldenburger LB and the BHW Holdings do exhibit a 
break-point with the introduction of EMU consistent with the majority of the banks in the 
sample. In short, the CUSUM square graphs support the assumption that there was a 
major structural change for the majority of the euro-zone banks with the introduction of 
EMU. 
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5.4 SUMMARY  
The aim of this study is to assess the impact of EMU on euro-zone bank equity 
risk in relation to hypotheses H12, H13 and H14 as mentioned in Section 2.6.3 of Chapter 
2. Over 70% of the banks reduced their total risk. More than 60% of the banks exhibit a 
reduction in idiosyncratic risk and 64% of the banks exhibit a decrease in systematic risk. 
The banks that exhibit a decrease in bank equity risk are clustered in countries like 
France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
The results are robust to a number of different test specifications. For example, 
the use of the European index and world index as a proxy for the market index had little 
impact on the results and the use of the Fama-French three-factor model, which adjusts 
for the impact of size and value as well as market effects, also has little effect on the tests 
for change in market sensitivity of bank equity over the period. Further, financial crises 
appear to have little impact on the results. Tests are also conducted using banking 
industry index returns as a further check on the results. Finally, visual analysis of 
CUSUM square graphs provides evidence of a structural break around the time of the 
introduction of EMU for the majority of the banks in the sample. In summary, the 
majority of the banks in the sample exhibit a decrease in systematic risk with EMU. 
Apparently, the euro-zone banking sector has been able to deal with the 
macroeconomic shocks arising from EMU. There has certainly been an increase in 
domestic and cross border merger activity since the formation of EMU and it has been 
argued that this has lead to an increase in financial integration among the euro-zone 
countries. Perhaps these mergers go some way toward explaining the reduction in bank 
equity risk in neighboring non-euro-zone European country banks with the formation of 
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EMU. 
The results are consistent with the contention that financial integration among the 
European banks may have resulted in reduced operating risk through decreased foreign 
exchange risk exposures, decreased differences in legislation and accounting and in 
simplification of European securities regulation. There has also been a rapid increase in 
bank merger and acquisition activity since 1999 with the beginning of EMU. These 
important changes could account for individual bank equity risk reduction that is noted in 
this study. Furthermore, the reduction in risk in non euro-zone European country banks 
suggests the possibility of spill-over effects from the EMU. However, the reduction in 
risk in non-euro-zone banking industry is not as pronounced as it is for EMU members. 
While not all banks in all the countries in the study exhibit equity risk reduction, 
equity risk reduction is apparent in most countries in the sample. An important exception 
is the German banking industry, where many of the banks exhibit an increase in bank 
equity risk on an average.  
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CHAPTER 6  
AN ANALYSIS OF BANK RISK AROUND THE WORLD - 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter revisits the analysis conducted in Chapter 4 using a comprehensive 
cross-country data-set52 in analysis of how bank-specific characteristics and overall 
banking environment affect the bank equity risk and credit risk.  
This chapter presents the results for the empirical testing of hypotheses H1, H2A 
H2B, H3, H4, H5A, H5B, H6, H7, H8, H9 and H10 related to research question 1 (RQ1): 
“Do bank regulation, off-balance sheet activities and market discipline explain bank risk, 
in particular equity risk and credit risk?” The remainder of the chapter is divided into the 
following sections. Section 6.2 discusses the regression results pertinent to research 
question 1 (RQ1). Section 6.3 presents regression results in relation to a regional analysis 
of bank equity risks and credit risk. Section 6.4 presents the results on the impact of the 
formation of EMU 1999. Section 6.5 presents tests of the robustness of the results 
reported for research question 1 (RQ1). Finally, Section 6.6 concludes the chapter, 
summarizing findings and relating the results with respect to the first research question 
(RQ1).  
                                                 
52The data-set includes Western European banks as covered in Chapter 4. In addition, the sample in this 
study incorporates Turkey and Cyprus. The study period is extended by one year that is 1996-2006.  
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6.2 REGRESSION RESULTS FOR RQ1A: WORLD ANALYSIS 
This section discusses the results of world analysis for all four risk measures 
(systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk, total risk and credit risk). Tests for endogeneity 
confirm that charter value and bank capital are endogenous variables and hence the 
preferred estimation method is two-stage least squares (2SLS) for all risk measures with 
the exception of idiosyncratic risk. However, the results are not particularly sensitive to 
estimation method. The Wald test statistics for the joint significance of time dummies is 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level and hence validates their inclusion in 
the model. Section 6.2.1 reports the results for systematic risk. Section 6.2.2 presents the 
results for idiosyncratic risk. Section 6.2.3 discusses the results for total risk and finally 
Section 6.2.4 reports the results for credit risk.  
6.2.1 Determinants of systematic risk  
Table 6.1 details the tests of the hypotheses H1, H2A, H2B, H3, H4 and H5A, 
H5B, H6, H7, H8, H9 and H10 for systematic risk determinants. The regression model is 
statistically significant with an adjusted R-square of 31% and significant F-statistic 
(F=70, prob >F 0.000).  
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Table 6.1 
Cross-country analysis of the determinants of bank systematic risk 
The table represents the cross-country results for the determinants of bank systematic risk. The standard 
market model is used to measure systematic risk:
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  where, itR  is the return on 
security i at time period t, 
mtR  is the return on an equity market index at time period t. The systematic risk 
estimate for each bank is 
iβ (systematic risk) and itε  is a random shock term. The table presents the pooled-
OLS regression, pooled-OLS regression with lagged value of bank capital and lagged value of bank charter 
value  and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression results to estimate the model of bank risk. 
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The explanatory variables such as 
tjiUD ,, is the natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at 
period t , 
tjiCV ,,  is the natural log of charter value for bank i , country j in period t tjiBC ,,  is the natural log of 
bank capital for bank i , in country j  in period t , tjiBC ,,2  is the natural log of bank capital squared for bank 
i , in country j  in period t , 
tjiOBS ,,  is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities for bank i , in country j  
at period t ,
tjiLTA ,,
is the loan to total assets for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiSize ,, is the natural log of 
market value of equity for bank i , in country j , in period t and 
tjEFI ,
 is the economic freedom index for 
country j  at period t . jD1  = bank specialization dummy where jD1 =1 if commercial banks or otherwise 0; 
jD2  = legal origin variable where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 2 if French civil law countries, 3 if 
German civil-law countries and 4 if Scandinavian civil law countries; 
tjBNC,  = Bank concentration for country 
j
 at period t ; 
tjNIM .  = Net interest margin for country j  at period t ; tjSTurn .  = Stock market turnover ratio for 
country j  at period t ;  
tjDIN .  = explicit deposit insurance dummy =1, otherwise=0; tjMB .  = market based country 
dummy =1, otherwise=0;
tjHI .  = High income country dummy =1, otherwise=0; Finally, ti,ε  is the random error 
term. The joint F-test for the year dummies are statistically significant for all risk measures. All results are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † indicates the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
Pooled-OLS  Pooled-OLS with lag  2SLS 
Intercept  0.023 
(0.130) 
0.177 
(0.155) 
0.049 
(0.137) 
0.252 
(0.177) 
-0.020 
(0.144) 
0.245 
(0.219) 
Bank capital -0.116*** -0.144** -0.090** -0.259** -0.117** -0.327** 
 (0.040) (0.075) (0.043) (0.131) (0.054) (0.156) 
Bank capital squared - 0.098** - 0.135** - 0.169** 
 - (0.051) - (0.058) - (0.082) 
Charter value -0.252 -0.268 0.294 0.296 0.608 0.580 
 (0.219) (0.217) (0.256) (0.253) (0.514) (0.515) 
Off balance sheet 
items 
0.109*** 0.108*** 0.100*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.096*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Market discipline 0.025** 0.025** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.020* 0.021* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Size 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.056*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
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Loan to total assets  -0.155*** -0.152*** -0.164*** -0.158*** -0.161*** -0.155*** 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) 
Bank concentration -0.269*** -0.267*** -0.279*** -0.276*** -0.272*** -0.268*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) 
Net interest margin -0.955** -1.056*** -1.402*** -1.503*** -1.253*** -1.394*** 
 (0.445) (0.452) (0.482) (0.490) (0.495) (0.517) 
Stock market turnover 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Deposit insurance 0.079*** 0.081*** 0.090*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.096*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Economic freedom 
index 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market based dummy  0.023 0.019 0.019 0.014 0.014 0.007 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Common law dummy 0.234*** 0.239*** 0.238*** 0.244*** 0.235*** 0.243*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
Commercial bank 
dummy 
-0.022 -0.021 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.005 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
High income 
economies dummy 
0.097*** 0.099*** 0.072*** 0.075*** 0.062** 0.066** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) 
Adj. R2 
Model test  
Jt. F-test for  
year dummies 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-
sq test 
NOBS 
0.27 
F(25,4644)=66 
F(10,4644)=31 
 
- 
- 
 
4670 
0.27 
F(25,4643)=64 
F(10,4644)=31 
 
- 
- 
 
4670 
0.28 
F(25,4442)=72 
F(10,4442)=30 
 
- 
- 
 
4468 
0.28 
F(26,4441)=70 
F(10,4441)=30 
 
- 
- 
 
4468 
0.31 
F(25,4429)=72 
λ2(10)=278 
 
4.75*** 
9.53*** 
 
4455 
0.31 
F(26,4428)=70 
λ2(10)=278 
 
4.71*** 
14.17*** 
 
4455 
 
The existence of a positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level) 
coefficient for off-balance sheet items indicates that the higher the level of off-balance 
sheet items the higher the bank systematic risk. This is consistent with hypothesis H3 
(Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3) and this result is similar to that reported for European banks 
(Chapter 4). This finding is broadly in line with earlier studies (e.g., Wagster 1996; 
Angbazo 1997; Fraser, Madura and Weigand 2002); supporting the moral-hazard 
hypothesis that off-balance sheet activities increase bank risk. 
Further, the coefficient for bank capital is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1% level, indicating that the higher the level of bank capital the lower the level of 
systematic risk (Furlong and Keeley 1989; Keeley and Furlong 1990). This finding is 
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consistent with hypothesis H2A (See Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2). Yet, incorporating bank 
capital squared in the model suggests the possibility of a non-linear association between 
bank capital and systematic risk, supporting the theoretical work of Calem and Rob 
(1999). This finding is also in line with hypothesis H2B (See Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2) 
and comparable to the earlier finding reported for European banks in Chapter 4. 
Figure 6.1 below provides a representation of the non-linear relationship, 
suggested by this model, between systematic risk (Y-axis) and capital requirement (X-
axis). 
 
Figure 6.1 Relationship between bank capital and systematic risk 
 
The coefficient for market discipline is positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level. This result leads to the rejection of hypothesis H4, indicating that an increase in 
market discipline increases bank systematic risk. This unexpected outcome raises concern 
about whether market discipline substitutes for bank capital (Blum 2002; Imai 2006; Niu 
2008a; Niu 2008b). It is important to note that this result is also contrary to the previous 
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findings discussed in Chapter 4 for European banks. However, this result will be further 
explored in the regional analysis in Section 6.3 as there is some variation across different 
regions of the world. 
Given the evidence in Table 6.1, the coefficient for size is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This result confirms that larger banks are more 
sensitive to overall market movements and hence larger banks exhibit higher systematic 
risk. This outcome is consistent with hypothesis H5A and also consistent with the finding 
discussed in Chapter 4 for European banks.  
In contrast to hypothesis H6, the coefficient for loans to total assets is negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding suggests that the magnitude of 
the bank loan portfolio (including risky loans) tends to reduce bank systematic risk.  
Although the result in Chapter 4 for European banks suggests that systematic risk 
increases with charter value, there is no appreciable evidence to support either this 
finding or the disciplinary role of charter value in this broader data set.  
In the case of country-level variables, the coefficient for deposit insurance is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level indicating that bank systematic risk is 
higher in countries that have deposit insurance. This finding is consistent with the 
existence of moral hazard associated with deposit insurance (Kareken and Wallace 1978; 
Buser, Chen and Kane 1981; Marcus and Shaked 1984; Ronn and Verma 1986). The 
result also supports hypothesis H10.  
The results in Table 6.1 suggest that higher bank concentration is associated with 
lower levels of systematic risk. This finding also validates previous findings (e.g., Beck, 
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Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2006; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2007; Schaeck, 
Cihak and Wolfe 2009). Consistent with predictions in Chapter 2, the coefficient for 
stock market turnover ratio is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that banks whose shares are more frequently traded are exposed to a higher 
level of systematic risk (Anderson and Fraser 2000; Konishi and Yasuda 2004). Also 
consistent with predictions as mentioned in Chapter 2, the coefficient for the common-
law country dummy is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
that legal-origin affects bank risk taking (Aghion and Bolton 1992; Hart and Moore 
1994) and thus banks operating under common-law or British legal origin tend to exhibit 
higher systematic risk. However, it should be noted that this result is contrary to the 
finding for European banks reported previously in Chapter 4.  
Furthermore, from Table 6.1, the coefficient for net interest margin is negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding is broadly consistent with the 
work of Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) though this is inconsistent with 
predictions in Chapter 2. 
Finally, the coefficient for the high income country dummy is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting developed economies exhibit greater 
systematic risk. 
6.2.2 Determinants of idiosyncratic risk  
Table 6.2 reports the results for idiosyncratic risk determinants. The regression 
model is statistically significant with an adjusted R-square of 25% and significant F-
statistic (prob >F 0.000). 
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Consistent with hypothesis H2A, the coefficient of bank capital is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that increases in bank capital are 
associated with decreased risk. This finding supports the theoretical proposition that bank 
capital has a stabilizing effect (Furlong and Keeley 1990). In order to investigate the 
possibility of a non-linear relationship between bank capital and risk, bank capital 
squared is included in the model, though there is no appreciable evidence of non-
linearity. This finding is inconsistent with hypothesis H2B.  
Furthermore, the coefficient for off-balance sheet activities is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates that higher off-balance sheet 
activities are associated with lower bank-specific risk, consistent with prior studies (e.g., 
Angbazo 1997; Esty 1998; Boot 2003; Yildirim and Philippatos 2007a). It appears that 
banks reduce risk with fee-based income, contrary to regulator suggestions (Basel Accord 
II) that off-balance sheet activities result in greater risk. The significance of off-balance 
sheet activities differs from the earlier analysis for European banks discussed in Chapter 
4, where, it is found that off-balance sheet activities result in greater risk. This difference 
likely explains the growing importance of off-balance sheet activities in different regions 
as banks expand their operations. This result is further explored in the regional analysis 
reported in Section 6.3. 
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Table 6.2 
Cross-country analysis of the determinants of bank idiosyncratic risk 
The tables represent the cross-country results for the determinants of bank idiosyncratic risk. The standard market 
model is used to measure idiosyncratic risk:
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  where, itR  is the return on security i at time 
period t, 
mtR  is the return on an equity market index at time period t. Idiosyncratic risk is defined as the variance of the 
residual from the one factor market model. The tables represent the pooled-OLS regression, pooled-OLS regression 
with lagged value of bank capital and lagged value of bank charter value  and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression 
results to estimate the following model of bank risk.  
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The explanatory variables such as 
tjiUD ,,
is the natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at 
period t , 
tjiCV ,,  is the natural log of charter value for bank i , country j in period t tjiBC ,,  is the natural log of 
bank capital for bank i , in country j  in period t , tjiBC ,,2  is the natural log of bank capital squared for bank 
i , in country j  in period t , 
tjiOBS ,,  is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities for bank i , in country j  
at period t ,
tjiLTA ,, is the loan to total assets for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiSize ,, is the natural log of 
market value of equity for bank i , in country j , in period t and 
tjEFI ,
 is the economic freedom index for 
country j  at period t . jD1  = bank specialization dummy where jD1 =1 if commercial banks or otherwise 0; 
jD2  = legal origin variable where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 2 if French civil law countries, 3 if 
German civil-law countries and 4 if Scandinavian civil law countries; 
tjBNC,  = Bank concentration for country 
j
 at period t ; 
tjNIM .  = Net interest margin for country j  at period t ; tjSTurn .  = Stock market turnover ratio for 
country j  at period t ;  
tjDIN .  = explicit deposit insurance dummy =1, otherwise=0; tjMB .  = market based country 
dummy =1, otherwise=0;
tjHI .  = High income country dummy =1, otherwise=0; Finally, ti,ε  is the random error 
term. The joint F-test for the year dummies are statistically significant for all risk measures. All results are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † indicates the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
Pooled-OLS   Pooled-OLS with lag  2SLS 
Intercept  -3.194*** 
(0.192) 
-3.386*** 
(0.224) 
-3.306*** 
(0.207) 
-3.400*** 
(.250) 
-3.320 
(0.211) 
-3.486 
(0.273) 
Bank capital -0.192*** -0.510*** -0.237*** -0.397** -0.282** -0.562** 
 (0.046) (0.166) (0.051) (0.198) (0.064) (0.256) 
Bank capital 
squared 
- -0.121** - -0.062 - -0.107 
 - (0.061) - (0.075) - (0.097) 
Charter value 0.349 0.369 0.144 0.143 0.339 0.356 
 (0.445) (0.444) (0.407) (0.408) (0.826) (0.827) 
Off balance sheet 
items 
-0.036*** -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.030*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Market discipline -0.025** -0.026** -0.027** -0.027** -0.027** -0.027** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Size 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004 
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 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Loan to total assets  -0.156*** -0.160*** -0.151*** -0.154*** -0.143*** -0.147*** 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) 
Bank concentration 0.081 0.078 0.077 0.075 0.067 0.065 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) 
Net interest margin 2.546*** 2.671*** 2.880*** 2.926*** 2.787*** 2.876*** 
 (0.511) (0.505) (0.563) (0.566) (0.587) (0.587) 
Stock market 
turnover 
0.070*** 0.070*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Deposit insurance 
dummy 
0.132*** 0.130*** 0.131*** 0.130*** 0.126*** 0.124*** 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
Economic freedom 
index 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market based 
dummy  
-0.191*** -0.187*** -0.188*** -0.186*** -0.183*** -0.178*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Common law 
dummy 
0.130*** 0.124*** 0.138*** 0.135*** 0.133*** 0.128*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) 
Commercial bank 
dummy 
-0.089*** -0.090*** -0.080*** -0.081*** -0.082*** -0.083*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) 
High income 
economy dummy 
-0.440*** -0.442*** -0.434*** -0.436*** -0.432*** -0.434*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test 
year dummies 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
chi-sq test 
NOBS 
0.25 
F(25,4636)=78 
F(10,4636)=25 
 
- 
- 
 
4662 
0.25 
F(26,4635)=78 
F(10,4635)=25 
 
- 
- 
 
4662 
0.25 
F(26,4434)=73 
F(10,4434)=26 
 
- 
- 
 
4460 
0.25 
F(26,4433)=73 
F(10,4433)=26 
 
- 
- 
 
4460 
0.24 
F(25,4421)=70 
λ2(10)=245*** 
 
2.46* 
4.95* 
 
4447 
0.24 
F(26,4420)=71 
λ2(10)=243*** 
 
1.75 
5.31 
 
4447 
 
The coefficient for market discipline is negative and statistically significant at the 
5% level. This suggests that the higher the market discipline the lower the idiosyncratic 
risk. This is consistent with the hypothesis H4 suggesting that market discipline dampens 
bank risk-taking incentives.53 The market disciplinary role of subordinated debt may 
convey information to investors and regulators regarding bank risk as subordinated debt-
holders demand a higher interest rate from riskier banks. Perhaps, anticipation of higher 
                                                 
53
 This finding differs from the earlier result for European banks reported in Chapter 4, where it is found 
that market discipline appear to be risk-enhancing. 
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funding costs motivates banks to reduce idiosyncratic risk.  
The coefficient for loan to total assets is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. This finding is inconsistent with hypothesis H6 (Chapter 2 Section 2.4.2). 
Possibly, this broader sample is dominated by US bank holding companies and so it is 
possible that increases in loans (commercial loans etc) may help these banks to diversify 
their idiosyncratic risk.  
It is evident from the results reported in Table 6.2 that the coefficient for deposit 
insurance is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding suggests 
that explicit safety nets may have encouraged banks to undertake more risky investments 
and hence increase bank risk. Further, mis-priced deposit insurance could also provide 
banks with an incentive to engage in more risky lending strategies that increase the 
contingent payout from deposit insurance agencies. This finding is consistent with 
hypothesis H10.  
The coefficient for the market-based dummy is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that under a market-based system banks tend to 
demonstrate lower levels of idiosyncratic risk. Perhaps, market-based economies 
encourage banks to undertake more prudent risk levels (Rajan and Zingales 1998, 1999). 
This finding is inconsistent with hypothesis H9.  
With respect to other country-level variables, the coefficient for stock market 
turnover ratio is positive and statistically significantly at the 1% level, indicating that the 
higher the frequency of share trading the higher the idiosyncratic risk (Anderson and 
Fraser 2000; Konishi and Yasuda 2004; Stiroh 2006). Further, there is evidence that 
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higher net interest margin leads to higher risk (Maudos and Fernández de Guevara 2004). 
These findings are consistent with predictions as explained earlier in Section 2.4.3 of 
Chapter 2. 
There is also evidence that common-law country banks exhibit higher risk 
indicating that banks can extend risky loans due to the lower expected loss per loan in 
common-law countries because of the superior creditor protection in these countries. This 
is consistent with predictions mentioned in Section 2.4.3 of Chapter 2.  
Banks in higher income economies also exhibit lower levels of idiosyncratic risk. 
Diversification opportunities and access to the capital markets enable high-income 
country investors to diversify their bank-specific risk. Thus, this is also in line with the 
predictions as discussed in Section 2.4.3 of Chapter 2. 
Finally, contrary to the earlier prediction (Section 2.4.3 of Chapter 2) commercial 
banks exhibit lower levels of idiosyncratic risk than other financial institutions. This 
finding suggests that commercial banks in the sample may be able to reduce bank-
specific risk through internal diversification opportunities. 
6.2.3 Determinants of total risk  
Estimation of the association between bank risk and bank-specific variables is 
reported in Table 6.3. The coefficient for bank capital is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level, indicating that bank capital imposes a disciplinary effect on 
total risk. This result supports hypothesis H2A. It seems that this finding is sensitive to 
the inclusion of bank capital square term and so fails to support hypothesis H2B, as well 
as the theoretical work of Calem and Rob (1999). However, the finding is consistent with 
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that observed for European banks as discussed in Chapter 4.  
Consistent with hypothesis H3, the coefficient for off-balance sheet activities is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that increases in off-
balance sheet activities lead to increased bank total risk (Wagster 1996; Fraser, Madura 
and Weigand 2002). However, this finding is contrary to the prior studies, particularly 
those based on US data (e.g., Hassan, Karels and Peterson 1994, Lynge and Lee 1994, 
Avery and Berger 1991). 
Market discipline is found to be associated with a reduction in total risk, 
suggesting that increases in market discipline decreases bank total risk. In other words, 
from the policy perspective, market discipline appears to promote disclosure and relevant 
information by banks to the market (Estrella 2004). Hence, banks that disclose more 
information are subject to greater market discipline and have greater incentive to reduce 
their total risk. This finding is also consistent with hypothesis H4 (See Chapter 2 Section 
2.3.4). For the purpose of comparison, regional analysis is also conducted and the results 
are reported in Section 6.3. 
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Table 6.3 
Cross-country analysis of the determinants of bank total risk 
The table represents the cross-country results for the determinants of bank total risk. The variance of bank 
equity returns is calculated each year for each bank using weekly return data available in that year and is 
defined as follows: 21
2 )(/1 RRN tNtri −∑= =σ  
where 2
riσ  = the total risk or variance of bank returns for bank i ; Ri = bank i return per week; R  = the 
average bank i return and; N = the number of observations. The table represent the pooled-OLS regression, 
pooled-OLS regression with lagged value of bank capital and lagged value of bank charter value and two-
stage least squares (2SLS) regression results to estimate the following model of bank risk.  
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The explanatory variables such as 
tjiUD ,, is the natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at 
period t , 
tjiCV ,,  is the natural log of charter value for bank i , country j in period t tjiBC ,,  is the natural log of 
bank capital for bank i , in country j  in period t , tjiBC ,,2  is the natural log of bank capital squared for bank 
i , in country j  in period t , 
tjiOBS ,,  is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities for bank i , in country j  
at period t ,
tjiLTA ,,
is the loan to total assets for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiSize ,, is the natural log of 
market value of equity for bank i , in country j , in period t and 
tjEFI ,
 is the economic freedom index for 
country j  at period t . jD1  = bank specialization dummy where jD1 =1 if commercial banks or otherwise 0; 
jD2  = legal origin variable where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 2 if French civil law countries, 3 if 
German civil-law countries and 4 if Scandinavian civil law countries; 
tjBNC,  = Bank concentration for country 
j
 at period t ; 
tjNIM .  = Net interest margin for country j  at period t ; tjSTurn .  = Stock market turnover ratio for 
country j  at period t ; 
tjDIN .  = explicit deposit insurance dummy =1, otherwise=0; tjMB .  = market based country 
dummy =1, otherwise=0;
tjHI .  = High income country dummy =1, otherwise=0; Finally, ti,ε  is the random error 
term. The joint F-test for the year dummies are statistically significant for all risk measures. All results are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † indicates the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
Pooled-OLS  Pooled-OLS with lag  2SLS 
Intercept  -3.512*** 
(0.202) 
-3.500*** 
(0.228) 
-3.537*** 
(0.206) 
-3.471*** 
(0.245) 
-3.569*** 
(0.210) 
-3.508*** 
(0.267) 
Bank capital -0.224*** -0.205 -0.262*** -0.149 -0.309*** -0.208 
 (0.039) (0.140) (0.045) (0.171) (0.055) (0.228) 
Bank capital squared - 0.007 - 0.044 - 0.039 
 - (0.047) - (0.061) - (0.082) 
Charter value 0.193 0.192 0.136 0.137 0.319 0.312 
 (0.409) (0.407) (0.398) (0.397) (0.774) (0.774) 
Off balance sheet 
items 
-0.003 -0.003 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
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Market discipline -0.014** -0.014** -0.018** -0.018** -0.018** -0.018** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Size 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Loan to total assets  -0.211*** -0.211*** -0.209*** -0.207*** -0.201*** -0.200*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Bank concentration 0.116** 0.116** 0.089* 0.090* 0.084 0.084 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) 
Net interest margin 2.787*** 2.779*** 2.871*** 2.838*** 2.831*** 2.798*** 
 (0.505) (0.515) (0.566) (0.574) (0.588) (0.600) 
Stock market turnover 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Deposit insurance 
dummy 
0.174*** 0.175*** 0.171*** 0.172*** 0.167*** 0.168*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) 
Economic freedom 
index 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
market based dummy  -0.183*** -0.184*** -0.178*** -0.180*** -0.174*** -0.176*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Common law dummy 0.193*** 0.194*** 0.196*** 0.198*** 0.191*** 0.193*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
Commercial bank 
dummy 
-0.058*** -0.058*** -0.049*** -0.048** -0.051** -0.051** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) 
High income economy 
dummy 
-0.431*** -0.431*** -0.427*** -0.426*** -0.426*** -0.425*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
R-squared 
Model test  
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman  
chi-sq test 
NOBS 
0.25 
F(25,4654)=87.18 
F(10,4654)=21.68 
 
- 
- 
 
4680 
0.25 
F(26,4653)=83.8 
F(10,4653)=21.6 
 
- 
- 
 
4680 
0.27 
F(25,4446)=87 
F(10,4446)=25.5 
 
- 
- 
 
4472 
0.27 
F(26,4445)=83.3 
F(10,4445)=25.5 
 
- 
- 
 
4472 
0.30 
F(25,4433)=81.2 
λ2(10)=236*** 
 
4.73*** 
9.10*** 
 
4459 
0.30 
F(26,4432)=80.9 
λ2(10)=236*** 
 
4.72*** 
13.09*** 
 
4459 
 
Given the evidence in Table 6.3, the results suggest that size is an important 
determinant of total risk. Large banks tend to exhibit greater levels of total risk. This 
finding is inconsistent with hypothesis H5B (Chapter 2 Section 2.4.1), though this result 
does support the work of Acharya, Hasan and Saunders (2002). Further, the coefficient 
for loans to total assets is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating 
that a greater proportion of loan to total assets is associated with lower bank total risk. 
This is an unexpected outcome and thus fails to support hypothesis H6 (See Chapter 2 
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Section 2.4). One possible interpretation of this finding may be that regulation, structural 
reforms, and institutional changes may have prompted banks to improve their allocation 
of financial resources, favouring prudent investments in their loan portfolio and thereby 
promoting further development of the financial system and reducing risk (Pelozo 2008). 
The coefficient for explicit deposit insurance is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that moral hazard associated with explicit deposit 
insurance creates incentive for excessive risk taking (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 
1998; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 2002). This finding is consistent with hypothesis 
H10 (See Chapter 2 Section 2.4.2).  
In addition, the coefficient for market-based economies is negative and is 
statistically significant at 1% significant level. This result leads to the rejection of 
hypothesis H9 though this finding supports prior studies (e.g., Rajan and Zingales 1998; 
Rajan and Zingales 1999). 
Finally, with respect to other country-level variables, the coefficients for net 
interest margin (positive) and the common-law country dummy (positive) exhibit their 
predicted signs (See Chapter 2 Section 2.4.2). Further, contrary to predictions, the 
coefficient for the commercial bank dummy is negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level, indicating that commercial banks demonstrate lower total risk. This finding 
seems to originate mostly from Canadian banks, as Canadian commercial banks are 
ranked among the world’s safest bank (World Economic Forum 2008). This proposition 
is further explored in the regional analysis in Section 6.3. 
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6.2.4 Determinants of credit risk  
Table 6.4 reports the results for credit risk determinants. Panel A and Panel B 
presents the findings for two alternate credit risk measures, loan loss provisions and loan 
loss reserves. According to the findings observed in Panel A and Panel B of Table 6.4, 
the coefficient for charter value is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level 
indicating that increases in the charter value are associated with decreases in credit risk. 
Thus, charter value helps to reduce excessive risk taking, supporting hypothesis H1 
(Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1). This finding is also consistent with prior theoretical (e.g., 
Merton 1977; Keeley 1990) and empirical (e.g. Konishi and Yasuda 2004; González 
2005) studies. Given the evidence in Table 6.4, it can be confirmed that off-balance sheet 
items increase bank credit risk and hence this justifies the inclusion of these activities in 
the calculation of risk-weighted capital requirement (Wagster 1996; Fraser, Madura and 
Weigand 2002). 
This finding is in line with hypothesis H3. Similar evidence is also observed for 
systematic risk and total risk. Further, consistent with hypothesis H4, the coefficient for 
market discipline is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that 
market discipline creates an incentive to monitor bank risk particularly on the loan side of 
the balance sheet (Morgan and Stiroh 2001; Blum 2002; Nier and Baumann 2006). 
Panel A and Panel B confirm that larger banks exhibit lower credit risk as 
reflected by the negative coefficient on size due to diversification benefits (Demsetz and 
Strahan 1997). This result is consistent with hypothesis H5B (See Chapter 2, Section 
2.4.1). 
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Table 6.4 
Cross-country analysis of the determinants of bank credit risk 
The table represents the cross-country results for the determinants of bank credit risk. Panel A Panel B 
represents the results of the determinants of credit risk. The table represent the pooled-OLS regression, 
pooled-OLS regression with lagged value of bank capital and lagged value of bank charter value and two-
stage least squares (2SLS) regression results to estimate the following model of bank risk.  
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tjiRISK ,,  measures credit risk. Credit risk is measured using tjitjitji TALLPCR ,,,,,, /= .where; tjiCR ,,  is the credit risk 
measure for bank i  in country j in period t ; or the ex-post realized risk. 
tjiLLP ,,
 is the loan loss provision 
for bank i  in country j in period t ; 
tjiTA ,,
 is the total assets of bank i  in country j in period t . The 
estimation techniques are provided in equation (3) Note that the second estimation method of credit risk 
eliminates a number of Danish banks due to lack of data availability. The explanatory variables such as 
tjiUD ,,
is the natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at period t , 
tjiCV ,,  is the natural log of 
charter value for bank i , country j in period t tjiBC ,,  is the natural log of bank capital for bank i , in country 
j  in period t , tjiBC ,,2  is the natural log of bank capital squared for bank i , in country j  in period t , 
tjiOBS ,,  is 
the natural log of off-balance sheet activities for bank i , in country j  at period t ,
tjiLTA ,,
is the loan to total 
assets for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiSize ,, is the natural log of market value of equity for bank i , in 
country j , in period t and 
tjEFI ,
 is the economic freedom index for country j  at period t . jD1  = bank 
specialization dummy where jD1 =1 if commercial banks or otherwise 0; jD2  = legal origin variable 
where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 2 if French civil law countries, 3 if German civil-law countries and 
4 if Scandinavian civil law countries; 
tjBNC,  = Bank concentration for country j  at period t ; tjNIM .  = Net 
interest margin for country j  at period t ;
tjSTurn .  = Stock market turnover ratio for country j  at period t ; tjDIN .  = 
explicit deposit insurance dummy =1, otherwise=0; 
tjMB .  = market based country dummy =1, otherwise=0; tjHI . =High 
income country dummy =1, otherwise=0; Finally, 
ti,ε  is the random error term. The joint F-test for the year 
dummies are statistically significant for all risk measures. All results are corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
The standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † indicates the coefficients of the explanatory variables and standard 
errors are scaled by 100. 
 
Panel A Determinants of credit risk (measured by loan loss provision to total assets) 
Pooled-OLS   Pooled-OLS with lag  2SLS 
Intercept  -1.671*** 
(0.130) 
-1.374*** 
(0.165) 
-1.697*** 
(0.144) 
-1.581*** 
(0.174) 
-1.549*** 
(0.141) 
-1.310*** 
(0.201) 
Bank capital -0.120*** 0.357** -0.052 0.139 -0.024 0.366* 
 (0.042) (0.161) (0.042) (0.148) (0.051) (0.219) 
Bank capital squared - 0.180*** - 0.073 - 0.147** 
 - (0.057) - (0.048) - (0.072) 
Charter value -0.618*** -0.641*** -0.826*** -0.829*** -1.602*** -1.620*** 
 (0.188) (0.187) (0.227) (0.228) (0.312) (0.312) 
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Off balance sheet items 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.0444*** 0.052*** 0.050*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Market discipline -0.023** -0.022** -0.032*** -0.0314*** -0.025** -0.024** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Size -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.008** -0.007** -0.006* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Loan to total assets  0.509*** 0.513*** 0.492*** 0.494*** 0.500*** 0.504*** 
 (0.064) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.068) 
Bank concentration -0.266*** -0.266*** -0.249*** -0.249*** -0.256*** -0.256*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Net interest margin 1.108** 0.925** 1.546*** 1.483*** 0.927* 0.804 
 (0.466) (0.470) (0.570) (0.575) (0.533) (0.539) 
Stock market turnover -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.059*** -0.058*** -0.062*** -0.062*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Deposit insurance dummy 0.005 0.008 0.018 0.0194 0.012 0.014 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Economic freedom index -0.007*** -0.007 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
market based dummy  0.075*** 0.067*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.080*** 0.073*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) 0.022 
Common law dummy -0.126*** -0.118*** -0.111*** -0.108*** -0.103*** -0.097*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) 
Commercial bank dummy 0.079*** 0.081*** 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.069*** 0.071*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
High income economy 
dummy 
-0.221*** -0.217*** -0.237*** -0.236*** -0.210*** -0.208*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
R-squared 
Model test  
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 
test 
NOBS 
0.27 
F(25,4605)=55 
F(10,4605)=35 
- 
- 
 
4631 
0.27 
F(26,4604)=53 
F(10,4604)=35 
- 
- 
 
4631 
0.28 
F(25,4220)=54 
F(10,4220)=37 
- 
- 
 
4246 
0.27 
F(26,4219)=52 
F(10,4219)=37 
- 
- 
 
4246 
0.27 
F(25,4207)=54 
λ2(10)=332*** 
8.262*** 
16.569*** 
 
4233 
0.28 
F(26,4206)=52 
λ2(10)=333*** 
6.068*** 
18.255*** 
 
4233 
 
Furthermore, the result reported in Panel B shows that the coefficient for bank 
capital is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that enforced 
minimum capital levels can lead banks to take on higher risk. This finding is inconsistent 
with hypothesis H2A (Chapter 2) and should be of major concern to regulators and 
creditors. 
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Panel B Determinants of credit risk (measured by loan loss reserves to total assets) 
 
Pooled-OLS  Pooled-OLS with lag  2SLS 
Intercept  -0.858*** 
(0.117) 
-0.290** 
(0.143) 
-0.968*** 
(0.130) 
-0.571*** 
(0.167) 
-0.827*** 
(0.131) 
-0.224 
(0.188) 
Bank capital 0.127*** 1.034*** 0.082** 0.737*** 0.119*** 1.091*** 
 (0.036) (0.147) (0.037) (0.171) (0.046) (0.232) 
Bank capital squared - 0.342*** - 0.250*** - 0.366*** 
 - (0.056) - (0.062) - (0.089) 
Charter value -0.410*** -0.365** -0.175*** -0.173*** -1.325*** -1.315*** 
 (0.194) (0.190) (0.059) (0.067) (0.378) (0.374) 
Off balance sheet items 0.009** 0.006** 0.006** 0.004** 0.009** 0.006** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Market discipline -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.028*** -0.028*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Size -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Loan to total assets  0.499*** 0.531*** 0.538*** 0.565*** 0.535*** 0.577*** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) 
Bank concentration 0.035 0.043 0.049 0.055 0.025 0.034 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) 
Net interest margin 0.055 -0.267 0.870** 0.687* 0.408 0.130 
 (0.342) (0.345) (0.415) (0.421) (0.375) (0.380) 
Stock market turnover -0.089*** -0.088*** -0.091*** -0.090*** -0.094*** -0.092*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Deposit insurance 
dummy 
0.016 0.023 0.024 0.029 0.016 0.023 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Economic freedom 
index 
-0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Market based dummy  0.052*** 0.042** 0.056*** 0.048*** 0.067*** 0.054*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Common law dummy -0.026 -0.012 -0.019 -0.009 -0.025 -0.011 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Commercial bank 
dummy 
0.059*** 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.069*** 0.062*** 0.069*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
High income dummy -0.140*** -0.129*** -0.139*** -0.132*** -0.125*** -0.114*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
R-squared 
Model test  
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.24 
F(25,4498)=65 
F(10,4498)=19 
 
- 
- 
4524 
0.25 
F(26,4497)=65 
F(10,4497)=18 
 
- 
- 
4524 
0.25 
F(25,4129)=64 
F(10,4129)=16 
 
- 
- 
4155 
0.26 
F(26,4128)=63 
F(10,4128)=15.8 
 
- 
- 
4155 
0.26 
F(25,4115)=65.05 
λ2(10)=141*** 
 
6.31*** 
12.68*** 
4141 
0.27 
F(26,4114)=64 
λ2(10)=141*** 
 
4.33*** 
13.04*** 
4141 
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With regards to the country-level variables, the coefficient for market-based 
dummy is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. It would appear that a 
market-based system does not result in lower credit risk (Greenwood and Jovanovic 
1990; Bencivenga and Smith 1991; de la Fuente and Marin 1996). This finding is 
consistent with hypothesis H9.  
Further, consistent with predictions, the coefficient for the commercial bank 
dummy is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that 
commercial banks are more aggressive in the credit market. The negative and statistically 
significant coefficient for the economic freedom index, suggests that higher levels of 
freedom may have led to a reduction in credit risk through greater diversification. 
Consistent with predictions in Chapter 2, it is observed from Panel A that higher 
credit risk is associated with higher interest margin (Maudos and Fernández de Guevara 
2004). The negative and significant coefficient for stock market turnover ratio suggests 
that increasing frequency of trading is associated with decreased bank credit risk. This 
finding is inconsistent with predictions (Chapter 2). Further, common-law country banks 
exhibit lower credit risk. This finding is inconsistent with predictions and the previous 
studies (e.g., Aghion and Bolton 1992; Hart and Moore 1992; 1994). Finally, the findings 
in Table 6.4 confirm that banks in higher income groups exhibit lower credit risk. This 
may be due to diversification opportunities.  
Overall, in answering research question 1 (RQ1A), the empirical findings suggest 
that in general off-balance sheet activities is associated with an increase in risk. Although 
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bank capital exhibit the disciplinary role with regard to equity risk but the finding is 
sensitive to the inclusion of bank capital squared. However, there is a non-linear 
association between bank capital and systematic risk. Moreover, while market discipline 
effect is present with regard to total risk, idiosyncratic risk and credit risk, the effect 
diminishes with regard to systematic risk. Size is an important determinant of bank risk. 
While large banks around the world show greater systematic risk and total risk, they also 
show lower credit risk. 
6.3 REGRESSION RESULTS FOR RQ1A: REGIONAL ANALYSIS  
This section discusses the results from regional analysis (Asia-Pacific, Eastern 
Europe, Middle East and Africa, North America, South America and Western Europe) to 
better understand the stability of the bank-level determinants across regions of the world. 
In this section, the results of the main variables are discussed at a regional level along 
with some of the important country-level variables. Section 6.3.1 presents the results for 
off-balance sheet activities. Section 6.3.2 represents the findings for charter value. 
Section 6.3.3 discusses the results for bank capital. Section 6.3.4 reports the finding for 
market discipline and finally Section 6.3.5 summarizes the results with respect to 
country-level variables.  
Table 6.6 summarizes the findings for each region and draws a comparison 
between world analysis and regional analysis. The details of the empirical results are 
provided in the Appendix in Tables A6.1, A6.2, A6.3, A6.4, A6.5 and A6.6.  
6.3.1 Off-balance sheet activities 
Table 6.5 reports the comparison between world analysis and regional analysis. 
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The coefficient for off-balance sheet activity is positive and statistically significant at the 
5% level or better for systematic risk in the Western Europe, Middle-East and Africa 
(MENA) and the North America regions. This finding is consistent with hypothesis H3, 
suggesting that reliance on non-interest generating income is an important risk factor. 
This finding is also consistent with the world analysis reported in Section 6.2.  
Table 6.5 
Off-balance Sheet Activities and Risk - World Analysis versus Regional Analysis 
This table presents a summary of the results as discussed in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3. The results 
reported in columns under the term “Actual Sign” in the following table are statistically significant at 5% 
significance level or better. Asia Pacific=Asia Pacific region; EEC=Eastern European countries; 
MENA=Middle East and Africa region, NA=North America region; SA= South America and W. 
Europe=Western Europe region. Equity risk includes systematic risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
Credit risk is measured by loan loss provision and loan loss reserve. LLP=loan loss provision; LLR=loan 
loss reserve. The detailed results are reported in Appendix Table A6.1, Table A6.2, Table A6.3, Table 
A6.4, Table A6.5 and Table A6.6. 
 World  Asia Pacific EEC MENA NA SA W. Europe 
Predicted 
sign 
Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual 
sign 
Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign 
Positive 
(+) 
Positive (+) 
with total, 
systematic 
and credit 
risk. Negative 
(-) with 
idiosyncratic 
risk. 
Positive (+) 
with 
idiosyncratic 
risk and 
LLP. 
Positive (+) 
with LLP 
under 2SLS 
Positive 
(+) with 
equity 
risk. 
Positive (+) 
with equity 
risk. 
Negative (-) 
with credit 
risk. 
Positive (+) 
with equity 
risk and 
credit risk 
 
Consistent with hypothesis H3, and the world analysis conducted in Section 6.2, a 
positive and significant (at the 1% level) association is also evident with respect to total 
risk in the Western Europe, Middle-East and Africa (MENA), the North America and 
Asia-Pacific region. A similar result is also observed with respect to idiosyncratic risk in 
Western Europe, Middle-East and Africa (MENA), North America and Asia-Pacific 
regions. It is interesting to note that the aforementioned finding for idiosyncratic risk is 
contrary to that reported for world analysis in Section 6.2. Thus, the effect reported in the 
world analysis may reflect regional differences in sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk. 
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Off-balance sheet activities show statistically significant positive coefficient (at 
the 1% level) for credit risk, in Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Asia-Pacific region.  
This result supports hypothesis H3 and further supports the argument that off-
balance sheet activities should be included in the calculation of capital as required by 
regulatory authorities. 
Further, with regard to credit risk, a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient (at the 5% level or better) is observed in the South America region. This 
finding rejects hypothesis H3, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
One possible explanation could be that increased competition and foreign bank 
penetration in these developing economies has helped banks to achieve greater efficiency 
(Yildirim and Philippatos 2007b), and lower credit risk levels through greater focus on 
non-interest income generating activities. Indeed, this is an important finding because the 
rest of world banking system shows a positive association between off-balance sheet 
activities and risk. Overall, there is no considerable variation in the findings across the 
regional and world analysis. The detailed results are reported in Appendix in Tables 
A6.1, A6.2, A6.3, A6.4, A6.5 and A6.6. 
6.3.2 Charter value 
As reported in Table 6.6, the coefficient for charter value is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level, or better, for systematic risk in Middle East and 
Africa region. This finding is in line with hypothesis H1, suggesting that charter value 
disciplines banks and thus reduces systematic risk (Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan 
1996; Anderson and Fraser 2000; Konishi and Yasuda 2004). Contrary to the 
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aforementioned finding in the Middle-East and Africa region, the results in Table 6.6 
show that higher charter value is associated with higher systematic risk, particularly, in 
North America, South America and Western European region. This is an unexpected 
outcome and suggests that charter value may reflect growth opportunities which are 
associated with high risk projects. It is also evident with respect to total risk, that the 
coefficient for charter value is negative and statistically significant (at the 5% level or 
better) in Middle East and African region, suggesting that an increase in charter value is 
associated with a decrease in bank total risk. This outcome is in line with hypothesis H1. 
Yet, other regions including North America, South America and Western Europe exhibit 
a positive and statistically significant (at the 5% level or better) association between 
charter value and total risk. This finding fails to support hypothesis H1, though is broadly 
in line with the work of Saunders and Wilson 2001. 
With regard to idiosyncratic risk, a negative and statistically significant (at the 5% 
level or better) coefficient for charter value is evident in Middle East and Africa region, 
consistent with hypothesis H1 and with the findings reported above for systematic risk 
and total risk. 
This confirms the disciplinary role of charter value on bank equity risk 
(systematic risk, total risk and idiosyncratic) in Middle East and African region. The 
findings on world analysis reported in Section 6.2 exhibit no appreciable association 
between charter value and bank equity risk (systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk and total 
risk).  
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Table 6.6 
Charter Value and Risk - World Analysis versus Regional Analysis 
This table presents a summary of the results as discussed in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3. The results 
reported in columns under the term “Actual Sign” in the following table are statistically significant at 5% 
significance level or better. Asia Pacific=Asia Pacific region; EEC=Eastern European countries; 
MENA=Middle East and Africa region, NA=North America region; SA= South America and W. 
Europe=Western Europe region. Equity risk includes systematic risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
Credit risk is measured by loan loss provision and loan loss reserve. LLP=loan loss provision; LLR=loan 
loss reserve. The detailed results are reported in Appendix Table A6.1, Table A6.2, Table A6.3, Table 
A6.4, Table A6.5 and Table A6.6. 
 World  Asia Pacific EEC MENA NA SA W. Europe 
Predicted 
sign 
Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign 
Negative 
(-) 
Negative (-) 
with credit 
risk. 
Negative (-) 
with LLP. 
Positive (+) 
with LLP 
under 2SLS 
Negative (-) 
with equity 
risk and 
credit risk. 
Negative (-) 
with credit 
risk. 
Positive (+) 
with equity 
risk. 
Positive 
(+) with 
systematic, 
total risk 
and LLR.  
Negative (-) 
with credit 
risk. Positive 
(+) with 
equity risk. 
 
Contrary to the Middle-East and the African region, a positive and statistically 
significant (at the 5% level or better) association is observed between charter value and 
idiosyncratic risk, particularly in the developed countries including the North American 
and the Western European regions. This finding supports existing literature (e.g., Marcus 
1984; Keeley 1990; Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz 2000; Matutes and Vives 2000).  
Furthermore, with respect to credit risk, evidence of the disciplinary role of 
charter value is observed in Asia-Pacific, Middle East and Africa, North America and 
Western European region with increases in charter value being associated with decreases 
in credit risk.  
This result is consistent with hypothesis H1 and with the world analysis reported 
in Section 6.2. Yet, the developing economies in Eastern Europe and South America 
confirm a diminishing disciplinary effect for charter value, with increases in charter value 
associated with increases in credit risk. This finding is inconsistent with hypothesis H1.  
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In essence, there are some variations in the findings across the regions. However, 
the findings of the world analysis, is possibly influenced by majority of the regions 
including Asia-Pacific, Middle East and Africa, North America and Western Europe. The 
empirical results are provided in Appendix in Tables A6.1, A6.2, A6.3, A6.4, A6.5 and 
A6.6. 
6.3.3 Bank capital 
Table 6.7 reports the result for bank capital. A negative and statistically 
significant (at the 1% level) association between bank capital and systematic risk is 
observed in the Middle East and Africa and the Western European region. This finding is 
consistent with hypothesis H2A, indicating that increases in bank capital are associated 
with decreases in bank systematic risk (Furlong and Keeley 1989; Keeley and Furlong 
1990). This result further supports the evidence reported for world analysis in Section 
6.2. 
There is evidence of non-linearity between bank capital and systematic risk in the 
Western European region54, though this result is not evident in the other regions. The 
coefficients for bank capital and bank capital squared are negative and positive 
respectively and statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding is consistent with 
hypothesis H2B and suggests that the systematic risk decreases initially with bank capital 
and then starts to increase after a certain level of bank capital (Calem and Rob 1999). It is 
important to note that this non-linear association between bank capital and systematic risk 
is also observed for the world analysis as reported in Section 6.2.  
                                                 
54
 This finding is also consistent with that reported in Chapter 4. 
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Table 6.7 
Bank Capital and Risk - World Analysis versus Regional Analysis 
This table presents a summary of the results as discussed in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3. The results 
reported in columns under the term “Actual Sign” in the following table are statistically significant at 5% 
significance level or better. Asia Pacific=Asia Pacific region; EEC=Eastern European countries; 
MENA=Middle East and Africa region, NA=North America region; SA= South America and W. 
Europe=Western Europe region. Equity risk includes systematic risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
Credit risk is measured by loan loss provision and loan loss reserve. LLP=loan loss provision; LLR=loan 
loss reserve. The detailed results are reported in Appendix Table A6.1, Table A6.2, Table A6.3, Table 
A6.4, Table A6.5 and Table A6.6. 
 World  Asia Pacific EEC MENA NA SA W. Europe 
Predicte
d sign 
Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual 
sign 
Actual 
sign 
Actual sign 
Negative 
(-) 
Negative (-) 
with equity risk 
(systematic, 
total, 
idiosyncratic) 
Positive with 
LLR. 
Negative (-) 
with total 
risk, 
idiosyncratic 
risk and 
credit risk. 
Negative (-) 
with LLP 
under 2SLS. 
Negative (-) 
with 
systematic 
risk. Positive 
(+) with 
credit risk.  
Negative 
(-) with 
total, 
idiosyncra
tic and 
credit 
risk. 
Positive 
(+) with 
LLR. 
Negative (-) 
with equity 
risk 
(systematic, 
total, 
idiosyncratic) 
and LLR. 
Non-
linear 
Non-linear with 
systematic risk. 
No evidence of 
non-linearity 
for the rest of 
the risk. 
No 
appreciable 
evidence of 
non-linearity 
for the risk. 
No evidence 
of non-
linearity for 
the risk. 
No evidence 
of non-
linearity for 
the risk. 
No 
evidence 
of non-
linearity 
for the 
risk. 
No 
evidence 
of non-
linearity 
for the 
risk. 
Non-linear 
with 
systematic 
risk.  
No evidence 
of non-
linearity for 
rest of the 
risk.  
 
With regard to total risk, the coefficient of bank capital is negative and 
statistically significant (at the 1% level) suggesting that increases in bank capital is 
associated with decreases in total risk as desired by the regulatory authorities. This 
finding is observed for the Asia-Pacific, the North American and the Western European 
regions. The result is consistent with hypothesis H2A and also consistent with the finding 
reported on the world analysis in Section 6.2. Further, similar to the world analysis 
(discussed in Section 6.2), there is no appreciable evidence of non-linear association 
between bank capital and total risk. Hence, there is little to support hypothesis H2B with 
respect to total risk.  
With regard to idiosyncratic risk, a negative and statistically significant 
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coefficient is observed for bank capital for the Asia-Pacific, the North American and the 
Western European regions. This result is in line with hypothesis H2A, indicating that 
increases in bank capital are associated with decreases in bank-specific risk (Furlong and 
Keeley 1989; Keeley and Furlong 1990). This finding is consistent with that reported in 
Section 6.2 on world analysis.  
Further, similar to the world analysis results there is no appreciable evidence of 
non-linearity between bank capital and idiosyncratic risk. This result fails to validate the 
theoretical work of Calem and Rob (1999) and does not support hypothesis H2B.  
It is evident from Table 6.7, that increases in bank capital are associated with 
decreases in credit risk particularly in the Asia-Pacific, the North American and the 
Western European regions. This find is consistent with hypothesis H2A, indicating that 
increases in bank capital are associated with decreases in credit risk. This result is 
inconsistent with the world result reported in Section 6.2.  
The coefficient of bank capital is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level for credit risk particularly, in the developing economies including the Middle East 
and African and the South American regions.55 This is an unexpected outcome suggesting 
that increases in bank capital are associated with increased credit risk and it is 
inconsistent with hypothesis H2A. Since increases in bank capital restrict the risk-return 
frontier of a bank, this forced reduction in leverage may induce banks to reconfigure the 
composition of its risky asset portfolio, leading to an increase in risk-taking behavior 
                                                 
55
 As there is little empirical evidence on bank capital and risk in developing countries, however, this 
finding is consistent with prior empirical work on Malaysian banks (Ahmed, Ariff and Skully 2008). 
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(Kohen and Santomero 1980; Kim and Santomero 1988). The other possible argument 
for this positive association between bank capital and credit risk in the Middle-East and 
Africa and the South America regions could be that the interests of government 
regulators and the private stakeholders (least-secured) in a government-owned bank may 
converge. Weakness in information and valuation technologies in the banks may 
constrain these banks from achieving better bank capital requirement (Kane 1995). This 
finding is also in line with the world analysis in Section 6.2 which reports a positive 
relationship between bank capital and credit risk.56  
Further, similar to the findings on world analysis (reported in Section 6.2) and in 
contrast to the European findings reported in Chapter 4, the results on regional analysis 
show no appreciable evidence of non-linearity between bank capital and credit risk. Thus, 
this finding fails to support hypothesis H2B. One possible interpretation of this finding 
may be that the Western European regional analysis discussed in this Chapter 
incorporates banks from Turkey and Cyprus and it could be possible the result may be 
driven by banks in these countries. The findings are presented in Appendix in Tables 
A6.1, A6.2, A6.3, A6.4, A6.5 and A6.6. 
Overall, the empirical findings discussed above exhibit the disciplinary role of 
bank capital similar to the findings on world analysis. However, it is possible that the 
non-linearity between bank capital and systematic risk is a purely Western European 
feature though we leave further analysis of this question to future research. 
                                                 
56
 Further discussion is explained at a higher level in the robustness section.  
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6.3.4 Market discipline 
Table 6.8 reported below summarizes the findings for market discipline variable 
in different regions. The coefficient for market discipline is negative and statistically 
significant (at the 1% level) for systematic risk in the Middle-East and Africa, North 
America and the Western European region. This finding suggests that increases in market 
discipline are associated with decreases in systematic risk. This result is consistent with 
hypothesis H4 and broadly in line with prior studies (e.g., Morgan and Stiroh 2000; Nier 
and Baumann 2006). An opposite finding is evident in the Asia-Pacific and the South 
American regions. The result shows that increases in market discipline are associated 
with increases in bank systematic risk. However, it should be interesting to note that this 
finding is consistent to that reported on world analysis in Section 6.2. 
Table 6.8 
Market Discipline and Risk - World Analysis versus Regional Analysis 
This table presents a summary of the results as discussed in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3. The results 
reported in columns under the term “Actual Sign” in the following table are statistically significant at 5% 
significance level or better. Asia Pacific=Asia Pacific region; EEC=Eastern European countries; 
MENA=Middle East and Africa region, NA=North America region; SA= South America and W. 
Europe=Western Europe region. Equity risk includes systematic risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
Credit risk is measured by loan loss provision and loan loss reserve. LLP=loan loss provision; LLR=loan 
loss reserve. The detailed results are reported in Appendix Table A6.1, Table A6.2, Table A6.3, Table 
A6.4, Table A6.5 and Table A6.6. 
 World  Asia Pacific EEC MENA NA SA W. Europe 
Predicted 
sign 
Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual 
sign 
Actual sign Actual 
sign 
Actual sign 
Negative 
(-) 
Positive (+) 
with 
systematic 
risk. Negative 
(-) with total 
risk, 
idiosyncratic 
risk and 
credit risk. 
Positive (+) 
with 
systematic 
risk 
Not 
significant 
for any risk 
measure. 
Negative 
(-) with 
equity 
risk. 
Positive 
(+) with 
LLR. 
Negative (-) 
with 
systematic risk 
and LLP. 
Positive (+) 
with 
idiosyncratic 
risk. 
Positive 
(+) with 
systematic 
risk, total 
risk and 
LLR.  
Negative (-) 
with 
systematic 
risk and 
LLR. 
Positive (+) 
with total 
risk and 
idiosyncratic 
risk. 
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With regard to total risk there is some variation across the regions. Consistent 
with hypothesis H4, the coefficient for market discipline is negative and statistically 
significant (at the 5% level or better) for banks in the Middle East and African regions. 
This finding is also in line with the world analysis reported in Section 6.2. Nevertheless, a 
positive and statistically significant (at the 5% level or better) association is evident 
between market discipline and total risk in the South American and the Western 
European regions.  
With regard to idiosyncratic risk, the coefficient for market discipline is negative 
and statistically significant (at the 5% level or better) for Middle East and African region. 
This finding is consistent with the hypothesis H4 and also consistent with the findings 
reported in Section 6.2 on a broader world analysis. Yet, there is some variation in the 
findings across the regions. A positive and statistically significant (at the 5% level or 
better) relationship is observed between market discipline and bank-specific risk in the 
developed regions including North American and Western European regions.  
The credit risk results are similar to the world analysis (discussed in Section 6.2), 
with the North American and the Western European regions showing increases in market 
discipline with decreases in credit risk. This finding is consistent with hypothesis H4 and 
prior studies (e.g., Morgan and Stiroh 2000; Nier and Baumann 2006) discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
Finally, a positive and statistically significant association between market 
discipline and credit risk is observed in the Middle-East and Africa and the South 
American regions. This finding casts some doubts on the regulatory role of uninsured 
deposits (subordinated-debt and inter-bank deposits) in these regions. This finding is 
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contradictory to hypothesis H4, though it is broadly in line with the theoretical and prior 
empirical studies (Blum 2002; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 2004; Imai 2006). 
The detailed results are reported in Appendix in Tables A6.1, A6.2, A6.3, A6.4, 
A6.5 and A6.6. In general, the findings discussed above suggest some variation across 
the regions. With regard to equity risk, it is possible that the world analysis may be driven 
by regions including Asia-Pacific, Middle-East and Africa and South America. However, 
with respect to credit risk, the world analysis may be influenced by North America and 
Western European regions. 
6.3.5 Size 
From Table 6.9, it is evident that size is an important determinant of bank risk. 
The coefficient for size is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for banks in 
Asia-Pacific, the Middle-East and Africa, North America and the Western European 
regions, suggesting large banks exhibit greater sensitivity to the general market 
movements and hence have greater systematic risk (Saunders, Travlos and Strock 1990; 
Anderson and Fraser 2000). This finding is consistent with hypothesis H5A and also 
supports the result on world analysis (See Section 6.2). 
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Table 6.9 
Size and Risk - World Analysis versus Regional Analysis 
This table presents a summary of the results as discussed in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3. The results 
reported in columns under the term “Actual Sign” in the following table are statistically significant at 5% 
significance level or better. Asia Pacific=Asia Pacific region; EEC=Eastern European countries; 
MENA=Middle East and Africa region, NA=North America region; SA= South America and W. 
Europe=Western Europe region. Equity risk includes systematic risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
Credit risk is measured by loan loss provision and loan loss reserve. LLP=loan loss provision; LLR=loan 
loss reserve. The detailed results are reported in Appendix Table A6.1, Table A6.2, Table A6.3, Table 
A6.4, Table A6.5 and Table A6.6. 
 World  Asia Pacific EEC MENA NA SA W. Europe 
Predicted sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual 
sign 
Actual sign Actual  
sign 
Actual sign 
Positive (+) 
with systematic 
risk. 
 
Negative (-) 
with credit risk, 
total risk, and 
idiosyncratic 
risk 
Positive (+) 
with 
systematic 
risk and 
total risk. 
Negative (-) 
with credit 
risk. 
Positive (+) 
with 
systematic 
risk and 
total risk.  
Negative (-) 
with LLP. 
Negative (-) 
with 
idiosyncratic 
risk under 
OLS. 
Positive (+) 
with credit 
risk under 
OLS. 
Positive 
(+) with 
equity 
risk and 
LLR. 
Positive (+) 
with 
systematic 
risk and 
credit risk. 
Negative (-) 
with 
idiosyncratic 
risk and total 
risk.  
Negative 
(-) with 
by LLR.  
Positive (+) 
with 
systematic 
risk. 
Negative (-) 
with 
idiosyncratic 
risk and 
credit risk.  
 
With regard to total risk, there is mixed evidence across the regions. The 
coefficient for size is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in the North 
America region suggesting that large banks are internally diversified and thus able to 
reduce total risk (Konishi and Yasuda 2004; Stiroh 2006). This finding is consistent with 
hypothesis H5B. However, a contradictory finding is observed in the Middle East and 
Africa and the Asia-Pacific regions indicating that large banks do not necessarily reduce 
total risk (Galloway, Lee and Roden 1997; Acharya, Hasan and Saunders 2002). It should 
be noted that, this positive association between size and total risk is also observed in 
world analysis discussed in Section 6.2.  
With regard to idiosyncratic risk, the coefficient for size is negative and 
statistically significant (at the 5% level or better) in Eastern Europe, North America and 
the Western European regions. This finding is consistent with hypothesis H5B and 
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supports prior studies (Konishi and Yasuda 2004; Stiroh 2006). Yet, there is evidence of 
a positive association between size and idiosyncratic risk in the Middle-East and African 
region, suggesting that large banks may not be able to reduce idiosyncratic risk through 
internal diversification. Perhaps, banks in these emerging regions undertake riskier 
activities and tend to employ higher leverage (Demsetz and Strahan 1997).  
Consistent with hypothesis H5B, evidence can be drawn from Table 6.9 that 
increases in size are associated with decreases in credit risk. This finding is observed in 
Asia-Pacific (particularly, for loan loss reserve), South America (particularly, for loan 
loss reserve) and the Western Europe (for both credit risk measures). The result reported 
for world analysis in the previous section (Section 6.2) also supports this finding.  
With respect to credit risk, there are some contradictory findings evident across 
the regions with respect to the size effect. The coefficient for size is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level or better, suggesting that large banks do not seem 
to better diversify their credit risk in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa and 
North America.  
A possible interpretation of this contradictory finding in developing (Middle-East 
and Africa) and transition economies (Eastern Europe) may be that large banks in these 
regions are less flexible to cope with unexpected liquidity shortages because of 
insufficient access to capital markets. 
In effect, the above findings indicate that with regard to systematic risk, there is 
no considerable variation between the world analysis and the regional analysis in 
particular, Asia-Pacific, Middle-East and Africa, North America and Western European 
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regions. With respect to total risk, it is possible that the world analysis may be driven by 
Asia-Pacific and Middle-East and Africa regions. Finally, the evidence confirms that 
large banks exhibit lower credit risk. This finding is observed in the world analysis as 
well as in separate regional analysis (Asia Pacific, North America, South America and 
Western Europe). The regression results are provided in Appendix in Tables A6.1, A6.2, 
A6.3, A6.4, A6.5 and A6.6. 
6.3.6 Country-level variables 
There is some variation in the country-level variables across the regions. It is 
evident from Table 6.10 that with respect to systematic risk, the coefficient for deposit 
insurance is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that deposit 
insurance is associated with moral hazard and thus there is support for hypothesis H10. 
This result is evident in the Asia-Pacific and the Western European regions and it is 
consistent with that reported for world analysis in Section 6.2.  
Consistent with hypothesis H10, the coefficient of deposit insurance is positive 
and statistically significant with respect to total risk for Asia-Pacific region. This further 
confirms the proposition that deposit insurance can encourage excessive bank risk 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Detragaiche 2002; Beck and Laeven 2006). Similar evidence is also 
observed in the Asia-Pacific region with regard to credit risk. 
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Table 6.10 
Deposit Insurance and Risk - World Analysis versus Regional Analysis 
This table presents a summary of the results as discussed in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3. The results 
reported in columns under the term “Actual Sign” in the following table are statistically significant at 5% 
significance level or better. Asia Pacific=Asia Pacific region; EEC=Eastern European countries; 
MENA=Middle East and Africa region, NA=North America region; SA= South America and W. 
Europe=Western Europe region. Equity risk includes systematic risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
Credit risk is measured by loan loss provision and loan loss reserve. LLP=loan loss provision; LLR=loan 
loss reserve. The detailed results are reported in Appendix Table A6.1, Table A6.2, Table A6.3, Table 
A6.4, Table A6.5 and Table A6.6. 
 World  Asia Pacific EEC MENA NA SA W. Europe 
Predicted 
sign 
Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual 
sign 
Actual sign Actual 
sign 
Actual sign 
Positive 
(+) 
Positive (+) with 
systematic, 
idiosyncratic and 
total risk. 
Positive (+) 
with total risk, 
systematic risk 
and credit risk. 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable  
Not 
applicable  
Positive (+) 
with 
systematic 
risk.  
 
Further, the existence of a market-based system is an important country-level 
explanatory variable with respect to bank risk (Table 6.11). The coefficient for the 
market-based system is positive and statistically significant (at the 5% level or better) 
with credit risk in the Asia-Pacific and the Western European regions. This result is 
consistent with hypothesis H9. A market-based system appears to encourage banks to 
undertake higher levels of risk (Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990; Bencivenga and Smith 
1991; de la Fuente and Marin 1996) and this finding is also observed in the world 
analysis (reported in Section 6.2). Similar results are also found for systematic risk 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Detragaiche 2002; Beck and Laeven 2006), particularly, in Asia-
Pacific region. 
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Table 6.11 
Market-Based System and Risk - World Analysis versus Regional Analysis 
This table presents a summary of the results as discussed in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3. The results 
reported in columns under the term “Actual Sign” in the following table are statistically significant at 5% 
significance level or better. Asia Pacific=Asia Pacific region; EEC=Eastern European countries; 
MENA=Middle East and Africa region, NA=North America region; SA= South America and W. 
Europe=Western Europe region. Equity risk includes systematic risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
Credit risk is measured by loan loss provision and loan loss reserve. LLP=loan loss provision; LLR=loan 
loss reserve. The detailed results are reported in Appendix Table A6.1, Table A6.2, Table A6.3, Table 
A6.4, Table A6.5 and Table A6.6. 
 World  Asia Pacific EEC MENA NA SA W. Europe 
Predicted 
sign 
Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual 
sign 
Actual sign 
Positive 
(+) 
Positive (+) with 
credit risk. 
Negative (-) with 
total risk and 
idiosyncratic risk.  
Positive (+) 
with 
systematic risk 
and credit risk. 
Negative (-) 
with 
idiosyncratic 
risk.  
Insignificant 
for all risk 
measures. 
Positive (+) 
and 
marginally 
significant 
for total and 
idiosyncratic 
risk. 
Not 
applicable  
Negative 
(-) with 
credit 
risk. 
Positive (+) 
with credit 
risk. 
Negative (-) 
with equity 
risk. 
 
A negative and statistically significant coefficient for market-based system is 
observed for equity risk (systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk and total risk) in the Western 
European region. Similar evidence is observed with respect to idiosyncratic risk in the 
Asia-Pacific region, supporting the argument that a market-based system conveys price 
signals which helps banks to make prudent investment decisions (Rajan and Zingales 
1998, 1999). Further, the findings are consistent with that reported on world analysis with 
respect to total risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
The economic freedom index (EFI) coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant (at the 1% level) with respect to credit risk in the Asia-Pacific, the Middle–
East and Africa, the North America and the Western Europe regions (Table 6.12 reported 
below). This finding is consistent with predictions in Chapter 2 and with the world 
analysis (discussed in Section 6.2) suggesting that lower restrictions on bank activity 
result in lower credit risk. In contrast, results for transition (Eastern Europe) and 
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emerging economies (South America) show that greater freedom in banking activity can 
lead to increased credit risk. This is possibly due to weak supervision, low enforcement, 
reduced transparency, complicated ownership structure and control that are often found in 
these regions (Claessens and Laeven 2003).  
Table 6.12 
Economic Freedom Index and Risk - World Analysis versus Regional Analysis 
This table presents a summary of the results as discussed in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3. The results 
reported in columns under the term “Actual Sign” in the following table are statistically significant at 5% 
significance level or better. Asia Pacific=Asia Pacific region; EEC=Eastern European countries; 
MENA=Middle East and Africa region, NA=North America region; SA= South America and W. 
Europe=Western Europe region. Equity risk includes systematic risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
Credit risk is measured by loan loss provision and loan loss reserve. LLP=loan loss provision; LLR=loan 
loss reserve. The detailed results are reported in Appendix A6.1, A6.2, A6.3, A6.4, A6.5 and A6.6. The 
detailed results are reported in Appendix Table A6.1, Table A6.2, Table A6.3, Table A6.4, Table A6.5 and 
Table A6.6. 
 World  Asia Pacific EEC MENA NA SA W. Europe 
Predicted 
sign 
Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign 
Negative 
(-) 
Negative (-) 
with credit risk. 
Negative (-) 
with credit 
risk. 
Positive (+) 
with LLP. 
Negative (-) 
with credit 
risk. Positive 
(+) with 
systematic 
risk. 
Negative (-) 
with LLR. 
Positive 
(+) with 
LLR. 
Negative (-) 
with 
systematic 
risk and 
credit risk. 
 
With respect to systematic risk, the coefficient for the economic freedom index is 
negative and statistically significant (at the 1% level), suggesting that higher levels of 
EFI, may result in lower levels of systematic risk and hence lead to greater stability in the 
banking system (Gonźalez 2005). This finding is evident in the Western European region. 
However, this result does not hold for developing region, given the positive association 
between EFI and systematic risk found in the Middle East and Africa region indicating 
that greater freedom in activities may actually result in increase in bank risk in some 
regions (Claessens and Laeven 2004). 
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Table 6.13 
Stock Market Turnover and Risk - World Analysis versus Regional Analysis 
This table presents a summary of the results as discussed in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3. The results 
reported in columns under the term “Actual Sign” in the following table are statistically significant at 5% 
significance level or better. Asia Pacific=Asia Pacific region; EEC=Eastern European countries; 
MENA=Middle East and Africa region, NA=North America region; SA= South America and W. 
Europe=Western Europe region. Equity risk includes systematic risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
Credit risk is measured by loan loss provision and loan loss reserve. LLP=loan loss provision; LLR=loan 
loss reserve. The detailed results are reported in Appendix Table A6.1, Table A6.2, Table A6.3, Table 
A6.4, Table A6.5 and Table A6.6. 
 World  Asia Pacific EEC MENA NA SA W. Europe 
Predicted 
sign 
Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual 
sign 
Actual sign Actual 
sign 
Actual sign 
Positive 
(+) 
Positive (+) with 
equity risk. 
Negative with 
credit risk. 
Positive (+) 
with equity 
risk. 
Negative (-) 
with credit 
risk. 
Positive 
(+) with 
equity risk 
and LLP. 
Positive (+) 
with total 
risk and 
idiosyncratic 
risk. 
Negative (-) 
with LLP. 
Positive 
(+) with 
credit risk 
and 
systematic 
risk 
(2SLS).  
Positive (+) 
with 
systematic 
risk. 
Negative (-) 
with LLP. 
 
Table 6.13, reports the results for stock market turnover ratio variable. Consistent 
with the prediction in Chapter 2 and with the world analysis reported in Section 6.2, the 
coefficient for stock market turnover is positive and statistically significant at the 5% 
level or better, suggesting that higher frequency of trading is associated with higher 
systematic risk. This result is evident in Asia-Pacific, the Middle-East and Africa, South 
America and North American regions. With regard to total risk and idiosyncratic risk, the 
findings are similar to that reported above for systematic risk and this positive and 
statistically significant association is also observed in Asia-Pacific, the Middle-East and 
Africa and North America regions. These findings are consistent with predictions and 
with the world analysis. Also consistent with predictions and with world analysis 
(discussed in Section 6.2), there is a positive association with credit risk. This finding is 
particularly evident in the developing regions including Middle East and Africa and 
South America.  
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A negative and statistically significant association is observed between market 
turnover ratio and credit risk, suggesting that increases in frequency of trading, decreases 
bank credit risk. This result is evident in Eastern Europe, North America and Western 
Europe. This is an unexpected outcome and suggests that increases in stock market 
liquidity are associated with decreases bank credit risk and thus it is crucial for the 
economic growth (Levine and Zervos 1998). Similar evidence is also provided in the 
world analysis discussed in Section 6.2 
It is evident from Table 6.14 that developed regions including North America and 
Western Europe exhibit a positive association between systematic risk and bank 
concentration.  
Table 6.14 
Bank Concentration and Risk - World Analysis versus Regional Analysis 
This table presents a summary of the results as discussed in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3. The results 
reported in columns under the term “Actual Sign” in the following table are statistically significant at 5% 
significance level or better. Asia Pacific=Asia Pacific region; EEC=Eastern European countries; 
MENA=Middle East and Africa region, NA=North America region; SA= South America and W. 
Europe=Western Europe region. Equity risk includes systematic risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
Credit risk is measured by loan loss provision and loan loss reserve. LLP=loan loss provision; LLR=loan 
loss reserve. The detailed results are reported in Appendix Table A6.1, Table A6.2, Table A6.3, Table 
A6.4, Table A6.5 and Table A6.6. 
 World  Asia Pacific EEC MENA NA SA W. Europe 
Predicted 
sign 
Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign 
Positive 
(+) or 
Negative 
(-) 
Negative (-) 
with 
systematic risk 
and LLP. 
Negative (-) 
with LLP. 
Positive (+) 
with LLR.  
Positive (+) 
and 
marginally 
significant for 
total and 
idiosyncratic 
risk. 
Negative (-) 
with equity 
risk. 
Positive (+) 
with 
systematic 
risk. 
Positive (+) 
with LLR. 
Positive (+) 
with 
systematic risk 
and total risk. 
Negative (-) 
with credit 
risk. 
 
This finding is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Boyd and Runkle 1993; Hughes, 
Lang, Mester and Moon 1999; Mishkin 1999). With regard to total risk, the coefficient 
for bank concentration is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in the 
Western European region. This finding supports the classical “concentration fragility 
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theory”. 
The Middle-East and Africa region provide a contrast from the above evidence. 
The coefficient for bank concentration is negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level for systematic risk. This finding is broadly in line with prior empirical studies (e.g., 
Keeley 1990; Allen and Gale 2000; Kwast and De Nicoló 2002; Boyd, De Nicoló and 
Smith 2004; Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2006, 2007) and also consistent with the world 
analysis (Section 6.2). 
Further, Table 6.14 highlights similar evidence for both total risk and 
idiosyncratic risk in Middle-East and Africa region. There is mixed evidence across the 
regions with respect to credit risk. A negative and statistically significant association is 
observed between bank concentration and credit risk in the Western European region. 
This result is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Bergstresser 2001). 
Similar evidence is also observed for the Asia-Pacific region (when loan loss 
provision is used to measure credit risk). Yet, there is evidence of a positive and 
statistically significant (at the 5% level or better) association between bank concentration 
and credit risk (measured by loan loss reserve) in Asia-Pacific and South American 
regions (Boyd and De NicolÓ 2005). 
It is evident from Table 6.15, with regard to total risk that the coefficient for net 
interest margin is positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level) in Asia-Pacific 
and South American regions, suggesting that increases in net interest margin are 
associated with increases in total risk. This result is consistent with predictions (Section 
2.4.3 of Chapter 2) and with the world analysis (Section 6.2). In contrast, a negative 
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association is observed between net interest margin and total risk in Middle-East and 
Africa and North American regions. This finding is broadly in line with Maudos and 
Fernández de Guevara (2004). Further, with respect to idiosyncratic risk, the predicted 
sign is observed in the Asia Pacific and the South America regions. This finding is also 
observed in the world analysis. However, contradictory evidence is observed in the 
Middle-East and Africa region. 
Table 6.15 
Net Interest Margin and Risk - World Analysis versus Regional Analysis 
This table presents a summary of the results as discussed in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3. The results 
reported in columns under the term “Actual Sign” in the following table are statistically significant at 5% 
significance level or better. Asia Pacific=Asia Pacific region; EEC=Eastern European countries; 
MENA=Middle East and Africa region, NA=North America region; SA= South America and W. 
Europe=Western Europe region. Equity risk includes systematic risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
Credit risk is measured by loan loss provision and loan loss reserve. LLP=loan loss provision; LLR=loan 
loss reserve. The detailed results are reported in Appendix Table A6.1, Table A6.2, Table A6.3, Table 
A6.4, Table A6.5 and Table A6.6. 
 World  Asia Pacific EEC MENA NA SA W. Europe 
Predicted 
sign 
Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign 
Positive 
(+) 
Negative (-) 
with 
systematic 
risk. Positive 
(+) with 
idiosyncratic 
risk, total risk 
and LLP. 
Positive (+) 
with total 
risk, 
idiosyncratic 
risk and 
credit risk. 
Negative (-) 
with 
systematic 
risk.  
Insignificant 
for all risk 
measures. 
Negative (-) 
with total 
risk and 
idiosyncratic 
risk. 
Positive (+) 
with LLR. 
Negative (-) 
with total risk.  
Positive (+) 
with total 
risk, 
idiosyncratic 
risk and 
credit risk  
Positive 
(+) with 
LLP. 
 
With regard to systematic risk, the coefficient for net interest margin is negative 
and statistically significant (at the 1% level) in the Asia-Pacific region. While this result 
is contrary to predictions as explained in Section 2.4.3 of Chapter 2, it is consistent with 
the world analysis (Section 6.2).  
Finally, with respect to credit risk, the coefficient for net interest margin is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that greater net interest 
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margin is associated with greater uncertainty on the loans granted (Maudos and 
Fernández de Guevara 2004). This finding is observed in Asia-Pacific, North America, 
South America and Western European regions. This result is consistent with predictions 
in Chapter 2 and also with the world analysis discussed in Section 6.2. 
Legal origin is also an important determinant of bank risk (Table 6.16 below). 
With regard to systematic risk, the coefficient for legal origin is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that common-law countries exhibit greater risk 
compared to their civil-law counterparts. This result is evident in Asia-Pacific region and 
is consistent with the finding observed in the world analysis. It is also found that 
common-law country banks exhibit higher total risk particularly in the Asia Pacific and 
the Western European regions. This finding is in line with predictions discussed in 
Section 2.4.2 of Chapter 2 and also with the world analysis (Section 6.2). Similar 
evidence is also observed with respect to idiosyncratic risk, particularly in the Western 
European region and it is also consistent with the world analysis. Finally, with regard to 
credit risk, Table 6.16 shows that common-law country banks exhibit higher credit risk 
particularly in the Western Europe region. 
In the Asia-Pacific region, it is evident from the above Table 6.16 that consistent 
with prediction, the coefficient for common-law origin is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level or better with respect to loan loss reserves. Further, an 
opposite result is evident with the alternate measure of credit risk that is loan loss 
provision. This finding is consistent with the world analysis and inconsistent with 
prediction mentioned in Chapter 2.  
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Table 6.16 
Legal Origin and Risk - World Analysis versus Regional Analysis 
This table presents a summary of the results as discussed in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3. The results 
reported in columns under the term “Actual Sign” in the following table are statistically significant at 5% 
significance level or better. Asia Pacific=Asia Pacific region; EEC=Eastern European countries; 
MENA=Middle East and Africa region, NA=North America region; SA= South America and W. 
Europe=Western Europe region. Equity risk includes systematic risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
Credit risk is measured by loan loss provision and loan loss reserve. LLP=loan loss provision; LLR=loan 
loss reserve. The detailed results are reported in Appendix Table A6.1, Table A6.2, Table A6.3, Table 
A6.4, Table A6.5 and Table A6.6. 
 
 
World  Asia Pacific EEC MENA NA SA W. Europe 
Predicted 
sign 
Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign 
Positive 
(+) 
Positive (+) 
with equity 
risk. 
Negative (-) 
with LLP 
Positive (+) 
with 
systematic 
and total risk 
and LLR. 
Negative (-) 
with LLP. 
Not 
applicable 
Negative (-) 
and marginally 
significant for 
equity risk. 
Not 
applicable  
Not 
applicable 
Positive (+) 
with 
idiosyncratic 
total risk and 
credit risk.  
 
The results reported in Table 6.17 below show that commercial banks in Western 
European region exhibit higher systematic risk. This finding is consistent with predictions 
discussed in Chapter 2.  
Yet, commercial banks in Asia-Pacific and North American regions exhibit lower 
systematic risk while commercial banks in Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe, North America 
and Western European regions exhibit lower total risk. One possible interpretation of this 
relationship could be that due to diversification benefits the commercial banks are able to 
diversify risk. This observation is also evident with respect to idiosyncratic risk in the 
Asia-Pacific, the Eastern Europe and the Western Europe regions. 
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Table 6.17 
Commercial bank and Risk - World Analysis versus Regional Analysis 
This table presents a summary of the results as discussed in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3. The results 
reported in columns under the term “Actual Sign” in the following table are statistically significant at 5% 
significance level or better. Asia Pacific=Asia Pacific region; EEC=Eastern European countries; 
MENA=Middle East and Africa region, NA=North America region; SA= South America and W. 
Europe=Western Europe region. Equity risk includes systematic risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
Credit risk is measured by loan loss provision and loan loss reserve. LLP=loan loss provision; LLR=loan 
loss reserve. The detailed results are reported in Appendix Table A6.1, Table A6.2, Table A6.3, Table 
A6.4, Table A6.5 and Table A6.6. 
 World  Asia Pacific EEC MENA NA SA W. Europe 
Predicted 
sign 
Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign 
Positive 
(+) 
Positive (+) 
with credit 
risk. Negative 
(-) with total 
risk and 
idiosyncratic 
risk. 
Negative (-) 
with equity 
risk and LLP. 
Negative (-) 
with LLP 
total risk 
and 
idiosyncratic 
risk. 
Not 
applicable 
Negative (-) 
with 
systematic 
risk, total 
risk. 
Positive (+) 
with LLP. 
Negative (-) 
with LLP. 
Positive (+) 
with 
systematic 
risk. Negative 
(-) with total 
and 
idiosyncratic 
risk.  
 
Similar evidence is also observed in the world analysis. Finally, with regard to 
credit risk (loan loss provision), it is evident from Table 6.17, that North American 
commercial banks are more aggressive in the credit market (similar to the world analysis) 
compared to their counterparts in the Asia-Pacific, the Eastern Europe and the South 
America regions.  
Overall, the empirical findings show that country-level variables are important 
determinants of bank risk. Deposit insurance exhibits moral hazard problem with regard 
to equity risk. This result is evident in world analysis as well as in Asia-Pacific and 
Western European regions. Further, with regard to market-based system, the findings 
show that there is no significant variation across the risk measures. The finding also 
exhibit that greater freedom in banking activities may lead to higher credit risk 
particularly in transition (Eastern Europe) and developing economies (South America) 
consistent with the world analysis. There is no considerable variation across the region 
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with regard to bank concentration and net interest margin. The findings are reported in 
detail in Appendix in Tables A6.1, A6.2, A6.3, A6.4, A6.5 and A6.6. 
6.4 IMPACT OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION (EMU) ON RISK 
FACTORS- RQ1B 
The impact of EMU in 1999, on variation in bank risk is also analyzed. Table 6.18 
presents the results for this analysis. Both pooled-OLS and 2SLS are applied in this 
analysis but the test of endogeniety supports the 2SLS approach. The year dummies are 
jointly significant for all risk measures. Panel A and Panel B of Table 6.18 report the 
findings for the impact of EMU on variation in bank equity risk and credit risk. 
With regard to total risk, the coefficient on bank capital is positive and 
statistically significant (at the 1% level), suggesting that the importance of EMU 
increased in the post-EMU period for the world analysis. This finding fails to support 
hypothesis H11B (Chapter 2 Section 2.5). Similar evidence is also observed with regard 
to idiosyncratic risk. 
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Table 6.18 
Determinants of bank risk with the formation of Economic and Monetary Union 
This table presents the result of impact of the formation of EMU in 1999 on the determinants of bank risk. The table only presents the result for the differences. A 
dummy for EMU takes a value of 1 for post-EMU and 0 pre-EMU. All results are corrected for heteroscedasticity and the adjusted standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. 
The Wald test to test the joint significance for difference and joint test for year dummies under pooled -OLS is a F distribution while for 2SLS it is a chi square 
distribution. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † indicates the coefficients of the explanatory variables and 
standard errors are scaled by 100. 
 
Panel A Impact of Economic Monetary Union (EMU) -Equity risk   
Systematic risk     Idiosyncratic risk    Total risk 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled-
OLS  
with lag 
2SLS Pooled OLS Pooled-OLS  
with lag 
2SLS Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled-
OLS  
with lag 
2SLS 
Intercept  
-0.065 -0.040 -0.047 -3.125*** -3.268*** -3.249*** -3.440*** -3.488*** -3.483*** 
 (0.155) (0.157) (0.172) (0.194) (0.208) (0.211) 0.205 0.207 0.211 
Bank capital 0.122 0.060 0.207 0.195* 0.243*** 0.637*** 0.142 0.190** 0.619*** 
 (0.108) (0.076) (0.282) (0.110) (0.078) (0.237) 0.110 0.077 0.236 
Charter value 
-1.894*** -0.992** -7.665** 1.278* 1.030* 0.371 0.694 0.660 -1.583 
 (0.653) (0.521) (3.428) (0.759) (0.607) (5.416) 0.776 0.607 5.295 
Off balance sheet activities -0.049** -0.051** -0.013 0.005 0.016 -0.006 -0.018 -0.004 -0.016 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.031) (0.024) (0.024) (0.036) 0.026 0.025 0.036 
Market discipline  -0.090*** -0.104*** -0.109*** -0.023 -0.016 -0.016 -0.052** -0.049* -0.051* 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) 0.027 0.026 0.028 
Size -0.004 -0.012 0.015 0.001 -0.003 0.012 0.000 -0.005 0.017 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010) (0.027) 0.010 0.009 0.026 
Loan to total assets 0.020 0.011 0.026 -0.043 -0.049 -0.086 -0.027 -0.044 -0.074 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.083) (0.074) (0.073) (0.071) 0.098 0.095 0.092 
Bank concentration 0.068 0.061 0.068 0.018 0.001 0.081 0.049 0.030 0.113 
 (0.099) (0.094) (0.108) (0.102) (0.100) (0.104) 0.105 0.102 0.106 
Net interest margin -1.380 -1.528 -0.601 1.283 0.142 0.856 1.360 0.451 1.339 
 (1.139) (1.100) (1.467) (1.152) (1.091) (1.919) 1.183 1.101 1.925 
Stock market turnover 0.093*** 0.094*** 0.179*** 0.060** 0.055** 0.072 0.100*** 0.082*** 0.120 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.052) (0.028) (0.027) (0.076) 0.030 0.029 0.075 
Deposit insurance dummy  
-0.015 -0.009 -0.022 -0.018 -0.033 0.044 -0.072 -0.088 -0.018 
 (0.059) (0.057) (0.072) (0.067) (0.069) (0.075) 0.070 0.071 0.078 
Economic freedom index 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.006* 0.000 0.002 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 0.003) 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Market based dummy 0.008 0.022 -0.002 -0.024 -0.002 -0.100 -0.003 0.014 -0.086 
 (0.050) (0.047) (0.076) (0.053) (0.050) (0.065) 0.053 0.050 0.065 
Common law dummy -0.-219*** -0.225*** -0.097 -0.082 -0.106** -0.022 -0.172*** -0.203*** -0.091 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.098) (0.051) (0.052) (0.115) 0.052 0.052 0.114 
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Commercial dummy -0.161*** -0.142*** -0.270*** 0.027 0.002 0.059 -0.004 -0.035 -0.013 
 (0.049) (0.047) (0.078) (0.054) (0.054) (0.119) 0.055 0.054 0.117 
High income dummy 
-0.070 -0.105** 0.025 0.094 0.106* 0.104 0.114* 0.129** 0.162 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.084) (0.062) (0.061) (0.115) (0.063) (0.063) (0.115) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 
Model F-test 
Tests of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test 
Wald test-joint significance for 
differences 
Joint significance for year dummies 
NOBS 
0.27 
48*** 
 
- 
- 
 
6.80*** 
29.60*** 
4670 
0.28 
52*** 
 
- 
- 
 
6.69*** 
27.42*** 
4468 
0.26 
51*** 
 
5.21*** 
10.49*** 
 
93.3*** 
287*** 
4455 
0.25 
52*** 
 
- 
- 
 
2.12*** 
21.96*** 
4662 
0.25 
50*** 
 
- 
- 
 
2.27** 
19.96*** 
4460 
0.25 
46*** 
 
2.53* 
5.11* 
 
34.21*** 
218*** 
4447 
0.26 
58*** 
 
- 
- 
 
3.57*** 
19.92*** 
4680 
0.27 
58*** 
 
- 
- 
 
3.75*** 
20.15*** 
4472 
0.26 
55*** 
 
2.70* 
5.42* 
 
56.77*** 
204.2*** 
4459 
 
Panel B Impact of EMU- Credit risk   
Loan loss provision to total assets     Loan loss reserves to total assets  
 Pooled OLS Pooled-OLS with lag 2SLS Pooled OLS Pooled-OLS with lag 2SLS 
Intercept  -1.647*** -1.630*** -1.529*** -0.803*** -0.927*** -0.764*** 
 (0.130) (0.142) (0.150) (0.126) (0.140) (0.143) 
Bank capital -0.049 -0.009 -0.485** 0.377*** 0.272*** 0.640*** 
 (0.087) (0.066) (0.216) (0.096) (0.062) (0.257) 
Charter value 0.886** 0.958*** 7.594*** 0.857*** 1.087*** 3.304 
 (0.412) (0.423) (2.336) (0.313) (0.308) (2.453) 
Off balance sheet activities 0.039** 0.036* 0.010 -0.046*** -0.020 -0.060*** 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.029) (0.015) (0.018) (0.024) 
Market discipline  -0.054** -0.035 -0.040 -0.072*** -0.058** -0.063*** 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.029) (0.020) (0.025) (0.024) 
Size -0.024*** -0.034*** -0.064*** -0.004 -0.019** -0.011 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.007) (0.009) (0.015) 
Loan to total assets 0.222** 0.203** 0.236** 0.105 0.121 -0.018 
 (0.104) (0.103) (0.103) (0.147) (0.157) (0.175) 
Bank concentration 0.124 0.177* 0.150 0.168** 0.124 0.202* 
 (0.094) (0.103) (0.120) (0.076) (0.083) (0.098) 
Net interest margin -2.555*** -3.413*** -3.801*** 0.532 -1.058 -0.024 
 (0.831) (1.223) (1.150) (0.753) (1.084) (1.066) 
Stock market turnover 0.120*** 0.125*** 0.018 0.046** 0.039* 0.011 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.041) (0.020) (0.021) (0.039) 
Deposit insurance dummy  
-0.055 -0.039 -0.054 -0.022 -0.008 0.049 
 (0.049) (0.056) (0.066) (0.050) (0.053) (0.062) 
Economic freedom index 0.003 0.004* 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Market based dummy -0.081*** -0.138*** -0.058 -0.048 -0.026 -0.102** 
 (0.042) (0.046) (0.067) (0.044) (0.049) (0.053) 
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Common law dummy 0.076*** 0.092*** -0.074 0.045 0.038 0.042 
 (0.036) (0.041) (0.073) (0.044) (0.049) (0.072) 
Commercial dummy -0.011 -0.014 0.078 0.207*** 0.200*** 0.306*** 
 (0.056) (0.058) (0.079) (0.042) (0.046) (0.064) 
High income dummy 
-0.085* -0.024 -0.202*** 0.008 0.022 -0.008 
 (0.049) (0.055) (0.070) (0.044) (0.048) (0.075) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 
Model F-test 
Tests of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test 
Wald test-joint significance for differences 
Joint significance for year dummies 
NOBS 
0.28 
43*** 
 
- 
- 
6.47*** 
37*** 
4631 
0.29 
38*** 
 
- 
- 
5.45*** 
37*** 
4246 
0.26 
37.88*** 
 
8.42*** 
16.95*** 
76.03*** 
355*** 
4233 
0.26 
43*** 
 
- 
- 
6.55*** 
17.69*** 
4524 
0.27 
44*** 
 
- 
- 
4.92*** 
15.40*** 
4155 
0.26 
43*** 
 
5.41*** 
10.91*** 
59*** 
146*** 
4141 
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Further, it is apparent from Panel B of Table 6.18, with regard to credit risk 
(particularly measured by loan loss reserve to total assets), the coefficient of bank capital 
is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level suggesting that the magnitude of 
bank capital coefficient increased in the post-EMU period. This finding is similar to that 
reported above with respect to bank equity risk particularly total risk and idiosyncratic 
risk.  
The magnitude of the charter value coefficients fell dramatically with EMU for 
systematic risk model. This outcome is interpreted in terms of the decline in the 
importance of charter value with the formation of EMU and increasing levels of 
competition. 
The most statistically significant decline is observed for charter value relative to 
systematic risk with a change in the coefficient of -7.66 (under 2SLS estimation method). 
This finding is also evident for idiosyncratic risk. The result is consistent with hypothesis 
H11A (Chapter 2) and with the findings reported in Chapter 4 (Section 4.4) on European 
banks. 
Yet, with regard to credit risk, the coefficient for charter value is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level or better, indicating that the importance of charter 
value increased for banks across the world with the formation of EMU. The most 
statistically significant increase is observed for charter value relative to loan loss 
provision with a change in the coefficient of 7.60. This finding fails to support hypothesis 
H11A (See Chapter 2 Section 2.5).  
The coefficient for off-balance sheet activities is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level or better with regard to systematic risk. This finding indicates 
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that importance of off-balance sheet activities has declined in the post-EMU period for 
the world analysis. This result fails to support hypothesis H11C, though it is in line with 
the European analysis discussed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.4). Yet, there is some mixed 
evidence with respect to the two alternate credit risk measures. For example, there is a 
strong support for a decline in the importance of off-balance sheet activities in the post-
EMU period with regard to loan loss reserves, though loan loss provision shows the 
magnitude of off-balance sheet activities increased in the post-EMU period.  
With regard to systematic risk, the coefficient for market discipline is negative 
and statistically significant at the 5% level or better, indicating that importance of 
uninsured deposits has declined in the post-EMU period. This finding fails to support 
hypothesis H11D. 
Further, inconsistent with hypothesis H11D, the magnitude of the market 
discipline coefficient fell with EMU for total risk. This is an unexpected outcome and 
suggests that subordinated debt and interbank deposits may not be an effective 
disciplinary tool during the post-EMU period for the bank across the world. Similar 
findings are also observed with regard to credit risk particularly loan loss reserve 
measure. 
It is important to note that the aforementioned findings on market discipline with 
regard to systematic risk, total risk and credit risk are contrary to that reported for 
European banks in Chapter 4 (Section 4.4). Further, the size variable has decreased in 
importance following the formation of EMU in 1999 with respect to credit risk.  
With regard to country-level variables, it is evident from Table 6.18 that the 
importance of stock market turnover has increased with the formation of EMU. Further, 
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countries under market-based system are able to reduce their credit risk during the post-
EMU period. 
6.5 ROBUSTNESS 
This study performs a variety of sensitivity analyses. Section 6.5.1 presents the 
findings excluding the Japanese commercial banks. Section 6.5.2 reports the results for 
developed, developing and transition economies. Section 6.5.3 presents the findings when 
individual bank heterogeneity is controlled and hence the model is re-estimated using 
Generalized Least Square random effects. Finally, Section 6.5.4 discusses the results 
incorporating some additional bank-specific variables.  
6.5.1 Excluding Japanese commercial banks 
Japanese banks are among the world’s largest global financial intermediaries, 
with significant presence in many regions, particularly, the US, Europe and South East 
Asia. In addition, to being the among the world’s largest banks, they have some of the 
world’s largest banking problems. The Japanese banking system undoubtedly faced the 
most difficult period in 1990s. Due to bad loan problems, the Japanese banks reduced 
their lending. This shrinkage was concentrated in their overseas operation particularly in 
the US and Europe. This slower growth is not surprising. Several Japanese banks 
reported risk-based capital requirements below the regulatory (by the Bank for 
International Settlement) requirement (minimum 8%) which is a consequence of the 
decline in capital associated with the sharp decline in Japanese stock prices (Peek and 
Rosenberg 1998). Further, it is interesting to note that Japanese bank activity rapidly 
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grew in South East Asia57 despite the serious and mounting problems at Japanese parent 
banks.58 
In 2001, Japanese government announced plans for a government-backed 
purchase of USD 90 billion of shares of Japanese banks in order to avert a banking crisis. 
This was the third major attempt to bailout the banking system since 1998. In 2003, 
foreign financial institutions such as Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and Deutsche bank 
were solicited in attempts to prevent a complete financial crisis in Japan. As a 
consequence, in late 2003, the eight biggest Japanese banking groups reported positive 
six month profits.  
As Japan restructures their banking system, it is possible that the findings reported 
on the world analysis discussed in Section 6.2 may be affected by this weak banking 
system. Thus, this section reports the result of banks across the world excluding Japanese 
commercial banks. Although the main results reported in Section 6.2.1 are not sensitive 
to the exclusion of Japanese banks, there is some variation in the results. It is evident that 
the coefficient of charter value is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that charter value increases bank systematic risk (Saunders and Wilson 2001). 
This finding is in consistent with hypothesis H1. Further, consistent with hypothesis H9, 
the coefficient for the market-based dummy is positive and statistically significant at the 
5% level, indicating that banks operating in market-based environment exhibit greater 
                                                 
57
 This lending growth was related to the surge in foreign direct investment by Japanese companies in South 
East Asia during late 1980s and early 1990s (Goldberg and Klien 1998). 
58
 Peek and Rosenberg (1998) report that during 1993-1997 period, Japanese banks reduced the number of 
branches in the US by almost one third and in Europe by one eight while increasing the number in South 
East Asia by one fourth.  
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systematic risk.  
With respect to idiosyncratic risk, the main result discussed in Section 6.2.2 is not 
sensitive to the exclusion of Japanese banks from the sample. Further, with respect to 
total risk, although the results discussed in Section 6.2.3 are essentially unchanged, there 
is evidence that off-balance sheet activity is sensitive to the exclusion of the Japanese 
banks from the broad sample.  
The main findings discussed in Section 6.2.4 are reiterated with respect to credit 
risk (measured by loan loss provision). These results are not driven by Japanese 
commercial banks. However, with regard to the alternative credit risk measure (loan loss 
reserve), the findings remain little changed for the majority of the bank-specific variables 
with the exception of charter value. Charter value yields no appreciable evidence of bank 
disciplinary effect on loan loss reserves when Japanese banks are excluded.  
The regression results are reported in Appendix Table A6.7, Panel A through to 
Panel E.  
6.5.2 Comparison among developed, transition and developing economies 
It is well-documented that banks may behave differently under different 
institutional settings (Berger, Klapper and Udell 2001; Berger and Udell 2002; 
Haselmann and Watchel 2006; Agoraki, Delis and Pasiouras 2009). To gain a better 
understanding of the relationship between bank-specific variables and bank risk, the 
sample in this study is divided into developed, transition and developing economies.59 It 
                                                 
59The sample is divided among developed, developing and transition economies based on The World Bank, 
226 
is evident from the literature that bank risk taking is well-documented for developed 
economies (e.g., Keeley 1990; Salas and Saurina 2003; Konishi and Yasuda 2004). 
However, none of the previous studies dealing with developed economies have focused 
on equity risk and credit risk as occurs in this study.  
Most transition economies, particularly in Eastern Europe, have introduced 
reforms with the aim of increased competition, greater stability and more efficient 
intermediation in the banking industry (Bonin and Watchel 2003; De Haas and Van 
Lelyveld 2006 ). Berglof and Bolton (2002) argue that banking supervision in Eastern 
Europe has been tightened to reinstate confidence in the banking sector. Moreover, in 
order to reduce credit risk, company and bankruptcy law has been reformed to facilitate 
transparency and contract enforcement (Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer 2000). The capital 
requirement for banks has been tightened particularly in the wake of Russian Rouble 
crisis. Thus, it is important to examine the determinants of bank equity risk and credit 
risk for this region. 
There is limited literature with particular focus on factors affecting bank equity 
risk and credit risk in transition economies. Haselmann and Watchel (2007) analyze the 
impact of the probability of default on a number of accounting measures of bank risk and 
conclude that banks in transition economies take on risk and also maintain a higher share 
of capital hence these banks are able to manage risk similar to banks in other developed 
economies. De Haas, Ferreira and Taci (2010) argue that bank-specific characteristics 
such as size and ownership (domestic versus foreign banks) are the major determinants of 
                                                                                                                                                 
www.econ.worldbank.org. 
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credit risk in these economies. With regard to equity risk, Brown, Maurer, Pak and 
Tynaev (2009) focus on the Kyrgyzstan banking industry and conclude that structural 
reforms in the banking industry were able to lower their interest rate risk.  
The banking sector of many developing economies has gradually transformed, 
particularly, driven by domestic deregulation, increased financial integration and 
globalization, increased importance of foreign banks and removal of entry barriers 
(Claessens, Van Horen, Gurcanlar and Mercado 2008). 
Capital markets in emerging countries are still under-developed, and thus the 
banking system typically plays the central role of intermediation. The literature on bank 
equity risk and credit risk with regard to developing economies is limited. Prior studies 
either on developing economies (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998; Levy-Yeyati, 
Peria, and Schmukler 2004) or on an international setting (Barth, Caprio and Levine 
2004; Barth, Caprio and Levine 2008) have mainly focused on banking crisis. Further, on 
an international setting González (2005) concludes that regulatory restrictions increases 
bank risk by reducing charter value. 
Table 6.19 summarizes the findings for developed, transition and developing 
economies. The detailed empirical findings are reported in Appendix in Table A6.8, 
Table A6.9 and Table A6.10. The results confirm the findings on world analysis 
discussed in Section 6.2 with very few variations. There are similarities in the findings 
between developed and developing economies particularly, with regard to bank capital 
and size. There is no appreciable evidence of association with respect to bank capital and 
off-balance sheet activities in transition economies.
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Table 6.19 
Determinants of bank risk: developed, transition and developing economies 
This table presents a summary of the results. The results reported in columns under the term “Actual Sign” 
in the following table are statistically significant at 5% significance level or better. Equity risk includes 
systematic risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk. Credit risk is measured by loan loss provision and loan loss 
reserve. LLP=loan loss provision; LLR=loan loss reserve. Detailed results are reported in Appendix A6.8, 
A6.9 and A6.10 
Bank Capital and Risk 
 World  Developed 
Economies 
Transition Economies Developing Economies 
Predicted sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign 
Negative (-) Negative (-) with 
equity risk. Positive 
with LLR. 
Negative (-) with total 
risk and idiosyncratic 
risk. Negative with 
LLP sensitive to 
estimation method. 
No appreciable 
evidence. 
Negative (-) with total risk 
and idiosyncratic risk. 
Positive with LLR. 
Non-linear Non-linear with 
systematic risk. No 
evidence of non-
linearity for the rest 
of the risk measures. 
No appreciable 
evidence of non-
linearity.  
No appreciable evidence 
of non-linearity. 
No appreciable evidence 
of non-linearity.  
Charter Value and Risk 
 World  Developed 
Economies 
Transition Economies Developing Economies 
Predicted sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign 
Negative (-) Negative (-) with 
credit risk. 
Positive with equity 
risk. Negative with 
credit risk. 
Positive with systematic 
and total risk. Positive 
with LLR. 
Negative with LLP and 
sensitive to estimation 
method. 
Off-balance sheet activities and Risk 
 World  Developed 
Economies 
Transition Economies Developing Economies 
Predicted sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign 
Positive (+) Positive (+) with 
total, systematic and 
credit risk. Negative 
(-) with idiosyncratic 
risk. 
Positive with 
systematic risk and 
credit risk. Positive 
with total risk but 
sensitive to estimation 
method. 
No appreciable 
evidence. 
Positive with systematic 
risk. 
Market discipline and Risk 
 World  Developed 
Economies 
Transition Economies Developing Economies 
Predicted sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign 
Negative (-) Positive (+) with 
systematic risk. 
Negative (-) with total 
risk, idiosyncratic risk 
and credit risk. 
Negative with LLR.  Negative with credit risk 
at the 10% significance 
level.  
Positive with systematic 
risk. Negative with total 
risk, idiosyncratic risk and 
credit risk. 
Size and Risk 
 World  Developed 
Economies 
Transition Economies Developing Economies 
Predicted sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign 
Positive (+) 
with 
systematic 
risk.  
Negative (-) 
with credit 
Positive (+) with 
systematic risk and 
total risk. 
Negative (-) with 
credit risk. 
Positive with 
systematic and total 
risk. Negative with 
idiosyncratic risk and 
credit risk. 
Negative with total risk 
LLR and sensitive to 
estimation method.  
Positive with systematic 
risk and total risk, 
sensitive to estimation 
method. Negative with 
LLP. 
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risk, total risk, 
and idiosyn. 
risk 
 
Deposit Insurance and Risk 
 World  Developed Economies Transition 
Economies 
Developing Economies 
Predicted sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign 
Positive (+) Positive (+) with 
equity risk. 
Negative with 
systematic risk. Positive 
with idiosyncratic risk 
and credit risk.  
NIL Positive with idiosyncratic 
and total risk.  
Market based System and Risk 
 World  Developed 
Economies 
Transition Economies Developing Economies 
Predicted sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign 
Positive (+) Positive (+) with 
credit risk. 
Negative (-) with total 
risk and idiosyncratic 
risk.  
Negative with 
idiosyncratic risk and 
total risk. 
Positive with LLR. Positive with systematic 
risk and credit risk. 
Negative with 
idiosyncratic risk.  
Stock Market Turnover and Risk 
 World  Developed 
Economies 
Transition Economies Developing Economies 
Predicted sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign 
Positive (+) Positive (+) with 
equity risk. 
Negative with credit 
risk. 
Positive with equity 
risk. Negative with 
credit risk. 
Negative with 
systematic risk. 
Positive with total and 
idiosyncratic risk. 
Negative with credit 
risk. 
Economic Freedom Index and Risk 
 World  Developed 
Economies 
Transition Economies Developing Economies 
Predicted sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign 
Negative (-) Negative (-) with 
credit risk. 
Negative with 
systematic and total 
risk. 
Positive with LLP. Positive with systematic 
risk. Negative with 
credit risk. 
Legal origin and Risk 
 World  Developed 
Economies 
Transition Economies Developing Economies 
Predicted sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign 
Positive (+) Positive (+) with 
equity risk. 
Negative (-) with LLP 
Positive with equity 
risk. 
Negative with credit 
risk. 
NIL Positive (+) with total 
and systematic risk. 
Negative with LLP and 
Positive with LLR. 
Commercial bank and Risk 
 World  Developed 
Economies 
Transition Economies Developing Economies 
Predicted sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign 
Positive (+) Positive (+) with 
credit risk. Negative 
(-) with total risk and 
idiosyncratic risk. 
Positive (+) with 
credit risk. 
Negative with equity 
risk.  
Negative with LLP. Positive with systematic 
risk and LLR .Negative 
with idiosyncratic risk 
and LLP.  
Finally, there is empirical support in transition and developed economies that increased 
charter value is associated with increase in bank risk. 
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6.5.3 Controlling for bank heterogenity 
This study controls for individual bank heterogeneity using generalized least 
squares (GLS) random effects with year dummies. The results from this sensitivity test 
are consistent with the primary results discussed in Section 6.2. The results are reported 
in Appendix in Table A6.11. 
6.5.4 Extended model 
This study incorporates some additional variables including dividend yield, 
operating leverage60 and governance variables including creditor rights index and anti-
director right index61 in the original model. The results of the major bank-specific 
variables are consistent with the empirical findings discussed in Section 6.2. This section 
only reports the result of the additional variables. The detailed results are reported in 
Appendix in Table A6.12.  
Creditor rights index seems to be important in explaining the variation in bank 
equity risk (systematic risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk). The results are consistent 
with predictions (Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3) and also consistent with the findings reported 
in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3). 
Further, with respect to total risk, the coefficient for anti-director rights index is 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% or better. This result suggests better 
                                                 
60
 It is evident from the result that for bank equity risk both dividend yield and operating leverage remain 
insignificant. So the model excludes these two variables and re-runs the analysis and the results remain 
unchanged for the rest of the variables. 
61
 It is important to note that due to lack of governance index information for Bangladesh, Cyprus, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg and Romania the model is run for a sub-sample. 
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protection of the minority shareholders (anti-director rights index) reduces bank total risk. 
Thus, this outcome is consistent with predictions (Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3). Similar 
evidence is also observed for idiosyncratic risk. These findings are consistent with that 
reported in Chapter 4. 
With regard to credit risk, contrary to prediction, the coefficient on creditor-rights 
index is positively associated with both credit risk measures (loan loss provision and loan 
loss reserves) indicating better creditor protection tend to increase credit risk. However, 
this result is consistent with result on European banks reported in Chapter 4. Further, the 
coefficient for operating leverage is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
This finding is consistent with prediction and also with the findings reported in Chapter 
4. 
6.5.5 Impact of Asian crisis (1997-1998) on bank risk 
The findings for the impact of Asian crisis 1997-1998 on variation in bank equity 
risk and credit risk are reported below in Panel A and Panel B of Table 6.20. 
The magnitude of the charter value coefficients increased dramatically with 
Asian- Crisis particularly for systematic risk measure model. This outcome is interpreted 
in terms of the increase in the importance of charter value with the Asian Crisis 1977-
1998. The most statistically significant increase is observed for charter value relative to 
systematic risk with a change in the coefficient of 1.819. This finding is contrary to that 
reported in Section 6.4 Nevertheless, the importance of charter value with respect to 
credit risk, has declined in the post-Asian crisis period and the most significant decline is 
observed with loan loss reserve. 
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Table 6.20 
Determinants of bank risk with Asian crisis (1997-1998) 
This table presents the result of impact of Asian Crisis 1997 on the determinants of bank risk. The table only presents the result for the differences. A dummy for Asian 
crisis takes a value of 1 for 1997 and 1998 and otherwise 0. All results are corrected for heteroscedasticity and the adjusted standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
The Wald test to test the joint significance for difference and joint test for year dummies under pooled-OLS is a F-distribution while for 2SLS it is a λ2-square 
distribution.  
***significant at 1% significance level,  
**significant at 5% significance level,  
*significant at 10% significance level.  
† the coefficients of the explanatory variables and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
Panel A Impact of Asian Crisis- Equity risk 
     Systematic risk     Idiosyncratic risk   Total risk  
 Pooled OLS Pooled-
OLS 
with lag 
2SLS Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled-
OLS 
with lag 
2SLS Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled-
OLS 
with lag 
2SLS 
Intercept -0.015 -0.030 -0.067 -3.141*** -3.215*** -3.273*** -3.473*** -3.470*** -3.534*** 
 (0.131) (0.139) (0.145) (0.198) (0.214) (0.218) (0.208) (0.213) (0.215) 
Bank capital -0.098 -0.021 -0.121 -0.084 -0.118* -0.059 -0.044 -0.089 -0.019 
 (0.109) (0.056) (0.120) (0.129) 0.064) (0.139) (0.131) (0.063) (0.140) 
Charter value 1.819** 0.949** 0.921** -1.358 -0.815 -1.193 -0.711 -0.540 -0.802 
 (0.741) (0.474) (0.452) (0.855) (0.681) (1.199) (0.906) (0.710) (1.221) 
Off balance sheet activities 0.060** 0.056** 0.055** -0.011 -0.028 -0.020 0.018 -0.005 -0.001 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) 
Market discipline 0.122*** 0.130*** 0.129*** 0.039 0.034 0.039 0.079** 0.080*** 0.085*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) 
Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.015 0.016 0.014 0.016** 0.017** 0.016** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Loan to total assets -0.038 -0.055 -0.039 -0.025 -0.025 -0.026 -0.065 -0.058 -0.063 
 (0.093) (0.095) (0.092) (0.110) (0.106) (0.105) (0.148) (0.139) (0.140) 
Bank concentration -0.060 -0.069 -0.086 0.112 0.109 0.104 0.097 0.088 0.087 
 (0.107) (0.106) (0.110) (0.123) (0.120) (0.123) (0.127) (0.123) (0.126) 
Net interest margin 0.490 0.060 0.626 -1.526 -0.671 -1.384 -1.584 -0.879 -1.454 
 (1.192) (1.109) (1.209) (1.372) (1.240) (1.363) (1.449) (1.280) (1.426) 
Stock market turnover -0.09*** -0.089*** -0.099*** -0.067* -0.058** -0.047* -0.098*** -0.078** -0.071** 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) 
Deposit insurance dummy 0.063 0.053 0.032 0.085 0.109 0.093 0.140* 0.167** 0.157* 
 (0.062) (0.061) (0.064) (0.079) (0.084) (0.083) (0.083) (0.088) (0.087) 
Economic freedom index 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Market based dummy -0.044 -0.054 -0.032 0.035 0.009 0.017 0.017 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.056) (0.050) (0.058) (0.062) (0.057) (0.062) (0.063) (0.058) (0.063) 
Common law dummy 0.228*** 0.252*** 0.223*** 0.064 0.078 0.081 0.157*** 0.191*** 0.194*** 
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 (0.052) (0.050) (0.055) (0.057) (0.058) (0.063) (0.060) (0.060) (0.065) 
Commercial dummy 0.068 0.058 0.054 -0.081 -0.032 -0.063 -0.055 -0.009 -0.027 
 (0.055) (0.051) (0.056) (0.061) (0.060) (0.063) (0.063) (0.061) (0.064) 
High income dummy 0.027 0.093 0.071 -0.125*** -0.148** -0.119* -0.126* -0.148** -0.126* 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.062) (0.069) (0.065) (0.070) (0.071) (0.067) (0.072) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 
Model F-test 
Tests of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test 
Wald test-joint significance for 
differences 
Joint significance for year dummies 
NOBS 
0.26 
48*** 
 
- 
- 
6.09*** 
30.18*** 
4670 
0.28 
52*** 
 
- 
- 
6.31*** 
29.01*** 
4468 
0.27 
51*** 
 
6.37*** 
12.82*** 
91.8*** 
268*** 
4455 
0.25 
51*** 
 
- 
- 
1.93** 
12.97*** 
4662 
0.25 
48*** 
 
- 
- 
1.83** 
9.53*** 
4460 
0.24 
46*** 
 
2.67* 
5.40* 
21 
123*** 
4447 
0.26 
57*** 
 
- 
- 
3.01*** 
10.29*** 
4680 
0.27 
57*** 
 
- 
- 
2.99*** 
7.77*** 
4472 
0.26 
55*** 
 
2.84** 
5.74** 
40.63*** 
102.9*** 
4459 
 
Panel B Impact of Asian Crisis- Credit risk 
Loan loss provision to total assets    Loan loss reserves to total assets  
 Pooled OLS Pooled-OLS with lag 2SLS Pooled OLS Pooled-OLS with 
lag 
2SLS 
Intercept -1.589*** -1.493*** -1.435*** -0.825*** -0.872*** -0.793*** 
 (0.132) (0.140) (0.144) (0.119) (0.128) (0.133) 
Bank capital 0.110 -0.055 0.015 -0.325*** -0.150*** -0.305*** 
 (0.098) (0.064) (0.109) (0.105) (0.054) (0.113) 
Charter value -0.874* -0.857* 0.198 -0.927*** -1.402*** -0.830*** 
 (0.527) (0.467) (0.638) (0.361) (0.321) (0.300) 
Off balance sheet activities -0.011 -0.027 -0.023 0.022 0.007 0.021 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) 
Market discipline 0.023 0.013 0.025 0.052** 0.041** 0.055** 
 (0.028) (0.031) (0.029) (0.026) (0.021) (0.028) 
Size 0.037*** 0.047*** 0.034*** 0.013** 0.032*** 0.014** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) 
Loan to total assets -0.174* -0.123 -0.159 -0.116 -0.157 -0.100 
 (0.097) (0.102) (0.101) (0.163) (0.174) (0.167) 
Bank concentration -0.194* -0.229** -0.271** -0.066 -0.046 -0.099 
 (0.111) (0.113) (0.113) (0.097) (0.098) (0.099) 
Net interest margin 0.895 3.159** 1.302 -0.751 1.328 -0.617 
 (0.979) (1.365) (0.987) (0.907) (1.195) (0.908) 
Stock market turnover -0.114*** -0.122*** -0.111*** -0.050** -0.041** -0.042** 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) 
Deposit insurance dummy 0.008 -0.038 -0.038 -0.056 -0.055 -0.081 
 (0.060) (0.066) (0.062) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) 
Economic freedom index 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
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 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market based dummy 0.138*** 0.150*** 0.141*** 0.079 0.010 0.060 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.053) (0.052) (0.055) (0.053) 
Common law dummy -0.036 -0.091** -0.096** -0.045 -0.018 -0.060 
 (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.051) (0.054) (0.053) 
Commercial dummy 0.028 0.044 0.055 -0.129** -0.094* -0.119** 
 (0.062) (0.059) (0.062) (0.055) (0.053) (0.056) 
High income dummy -0.014 -0.065 -0.023 -0.029 -0.021 -0.030 
 (0.060) (0.061) (0.059) (0.053) (0.052) (0.054) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 
Model F-test 
Tests of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test 
Wald test-joint significance for differences 
Joint significance for year dummies 
NOBS 
0.28 
38*** 
 
- 
- 
4.41*** 
32*** 
4631 
0.29 
37*** 
 
- 
- 
5.66*** 
33.15*** 
4246 
0.28 
37.88*** 
 
9.11*** 
18.34*** 
69.18*** 
307.5*** 
4233 
0.25 
42*** 
 
- 
- 
3.67*** 
19.10*** 
4524 
0.26 
43*** 
 
- 
- 
3.92*** 
13.72*** 
4155 
0.26 
43*** 
 
6.40*** 
12.90*** 
44*** 
146*** 
4141 
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The findings generally show a statistically significant (at the 1% level) increase in 
the effect of off-balance sheet activities on systematic risk in the post-Asian crisis period, 
suggesting that banks expanded into off-balance sheet activities, and systematic risk 
became more highly linked to these non-interest generating activities. The importance of 
market discipline has increased for bank systematic risk, total risk and credit risk (loan 
loss reserve) in the post-Asian crisis period. This supports the growing belief in the 
ability of the market participants to monitor and discipline large and complex financial 
institutions (Stiroh 2006). Moreover, bank size has increased in importance following 
Asia Crisis 1997-1998 with regard to total risk and credit risk measures. Thus, large 
banks have experienced increased equity volatility over the period.  
In essence, the findings discussed above supports the continued importance of 
charter value, off-balance sheet activities and market discipline as a determinant of bank 
risk in the post-Asian crisis period. On the contrary, the findings for EMU as discussed 
earlier in Section 6.4, imply that charter value, off-balance sheet activities and market 
discipline became less important determinants of bank equity risk following 1999.  
6.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter presents the results for the determinants of bank equity risk and 
credit risk measures using banks across the world. The sample consists of 758 listed 
financial institutions across six regions (Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe, Middle East and 
Africa, North America, South America and Western Europe) from the period 1996-2006. 
The study conducts a world analysis and also a separate regional analysis. This study 
focuses on the effect of a number of bank-specific and country-specific variables on four 
risk measures, total risk, systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk and credit risk. The study 
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applies pooled-OLS, pooled-OLS with lagged charter value and bank capital and two-
stage least squares (2SLS) estimation techniques. Some of the major findings are 
discussed below. 
In general, off-balance sheet activities are linked with higher risk. This is evident 
in the world analysis as well as in the separate regional analysis. With regard to charter 
value, the results indicate that there are some variations across the risk measures. The 
charter value decreases bank credit risk but increases bank equity risk. This finding is 
evident both in the developed and developing economies.  
The results show that bank risk is closely linked to bank capital. The finding 
suggests the disciplinary role of bank capital in the world analysis as well as in the 
separate regional analysis, particularly in Asia-Pacific, North America and Western 
Europe. Nevertheless, with regard to systematic risk, the non-linear association between 
bank risk and bank capital is evident in the world analysis. Indeed, this finding is driven 
by the Western European region. 
In addition, as evident from the world analysis, market discipline decreases total 
risk, idiosyncratic risk and credit risk but it increases bank systematic risk. Similar 
finding is observed in North America and Western European regions. However, there are 
some variations across other regions. Moreover, some of the country-level variables are 
important determinant of bank equity risk and credit risk. For example, moral hazard 
problem associated with deposit insurance is observed in the world analysis particularly 
in Asia-Pacific and Western European regions. Further, market based system 
demonstrates greater credit risk and lower equity risk particularly in Western Europe. 
These results are robust to different specifications. 
238 
 
CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This concluding chapter summarizes the thesis. Specifically, Section 7.2 
recapitulates the two broad research questions, their associated hypotheses, testing and 
results. Section 7.3 delineates the major contribution of this thesis to the literature. This is 
followed by a discussion on its policy implications in Section 7.4. Section 7.5 identifies 
some limitations while Section 7.6 concludes this chapter with some suggestions for 
future research. 
7.2 REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS, HYPOTHESES AND FINDINGS 
The objective of this thesis has been to assess the dynamics of bank regulation 
(bank capital and charter value), off- balance sheet activities and market discipline and its 
relevance on bank risk. To achieve this, two broad research questions guided by the 
existing research gaps were considered: (RQ1A) Do bank regulation, off-balance sheet 
activities and market discipline, explain bank risk, in particular equity risk and credit 
risk? (RQ1B) Does bank risk sensitivity to bank regulation, off-balance sheet activities 
and market discipline change with the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU)?, and (RQ2) Is there a structural change in European bank equity risk with the 
formation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)? The following three sub-sections 
(7.2.1, 7.2.2, 7.2.3 and 7.2.4) summarize the hypotheses, methodology and major findings 
in relation to each of these research questions. 
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7.2.1 Summary of findings relates to RQ1A– An analysis of European banks 
(chapter 4) 
RQ1A “Do bank regulation, off-balance sheet activities and market discipline 
explain bank risk, in particular equity risk and credit risk?”  
This question was addressed by testing hypotheses (H1, H2A, H2B, H3 H4, H5A 
and H5B) in Equation 3 through to Equation 6 (as discussed in Chapter 3) focusing on the 
determinants of bank risk for European banks. The objective was to examine whether 
bank capital, charter value, off-balance sheet activities and market discipline explain 
bank equity risk (systematic risk, total risk, interest rate risk and idiosyncratic risk) and 
credit risk. The results for the base-line estimation method, pooled-OLS, along with two 
stage least squares (2SLS) and additional robustness tests were reported in Chapter 4. The 
following discussion focuses on the findings for European bank risk as discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
Table 7.1 summarizes the findings on European bank risk analysis. It is well-
documented that bank capital disciplines banks and reduce their risk taking incentives. 
However, securitization and other financial innovation encourage particularly, large 
banks to lower their effective capital requirements per dollar of risk which is popularly 
known as “regulatory capital arbitrage” (Jones 2000). This is a major concern to both 
regulators and investors. In this study, the findings for bank capital show a non-linear 
association between systematic risk and bank capital, which essentially implies that banks 
first reduce risk with the increase in bank capital and as the bank capital build-up, the 
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banks then start increasing their risk levels. 
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Table 7.1 
Summary of the results 
This table represents a summary of the result as discussed in Chapter 4 in Section 4.2. The results reported 
in column 3 under the term “Actual Sign” in the following table are statistically significant at 5% 
significance level or better.  
Variables Predicted sign Actual sign 
Bank Capital  Non-linear (negative then positive) Non-linear with systematic risk and credit 
risk. No appreciable evidence of non-linearity 
with total and idiosyncratic risk. 
Off-balance 
sheet activities 
Positive (+) Positive (+) with all risk measures except 
interest rate risk. 
Charter value Negative (-) Negative (-) with credit risk only. Positive (+) 
with total, systematic and idiosyncratic risk 
Uninsured 
deposits 
Negative (-) Negative (-) with systematic risk. Positive (+) 
with credit, total and idiosyncratic risk. 
Size Positive (+) with systematic risk. 
Negative (-) with credit, total, interest 
rate and idiosyncratic risks 
Negative (-) with credit and idiosyncratic 
risks. Positive (+) with systematic risk and 
total risk. 
Loans to total 
assets   
Positive(+) Positive (+) with credit risk. Negative (-) with 
systematic risk 
Economic 
freedom index 
Negative (-) Negative (-) with all risk measures. 
Dividend yield Negative (-) Negative (-) with systematic, total and 
idiosyncratic risk and positive with credit 
risk. 
Operating 
leverage  
Positive (+) Positive (+) with all risk measures except for 
interest rate risk. 
Ownership 
dummy (D1) 
Positive (+) Positive (+) with credit risk, systematic and 
total risk 
Legal origin 
dummy( D2) 
Positive (+) Negative (-) with credit risk, total risk, 
systematic risk and interest rate risk. Positive 
with idiosyncratic risk. 
Geographical 
dummy (D3) 
Negative (-) Negative (-) with all risk measures 
Creditor rights 
dummy (D4) 
Negative (-) Positive (+) with credit risk. Negative (-) with 
total risk and idiosyncratic risk. 
Anti-director 
rights (D5) 
Negative (-) Negative (-) with all risk measures except 
interest rate risk. Positive (+) with interest 
rate risk. 
 
Similar evidence is also observed with regard to credit risk. However, this non-
linear relationship does not hold for other risk measures (total risk, idiosyncratic risk, 
interest rate risk). The growth in off-balance sheet activities and increase in the number 
of depository institutions failures have raised questions about the possible relationship 
between the two developments over the past decades. In this study the findings show that 
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off-balance sheet activities are in general positively related to various bank risk measures 
(equity risk and credit risk). Perhaps, this finding provides some comfort to the regulators 
to the extent that off-balance sheet activities is indeed risky business and must be 
included in the calculation of minimum risk capital.  
The results for European banks show uninsured deposits are negatively associated 
with systematic risk, suggesting a market discipline effect. This finding indicates that the 
level of uninsured deposits has a direct impact on European bank share price through its 
impact on systematic risk. There is a positive and statistically significant relation between 
uninsured deposits and other bank risk measures (credit risk, total risk and idiosyncratic 
risk). Thus, while there is a positive pricing effects through systematic risk effects, 
uninsured deposits can lead to increasing levels of diversifiable risks. This result is 
important to undiversified investors and also to regulators concerned with bank failure. 
The other important factor is bank charter value. A negative and statistically 
significant relationship is observed between bank charter value and credit risk, which 
implies charter value, acts as a bank disciplinary instrument with regard to credit risk. 
Yet, the evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between charter 
value and bank equity risk proxies (total risk, idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk) 
suggest the diminishing effect of charter value. This may be a major concern to bank 
regulators as well as investors. One possible explanation could be that the impact of 
financial liberalization and increased competition may have diminished the disciplinary 
effect of bank charter value. However, it is also possible that this positive association 
could simply reflect the growth opportunities implicit in bank charter value.  
Furthermore, the finding for bank size confirms that large European banks exhibit 
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greater systematic risk and total risk. This suggests that large banks potentially suffer 
greater moral hazard problem created by “too big to fail” policy. It is often argued that 
the presence of larger institutions possess a threat to the safety and soundness of the 
financial system (Mishkin 1999). This implies failure of a large institution exposes the 
financial system to increased level of risk. Thus, regulators and governments are more 
concerned about the contagion effect on the banking system and hence are reluctant to 
allow large financial institutions to fail.  
There is a negative association between dividend yield and bank equity risk. This 
result is important for investors as dividend payments provide a signal concerning bank 
expectations about future income.  
The findings also provide evidence that any variability in business profile will 
affect the equity risk and credit risk. This may be of some concern to regulators and 
investors. Thus, it is evident from Table 7.1, that operating leverage has a positive effect 
on European bank equity risk (total risk, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk) and credit 
risk. Yet, with regard to interest rate risk, the coefficient for operating leverage is 
negative and statistically significant. 
Finally, the finding shows that European commercial banks involve greater credit 
risk, systematic risk and total risk compared to other bank classifications including 
cooperatives, bank holding companies and savings banks. It is also important to note that 
the banks in euro-zone area exhibit lower bank equity risk and credit risk. Policymakers 
and regulators were doubtful whether formation of EMU will encourage banks in the 
euro-zone area to reduce their risk levels through greater integration. Hence, the findings 
from this thesis confirms European banks were able to reduce equity risk and credit risk 
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perhaps through increased bank merger and acquisitions. Moreover, the findings confirm 
that enforcement of creditor rights and anti-director rights are important in explaining the 
variation in bank total risk and idiosyncratic risk (La Porta et. al 1998). 
7.2.2 Summary of findings related to RQ1A - An analysis of world banks 
(chapter 6) 
RQ1A “Do bank regulation, off-balance sheet activities and market discipline 
explain bank risk in particular, equity risk and credit risk?”  
This question was also addressed by testing hypotheses H1, H2A, H2B, H3, H4, 
H5A, H5B, H6, H7 H8 H9 and H10 in Equation 3, Equation 4 and Equation 7 (discussed 
in Chapter 3) on the determinants of equity risk and credit risk for banks across the 
world. The following discussion delineates the findings discussed earlier in Chapter 6 on 
the world analysis. Table 7.2 draws a comparison between the findings from the world 
analysis and the regional analysis. The findings are consistent with different robust 
estimation techniques. The following sub-sections discuss the findings with regard to risk 
for each of the important explanatory variables directly related to main hypotheses (H1, 
H2A, H2B, H3, H4, H5A, H5B, H6, H7, H8, H9 and H10).  
7.2.2.1 Off-balance sheet activities  
This study provides evidence that banks around the world generally show positive 
association between off-balance sheet activities and bank equity risk, with the exception 
of idiosyncratic risk. This finding is also observed in regional analysis particularly in 
Asia-Pacific, Western Europe, Middle-East and Africa (MENA) and the North America 
regions, suggesting that reliance on non-interest generating income is an important risk 
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factor for banks in developed as well as emerging economies.  
With regard to credit risk, the result suggests that off-balance sheet activities do 
influence credit risk. This finding is evident both in the world analysis (Chapter 6 Section 
6.2) and in the regional analysis (Chapter 6 Section 6.3) particularly in Western Europe, 
Eastern Europe and Asia-Pacific regions. This provides further support to the Basel 
Accord I and II, as it requires banks around the world to incorporate off-balance sheet 
activities in their bank capital calculation. There is one variation in the finding which is 
with regard to credit risk, a negative coefficient is observed in the South America region. 
Indeed, policy makers may be interested in this finding because the rest of the regions 
show a positive association between off-balance sheet activity and risk. 
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Table 7.2 
Comparison of the results - world analysis and regional analysis 
This table presents a summary of the results as discussed in Chapter 6 in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3. The results reported in columns under the term 
“Actual Sign” in the following table are statistically significant at 5% significance level or better. Asia Pacific=Asia Pacific region; EEC=Eastern 
European countries; MENA=Middle East and Africa region, NA=North America region; SA= South America and W. Europe=Western Europe region. 
Equity risk means systematic risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk. Credit risk is measured by loan loss provision and loan loss reserve. LLP=loan loss 
provision; LLR=loan loss reserve. 
World  Asia Pacific EEC  MENA  NA  SA W. Europe 
Variables Predicted 
sign 
Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual 
sign 
Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign 
Off-balance 
sheet 
activities 
Positive Positive with 
all risk 
measures 
except for 
idiosyncratic 
risk. 
Positive with 
idiosyncratic 
risk and credit 
risk (measured 
by LLP). 
Positive with 
credit risk 
(measured 
by LLP) 
under 2SLS 
Positive 
with equity 
risk. 
Positive 
with equity 
risk. 
Negative 
with credit 
risk. 
Positive with 
all risk 
measures. 
Charter 
value 
Negative Negative with 
credit risk. 
Negative with 
credit risk 
(measured by 
LLP). 
Positive with 
credit 
risk(measure
d by LLP) 
under 2SLS 
Negative 
with all 
risk. 
Negative 
with credit 
risk. Positive 
with equity 
risk. 
Positive with 
systematic 
risk, total 
risk and 
credit risk 
(measured 
by LLR).  
Negative with 
credit risk. 
Positive with 
equity risk. 
Bank 
Capital 
Negative Negative with 
equity risk. 
Positive with 
credit risk 
(measured by 
LLR). 
Negative with 
total risk, 
idiosyncratic 
risk and credit 
risk. 
Negative 
with credit 
risk 
(measured 
by LLP) 
under 2SLS. 
Negative 
with 
systematic 
risk. 
Positive 
with credit 
risk.  
Negative 
with total 
risk, 
idiosyncratic 
risk and 
credit risk. 
Positive with 
credit risk 
(measured 
by LLR). 
Negative with 
equity risk 
and credit risk 
(measured by 
LLR). 
Bank 
Capital 
Squared 
Non-
linear 
Non-linear 
with 
systematic 
risk. No 
appreciable 
evidence of 
No 
appreciable 
evidence of 
non-linearity 
for the risk 
measures. 
No 
appreciable 
evidence of 
non-linearity 
for the risk 
measures. 
No 
appreciable 
evidence of 
non-
linearity 
for the risk 
No 
appreciable 
evidence of 
non-linearity 
for the risk 
measures. 
No 
appreciable 
evidence of 
non-linearity 
for the risk 
measures. 
Non-linear 
with 
systematic 
risk.  
No 
appreciable 
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non-linearity 
for the rest of 
the risk 
measures. 
measures. evidence of 
non-linearity 
for rest of the 
risk measures. 
 
World  Asia Pacific EEC  MENA  NA  SA W. Europe 
Variables Predicted 
sign 
Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual 
sign 
Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign 
Market 
Discipline 
or uninsured 
deposits 
Negative Positive 
with 
systematic 
risk. 
Negative 
with total 
risk, 
idiosyncrati
c risk and 
credit risk. 
Positive with 
systematic 
risk 
Not 
significant for 
any risk 
measure. 
Negative 
with 
equity 
risk. 
Positive 
with 
credit risk 
(measure
d by 
LLR). 
Negative 
with 
systematic 
risk and 
credit risk 
(measured 
by LLP). 
Positive 
with 
idiosyncratic 
risk. 
Positive with 
systematic 
risk, total 
risk and 
credit risk 
(measured 
by LLR).  
Negative with 
systematic 
risk and credit 
risk (measured 
by LLR). 
Positive with 
total risk and 
idiosyncratic 
risk. 
Size Positive with 
systematic 
risk. 
Negative 
with credit 
risk, total 
risk, and 
idiosyncratic 
risk 
Positive 
with 
systematic 
risk and 
total risk. 
Negative 
with credit 
risk. 
Positive with 
systematic 
risk and total 
risk. Negative 
with credit 
risk 
(measured by 
LLP). 
Negative with 
idiosyncratic 
risk under 
OLS. Positive 
with credit 
risk under 
OLS. 
Positive 
with 
equity 
risk and 
credit risk 
(measure
d by 
LLR). 
Positive 
with 
systematic 
risk and 
credit risk. 
Negative 
with 
idiosyncratic 
risk and total 
risk. 
Negative 
with credit 
risk 
(measured 
by LLR). 
Positive with 
systematic 
risk. Negative 
with 
idiosyncratic 
risk and credit 
risk. 
Loans to 
total assets 
Positive Negative 
with equity 
risk. 
Positive 
with credit 
risk. 
Positive with 
credit risk. 
Negative with 
systematic 
risk and 
idiosyncratic 
risk. 
Positive with 
credit risk 
(measured by 
LLP). 
 
Negative 
with 
credit risk 
(measure
d by 
LLR). 
Negative 
with total 
risk and 
systematic 
risk. Positive 
with credit 
risk. 
Negative 
with 
idiosyncratic 
risk and total 
risk. Positive 
with credit 
risk. 
Negative with 
equity risk 
and credit risk 
(measured by 
LLP). Positive 
with credit 
risk (measured 
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by LLR). 
Economic 
freedom 
index 
Negative Negative 
with credit 
risk. 
Negative with 
credit risk. 
Positive with 
credit risk 
(measured by 
LLP). 
Negative 
with 
credit 
risk. 
Positive 
with 
systemati
c risk. 
Negative 
with credit 
risk 
(measured 
by LLR). 
Positive with 
credit risk 
(measured 
by LLR). 
Negative with 
systematic 
risk and credit 
risk. 
World   Asia Pacific EEC  MENA  NA  SA W. Europe 
Variables Predicted 
sign 
Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual 
sign 
Actual sign 
Bank 
concentration 
Positive 
or 
negative 
Negative 
with 
systematic 
risk and 
credit risk 
(measured by 
LLP). 
Negative with loan 
loss provision and 
positive with credit 
risk (measured by 
LLR). 
Positive and 
marginally 
significant 
for total and 
idiosyncratic 
risk. 
Negative 
with equity 
risk. 
Positive 
with 
systematic 
risk. 
Positive 
with 
credit risk 
(measured 
by LLR). 
Positive 
with 
systematic 
risk and 
total risk. 
Negative 
with credit 
risk. 
Net interest 
margin 
Positive Negative 
with 
systematic 
risk. Positive 
with 
idiosyncratic 
risk, total 
risk and 
credit risk 
(measured by 
LLP). 
Positive with total 
risk, idiosyncratic 
risk and credit risk. 
Negative with 
systematic risk. 
 
Insignificant 
for all risk 
measures. 
Negative 
with total 
risk and 
idiosyncratic 
risk. 
Positive 
with credit 
risk 
(measured 
by LLR). 
Negative 
with total 
risk. 
Positive 
with all 
risk 
measures 
except for 
systematic 
risk. 
Positive 
with credit 
risk 
(measured 
by LLP). 
Stock market 
turnover 
Positive Positive with 
equity risk. 
Negative 
with credit 
risk. 
Positive with equity 
risk. 
 
Negative 
with credit 
risk. 
Positive 
with equity 
risk and 
credit risk 
(measured 
Positive 
with total 
risk and 
idiosyncratic 
risk. 
Positive 
with 
credit risk 
and 
systematic 
Positive 
with 
systematic 
risk. 
Negative 
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by LLP). Negative 
with credit 
risk 
(measured 
by LLP). 
risk 
(under 
2SLS). 
with credit 
risk 
(measured 
by LLP). 
Deposit 
insurance 
Positive Positive with 
equity risk. 
Positive with total 
risk, systematic risk 
and credit risk. 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Positive 
with 
systematic 
risk. 
Market-
based 
dummy 
Positive Positive with 
credit risk. 
Negative 
with total 
risk and 
idiosyncratic 
risk.  
Positive with 
systematic risk and 
credit risk. Negative 
with idiosyncratic 
risk.  
Insignificant 
for all risk 
measures. 
Positive and 
marginally 
significant 
for total and 
idiosyncratic 
risk. 
Not 
applicable  
Negative 
with 
credit 
risk. 
Positive 
with credit 
risk. 
Negative 
with equity 
risk. 
 
World   Asia Pacific  EEC MENA  NA  SA W. Europe 
Variables Predicted 
sign 
Actual sign Actual sign Actual sign Actual 
sign 
Actual 
sign 
Actual sign Actual sign 
Common-
law dummy 
Positive Positive with 
equity risk. 
Negative with 
credit risk 
(measured by 
LLP). 
Positive with credit 
risk (measured by 
LLR), systematic 
risk and total risk.  
Negative with credit 
risk (measured by 
LLP). 
Not 
applicable 
Negative 
and 
marginally 
significant 
for equity 
risk. 
Not 
applicable  
Not 
applicable 
Positive with 
idiosyncratic 
total risk and 
credit risk.  
Commercial 
bank 
dummy 
Positive Positive with 
credit risk. 
Negative with 
total risk and 
idiosyncratic 
risk. 
Negative with 
equity risk and 
credit risk 
(measured by LLP). 
Negative 
with credit 
risk 
(measured 
by LLP) 
total risk 
and 
idiosyncratic 
risk. 
Not 
applicable 
Negative 
with 
systematic 
risk, total 
risk. 
Positive 
with credit 
risk 
(measured 
Negative 
with credit 
risk 
(measured 
by LLP). 
Positive with 
systematic 
risk. 
Negative 
with total 
risk and 
idiosyncratic 
risk.  
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by LLP). 
High-
income 
dummy 
Negative Negative 
equity risk and 
credit risk.  
Negative with total 
risk, idiosyncratic 
risk and credit risk 
(measured by LLP). 
Insignificant 
for all risk 
measures. 
Negative 
with 
systematic 
risk. 
Not 
applicable  
Not 
applicable 
Negative 
with equity 
risk. Positive 
with credit 
risk. 
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7.2.2.2 Charter value  
It is observable from Table 7.2, that increases in charter value are associated with 
decreases in credit risk with respect to world analysis. Similar evidence of the 
disciplinary role of charter value although observed in Asia-Pacific, Middle East and 
Africa, North America and Western Europe regions but fails to confirm in the developing 
economies including Eastern Europe and South America. This diminishing effect of 
charter value may reflect the impact of financial liberalization and increased competition.  
Further, there is evidence that charter value disciplines banks and thus reduces 
risk particularly systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk and total risk. This finding is observed 
in the Middle East and Africa region. Contrary to the aforementioned finding in the 
Middle-East and Africa region, it is evident that higher charter value is associated with 
higher risk (systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk and total risk) in North America, South 
America and Western European regions. Yet, the findings on world analysis exhibit no 
appreciable association between charter value and bank equity risk (systematic risk, 
idiosyncratic risk and total risk). Regulators and supervisors are about banking sector 
stability, hence the aforementioned findings may be of importance to them. These 
findings are equally important to managers, borrowers and customers as they are 
concerned particularly about idiosyncratic risk.  
7.2.2.3 Bank capital  
A number of regulatory reforms were addressed for banks around the world in 
order to discourage bank risk taking, prevent bank failures and ensure continued 
solvency. It has been argued that excessive risk-taking has been a major problem under 
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the deposit insurance contract.  
However, bank capital shields the deposit insurance fund from liability by 
absorbing bank losses and preventing bank insolvency (Calem and Rob 1999). Thus, 
capital regulation has been a foundation of banking supervision.  
With regard to systematic risk, the disciplinary effect of bank capital is observed 
in the world analysis and also in the regional analysis particularly, for the Middle East 
and Africa and Western Europe. This finding indicates that increases in bank capital are 
associated with decreases in bank systematic risk. However, the findings in this study on 
world analysis provide support that the build-up of bank capital may make banks less safe 
since the relationship is non-linear.  
There is also support for this non-linearity in Western Europe62, though this result 
is not evident in the other regions. This is of greater importance to policy makers and 
regulators because a potential social cost of bank risk-taking is the possibility that a major 
banks failure or series of failures could impose external cost on financial markets 
(Bhatacharya and Thakor 1993). This non-linear association between bank capital and 
systematic risk provides the regulators and the supervisors to assess the appropriateness 
of bank capital requirement addressed in the New Basel Capital Accord. 
With regard to total risk, the finding reported on the world analysis shows bank 
capital is associated with decreases in total risk as desired by the regulatory authorities. 
Similar finding is observed in the regional analysis particularly for Asia-Pacific, North 
                                                 
62
 This finding is also consistent with that reported in Chapter 4. 
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America and Western Europe. Similarly, with respect to idiosyncratic risk, the 
disciplinary role of bank capital is observed in the world analysis as well as in the 
regional analysis particularly in Asia-Pacific, North America and Western Europe, 
indicating that increases in bank capital are associated with decreases in bank-specific 
risk (Furlong and Keeley 1989; Keeley and Furlong 1990).  
There is no appreciable evidence of non-linearity with regard to total risk and 
idiosyncratic risk both in the world analysis and the regional analysis. The findings 
further demonstrate that increase in bank capital is associated with decrease in credit risk 
particularly in Asia-Pacific, North America and Western Europe. Yet, the world analysis 
as well as the regional analysis particularly developing economies (Middle East and 
Africa and South America) suggests that bank capital does not necessarily reduce credit 
risk instead it may be stringent due to moral hazard problem associated with deposit 
insurance scheme. 
7.2.2.4 Market discipline  
Evidence from other variables also provides potentially important insights into 
bank risk taking. The findings suggest caution in evaluating the potential “market 
discipline” effects of subordinated debt and inter-bank deposits. This finding is evident 
both in world analysis and regional analysis particularly for Asia-Pacific and South 
American regions with regard to systematic risk. Similar evidence is also observed with 
regard to total risk particularly in South America and the Western Europe.  
Developed economies including, North America and Western Europe, exhibit that 
uninsured deposits fail to account for reducing bank idiosyncratic risk. Similarly, with 
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regard to credit risk, the findings cast some doubts on the regulatory role of uninsured 
deposits (subordinated-debt and inter-bank deposits). This is evident particularly in the 
Middle-East and Africa and South American regions. The aforementioned results are 
important to regulators and policy makers as it suggests the erosion of market 
disciplinary effect of subordinated debt and inter-bank deposits. Yet, the analysis has 
implications for reducing bank risk through holding a riskier portfolio which will allow 
them to pay higher price for subordinated debt and this is evident with regard to 
systematic risk in Middle-East and Africa, North America and Western Europe. Similar 
evidence is also observed with regard to total risk and idiosyncratic risk particularly in 
Middle-East and Africa region. The credit risk results for both regional analysis 
(particularly in North America and Western Europe) and world analysis support the 
market disciplinary effect of subordinated debt and inter-bank deposits.  
7.2.2.5 Size  
The findings show that bank size has different and offsetting effects on bank 
equity risk and credit risk. With regard to systematic risk, the result confirms that large 
banks exhibit greater sensitivity to the general market movements and hence lead to 
higher level of systematic risk. This finding is evident in the world analysis and regional 
analysis particularly in Asia-Pacific, Middle-East and Africa, North America and 
Western European region.  
With regard to total risk, it is also evident that large banks involve greater total 
risk. This finding is evident in the world analysis and particularly for Middle-East and 
Africa and Asia-Pacific regions. The findings also suggest that in the Middle-East and 
Africa region, large banks may not be able to reduce idiosyncratic risk through internal 
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diversification because these banks may tend to undertake riskier activities and likely to 
employ higher leverage (Demsetz and Strahan 1997). However, large banks in North 
America reflect lower total risk. Similar findings are observed with regard to 
idiosyncratic risk particularly, in Eastern Europe, North America and Western European 
regions. Further, with regard to credit risk, the world analysis supports that large banks 
are able to reduce their asset risk and hence reflect lower credit risk. This finding is also 
observed in the regional analysis particularly in Asia-Pacific, South America and Western 
Europe.  
There are some contradictory findings suggesting that large banks have less 
flexibility to cope with unexpected liquidity shortages because of insufficient access to 
capital markets. This finding is evident in the transition (Eastern Europe) and developing 
(Middle East and Africa) economies.   
7.2.2.6 Country-level variables 
It is evident from Table 7.2 that some of the country level variables are important 
in explaining bank equity risk and credit risk. Deposit insurance exhibit moral hazard 
with regard to each risk measures in the world analysis as well as in the regional analysis 
particularly in Asia-Pacific and Western European regions.  
It is evident in the world analysis that, market-based system increases credit risk. 
This finding is also observed in Asia-Pacific and Western European regions. Similar 
result is also found with regard to systematic risk particularly for Asia-Pacific region. 
Yet, it is evident from Table 7.2 that in Western Europe; market-based system reduces 
bank equity risk (systematic risk, total risk and idiosyncratic risk). Similar finding is also 
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observed in the world analysis with respect to total risk and idiosyncratic risk.  
Further, greater freedom in banking activities can result in lower credit risk. This 
finding is observed in four out of six regions and is also evident in the world analysis. 
Yet, increased banking freedom can also lead to greater credit risk which is evident in the 
transition (Eastern Europe) and emerging economies (South America). The findings show 
no appreciable association between EFI and bank equity risk in the world analysis. 
However, with regard to systematic risk in Western European region, it is observed that 
higher level of EFI decreases systematic risk. A contradictory finding is observed in 
Middle East and Africa region.  
It can be observed from Table 7.2 that stock market turnover ratio is an important 
country-level explanatory variable. There is evidence in the world analysis that high 
frequency of trading is associated with high bank equity risk. Yet, a negative association 
is observed with regard to credit risk. Further, there are some variations in the findings 
across the regions.  
With regard to bank concentration variable, it is evident from the finding that 
there is support for “concentration fragility theory” particularly in Western European 
region. Yet, consistent with the world analysis, there is also evidence that higher bank 
concentration may result in decrease in equity risk. Further, net interest margin is 
associated with increases in total risk. This finding is evident in the world analysis as well 
as in the regional analysis particularly for Asia-Pacific and South American region. 
Similar finding is observed with regard to idiosyncratic risk and credit risk. However, 
contradictory evidence is also observed with regard to systematic risk.  
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The findings show that commercial banks exhibit lower total risk particularly in 
Eastern Europe, North America and Western European regions. This finding is also 
evident with regard to idiosyncratic risk in Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe and Western 
European regions. Similar evidence is also observed with regard to total risk and 
idiosyncratic risk in the world analysis. Finally, North American commercial banks are 
more aggressive than their counterparts in Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe and South 
American in the credit market. It is also evident from the empirical results that common-
law country banks exhibit greater equity risk and credit risk. 
7.2.3 Summary of findings related to RQ1B – Impact of EMU 1999  
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the detailed impact of 
EMU on bank risk taking, RQ1B: “Does bank risk sensitivity to bank regulation, off-
balance sheet activities and market discipline change with the creation of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU)?” was intended to produce a simple understanding of 
whether bank-specific variables experienced statistically significant change between pre-
EMU period and post-EMU period. Such understanding is important in order to 
comprehend the importance of bank capital, charter value, off-balance sheet activities and 
market discipline before and after the formation of EMU. This research question was 
addressed by testing four hypothesis: (hypothesis H11A) bank charter value decreased in 
the post-EMU period, (hypothesis H11B) bank capital increased in the post-EMU period, 
(hypothesis H11C) bank off balance sheet activities increased in the post-EMU period, 
(hypothesis H11D) bank uninsured deposits increased in the post-EMU period. 
The magnitude of the charter value coefficients fell dramatically with EMU for 
systematic risk model. This outcome is interpreted in terms of the decline in the 
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importance of charter value with the formation of EMU and increasing levels of 
competition. This finding is also evident for idiosyncratic risk. Further, with regard to 
systematic risk, findings indicate that importance of off-balance sheet activities has 
declined in the post-EMU period for the European analysis (discussed in Chapter 4) and 
world analysis (discussed in Chapter 6).  
In general, the findings show that the formation of the EMU has had an impact on 
the sensitivity of bank risk to some of the key variables included in the model. While 
some of the variation is due to changes in sensitivity to bank capital the remaining 
variation is associated more with changes in the magnitude of coefficients rather than 
their sign (Chapter 4 and Chapter 6).  
7.2.4 Summary of findings related to RQ2-Structural change in European 
bank risk (chapter 5) 
RQ2 “Is there a structural change in European bank equity risk with the formation 
of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)?”  
This question was addressed by testing of the final three hypotheses: (hypothesis 
H12) total bank equity risk (increases) decreases with EMU, (hypothesis H13) 
idiosyncratic risk (increases) decreases with EMU and (hypothesis H14) systematic bank 
equity risk (increases) decreases with EMU. These were tested using regression Equation 
9 (See Chapter 3). This finding supports the three hypotheses, H12, H13 and H14, as 
mentioned in Chapter 2 (See Section 2.6.3) and this support is evident at both the 
individual bank level and the bank sector level (proxied by equally weighted and value 
weighted portfolios of the banks in the sample) for decreased risk with EMU.  
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The decrease in risk is particularly evident for French, Italian, Greek, Portuguese 
and Spanish banks (See Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 in Chapter 5). It is evident (Table 5.2, 
Panel A) that 67 of the 96 euro zone banks (70% of the sample) show a decline in total 
risk on average of 19% on average, with more than half of these declines being 
statistically significant. Further, bank idiosyncratic risk (Panel B, Table 5.2) declined 
10%, on average, with 58 of the 96 banks (60% of the sample) exhibiting decreased risk. 
While not all banks in all the countries in the study reveal equity risk reduction, equity 
risk reduction is apparent in most countries in the sample. An important exception is the 
German banking industry, where many of the banks exhibit an increase in bank equity 
risk on an average. 
7.3 ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTION 
This thesis contributes to the literature in several ways. As far as it could be 
ascertained, this is the first study to account for the structural changes in the European 
bank equity risk with the formation of EMU in 1999. The period is marked by increasing 
competition, changes in regulation, and increasing mergers and acquisition activity both 
in euro-zone and non-euro-zone countries. With regard to the determinants of bank equity 
risk and credit risk, as far as it could be ascertained, no prior study has examined the 
effect of bank regulation (bank capital and charter value), off-balance sheet activities and 
market discipline on bank equity risk and credit risk across the world.  
This study attempts to bridge this gap by exploring the impact of endogenous 
variables such as bank capital and charter value, on bank risk. Moreover, few studies 
compare the factors that explain bank equity risk considering the pre-EMU period (before 
1999) and post-EMU period (post 1999). Thus, this study provides an attempt to observe 
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whether there have been any changes in the importance of the factors affecting the bank 
equity risk with the formation of EMU. 
In relation to the literature of bank risk, it is believed that this is the first study to 
use both equity and credit risk measures in a single study. The market based risk 
measures provide a clear view of the risk impact of various bank-specific factors such as 
bank capital, charter value, off balance sheet activities and market discipline. 
In addition, this study considers credit risk, an accounting based risk measure. 
Although accounting based risk measures are considered to be backward-looking (Stiroh 
2006), credit risk is an essential risk measure for the banking industry and it has become 
more important since Basel Accord I and Basel Accord II with the greater emphasis on 
the bank internal credit risk measures63.  
This study is perhaps the first to provide empirical evidence of a non-linear 
relationship between bank risk and bank capital from an international viewpoint. Based 
on the arguments of Calem and Rob (1999), this study hypothesize that with increasing 
bank capital, bank at first reduces risk with build-up  of bank capital but with further 
build-up of bank capital banks may tend to take on greater level of risk, consistent with 
the “too big to fail” arguments.  
7.4 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The findings of this thesis should prove useful to policymakers, bank regulatory 
                                                 
63Yet, in the revised version, of Basel Accord II as proposed in 2000, recognizes the role of the market, 
capable of forcing the banks to adopt capitalization level consistent with risk profile (Sironi and Zazzara 
2003). 
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bodies and supervisory agencies which exercise regulatory authority over financial 
institutions, potential bank investors, creditors as well as academics. Regulators favour 
capital as a buffer against insolvency to promote the safety and soundness of the financial 
system. Basel Accord I and II focused on considering that banks across the world should 
be regulated by maintaining minimum 8% capital requirement. Perhaps, the increased 
attention on Basel capital requirement may help banks to reduce their risk. However, the 
findings in this study provide an insight that banks may reduce risk with bank capital but 
with the build-up of bank capital they tend to increase their risk level. Thus, it may not be 
possible to say that mandatory capital requirement have been effective tool in monitoring 
bank risk. It should be acknowledged that regulators should not consider “one size fits 
all” policy and thus should better design capital requirement which will help to mitigate 
bank runs and panics. Further, shareholders view the capital requirement different from 
the regulators. Shareholders seek an optimal mix of debt and equity in order to maximize 
the value of their common stock. Hence, given the regulatory requirement on capital 
adequacy and deposit insurance costs, bank shareholders need to consider the risk 
exposure of the bank.  
In 1980s, rising losses on loans to less-developed and Eastern European 
economies, increased interest rate volatility and squeezed interest margins for on-balance 
sheet lending due to non-bank competition motivated large commercial banks 
particularly, in developed economies to involve in off-balance sheet activities. However, 
over the decades, increased financial innovation and securitization activities suggest that 
bank across the world can be termed as an “asset broker” rather than an “asset 
transformer”. This finding is observed for banks across the world and particularly in 
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Middle-East and Africa, North America and Western European regions. Thus, it is 
possible to state with hindsight that off-balance sheet activities increase risk and these 
activities are now an important source of fee income for many banks.  
Earlier studies particularly based on US banks find that off-balance sheet 
activities reflect risk reducing attributes. However, this study provides evidence that 
banks across the regions show off-balance sheet activities increases bank risk exposure. 
This finding provides some comfort to the bank regulators. Indeed, expanded use of 
derivatives has resulted in an increase in the amount of regulation. For instance, the Basel 
requires incorporating off-balance sheet activities in the calculation of minimum capital 
requirement. Despite rules and regulations in place, huge losses have been observed over 
the past decade such as the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008); collapse of the Long-
term Capital Management in 1998 and Barings Bank in 1995.  
Further, according to the Basel Accord II, under the market discipline criteria, the 
banks are required to increase their information disclosure particularly in relation to 
credit risk. Regulators encourage banks to issue long-term bonds which would improve 
the market discipline from the standpoint of creditor monitoring. The findings in this 
thesis shows that market discipline or uninsured deposits may not be justifiable to reduce 
risk. However, this result provides an understanding to the investors that subordinated 
debt may not be able to eliminate the agency problem and hence banks may engage in 
undertaking higher risk.  
The empirical link between charter value and bank risk is examined in this study. 
This examination is partly motivated by changes in legislation and regulation in the 
banking industry and increase bank competition in the developed as well as emerging and 
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transition economies. Moreover, it is important for regulators and supervisors because 
greater supervisory requirement by the Basel Accord I and II may affect the impact of 
charter value on bank risk taking across the regions.  
The findings identified in this study have implications for competition policy, 
moral hazard in banking, and bank safety and soundness. The results in this thesis have 
implications regarding the potential effect of deposit insurance on bank risk taking. It is 
apparent from the findings that the provision of insurance encourages banks to undertake 
excessive risk and thus lead to moral hazard problem. This is of importance to the 
regulators and policy makers as deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to overall bank 
stability.  
Thus, an important policy implication is that regulators and supervisors may like 
to devote relatively more attention to bank equity risk compared to credit risk. This is 
important since the findings discussed in this thesis suggest that a number of factors 
identified by the equity market are risky. 
Furthermore, policymakers should perhaps focus on gaining a better 
understanding of what European bank capabilities helped them to reduce equity market 
risk while adapting to a rapidly changing economic climate. From the point of view of 
EMU, the major policy implication of this analysis is perhaps one of unintended 
consequences. While there was little academic discussion concerning the impact of EMU 
on the banks, it appears that EMU has had a marked impact on European banks equity 
risk. Yet, the regulators/policymakers and investors can generate further evidence on 
German banking industry. Evidence suggests an increase in bank equity risk for the 
German banking industry. Germany is dominated by Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe which 
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includes savings and Landesbanken. This peculiarity of the German banking system is 
said to have limited bank consolidation, lowered market concentration, and facilitated 
continuing fragmentation in the market and may well explain the risk increases that is 
observed in this study.  
7.5 LIMITATIONS  
This study has several limitations. As discussed in Chapter 3, the sample selection 
may have been biased due to lack of information on merged or delisted banks during the 
sample period. Unfortunately, both Bureau Van Djik Bankscope and Datastream 
International remove such information after the banks have been acquired, failed or 
delisted. However, the survivorship bias may be of less importance for regulators as in 
the banking industry due to the special regulatory treatment afforded via recapitalization 
or reorganization when banks face difficulties (Boyd and Runkle 1993).  
With regard to methodological issues, a more heuristic approach could have been 
undertaken in defining certain market discipline variables such as the subordinated debt 
yield spread. Bank risk could have been measured using the “Value at Risk”. Further, 
while a large set of factors have been incorporated in this thesis to account for bank 
equity risk and credit risk, some other bank specific and economic variables could still be 
excluded, such as individual bank efficiency, state bank versus other bank dummy and 
size measured using gross domestic product (GDP).  
With respect to the world banking industry, the study could not incorporate some 
of the major banks from Middle East due to lack of market information in the Datastream 
International database. Nevertheless, study could not incorporate ownership variables 
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because of a lack of quantifiable ownership data. Moreover, due to lack of data, 
particularly in developing and transition economies, a finer measure of bank capital such 
as tier 1 or risk adjusted total capital requirement could not be used.  
7.6 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
The results presented in this thesis suggest several avenues for future research on 
bank risk both in terms of sample and methodology. With respect to sample, the study 
can be extended to incorporate the unlisted banks around the world. For example, future 
research may seek to incorporate the difference in the factors affecting bank risk for listed 
and unlisted banks. Similarly, other financial companies such as insurance, thrift 
institutions and securities business could be included in the analysis. Moreover, as 
observed from the results reported in Chapter 5, based on the peculiarity in the German 
banking system, it would be interesting to tease out the reasons for the differences in 
bank equity risk particularly systematic risk for France and Germany. Further, given the 
GFC in 2007-2008, and the Western conventional banks (Barclays, Deutsche Bank, 
HSBC Plc, Llyods TSB Plc and UBS among others) move into establishing a separate 
Islamic banking wing in their respective countries and overseas, it would be interesting 
compare the Western world banking system with the Islamic banking system.  
The study could be extended to incorporate bank governance variables such as 
ownership variables including the percentage of insiders’ and outsiders’ ownership. 
Another avenue for future research is to further explore the possibility of non-linear 
relationship between bank capital and bank risk, and to delineate whether bank capital 
restrictions are essential for banks to avoid excessive risk. Scholars have argued that 
subordinated debt can substitute for bank capital (Herring 2004). Future research could 
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also provide new evidence on the market disciplinary effect of subordinated debt on bank 
risk. One extension to bank capital research could be to use a finer measure of bank 
capital such as risk-adjusted bank capital requirement (tier 1 or total capital) to delineate 
the impact of capital requirement on bank risk. 
In terms of methodology, future research on the determinants of bank risk could 
be improved upon on several fronts. Future research could also be improved through the 
use of other measures of bank risk such as value at risk (VAR) and more detailed 
measures of off-balance sheet activities such as loan commitments, standby letters of 
credit and derivatives. Since a large fraction of variations in bank risk remains 
unexplained, future research may also seek to identify other factors that affect bank 
equity risk and credit risk. As mentioned in Section 7.5, the results for research question 
1 (RQ1) in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 may still be biased due to endogeneity. To that end, 
more sophisticated econometric methods such as dynamic panel techniques could be used 
to address in the future research.  
One question for future research is whether the decline in bank equity risk (as 
discussed in Chapter 5) is due to bank portfolio diversification, increased equity holdings, 
changing income or the internationalization of the euro-zone banks as they take a more 
active part in the Eastern European markets. A further question is whether those banks 
with decreased risk weather the global financial crisis better than those banks with 
increased risk. In addition, it will be worthwhile to explore whether size and charter value 
is closely related to systematic risk.  
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Table A3.1 
List of sample banks 
This table presents the list of sample banks across the world over the sample period of 1996-2006. 
 Banks Country  Banks Country 
1 Grupo Financiero Galicia SA Argentina  54 Banco Santander Chile Chile   
2 Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires SA Argentina  55 Banco de Credito e Inversiones  Chile  
3 BBVA Banco Frances SA Argentina  56 CorpBanca Chile  
4 Banco Santander Rio S.A. Argentina  57 Scotiabank Sud Americano Chile  
5 Banco Hipotecario SA Argentina  58 China Merchants Bank Co Ltd China  
6 Banco Macro SA Argentina  59 China Minsheng Banking Corp China  
7 Australia and New Zealand Banking  Australia  60 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank China  
8 Bank of Queensland Limited Australia  61 Shenzhen Development Bank CoLtd. China  
9 Bendigo Bank Ltd Australia  62 Hua Xia Bank China  
10 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Australia  63 Banco de Bogota Colombia  
11 St. George Bank Limited Australia  64 Banco de Occidente SA Colombia  
12 Suncorp-Metway Ltd Australia  65 Banco Popular Colombia  
13 Westpac Banking Corporation Australia  66 Banco Commercial AV Villas SA Colombia  
14 National Australia Bank Australia  67 Banco Colpatria Red Multibanca Colombia  
15 Al-Arafah Islami Bank Ltd. Bangladesh  68 Bank of Cyprus Group Cyprus  
16 United Commercial Bank Ltd Bangladesh  69 Hellenic Bank Public Company  Cyprus  
17 Uttara Bank Limited Bangladesh  70 Marfin Popular Bank Public Co Ltd Cyprus  
18 Bank Asia Limited Bangladesh  71 Universal Bank Public Ltd Cyprus  
19 City Bank Ltd Bangladesh  72 Komercni Banka Czech 
20 Dhaka Bank Limited Bangladesh  73 Amagerbanken Denmark  
21 Dutch-Bangla Bank Limited Bangladesh  74 Danske Bank A/S Denmark  
22 Eastern Bank Limited Bangladesh  75 DiBa Bank A/S Denmark  
23 Export Import Bank of Bangladesh  Bangladesh  76 Fionia Bank A/S Denmark  
24 Southeast Bank Limited Bangladesh  77 ebh bank as Denmark  
25 Standard Bank Limited Bangladesh  78 Jyske Bank A/S  Denmark  
26 IFIC Bangladesh  79 Nordfyns Bank Denmark  
27 Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited Bangladesh  80 Roskilde Bank Denmark  
28 Pubali Bank Limited Bangladesh  81 Spar Nord Bank Denmark  
29 Rupali Bank Limited Bangladesh  82 Sparekassen Faaborg A/S Denmark  
30 National Bank Limited Bangladesh  83 Sydbank A/S Denmark  
31 National Credit and Commerce  Bangladesh  84 Vestjysk Bank A/S Denmark  
32 Mercantile Bank Limited Bangladesh  85 Bonusbanken A/S Denmark  
33 Dexia Belgium  86 Djurslands Bank A/S Denmark  
34 KBC Group Belgium  87 FB Bank Copenhagen A/S- Denmark  
35 Banco Bradesco SA Brazil  88 Aarhus Lokalbank Denmark  
36 Banco Itau Holding Financeira S.A. Brazil  89 Hvidbjerg Bank Aktieselskab Denmark  
37 Unibanco Holdings SA Brazil  90 Kreditbanken A/S Denmark  
38 Banco Nossa Caixa S.A. Brazil  91 Laan & Spar Bank A/S Denmark  
39 BANRISUL Brazil  92 Lokalbanken i Nordsjaelland Denmark  
40 Banco da Amazonia SA Brazil  93 Lollands Bank Denmark  
41 Banco Mercantil do Brasil S.A. Brazil  94 Max Bank A/S Denmark  
42 Banco do Estado de Santa Catarina  Brazil  95 Moens Bank A/S Denmark  
43 BANESTES Brazil  96 Morsoe Bank Denmark  
44 Banco do Estado de Sergipe SA  Brazil  97 Noerresundby Bank A/S Denmark  
45 Central Cooperative Bank AD Bulgaria  98 Nordjyske Bank A/S Denmark  
46 Toronto Dominion Bank Canada  99 Oestjydsk Bank A/S Denmark  
47 Royal Bank of Canada RBC Canada  100 Ringkjoebing Bank Denmark  
48 Laurentian Bank of Canada Canada  101 Ringkjoebing Landbobank Denmark  
49 Canadian Western Bank Canada  102 Salling Bank A/S Denmark  
50 Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce  Canada  103 Skaelskor Bank Denmark  
51 Banque Nationale du Canada Canada  104 Skjern Bank Denmark  
52 Banque de Montreal Canada  105 Sparbank A/S Denmark  
53 Bank of Nova Scotia  Canada  106 Totalbanken A/S Denmark  
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107 Vestfyns Bank A/S Denmark  167 Corporation Bank Ltd. India  
108 Vordingborg Bank A/S Denmark  168 Dena Bank India  
109 Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank  Denmark  169 Dhanalakshmi Bank Ltd India  
110 Ahli United Bank  Egypt 170 Federal Bank Ltd. (The) India  
111 Al Watany Bank of Egypt Egypt 171 State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur India  
112 Commercial International Bank  Egypt 172 State Bank of India India  
113 Credit Agricole Egypt Egypt 173 State Bank of Mysore India  
114 Egyptian Gulf Bank Egypt 174 State Bank of Travancore India  
115 National Bank for Development Egypt 175 Syndicate Bank India  
116 Banco Pichincha C.A. El Salvador  176 South Indian Bank Limited India  
117 Banco de Guayaquil El Salvador  177 HDFC Bank Ltd India  
118  PRODUBANCO El Salvador  178 Indian Overseas Bank India  
119 Banco Bolivariano CA El Salvador  179 ICICI Bank Limited India  
120 Banco Solidario El Salvador  180 Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd India  
121 Alandsbanken Abp Finland 181 Indusind Bank Limited India  
122 Pohjola Pankki Oyj Finland 182 ING Vysya Bank Ltd India  
123 Banque de Savoie France  183 Punjab National Bank India  
124 Banque Tarneaud France  184 Karnataka Bank Limited (The) India  
125 Natixis France  185 Oriental Bank of Commerce Ltd. India  
126 Societe Generale France  186 Bank Danamon Indonesia Tbk Indonesia  
127 Banque de la Réunion France  187 Bank Internasional Indonesia Tbk Indonesia  
128 Crédit Industriel et Commercial - CIC France  188 Bank Lippo Tbk. Indonesia  
129 Deutsche Bank AG Germany  189 Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk Indonesia  
130 Bankverein Werther AG Germany  190 Bank Mayapada Internasional Indonesia  
131 Merkur-Bank KGaA Germany  191 Bank Mega TBK Indonesia  
132 UmweltBank AG Germany  192 Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) Indonesia  
133 Attica Bank SA Greece  193 Bank Nisp Indonesia  
134 Marfin Egnatia Bank SA Greece  194 Bank Nusantara Parahyangan Indonesia  
135 Alpha Bank AE Greece  195 Panin Bank-Bank Pan Indonesia  Indonesia  
136 EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA Greece  196 Bank Permata Tbk Indonesia  
137 Emporiki Bank of Greece SA Greece  197 Bank Rakyat Indonesia  Indonesia  
138 National Bank of Greece SA Greece  198 Bank Swadesi Indonesia  
139 Piraeus Bank SA Greece  199 Bank UOB Buana Indonesia  
140 General bank of Greece Greece  200 Bank Bumiputera Indonesia Indonesia  
141 Agricultural Bank of Greece Greece  201 Bank Central Asia Indonesia  
142 Wing Hang Bank Ltd Hong Kong  202 Bank Century, Tbk Indonesia  
143 Wing Lung Bank Ltd Hong Kong  203 Allied Irish Banks plc Ireland  
144 Bank of East Asia Ltd Hong Kong  204 Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Plc Ireland  
145 BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd Hong Kong  205 Bank of Ireland Ireland  
146 Chong Hing Bank Limited Hong Kong  206 Bank Hapoalim BM Israel  
147 CITIC International Financial Hong Kong  207 Bank Leumi Le Israel BM Israel  
148 Dah Sing Financial Holdings Ltd Hong Kong  208 Israel Discount Bank LTD Israel  
149 Dah Sing Banking Group Limited Hong Kong  209 Mizrahi Tefahot Bank Ltd. Israel  
150 Fubon Bank (Hong Kong) Limited Hong Kong  210 First International Bank of Israel Israel  
151 Hang Seng Bank Ltd. Hong Kong  211 Union Bank of Israel Ltd Israel  
152 ICBC Hong Kong  212 Bank of Jerusalem Israel  
153 OTP Bank Plc Hungary  213 Industrial Development Bank  Israel  
154 Allahabad Bank India  214 Banca Popolare di Sondrio Italy  
155 Andhra Bank India  215 Banca Popolare di Spoleto SpA Italy  
156 AXIS Bank Limited India  216 Banca popolare dell'Emilia  Italy  
157 YES BANK Limited India  217 Banca Popolare di Milano SCaRL Italy  
158 Vijaya Bank India  218 Credito Valtellinese Soc Coop Italy  
159 UCO Bank India  219 Banca Popolare Italiana Italy  
160 Union Bank of India India  220 Banca Popolare di Intra SpA Italy  
161 Bank of Baroda India  221 Banca Carige SpA Italy  
162 Bank of Maharashtra India  222 Banca Fideuram SpA Italy  
163 Bank of Rajasthan Ltd India  223 Banca Finnat Euramerica SpA Italy  
164 Canara Bank India  224 Banca Ifis SpA Italy  
165 Centurion Bank of Punjab Limited India  225 Intesa San Paolo Italy  
166 City Union Bank Ltd. India  226 Banca Profilo SpA Italy  
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227 Banco di Sardegna SpA Italy  287 Hokkoku Bank Ltd.  Japan  
228 Banco Desio  Italy  288 Hokuhoku Financial Group Japan  
229 Capitalia Italy  289 Hokuetsu Bank Ltd. Japan  
230 UniCredit SpA Italy  290 Howa Bank, Ltd Japan  
231 Credito Bergamasco Italy  291 Hyakugo Bank Ltd. Japan  
232 UBI Banca  Italy  292 Hyakujushi Bank Ltd. Japan  
233 77 Bank  Japan  293 Iyo Bank Ltd Japan  
234 Aichi Bank Japan  294 Resona Holdings, Inc Japan  
235 Akita Bank Ltd Japan  295 Sapporo Hokuyo Holdings Japan  
236 Aomori Bank Ltd. Japan  296 San-In Godo Bank, Ltd Japan  
237 Awa Bank  Japan  297 Mitsubishi UFJ  Japan  
238 Yamagata Bank Ltd. Japan  298 Joyo Bank Ltd. Japan  
239 Yamanashi Chuo Bank Ltd  Japan  299 Juroku Bank Ltd. Japan  
240 Tokyo Star Bank Ltd. Japan  300 Kagawa Bank, Ltd. Japan  
241 Tokyo Tomin Bank, Ltd. Japan  301 Kagoshima Bank Ltd.  Japan  
242 Tomato Bank, Ltd Japan  302 Kansai Urban Banking Corp Japan  
243 Tottori Bank Japan  303 Kanto Tsukuba Bank  Japan  
244 Towa Bank Japan  304 Ogaki Kyoritsu Bank Japan  
245 Toyama Bank, Ltd Japan  305 Oita Bank Ltd Japan  
246 Bank of Ikeda Japan  306 Nishi-Nippon City Bank Ltd  Japan  
247 Bank of Iwate, Ltd Japan  307 Nagano Bank Ltd. Japan  
248 Taiko Bank Ltd Japan  308 Nanto Bank Ltd.  Japan  
249 Tochigi Bank, Ltd. Japan  309 Michinoku Bank, Ltd.  Japan  
250 Toho Bank Ltd.  Japan  310 MIE Bank Ltd Japan  
251 Tohoku Bank Japan  311 Minami-Nippon Bank, Ltd. Japan  
252 Tokushima Bank Japan  312 Minato Bank Ltd Japan  
253 Bank of Kyoto Japan  313 Miyazaki Bank Japan  
254 Bank of Nagoya Japan  314 Miyazaki Taiyo Bank, Ltd.  Japan  
255 Bank of Okinawa Japan  315 Mizuho Financial Group Japan  
256 Bank of Saga, Ltd.  Japan  316 Mizuho Trust & Banking Co Japan  
257 Bank of the Ryukyus Ltd. Japan  317 Musashino Bank Japan  
258 Bank of Yokohama, Ltd Japan  318 Keiyo Bank, Ltd.  Japan  
259 Biwako Bank Ltd Japan  319 Kita-Nippon Bank Japan  
260 Chiba Bank Ltd. Japan  320 Kirayaka Holdings Inc Japan  
261 Chiba Kogyo Bank Japan  321 Kiyo Holdings Inc Japan  
262 Chikuho Bank Japan  322 Woori Finance Holdings Co.  Japan  
263 Chugoku Bank, Ltd. (The) Japan  323 Jeju Bank-Cheju Bank, Ltd. Japan  
264 Chukyo Bank Ltd Japan  324 Daegu Bank Ltd. Japan  
265 Chuo Mitsui Trust Holdings, Inc Japan  325 Shinhan Financial Group Japan  
266 Daisan Bank, Ltd. Japan  326 Jeonbuk Bank Japan  
267 Daito Bank Japan  327 Industrial Bank of Korea Korea  
268 Ehime Bank, Ltd.  Japan  328 Pusan Bank Korea  
269 Eighteenth Bank  Japan  329 Kookmin Bank Korea  
270 Fukui Bank Ltd.  Japan  330 Korea Exchange Bank Korea  
271 Fukuoka Chuo Bank, Ltd. Japan  331 AB Ukio Bankas Lithuania  
272 Fukushima Bank Japan  332 Bankas Snoras Lithuania  
273 Gifu Bank Ltd  Japan  333 Espirito Santo Financial  Luxembourg  
274 Gunma Bank Ltd. Japan  334 Alliance Financial Group  Malaysia  
275 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Japan  335 UBG Berhad Malaysia  
276 Sumitomo Trust & Banking Comp Japan  336 BIMB  Malaysia  
277 Suruga Bank, Ltd.  Japan  337 Bumiputra-Commerce Hdg  Malaysia  
278 Shizuoka Bank Japan  338 EON Capital Berhad Malaysia  
279 Shiga Bank, Ltd (The) Japan  339 Hong Leong Financial Malaysia  
280 Shikoku Bank Ltd. (The) Japan  340 Hong Leong Bank Malaysia  
281 Shimizu Bank Ltd (The) Japan  341 Public Bank Berhad Malaysia  
282 Shinkin Central Bank Japan  342 Malayan Banking Berhad  Malaysia  
283 Hachijuni Bank Japan  343 State Bank of Mauritius Ltd Mauritius 
284 Higashi-Nippon Bank Japan  344 Grupo Financiero Inbursa Mexico  
285 Higo Bank Japan  345 Ixe Grupo Financiero SA Mexico  
286 Hiroshima Bank Ltd Japan  346 Attijariwafa Bank Morocco  
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347 Banque Centrale Populaire Morocco  405 Millennium bcp Portugal  
348 BMCI Morocco  406 Banca Comerciala Carpatica  Romania  
349 BMCE Bank Morocco  407 Banca Transilvania SA Romania  
350 Crédit du Maroc Morocco 408 BRD-Groupe Societe Generale  Romania  
351 ABN Amro Netherlands  409 Romanian bank development Romania  
352 Van Lanschot NV Netherlands  410 United Overseas Bank Limited  Singapore  
353 Sparebank 1 Nord-Norge Norway  411 DBS Group Holdings Ltd Singapore  
354 SpareBank 1 SR-Bank Norway  412 Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp  Singapore  
355 Totens Sparebank Norway  413 ABSA Group Limited South Africa 
356 DnB Nor ASA Norway  414 FirstRand Limited South Africa  
357 Sparebanken Vest Norway  415 Mercantile Bank Holdings  South Africa 
358 Sandnes Sparebank Norway  416 Nedbank Group Limited South Africa  
359 Allied Bank Limited Pakistan  417 Standard Bank Group Limited South Africa 
360 Askari Bank Limited Pakistan  418 Bankinter SA Spain  
361 United Bank Ltd. Pakistan  419 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Spain  
362 Bank Al Habib Pakistan  420 Banco Guipuzcoano SA Spain  
363 Bank of Punjab Pakistan  421 Banco Pastor SA Spain  
364 Crescent Commercial Bank Ltd Pakistan  422 Banco de Valencia SA Spain  
365 Faysal Bank Ltd Pakistan  423 Bance Popular Espanol  Spain  
366 Habib Metropolitan Bank Limited Pakistan  424 Banco Espanol de Credito  Spain  
367 Soneri Bank Limited Pakistan  425 Commercial Bank of Ceylon Ltd Sri Lanka  
368 Saudi Pak Commercial Bank Ltd Pakistan  426 Seylan Bank Plc Sri Lanka  
369 Prime Media Holdings, Inc Pakistan  427 Hatton National Bank Ltd. Sri Lanka  
370 Prime Bank Limited Pakistan  428 Sampath Bank Sri Lanka  
371 PICIC  Pakistan  429 Nations Trust Bank Limited Sri Lanka  
372 NIB Bank Ltd Pakistan  430 National Development Bank Ltd Sri Lanka  
373 National Bank of Pakistan Pakistan  431 Swedbank AB  Sweden  
374 Mybank Ltd Pakistan  432 Nordea Sweden  
375 MCB Bank Limited Pakistan  433 Bank CA St. Gallen Switzerland  
376 BBVA Banco Continental Peru  434 Bank Linth Switzerland  
377 Scotiabank Peru SAA Peru  435 Bank Coop Switzerland  
378 Banco Internacional del Peru  Peru  436 UBS AG Switzerland  
379 Banco de Comercio Peru  437 Credit Suisse Group Switzerland  
380 Banco Financiero del Peru Peru  438 Union Bank of Taiwan Taiwan  
381 Asiatrust Development Bank Philippines  439 Taichung Commercial Bank Taiwan  
382 Union Bank of the Philippines Philippines  440 Bank of Kaohsiung Taiwan  
383 Bank of The Philippine Islands Philippines  441 Taiwan Business Bank Taiwan  
384 China Banking Corporation  Philippines  442 Taiwan Cooperative Bank Taiwan  
385 Chinatrust Commercial Bank  Philippines  443 Chang Hwa Commercial Bank Ltd. Taiwan  
386 Citystate Savings Bank, Inc Philippines  444 EnTie Commercial Bank Taiwan  
387 Export & Industry Bank Inc Philippines  445 Far Eastern International Bank Taiwan  
388 Security Bank Corporation Philippines  446 Ta Chong Bank Ltd. Taiwan  
389 Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. Philippines  447 King's Town Bank Taiwan  
390 Philippine Bank of Comm. Philippines  448 Bangkok Bank Public Ltd Thailand  
391 Philippine National Bank Philippines  449 Bank of Ayudhya Public Ltd Thailand  
392 Philippine Savings Bank  Philippines  450 Tisco Bank Public Company Ltd Thailand  
393 Metropolitan Bank  Philippines  451 TMB Bank Public Company Ltd Thailand  
394 Bank BPH SA Poland  452 Bankthai Public Company Ltd Thailand  
395 Bank Millennium Poland  453 Siam City Bank Public Comp Ltd Thailand  
396 Bank Ochrony Srodowiska SA  Poland  454 Siam Commercial Bank Public Thailand  
397 Bank Pekao SA Poland  455 Kasikornbank Public Comp Ltd Thailand  
398 Bank Zachodni WBK S.A. Poland  456 Krung Thai Bank Public  Thailand  
399 BRE Bank SA Poland  457 Denizbank A.S. Turkey  
400 DZ Bank Polska SA Poland  458 Turk Ekonomi Bankasi A.S. Turkey  
401 Fortis Bank Polska SA Poland  459 Akbank T.A.S. Turkey  
402 ING Bank Slaski S.A. Poland  460 Alternatifbank A.S. Turkey  
403 Kredyt Bank SA Poland  461 Fortis Bank AS Turkey  
404 Banco Espirito Santo SA Portugal  462 Turkiye Garanti Bankasi A.S. Turkey  
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463 Tekstil Bankasi A.S.-Tekstilbank Turkey  520 CoBiz Financial Inc USA 
464 Sekerbank T.A.S. Turkey  521 Colonial BancGroup, Inc USA 
465 Turkiye is Bankasi A.S Turkey  522 Colony Bankcorp, Inc USA 
466 Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi TAO Turkey  523 Columbia Bancorp USA 
467 Yapi Ve Kredi Bankasi A.S. Turkey  524 Comerica Incorporated USA 
468 Lloyds TSB Group Plc UK  525 Commerce Bancorp, Inc. USA 
469 1st Source Corporation USA 526 COMM BANCORP USA 
470 ACNB Corporation USA  527 Commerce Bancshares, Inc. USA 
471 AF Financial Group USA  528 COMMERCE BCSH. USA 
472 Alabama NationalBanCorporation USA 529 CommerceFirst Bancorp, Inc USA 
473 Alliance Financial Corporation USA 530 Community Bank System, Inc. USA 
474 AMCORE Financial, Inc. USA 531 CMTY.BK.SYS. USA 
475 American Bank Holdings Inc USA 532 Community Bankshares, Inc USA 
476 AmericanWest Bancorporation USA 533 CMTY.BANCSHARES SC USA 
477 AmeriServ Financial, Inc USA 534 Community Trust Bancorp, Inc USA 
478 Ames National Corporation USA 535 Community West Bancshares USA 
479 Appalachian Bancshares, Inc USA 536 Corus Bankshares, Inc USA 
480 Arrow Financial Corp. USA 537 Cowlitz Bancorporation USA 
481 Associated Banc-Corp. USA 538 Croghan Bancshares, Inc USA 
482 BancFirst Corporation USA 539 Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc USA 
483 Bancorp Rhode Island, Inc USA 540 CVB Financial Corp USA 
484 Bancorpsouth, Inc. USA 541 DCB Financial Corporation USA 
485 Bank of America Corporation USA 542 Dearborn Bancorp Inc USA 
486 Bank of Commerce Holdings USA 543 DNB Financial Corporation USA 
487 Bank of Hawaii Corporation USA 544 Doral Financial Corporation USA 
488 Banner Corporation USA 545 East West Bancorp, Inc USA 
489 Baylake Corporation USA 546 EAST WS.BANC. USA 
490 BB&T Corporation USA 547 ebank Financial Services, Inc USA 
491 Berkshire Bancorp, Inc USA 548 ECB Bancorp, Inc USA 
492 BOK Financial Corporation USA 549 Enterprise Bancorp Inc USA 
493 Boston Private Financial HDG  USA 550 Enterprise Financial Services Corp USA 
494 Bridge Bancorp, Inc USA 551 Tamalpais Bancorp USA 
495 Bridge Capital Holdings USA 552 Farmers Capital Bank Corpo USA 
496 Brunswick Bancorp USA 553 Farmers National Banc Corp USA 
497 C&F Financial Corporation USA 554 Fentura Financial, Inc USA 
498 Cadence Financial Corporation USA 555 Fidelity Southern Corporation USA 
499 Camden National Corporation USA 556 Fifth Third Bancorp USA 
500 Capital City Bank Group, Inc. USA 557 Financial Institutions, Inc USA 
501 Capital Corp of the West USA 558 First BanCorp USA 
502 Carrollton Bancorp USA 559 First Bancorp of Indiana Inc USA 
503 Cascade Financial Corporation USA 560 First Busey Corporation USA 
504 Cathay General Bancorp Inc USA 561 First Century Bankshares, Inc USA 
505 CCFNB Bancorp, Inc. USA 562 First Charter Corporation USA 
506 Center Bancorp, Inc USA 563 First Citizens Bancorporation Inc. USA 
507 Central Pacific Financial Corp. USA 564 First Citizens BancShares  USA 
508 Centrue Financial Corporation USA 565 First Community Bancshares, Inc USA 
509 Chemical Financial Corporation USA 566 First Farmers and Merchants  USA 
510 Cheviot Financial Corp USA 567 First Financial Bancorp USA 
511 Chittenden Corporation USA 568 First Financial Bankshares, Inc USA 
512 Chemung Financial Corporation USA 569 First Financial Corporation USA 
513 Citigroup Inc USA 570 First Horizon National Corp USA 
514 Citizens & Northern Corporation USA 571 First Keystone Corporation USA 
515 Citizens National Bancorp, Inc USA 572 First M & F Corporation USA 
516 Citizens Republic Bancorp USA 573 First Manitowoc Bancorp, Inc USA 
517 City Holding Company USA 574 First Mariner Bancorp USA 
518 City National Corporation USA 575 First Merchants Corporation USA 
519 Clarkston Financial Corp USA 576 First Midwest Bancorp, Inc USA 
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577 First Mutual Bancshares, Inc USA 634 Macatawa Bank Corporation USA 
578 1ST.MUT.BCSH. USA 635 Mackinac Financial Corporation USA 
579 First National Community Bancorp USA 636 Marquette National Corporation USA 
580 First National Corporation USA 637 Marshall & Ilsley Corporation USA 
581 First National of Nebraska, Inc. USA 638 Massbank Corp USA 
582 First of Long Island Corporation  USA 639 MBT Financial Corporation USA 
583 First PacTrust Bancorp, Inc USA 640 Mercantile Bank Corporation USA 
584 First Regional Bancorp USA 641 Merchants and Manufacturers  USA 
585 First South Bancorp Inc USA 642 Merchants Bancshares Inc. USA 
586 First United Corporation USA 643 Mid Penn Bancorp, Inc USA 
587 First West Virginia Bancorp Inc USA 644 MidSouth Bancorp, Inc USA 
588 Firstbank Corporation USA 645 Midwest Banc Holdings, Inc USA 
589 FirstMerit Corporation USA 646 Monarch Community Bancorp, Inc USA 
590 FNB Corporation USA 647 Monroe Bancorp USA 
591 FNB United Corp USA 648 MutualFirst Financial Inc USA 
592 FNBH Bancorp, Inc USA 649 Nara Bancorp, Inc USA 
593 Four Oaks Fincorp Inc USA 650 National Bankshares, Inc. USA 
594 FPB Bancorp, Inc. USA 651 National City Corporation USA 
595 Franklin Bank Corp USA 652 National Penn Bancshares, Inc. USA 
596 Frontier Financial Corporation USA 653 NBT Bancorp, Inc. USA 
597 Fulton Financial Corporation USA 654 NB&T Financial Group, Inc USA 
598 Gateway Financial Holdings Inc. USA 655 NewAlliance Bancshares Inc USA 
599 GB&T Bancshares, Inc USA 656 NewBridge Bancorp USA 
600 German American Bancorp USA 657 Zions Bancorporation USA 
601 Glacier Bancorp, Inc USA 658 Valley National Bancorp USA 
602 Gouverneur Bancorp, Inc USA 659 USB Holding Co, Inc USA 
603 Great Southern Bancorp, Inc USA 660 US Bancorp USA 
604 Greater Community Bancorp USA 661 Univest Corporation of Penn USA 
605 Green Bankshares, Inc. USA 662 University Bancorp, Inc USA 
606 Hamilton Bancorp Inc USA 663 Unity Bancorp, Inc USA 
607 Habersham Bancorp USA 664 United Western Bancorp USA 
608 Hancock Holding Company USA 665 Wachovia Corporation USA 
609 Harleysville National Corporation USA 666 W Holding Company, Inc. USA 
610 Hawthorn Bancshares Inc USA 667 Village Bank & Trust Fin. Corp. USA 
611 Heritage Commerce Corp USA 668 West Coast Bancorp USA 
612 Heritage Oaks Bancorp USA 669 WesBanco, Inc. USA 
613 Highlands Bankshares, Inc USA 670 Westamerica Bancorporation USA 
614 Home City Financial Corporation USA 671 Western Alliance Bancorporation USA 
615 Horizon Financial Corp USA 672 Whitney Holding Corporation USA 
616 Hudson Valley Holding Corp USA 673 Wintrust Financial Corporation USA 
617 Huntington Bancshares Inc USA 674 WSFS Financial Corporation USA 
618 Iberiabank Corporation USA 675 Webster Financial Corp USA 
619 IBT Bancorp USA 676 Wells Fargo & Company USA 
620 Independent Bank Corp. USA 677 Old Point Financial Corporation USA 
621 Integra Bank Corporation USA 678 Old Second Bancorp, Inc USA 
622 International Bancshares Corp USA 679 Omega Financial Corporation USA 
623 Intervest Bancshares Corporation USA 680 Oriental Financial Group Inc USA 
624 Iowa First Bancshares Corp USA 681 Orrstown Financial Services, Inc USA 
625 Irwin Financial Corporation USA 682 PAB Bankshares, Inc USA 
626 JP Morgan Chase & Co. USA 683 Pacific Capital Bancorp USA 
627 Juniata Valley Financial Corp USA 684 Pacific Premier Bancorp Inc USA 
628 Kentucky Bancshares, Inc USA 685 Northway Financial, Inc USA 
629 KeyCorp USA 686 Norwood Financial Corp USA 
630 Lakeland Bancorp, Inc USA 687 O.A.K. Financial Corporation USA 
631 Landmark Bancorp, Inc. USA 688 Ohio Valley Banc Corp USA 
632 LNB Bancorp, Inc USA 689 Old Line Bancshares, Inc USA 
633 M&T Bank Corporation USA 690 Old National Bancorp USA 
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691 Northern Trust Corporation USA 731 R & G Financial Corporation USA 
692 Park National Corporation USA 732 Regions Financial Corporation USA 
693 Penns Woods Bancorp, Inc USA 733 Renasant Corporation USA 
694 Pennsylvania Commerce Bancorp, Inc USA 734 Republic Bancorp Inc. USA 
695 Peoples Bancorp USA 735 Rurban Financial Corp USA 
696 Peoples Bancorp of North Carolina, Inc USA 736 Southern Connecticut Bancorp USA 
697 Peoples Community Bancorp Inc USA 737 Southern Michigan Bancorp, Inc USA 
698 Peoples-SidneyFinancial Corp USA 738 Southside Bancshares, Inc USA 
699 PNC Financial Services Group Inc USA 739 Southwest Bancorp, Inc USA 
700 Popular, Inc USA 740 State Bancorp Inc USA 
701 Prosperity Bancshares, Inc USA 741 STE.BANC.NY USA 
702 S & T Bancorp, Inc. USA 742 Taylor Capital Group, Inc USA 
703 Sandy Spring Bancorp, Inc. USA 743 TCF Financial Corporation USA 
704 Santander BanCorp USA 744 Sun Bancorp, Inc USA 
705 Seacoast Banking Corporation of Florida USA 745 SunTrust Banks, Inc. USA 
706 Provident Bankshares Corporation USA 746 Superior Bancorp USA 
707 Severn Bancorp Inc USA 747 Susquehanna Bancshares, Inc. USA 
708 Sierra Bancorp USA 748 SVB Financial Group USA 
709 Simmons First National Corporation USA 749 Synovus Financial Corp USA 
710 Smithtown Bancorp, Inc USA 750 Mercantil Servicios Financieros,  USA 
711 South Financial Group, Inc USA 751 Banco Provincial USA 
712 Southeastern Banking Corporation USA 752 Corp Banca CA Banco Universal USA 
713 Southern Bancshares Inc USA 753 Venezolano de Credito SA USA 
714 Southern Community Financial Corp USA 754 Banco Exterior, C.A.  Venezuela 
715 Union Bankshares, Inc USA 755 Banco del Caribe CA Venezuela 
716 Union National Financial Corporation USA 756 Fondo Comun CA Banco Universal Venezuela 
717 UnionBanCal Corporation USA 757 Banco Canarias de Venezuela CA Venezuela 
718 United Bancorp, Inc USA 758 Banco Nacional de Credito C.A. Venezuela 
719 United Bankshares, Inc. USA    
720 United Community Banks, Inc USA    
721 Tri City Bankshares Corporation USA    
722 TriCo Bancshares USA 
   
723 TrustCo Bank Corp of NY USA 
   
724 Trustmark Corporation USA 
   
725 UCBH Holdings, Inc USA 
   
726 UMB Financial Corporation USA 
   
727 Texas Capital Bancshares, Inc USA 
   
728 Tompkins Financial Corp USA 
   
729 Sterling Bancorp USA 
   
730 Sterling Bancshares, Inc USA 
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Table A4.1 
Determinants of European bank equity risk and credit risk: excluding Danish banks 
This table represents the pooled-OLS regression results for bank characteristics. Panel A represents the findings under 
the base model and Panel B reports the results under extended model. The following equations have been applied to 
generate the results. 
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(2) 
tjiRISK ,, presents the bank equity risks. The bank equity risks include systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk, interest rate risk 
and total risk for individual bank i  in country j at period t . All bank equity risks are measured using the two index 
market model. The estimation techniques are provided in equation (3) and equation (4) in chapter 3. The explanatory 
variables such as 
tjiUD ,, is the natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at period t , tjiCV ,,  is the natural 
log of charter value for bank i , country j in period t
tjiBC ,,  is the natural log of bank capital for bank i , in country j  in 
period t , tjiBC ,,2  is the natural log of bank capital squared for bank i , in country j  in period t , 
tjiOBS ,,  is the natural log 
of off-balance sheet activities for bank i , in country j  at period t ,
tjiLTA ,, is the loan to total assets for bank i , in country 
j  at period t , 
tjiSize ,, is the natural log of market value of equity for bank i , in country j , in period t and tjEFI ,  is the 
economic freedom index for country j  at period t . tjiOPL ,,  = natural logarithm of operating leverage for bank i , 
country j at period t ; 
tjiDY ,,  = dividend yield for bank i , country j at period t ; jD1  = bank specialization dummy 
where jD1 =1 if commercial banks or otherwise 0; jD2  = legal origin variable where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 2 
if French civil law countries, 3 if German civil-law countries and 4 if Scandinavian civil law countries; jD3  = 
geographical dummy where jD3 =1 if euro-zone countries or otherwise 0; jD4  = creditor rights index and; jD5  = 
shareholder rights index. Finally, 
ti,ε  is the random error term. The joint F-test for the year dummies are statistically 
significant for all risk measures. All results are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. ***significant at 1% significance level, **significant at 5% significance level, *significant at 10% 
significance level. † the coefficients of the explanatory variables and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
Panel A Determinants of bank risks (base model) 
 Credit risk Systematic 
risk 
Total risk Interest rate 
risk 
Idiosyncratic 
risk 
Intercept 0.018*** 0.648*** -4.992*** 0.477*** -5.239*** 
 (0.004) (0.217) (0.600) (0.132) (0.601) 
Uninsured deposits 0.017†* -0.057** 0.052** -0.023 0.051** 
 (0.009)† (0.029) (0.026) (0.020) (0.024) 
Charter Value -0.005*** 0.498** 2.121*** 0.017 1.531*** 
 (0.002) (0.255) (0.585) (0.206) (0.618) 
Bank capital -0.079†** -0.142** -0.084 0.002 -0.065 
 (0.037)† (0.060) (0.139) (0.034) (0.141) 
Bank capital2 0.002*** 0.114*** -0.056 -0.024 -0.091 
 (0.065)† (0.037) (0.090) (0.023) (0.093) 
Off-balance sheet items 0.015†*** 0.055*** 0.168*** 0.004 0.140*** 
 (0.006)† (0.017) (0.034) (0.009) (0.033) 
Loan to total assets 0.001 -0.267*** -0.781*** -0.009 -0.246 
 (0.002) (0.105) (0.256) (0.073) (0.256) 
Size -0.011†** 0.162*** 0.032** -0.004 -0.101*** 
 (0.005)† (0.012) (0.016) (0.008) (0.030) 
Economic freedom index 0.009†** -0.011*** -0.041*** -0.006*** -0.034*** 
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(0.004)† (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) 
Year dummy 1996-2005 yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj R2 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year 
dummies  
Number of obs. 
0.23 
F[17,600]=14 
2.48 
Prob(0.000) 
669 
0.61 
F[17,600]=69 
7.61 
Prob(0.000) 
669 
0.35 
F[17,600]=23 
6.91 
Prob(0.000) 
669 
0.10 
F[17,600]=5 
1.89 
Prob(0.000) 
669 
0.28 
F[17,600]=11 
5.32 
Prob(0.000) 
669 
 
Panel B Determinants of bank risk (extended model) 
 
Credit risk Systematic risk Total risk Interest rate 
risk 
Idiosyncratic 
risk 
Intercept 0.024*** 1.255*** -6.071*** 0.166 -6.395*** 
 (0.004) (0.353) (0.745) (0.179) (0.722) 
Dividend Yield 0.001** -0.020** -0.007* -0.002 -0.014** 
 (0.051)† (0.010) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) 
Operating leverage 0.002** 0.022** 0.015** -0.010** 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002) 
Uninsured deposits 0.027†** -0.035** 0.097** -0.041** 0.051** 
 (0.012)† (0.016) (0.045) (0.021) (0.024) 
Charter Value -0.005*** 0.284** 0.659** -0.232 0.670** 
 (0.002) (0.135) (0.318) (0.236) (0.319) 
Bank capital -0.033†** -0.140** -0.364** -0.046 -0.333** 
 (0.016)† (0.069) (0.161) (0.038) (0.162) 
Bank capital2 0.001** 0.092** 0.064 -0.004 0.028 
 (0.066)† (0.043) (0.097) (0.024) (0.102) 
Off-balance sheet items 0.022†** 0.063*** 0.216*** 0.015* 0.189*** 
 (0.011)† (0.018) (0.034) (0.009) (0.033) 
Loan to total assets 0.002 -0.193* -0.630** -0.002 -0.163 
 (0.002) (0.114) (0.292) (0.076) (0.286) 
Size 0.016†** 0.150*** 0.016** -0.008 -0.128*** 
 (0.008)† (0.016) (0.008) (0.008) (0.035) 
Economic freedom index -0.011†*** -0.013*** -0.030*** -0.004* -0.022*** 
 
(0.004)† (0.004) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) 
Ownership dummy (D1) -0.001 0.062** 0.291** 0.014 0.304** 
 (0.001) (0.031) (0.137) (0.036) (0.140) 
Legal Origin dummy(D2)  -0.001*** -0.118*** -0.132** -0.021 -0.135** 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.061) (0.017) (0.060) 
Geographical dummy (D3) -0.001*** -0.214** -0.186** 0.090** -0.233** 
 (0.001) (0.089) (0.095) (0.039) (0.117) 
Creditor rights index (D4) 0.015† -0.023 -0.054 0.010 0.026 
 (0.030)† (0.033) (0.073) (0.015) (0.073) 
Anti-director rights index (D5) 0.020† -0.022 -0.121** 0.032** -0.119** 
 (0.030)† (0.021) (0.053) (0.013) (0.052) 
Year dummy 1996-2005 yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj R2 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies  
Number of obs. 
0.20 
F[24,630]=5 
2.45 
669 
0.50 
F[24,630]=22 
10.45 
669 
0.40 
F[24,600]=15 
3.45 
669 
0.11 
F[24,630]=3 
2.20 
669 
0.35 
F[24,630]=11 
3.45 
669 
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Table A4.2 
Determinants of European bank equity risk and credit risk: excluding German banks 
This table represents the pooled-OLS regression results for bank characteristics. Panel A represents the findings under 
the base model and Panel B reports the results under extended model. The following equations have been applied to 
generate the results. 
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tjiRISK ,, presents the bank equity risks. The bank equity risks include systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk, interest rate risk 
and total risk for individual bank i  in country j at period t . All bank equity risks are measured using the two index 
market model. The estimation techniques are provided in equation (3) and equation (4) in Chapter 3. The explanatory 
variables such as 
tjiUD ,, is the natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at period t , tjiCV ,,  is the natural 
log of charter value for bank i , country j in period t
tjiBC ,,  is the natural log of bank capital for bank i , in country j  in 
period t , tjiBC ,,2  is the natural log of bank capital squared for bank i , in country j  in period t , 
tjiOBS ,,  is the natural log 
of off-balance sheet activities for bank i , in country j  at period t ,
tjiLTA ,, is the loan to total assets for bank i , in country 
j  at period t , 
tjiSize ,, is the natural log of market value of equity for bank i , in country j , in period t and tjEFI ,  is the 
economic freedom index for country j  at period t . tjiOPL ,,  = natural logarithm of operating leverage for bank i , 
country j at period t ; 
tjiDY ,,  = dividend yield for bank i , country j at period t ; jD1  = bank specialization dummy 
where jD1 =1 if commercial banks or otherwise 0;  jD2  = legal origin variable where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 
2 if French civil law countries, 3 if German civil-law countries and 4 if Scandinavian civil law countries; jD3  = 
geographical dummy where jD3 =1 if euro-zone countries or otherwise 0; jD4  = creditor rights index and; jD5  = 
shareholder rights index. Finally, 
ti,ε  is the random error term. The joint F-test for the year dummies are statistically 
significant for all risk measures. All results are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. ***significant at 1% significance level, **significant at 5% significance level, *significant at 10% 
significance level. † the coefficients of the explanatory variables and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
Panel A Determinants of bank risks (base model) 
 Credit risk Systematic 
risk 
Total risk Interest rate 
risk 
Idiosyncratic 
risk 
Intercept 0.013*** 0.714*** -5.002*** 0.554*** -5.067*** 
 (0.003) (0.180) (0.509) (0.096) (0.500) 
Uninsured deposits 0.043†** -0.037*** 0.032** -0.001 0.079** 
 (0.018)† (0.011) (0.016) (0.008) (0.037) 
Charter value -0.002** 0.111** 0.565*** 0.060 0.495** 
 (0.001) (0.055) (0.221) (0.063) (0.204) 
Bank capital -0.001** -0.137** -0.047 0.003 -0.066 
 (0.045)† (0.059) (0.149) (0.034) (0.164) 
Bank capital2 0.025†** 0.070** 0.039 -0.002 0.056 
 (0.012)† (0.029) (0.072) (0.016) (0.080) 
Off-balance sheet items 0.001*** 0.036*** 0.054** -0.010* 0.037** 
 (0.012)† (0.011) (0.027) (0.006) (0.018) 
Loan to total assets 0.004*** -0.211*** -0.617*** -0.007 -0.401** 
 (0.001) (0.063) (0.189) (0.038) (0.182) 
Size -0.001*** 0.137*** 0.158*** 0.007** -0.054*** 
 (0.000)† (0.006) (0.015) (0.003) (0.015) 
Economic freedom index 0.007†*** -0.014*** -0.043*** -0.006*** -0.038*** 
 
(0.003)† (0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.006) 
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Year dummy 1996-2005 yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj R2 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year 
dummies  
Number of obs. 
0.20 
F[17,971]=13 
3.45 
 
989 
0.51 
F[17,971]=62 
9.25 
 
989 
0.30 
F[17,971]=21 
5.61 
 
989 
0.10 
F[17,971]=4 
1.93 
 
989 
0.22 
F[17,971]=11 
4.23 
 
989 
 
Panel B Determinants of bank risks (extended model) 
 
Credit risk Systematic 
risk 
Total risk Interest rate 
risk 
Idiosyncratic 
risk 
Intercept 0.024*** 1.237*** -7.642*** 0.275* -7.877*** 
 (0.003) (0.243) (0.692) (0.143) (0.678) 
Operating leverage 0.001*** -0.040** -0.075** -0.008 -0.049* 
 (0.000) (0.018) (0.033) (0.008) (0.028) 
Dividend yield 0.000** 0.018*** -0.009 -0.004 -0.019 
 (0.000) (0.007) (0.018) (0.004) (0.018) 
Uninsured deposits 0.001*** -0.031*** -0.002 -0.004 0.042** 
 (0.000) (0.011) (0.036) (0.007) (0.021) 
Charter Value -0.002** -0.088 -0.134 -0.004 -0.093 
 (0.001) (0.096) (0.247) (0.068) (0.226) 
Bank capital 0.012† -0.135** -0.320*** -0.036 -0.325*** 
 (0.042) (0.067) (0.160) (0.035) (0.169) 
Bank capital2 0.017 0.066** 0.181*** 0.019 0.193*** 
 (0.021) (0.033) (0.079) (0.017) (0.083) 
Off-balance sheet items 0.037**† 0.053*** 0.178*** 0.002 0.136*** 
 (0.016)† (0.012) (0.033) (0.006) (0.032) 
Loan to total assets 0.005*** -0.174*** -0.543*** -0.015 -0.367*** 
 (0.001) (0.066) (0.203) (0.039) (0.194) 
Size -0.001*** 0.116*** -0.079*** -0.001 -0.017** 
 (0.013)† (0.007) (0.017) (0.004) (0.008) 
Economic freedom index 0.014†*** -0.012*** 0.000 -0.002 0.004 
 
(0.003)† (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) 
Ownership dummy (D1) 0.001** 0.084*** 0.022 -0.003 -0.053 
 (0.049)† (0.034) (0.086) (0.017) (0.082) 
Legal Origin dummy(D2)  -0.002*** -0.190*** -0.048 0.001 0.024 
 (0.022)† (0.023) (0.060) (0.014) (0.062) 
Geographical dummy (D3) -0.003*** -0.192*** 0.630*** 0.079*** 0.726*** 
 (0.001) (0.048) (0.149) (0.030) (0.146) 
Creditor rights index (D4) 0.001*** 0.027 -0.154*** -0.007 -0.141*** 
 (0.019)† (0.018) (0.049) (0.010) (0.048) 
Anti-director rights index (D5) -0.001*** -0.023 0.153*** 0.027*** 0.162*** 
 (0.019)† (0.015) (0.039) (0.008) (0.037) 
Year dummy 1996-2005 yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj R2 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies  
Number of obs. 
0.24 
F[24,971]=13 
2.21 
989 
0.55 
F[24,971]=48 
12.12 
989 
0.35 
F[24,971]=21 
4.96 
989 
0.11 
F[24,971]=5 
2.00 
989 
0.30 
F[24,971]=15 
4.21 
989 
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Table A4.3 
Proportional risk measures 
This table represents the pooled-OLS regression results for bank characteristics. Panel A represents the findings under 
the base model and Panel B reports the results under extended model. The following equations have been applied to 
generate the results. 
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(2) 
tjiRISK ,, presents the bank equity risks. The bank equity risks include systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk, interest rate risk 
and total risk for individual bank i  in country j at period t . All bank equity risks are measured using the two index 
market model. The estimation techniques are provided in equation (11) and equation (12) in Chapter 4. The explanatory 
variables such as 
tjiUD ,,
is the natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at period t , 
tjiCV ,,  is the natural 
log of charter value for bank i , country j in period t
tjiBC ,,  is the natural log of bank capital for bank i , in country j  in 
period t , tjiBC ,,2  is the natural log of bank capital squared for bank i , in country j  in period t , 
tjiOBS ,,  is the natural log 
of off-balance sheet activities for bank i , in country j  at period t ,
tjiLTA ,, is the loan to total assets for bank i , in country 
j  at period t , 
tjiSize ,, is the natural log of market value of equity for bank i , in country j , in period t and tjEFI ,  is the 
economic freedom index for country j  at period t . tjiOPL ,,  = natural logarithm of operating leverage for bank i , 
country j at period t ; 
tjiDY ,,  = dividend yield for bank i , country j at period t ; jD1  = bank specialization dummy 
where jD1 =1 if commercial banks or otherwise 0;  jD2  = legal origin variable where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 
2 if French civil law countries, 3 if German civil-law countries and 4 if Scandinavian civil law countries; jD3  = 
geographical dummy where jD3 =1 if euro-zone countries or otherwise 0; jD4  = creditor rights index and; jD5  = 
shareholder rights index. Finally, 
ti,ε  is the random error term. The joint F-test for the year dummies are statistically 
significant for all risk measures. All results are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. ***significant at 1% significance level, **significant at 5% significance level, *significant at 10% 
significance level. † the coefficients of the explanatory variables and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
Panel A Determinants of bank risks when systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk and interest rate risk is a proportion of 
total risk. (base model) 
 
Systematic  risk Idiosyncratic risk Interest rate risk 
Intercept -0.129*** 
(0.038) 
1.055*** 
(0.026) 
-0.064*** 
(0.022) 
Uninsured deposits  -0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
Charter value 0.120*** 
(0.037) 
0.127*** 
(0.010) 
-0.053 
(0.034) 
Bank capital -0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.001† 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
Bank capital squared 0.014** 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
Off-balance sheet activities 0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.010) 
-0.020† 
(0.001) 
Loan to total assets 0.039*** 
(0.013) 
-0.062*** 
(0.001) 0.020† (0.008) 
Size 0.024*** 
(0.002) 
-0.018*** 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
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Economic freedom  
index 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(0.020)† 
-0.001*** 
(0.030)† 
Adj R2 
Model test 
NOBS  
0.55 
F[17,1017]=56.82 
1029 
0.53 
F[17,1017]=56.42 
1029 
0.07 
F[17,1017]=4.89 
1029 
 
Panel B Determinants of bank risks when systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk and interest rate risk is a proportion of 
total risk. (extended model) 
 Systematic risk Idiosyncratic risk Interest rate risk 
Intercept -0.184*** 
(0.50) 
1.065*** 
(0.036) 
-0.023 
(0.029) 
Operating leverage  0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Dividend yield -0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
Uninsured deposits  -0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.003** 
(0.002) 
Charter value 0.085** 
(0.038) 
0.110*** 
(0.031) 
 0.003 
(0.037) 
Bank capital 0.016 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
0.013* 
(0.008) 
Bank capital squared -0.010 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
Off balance sheet activities 0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
Loan to total assets  0.032** 
(0.014) 
-0.053*** 
(0.012) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
Size 0.021*** 
(0.002) 
-0.017*** 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
Economic freedom index -0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.010)† 
0.001 
(0.010)† 
Ownership dummy D1 -0.011* 
(0.006) 
0.013*** 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
Legal origin dummy D2 0.024*** 
(0.004) 
-0.008*** 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
Geographical dummy D3 0.026*** 
(0.009) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.013*** 
(0.004) 
Creditor rights dummy D4 0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
Shareholder rights D5 0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
Adj R2 
Model test 
NOBS 
0.55 
F[24,1017]=43.25 
1029 
0.54 
F[24,1017]=42.21 
1029 
0.12 
F[24,1017]=5.79 
1029 
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Table A5.1 
Commercial banks in euro-zone countries 
Average individual bank equity risk are reported for euro-zone countries. Pre-EMU period along with the change in 
systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk and total risk that occurred with EMU are reported in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C 
respectively. Total risk is defined: 2
1
2 )(/1 RRN tNtri −∑= =σ  where 2riσ  is the variance of the return for bank i, Ri return 
of bank i and R  average bank i return. Idiosyncratic risk is defined as 2222
rmri σβσσ ε −=  where 2riσ  is the total 
risk for bank i , 2
εσ  bank return idiosyncratic risk and 
22
rmσβ  reflects the impact of systematic risk. The standard 
market model is used to measure systematic risk:
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  where, itR  is the return on security i at 
time period t, 
mtR
 is the return on an equity market index at time period t. The systematic risk estimate for each bank or 
portfolio of banks is 
iβ (systematic risk) and itε  is a random shock term. The market model is extended by introducing 
a dummy variable to capture the structural changes in systematic risk. The dummy variable (D) takes on a value of zero 
(0) for the months of January 1995 to December 1998 and a value of one (1) from January 1999 to April 
2006. ( ) ( ) ittmtprepostmtpretprepostpreit DRRDR εβββααα +−++−+= . *** significant at 1% significance level.** significant 
at 5% significance level.* significant at 10% significance level 
 
Panel A Estimation of systematic risk  
 Pre-EMU 
Average β 
Average 
changes in β 
N N* N** N+ N++ 
Austria  0.362 -0.298 3 2 1* - - 
Finland  0.242 -0.180 2 1 1** - - 
France  1.082 -0.536 8 2 4***   
Germany  1.120 0.745 2 - - - 2** 
Greece  0.903 0.402 6 - - 5 1* 
Ireland  0.965 -0.187 3 3 - - - 
Italy 1.280 -0.450 10 5 3***/** 2 - 
Netherlands  1.410 0.064 1 - - 1 - 
Portugal  1.010 -0.595 3 2 1 - - 
Spain  1.790 -0.421 13 7 4***/** 2 - 
Total listed 
bank shares 
  51 22 14 10 3 
 
Panel B Estimation of idiosyncratic risk  
 Pre-EMU  Post -EMU N N* N** N+ N++ 
Austria 22.048 12.658 3 1 2*** - - 
Finland 55.936 24.433 2 1 1** - - 
France 114.52 127.10 8 2 4*** 2 - 
Germany 44.898 99.252 2 - - - 2*** 
Greece 311.06 97.93 6 2 4***/** - - 
Ireland 33.80 52.39 3 - 1* 1 1* 
Italy 159.70 52.81 10 2 7*** 1 - 
Netherlands 39.16 36.87 1 1 - - - 
Portugal 56.8 27.23 3 - 3***/** - - 
Spain 53.03 25.35 13 2 10***/** 1 - 
Total listed 
bank shares 
  51 11 32 5 3 
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Panel C Estimation of total risk  
 Pre-EMU Post-EMU N N* N** N+ N++ 
Austria 25.09 12.86 3 1 2*** - - 
Finland 66.42 29.70 2 1 1*** - - 
France 153.98 139.96 8 1 6*** 1 - 
Germany 72.20 191.24 2 - - - 2*** 
Greece 333.20 137.43 6 3 3*** - - 
Ireland 56.85 63.51 3 - - 3  
Italy 201.48 74.31 10 3 7*** - - 
Netherlands 78.65 83.20 1 - - - 1 
Portugal 86.68 32.27 3 - 3***/** - - 
Spain 73.55 35.89 13 1 11***/** 1 - 
Total listed 
bank shares 
  51 10 33 5 3 
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Table A5.2  
Equity market index choice and equity pricing model 
This table reports the findings using Fama-French three factor model. The alternative method to measure the risk is the Fama-French three factor model (1993) which is as follows: 
itiimtiiit HMLhSMBEsrbr εα ++++= )()(     
=SMB  the return on the individual security for size factor; =HML the return on the individual security for book to market factor; ftitit RRr −=  and ftmtmt RRr −= where, itR , mtR  
and 
ftR are the return on security i , return on market index and return on risk free asset respectively. N is the number of banks with a decrease in total risk. N* is the total number 
of banks with a statistically significant decrease in risk. 
 *** significant at 1% significance level.** significant at 5% significance level.* significant at 10% significance level 
 Pre 
HML(avg.) 
Changes 
in HML(avg.) 
N N* Pre SMB 
(avg.) 
Changes in SMB 
(avg.) 
N N* Pre-excess 
return (avg.) 
Changes in 
excess 
return (avg.) 
N N* 
Austria 0.0875 
(0.414) 
-0.0964 
(-.378) 
3 - -0.0012 
(0.104) 
0.0380 
(.144) 
2 - 0.2717 
(2.128) 
0.0451 
(.39) 
3 - 
EW portfolio 0.1163 
(1.04) 
-0.1252 
(-1.09) 
- - 0.0276 
(0.22) 
0.0092 
(.07) 
- - .3129 
(4.9) 
.0039 
(.05) 
- - 
MV portfolio 0.1756 
(1.05) 
-0.226 
(-1.27) 
- - -0.1068 
(-0.69) 
0.0418 
(.23) 
- - .356 
(3.91) 
.322 
(2.83) 
- - 
Belgium -.1810 
(-.945) 
.1585 
(.775) 
2 - .1112 
(.5625) 
-.1899 
(-.5825) 
3 1 .9493 
(5.945) 
.0184 
(-.0075) 
2 1 
EW portfolio -.1911 
(-1.11) 
.1687 
(.94) 
- - .1903 
(1.67) 
-.2691 
(-1.93) 
- - .9955 
(11.76) 
-.0278 
(-.27) 
- - 
MV portfolio .0074 
(.03) 
-.1285 
(-.5) 
- - .0814 
(.66) 
-.2457 
(-1.72) 
- - 1.197 
(9.13) 
.0369 
(.25) 
- - 
Finland -.0330 
(.5717) 
.2698 
(.2167) 
2 - .5428 
(.9283) 
-.3652 
(-.2667) 
3 1 .4692 
(2.186) 
.1424 
(-.0533) 
3 1 
EW portfolio .0106 
(.06) 
.2262 
(.84) 
- - .565 
(2.33) 
-.3874 
(-1.13) 
- - .5613 
(4.42) 
.0503 
(.23) 
- - 
MV portfolio -.0495 
(-.33) 
.0503 
(.24) 
- - .7751 
(3.24) 
-.479 
(-1.58) 
- - 1.072 
(5.74) 
-.5298 
-2.25) 
- - 
France .4288 
(1.696) 
-.2974 
(-.9371) 
5 3 -.1376 
(-.0514) 
.0976 
(.053) 
4 1 .7477 
(2.877) 
-.396 
(-1.244) 
6 2 
EW portfolio .4652 
(2.71) 
-.334 
(-1.88) 
- - -.143 
(-.64) 
.103 
(.43) 
- - .8276 
(4.76) 
-.4758 
(-2.56) 
- - 
MV portfolio .7911 
(3.67) 
-.6608 
(-2.8) 
- - .669 
(-2.22) 
.5709 
(1.70) 
- - 1.042 
(4.72) 
-.4434 
(-1.77) 
- - 
Germany .1650 
(1.136) 
.1364 
(.4155) 
5 - .0740 
(.3855) 
.1301 
(.4091) 
4 - .6434 
(4.173) 
.0205 
(-.2109) 
7 2 
EW portfolio .1685 
(2.48) 
.1329 
(1.36) 
- - .0884 
(.910) 
.1156 
(.810) 
- - .6608 
(9.43) 
.0031 
(.030) 
- - 
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MV portfolio .1550 
(1.06) 
.2308 
(1.31) 
- - -.1356 
(-.930) 
.2504 
(1.37) 
- - 1.026 
(9.06) 
.0046 
(.030) 
- - 
Ireland -.076 
(-.82) 
.3084 
(2.22) 
- - -.016 
(-.055) 
-1.02 
(-.37) 
3 - 1.137 
(7.58) 
-.0967 
(-.488) 
2 - 
EW portfolio .076 
(-1.05) 
.3085 
(3.02) 
- - -.016 
(-.15) 
-.102 
(-.58) 
- - 1.138 
(13.44) 
-.097 
(-.83) 
- - 
MV portfolio -.084 
(-1.02) 
.3116 
(2.66) 
- - -.1462 
(-1.11) 
-.1728 
(-.85) 
- - 1.222 
(13.51) 
-.2131 
( -1.67) 
- - 
Italy .4853 
(1.62) 
-.1629 
(-.233) 
16 4 .0438 
(.0893) 
.1960 
(.4282) 
10 2 .6582 
(5.686) 
.1810 
(.6939) 
11 6 
EW portfolio .5417 
(5.16) 
-.2193 
(-1.78) 
- - .0266 
(.18) 
.2132 
(1.2) 
- - .6904 
(13.78) 
.1489 
(2.20) 
- - 
MV portfolio .446 
(3.71) 
-.069 
(-.44) 
- - -.3057 
(-2.16) 
.4126 
(2.5) 
- - .9598 
(17.98) 
.0915 
(1.08) 
- - 
Netherlands .273 
(1.47) 
-.169 
(-.667) 
2 - .2284 
(.513) 
-.295 
(-.790) 
2 1 1.06 
(4.70) 
-.095 
(-.227) 
1 - 
EW portfolio .273 
(2.179) 
-.169 
(-1.118) 
- - .228 
(1.28) 
-.285 
(-1.347) 
- - 1.061 
(7.67) 
-.0947 
(-.545) 
- - 
MV portfolio .4307 
(3.11) 
-.254 
(-1.502) 
- - .0065 
(.036) 
-.322 
(-1.368) 
- - 1.143 
(7.03) 
.0543 
(.261) 
- - 
Spain -.093 
(-.546) 
.2014 
(.804) 
3 1 .332 
(.946) 
-.0936 
(-.0671) 
7 1 .7556 
(6.108) 
-.1989 
(-1.5) 
7 4 
EW portfolio -.0925 
-.62 
.2014 
(1.26) 
- - .3316 
(2.37) 
-.0936 
(-.59) 
- - .7556 
(10.83) 
-.1989 
(-2.12) 
- - 
MV portfolio -.3511 
(-3.69) 
.4112 
(3.26) 
- - .0942 
(.57) 
-.17 
(-.87) 
- - 1.069 
(12.46) 
-.1511 
(-1.21) 
- - 
Total   38 8   38 7   42 16 
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Table A5.3 
Effects using different events 
This table presents the impact of events such as; EMU January 1999, Asian Crisis July 1997-July 1998, Russian ruble crisis August 1998 and Internet bubble December 
1999 to April 2000. The following model is used to estimate the impact of these events on bank risk.  
tmtmtt DRRDDDDR εββααααα +++++++= 121443322110  where 1D =0 pre Euro period January 1995 - December 1998 and 1D =1 post Euro January 1999 –April 2006., 
2D = 1 Asian Crisis period July 1997 to July 1998 and 2D =0 otherwise, 3D =1 Russian Ruble crisis August 1998 to September 1998 and 3D =0 otherwise, 4D = 1  
internet bubble period December 1999 to April 2000 and 
4D =0 otherwise. Panel A, Panel B and Panel C presents the effects of different events using country index, 
world index and Europe index respectively.*Significant at 10% significance level;** Significant at 5% significance level;***Significant at 1% significance level. 
Panel A Impact of EMU, Asian crisis, Russian ruble crisis and internet bubble on bank equity return using the country index 
Austria 
EMU EMU  t-
stats 
Asian Crisis  Asian 
Crisis avg.  
t-stats 
Russian 
Crisis 
Russian 
crisis avg.  t-
stats 
Internet 
bubble 
Internet 
bubble avg, 
t-stats 
Avg. changes in 
systematic risk  
Avg. t stat 
Banks -0.0066 0.0025 0.0023 0.455 -0.00498 -0.5275 -0.0032 -0.7425 -0.1576 -0.9150 
EW portfolio -0.0082 -1.5 0.0004 0.04 -0.0037 -0.21 -0.0061 -0.7 -0.0783 -1.2100 
MV portfolio -0.0037 -0.53 0.0019 0.12 -0.0007 -0.03 -0.0122 -0.59 0.1965 1.6900* 
Belgium           
Banks -0.0017 -0.17 -0.00375 -0.26 -0.00408 0.0375 -0.01815 -1.05 -0.1101 -0.5750 
EW portfolio -0.0015 -0.36 -0.0043 -0.34 -0.0029 -0.21 -0.0182 -2.22 -0.1257 -1.2000 
MV portfolio -0.0032 -0.49 -0.005 -0.44 -0.0043 -0.29 -0.0061 -0.75 -0.0704 -0.4800 
Finland           
Banks 0.0149 0.326 0.03698 0.834 -0.03976 -0.482 0.0724 0.342 -0.0975 -0.5200 
EW portfolio 0.0043 0.28 0.0258 1.48 -0.0396 -1.73 0.0608 1.31 -0.1210 -0.7800 
MV portfolio 0.0148 0.94 0.0346 1.48 -0.0415 -1.78 0.0101 0.53 -0.4037 -2.1600** 
France           
Banks 0.0275 1.9083 0.016 0.685 0.0251 1.04 -0.0254 -0.9383 -0.5913 -1.9850** 
EW portfolio 0.0275 3.77 0.019 1.52 0.0212 1.07 -0.0221 -1.86 -0.5692 -4.0500*** 
MV portfolio 0.0333 2.75 0.0317 1.7 0.0171 0.54 -0.0401 -1.83 -0.7195 -2.89*** 
Germany           
Banks 0.0090 0.7045 0.0113 0.2018 0.0168 0.7036 -0.0095 -0.3173 0.0048 -0.3282 
EW portfolio 0.0077 1.3400 0.0098 0.8900 0.0171 1.5900 -0.0095 -0.4900 0.0006 0.0100 
MV portfolio 0.0154 2.1200 0.0068 0.3800 0.0413 2.3400 -0.0160 -0.5600 -0.0929 -0.7900 
Greece           
Banks -0.0087 -0.419 0.0112 0.041 -0.0480 -0.884 -0.037 -0.531 0.1989 0.49 
EW portfolio -0.0087 -0.88 0.0112 0.38 -0.048 -1.52 -0.0374 -1.62 0.1989 1.24 
MV portfolio -0.0085 -1.17 -0.0124 -0.5 -0.0597 -2.19 0.0112 0.81 -0.1488 -1.39 
Ireland           
Banks 0.0020 0.2325 0.0165 0.6600 -0.0405 -1.0950 -0.0254 -0.6325 -0.1816 -0.7675 
EW portfolio 0.0020 0.2600 0.0165 0.8800 -0.0405 -1.1400 -0.0254 -0.6700 -0.1816 -1.1100 
MV portfolio -0.0030 -0.360 0.0167 0.8800 -0.0495 -1.1200 -0.0303 -0.6500 -0.1820 -1.1000 
Italy           
Banks 0.0102 0.7715 0.0540 1.3527 -0.0334 -0.7873 -0.0004 -0.2900 0.0947 0.1327 
EW portfolio 0.0099 1.7800 0.0536 2.6600 -0.0334 -1.6200 -0.0023 -0.1900 0.1034 1.0700 
MV portfolio 0.0042 0.7500 0.0409 4.0200 -0.0210 -1.8200 -0.0110 -0.3600 0.0480 0.5200 
Netherlands           
Banks 0.0049 0.2633 0.0064 0.2967 -0.0341 -1.1200 -0.0388 -1.4200 -0.1358 -0.4933 
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EW portfolio 0.0049 0.5000 0.0064 0.4800 -0.0341 -1.0700 -0.0388 -1.4900 -0.1358 -0.7500 
MV portfolio 0.0067 0.6200 0.0128 0.9600 -0.0580 -2.2200 -0.0563 -2.7200 -0.0612 -0.2900 
Portugal           
Banks 0.0163 1.4360 0.0507 1.4560 -0.0242 -0.9520 -0.0200 -0.5920 -0.3975 -2.1560** 
EW portfolio 0.0158 2.4900 0.0515 2.1700 -0.0251 -0.9600 -0.0130 -0.7000 -0.4052 -3.8700*** 
MV portfolio 0.0054 0.8300 0.0412 2.1400 -0.0345 -1.8900 -0.0271 -1.0300 -0.2955 -2.4900** 
Spain           
Banks 0.0010 0.2486 0.0142 0.4757 -0.0249 -0.6350 -0.0055 -0.3221 -0.1983 -1.5207 
EW portfolio 0.0009 0.1600 0.0142 0.7600 -0.0249 -1.3000 -0.0055 -0.4100 -0.1983 -1.8300* 
MV portfolio 0.0060 0.9500 0.0098 0.6000 -0.0008 -0.0500 -0.0065 -0.7600 -0.1785 -1.8100* 
 
Panel B Impact of EMU, Asian crisis, Russian ruble crisis and internet bubble on bank equity return using the world index 
Austria 
EMU EMU  t-stats Asian Crisis  Asian 
Crisis avg. 
t-stats 
Russian 
Crisis 
Russian 
crisis avg.  t-
stats 
Internet 
bubble 
Internet 
bubble avg, 
t-stats 
Avg. changes in 
systematic risk  
Avg. t stat 
Banks -0.0013 1.0325 0.0084 0.7450 -0.0065 -0.6050 -0.0046 -0.9100 -0.2016 -0.6875 
EW portfolio 0.0013 0.2100 0.0102 1.0600 -0.0081 -0.4200 -0.0111 -1.5900 -0.2024 -1.8700* 
MV portfolio 0.0137 1.7400 0.0155 1.1200 -0.0074 -0.3300 -0.0255 -1.7400 -0.1429 -0.8700 
Belgium           
Banks -0.0101 -0.7250 0.0079 0.4125 -0.0493 -1.6975 -0.0524 -1.9650 -0.0270 -0.3200 
EW portfolio -0.0084 -1.1100 0.0093 0.7400 -0.0488 -2.6200 -0.0524 -2.1000 -0.0386 -0.2300 
MV portfolio -0.0125 -1.2300 0.0126 1.0200 -0.0638 -3.2000 -0.0520 -1.6600 0.0940 0.4200 
Finland           
Banks 0.01378 0.428 0.04026 0.852 -0.0325 0.024 0.0803 0.51 0.0734 -0.3420 
EW portfolio 0.0047 0.32 0.0292 1.65 -0.0307 -1.3 0.0678 1.47 -0.0646 -0.2000 
MV portfolio 0.0182 1.15 0.043 1.71 -0.0157 -0.53 0.0271 1.63 -0.7374 -1.8200* 
France           
Banks 0.0307 1.8533 0.0324 1.1750 0.0119 0.4767 -0.0137 -0.5450 -0.6961 -2.1167** 
EW portfolio 0.0304 3.0800 0.0344 2.1400 0.0087 0.6000 -0.0115 -1.0700 -0.6678 -3.93*** 
MV portfolio 0.0376 2.5000 0.0542 2.3900 -0.0012 -0.0600 -0.0219 -0.8600 -0.8487 -3.43*** 
Germany           
Banks 0.0075 0.4909 0.0224 0.6409 -0.0076 -0.1391 0.0029 -0.0027 0.3149 0.6818 
EW portfolio 0.0059 0.7700 0.0209 1.4000 -0.0079 -0.4900 0.0029 0.1900 0.3225 1.6100 
MV portfolio 0.0128 1.1700 0.0269 1.0800 -0.0035 -0.1100 0.0044 0.1200 0.4292 1.5900 
Greece           
Banks -0.0043 -0.1570 0.0345 0.4310 -0.0088 -0.1210 -0.1212 -3.2790 -0.2674 -0.5040 
EW portfolio -0.0043 -0.2800 0.0345 0.5000 -0.0088 -0.1200 -0.1212 -7.2600 -0.2674 -0.6500 
MV portfolio -0.0098 -0.5300 0.0211 0.2700 -0.0159 -0.2000 -0.0724 -3.7200 -0.3525 -0.7600 
Ireland           
Banks 0.0041 0.4050 0.0479 1.7050 -0.0425 -1.2325 -0.0379 -0.8575 -0.2569 -0.8125 
EW portfolio 0.0041 0.4700 0.0479 1.9500 -0.0425 -1.6900 -0.0378 -0.9000 -0.2568 -1.0700 
MV portfolio -0.0004 -0.0400 0.0491 2.0400 -0.0506 -1.7600 -0.0433 -0.8600 -0.2905 -1.1600 
Italy           
Banks 0.0153 1.0123 0.0799 1.7212 -0.0213 -0.4092 0.0136 -0.0569 0.0269 -0.1792 
EW portfolio 0.0150 1.7000 0.0799 2.5300 -0.0217 -0.7000 0.0117 0.4100 0.0529 0.3200 
MV portfolio 0.0147 1.3000 0.0776 2.6200 0.0030 0.1100 0.0087 0.1800 -0.2905 -1.3500 
Netherlands           
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Banks -0.0017 -0.2033 0.0121 0.41 -0.0652 -2.793 -0.0320 -1.057 -0.0344 -0.0733 
EW portfolio -0.0017 -0.16 0.0121 0.66 -0.0651 -4 -0.032 -1.67 -0.0344 -0.1700 
MV portfolio -0.0024 -0.19 0.0202 0.91 -0.0968 -4.61 -0.0482 -2.08 0.1950 0.7700 
Portugal           
Banks 0.0174 1.3060 0.0823 2.2620 -0.0313 -0.8040 -0.0132 -0.6700 -0.5073 -1.9100** 
EW portfolio 0.0166 1.6300 0.0826 3.0100 -0.0327 -1.1900 -0.0064 -0.3500 -0.5151 -2.8600*** 
MV portfolio 0.0075 0.6800 0.0763 3.4400 -0.0397 -1.5100 -0.0171 -1.1300 -0.5384 -2.70*** 
Spain           
Banks -0.0004 0.0814 0.0181 0.5857 0.0000 -0.0243 -0.0069 -0.3893 -0.3080 -1.4721 
EW portfolio -0.0004 -0.0600 0.0181 0.7700 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0069 -1.1100 -0.3080 -1.9400** 
MV portfolio 0.0056 0.5400 0.0159 0.6400 0.0476 1.7200 -0.0081 -0.4200 -0.5238 -2.2700** 
 
Panel C Impact of EMU, Asian crisis, Russian ruble crisis and internet bubble on bank equity return using Europe index 
Austria 
EMU EMU t-stats Asian crisis  Asian 
crisis avg. 
t-stats 
Russian crisis Russian crisis 
avg.  t-stats 
Internet 
bubble 
Internet 
bubble avg, t-
stats 
Avg. changes in 
systematic risk  
Avg. t stat 
Banks -0.0011 0.9350 0.0055 0.5925 -0.0074 -0.6700 -0.0047 -0.8925 -0.2182 -0.8275 
EW portfolio 0.0019 0.3600 0.0058 0.6600 -0.0084 -0.3600 -0.0116 -1.7500 -0.2581 -3.38*** 
MV portfolio 0.0146 2.0400 0.0096 0.6700 -0.0075 -0.2600 -0.0271 -1.9200 -0.2346 -1.6600 
Belgium           
Banks -0.0084 -0.7050 -0.0025 -0.195 -0.0493 -1.5200 -0.0595 -2.1950 -0.1069 -0.5675 
EW portfolio -0.0070 -1.1600 -0.0016 -0.12 -0.0489 -3.710 -0.0595 -2.4300 -0.1190 -0.7600 
MV portfolio -0.0108 -1.2100 -0.0003 -0.020 -0.0635 -5.5700 -0.0619 -2.0100 0.0009 0.0000 
Finland           
Banks 0.0168 0.518 0.03182 0.556 -0.02854 -0.088 0.07384 0.272 -0.0324 -0.4740 
EW portfolio 0.0068 0.48 0.0204 1.1 -0.027 -1.84 0.0622 1.55 -0.1394 -0.5000 
MV portfolio 0.0192 1.39 0.0264 0.81 -0.0193 -0.43 0.0209 0.96 -0.7722 -2.0400*** 
France           
Banks 0.0335 2.2517 0.0149 0.6083 0.0124 0.7067 -0.0180 -0.6800 -0.8871 -2.5817*** 
EW portfolio 0.0329 4.1300 0.0182 1.5300 0.0091 0.3900 -0.0153 -1.3800 -0.8409 -4.7500*** 
MV portfolio 0.0410 3.2400 0.0308 1.5600 -0.0011 -0.0300 -0.0288 -1.2800 -1.0862 -3.8100*** 
Germany           
Banks 0.0083 0.6164 0.0146 0.3500 -0.0081 -0.2582 -0.0041 -0.2745 0.2092 0.4609 
EW portfolio 0.0070 1.1000 0.0131 0.9500 -0.0079 -0.6000 -0.0041 -0.3200 0.2048 1.3300 
MV portfolio 0.0150 1.8400 0.0121 0.5400 -0.0033 -0.1500 -0.0071 -0.3100 0.1977 1.0400 
Greece           
Banks -0.0061 -0.2310 0.0237 0.2860 -0.0167 -0.2070 -0.1308 -3.6860 -0.0985 -0.1890 
EW portfolio -0.0061 -0.4000 0.0236 0.3300 -0.0167 -0.2300 -0.1308 -6.2800 -0.0985 -0.2500 
MV portfolio -0.0090 -0.5500 0.0051 0.0600 -0.0194 -0.2400 -0.0818 -5.1200 -0.3771 -0.9100 
Ireland           
Banks 0.0015 0.2075 0.0403 1.4575 -0.0524 -1.5575 -0.0427 -0.8275 -0.1630 -0.5200 
EW portfolio 0.0015 0.1400 0.0403 1.7100 -0.0524 -2.0800 -0.0427 -0.8600 -0.1630 -0.6500 
MV portfolio -0.0033 -0.3100 0.0412 1.7600 -0.0615 -2.1100 -0.0483 -0.8300 -0.1883 -0.7500 
Italy           
Banks 0.0183 1.2750 0.0671 1.5246 -0.0183 -0.4038 0.0065 -0.2446 -0.1757 -0.7700 
EW portfolio 0.0180 2.3500 0.0671 2.4000 -0.0185 -0.5600 0.0046 0.2600 -0.1571 -0.9500 
MV portfolio 0.0167 1.7600 0.0600 2.5500 0.0021 0.0600 -0.0016 -0.0500 -0.3803 -2.0900** 
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Netherlands           
Banks 0.0002 -0.1433 -0.0033 -0.287 -0.0656 -2.2200 -0.0415 -1.2033 -0.1805 -0.6733 
EW portfolio 0.0002 0.0200 -0.0033 -0.20 -0.0656 -2.3900 -0.0415 -1.4900 -0.1805 -0.8400 
MV portfolio -0.0007 -0.0600 0.0036 0.1700 -0.0982 -4.2400 -0.0604 -2.1500 0.0366 0.1300 
Portugal           
Banks 0.0189 1.438 0.07012 1.988 -0.032 -1.116 -0.01656 -0.888 -0.6107 -2.658*** 
EW portfolio 0.0182 1.95 0.0707 2.84 -0.0329 -1.35 -0.0096 -0.48 -0.6130 -3.88*** 
MV portfolio 0.0077 0.78 0.0636 2.92 -0.0437 -2.14 -0.0221 -1.22 -0.5528 -3.72*** 
Spain            
Banks 0.0002 0.1507 0.0083 0.2857 -0.0022 -0.1393 -0.0111 -0.5529 -0.3553 -1.6943* 
EW portfolio 0.0002 0.0300 0.0083 0.3700 -0.0022 -0.0800 -0.0111 -1.2900 -0.3553 -2.82*** 
MV portfolio 0.0053 0.6700 -0.0012 -0.05 0.0407 1.0900 -0.0170 -1.3200 -0.5243 -2.88*** 
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Table A5.4  
Estimates of systematic risk and total risk of FTSE world bank indices 
This table reports the average systematic risk (β) for the full sample period and the pre euro period and changes in systematic risk using the world index and the Europe index 
respectively after the introduction of euro. The standard market model is used to measure the systematic risk:
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  where, itR  is the return of individual 
security at time period t, 
mtR
 is the return on an index at time period t. The systematic risk estimate of each bank or portfolio of banks is captured by 
iβ (systematic risk) and itε  is a 
random shock term. The market model in equation (1) is extended by introducing a dummy variable to capture the structural changes in systematic risk. The dummy variable takes 
on a value of zero (0) for the month of January 1995 to December 1998 and a value of one (1) from January 1999 to April 
2006. ( ) ( ) tmtprepostmtpreprepostpret DRRDR εβββααα +−++−+=  where, D =0 pre Euro period January 1995 - December 1998 and D =1 post Euro January 1999 –April 2006. The 
following model is applied on individual bank return to estimate the total risk. 2
1
2 )(/1 RRN tNtri −∑= =σ where, 2riσ  is the variance of the return for bank i, Ri return of bank i and R  
average return of bank i.*Significant at 10% significance level.** Significant at 5% significance level.***Significant at 1% significance level. 
 
  World  index   Europe   index  Total Risk  
Bank indices Systematic  
risk (β) 
t -stat Changes in 
β 
t-stat Systematic  
risk (β) 
t -stat Changes  
in β 
t-stat Pre euro Post  euro F test 
Austria 0.751 4.59 -0.6658 -1.97 0.74 5.33 -0.8733 -3.06 0.0097 0.0051 0.0088*** 
Belgium 1.017 8.67 0.2099 0.84 1.04 11.37 0.0941 0.48 0.0041 0.0048 0.5389 
Finland 0.798 5.15 -0.9340 -2.89 0.72 5.33 -0.8545 -3.04 0.0112 0.0036 0.0000*** 
France 1.398 10.14 -0.6609 -2.30 1.37 12.78 -0.8878 -4.12 0.0115 0.0052 0.0012*** 
Germany 1.635 12.11 0.4749 1.67 1.58 15.52 0.1835 0.841 0.0068 0.0092 0.2664 
Greece 1.213 6.08 -0.9074 -1.80 1.15 6.78 -0.8105 -1.85 0.0358 0.0079 0.0010*** 
Ireland 1.049 7.98 -0.3719 -1.33 0.87 7.35 -0.2863 -1.14 0.0050 0.0057 0.6150 
Italy 1.270 9.69 -0.2288 -0.82 1.32 13.64 -0.4498 -2.20 0.0088 0.0048 0.0163** 
Netherlands 1.494 11.48 0.1120 0.40 1.44 14.35 -0.0458 -0.211 0.0082 0.0068 0.4722 
Portugal 0.7464 5.84 -0.2964 -0.93 0.72 6.72 -0.4179 -1.52 0.0121 0.0031 0.0020*** 
Spain 1.5160 14.97 -0.4066 -1.89 1.42 18.63 -0.4108 -2.55 0.0079 0.0048 0.0474** 
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Table A5.5 
Banks versus non-bank risk individual country analysis using Europe index 
The change in country bank equity risk and non-bank equity risk are reported for both the euro-zone and the non euro-
zone countries. Pre-EMU period along with the change in total risk, idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk that occurred 
with EMU are reported in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C respectively. Total risk is defined: 2
1
2 )(/1 RRN tNtri −∑= =σ  
where 2
riσ  is the variance of the return for bank i, Ri return of bank i and R  average bank i return. Idiosyncratic risk is 
defined as 2222
rmri σβσσ ε −=  where 2riσ  is the total risk for bank i , 2εσ  bank return idiosyncratic risk and 22 rmσβ  
reflects the impact of systematic risk. The standard market model is used to measure systematic 
risk:
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  (see equation (4)) where, itR  is the return on security i at time period t, mtR  is the return 
on an equity market index at time period t. The systematic risk estimate for each bank or portfolio of banks is 
iβ (systematic risk) and itε  is a random shock term. The market model is extended by introducing a dummy variable to 
capture the structural changes in systematic risk. The dummy variable (D) takes on a value of zero (0) for the months of 
January 1995 to December 1998 and a value of one (1) from January 1999 to April 
2006. ( ) ( ) ittmtprepostmtpretprepostpreit DRRDR εβββααα +−++−+=  *** significant at 1% significance level.** significant 
at 5% significance level.* significant at 10% significance level 
 
Panel A: Estimation of total risk  
   Non banking sector     Banking sector 
 Pre 
EMU 
Post 
EMU 
Difference F-test Pre 
EMU 
Post 
EMU 
Difference F-test 
Euro zone         
Austria 0.0028 0.0018 -0.001 0.073* 0.0046 0.0028 -0.0018 0.050** 
Belgium 0.0016 0.0013 -0.0003 0.375 0.0040 0.0041 0.0001 0.903 
Finland 0.0062 0.0108 0.0046 0.042** 0.0112 0.0036 -0.0076 .0000*** 
France 0.0027 0.0029 0.0002 0.85 0.0119 0.0046 -0.0073 0.000*** 
Germany 0.0026 0.0040 0.0014 0.105 0.0051 0.0060 0.0009 0.570 
Greece 0.0069 0.0050 -0.0019 0.2068 0.0163 0.0075 -0.0088 0.002*** 
Ireland 0.0021 0.0039 0.0018 0.017*** 0.0070 0.0037 -0.0033 0.012*** 
Italy 0.0056 0.0030 -0.0026 0.013*** 0.0047 0.0052 0.0005 0.723 
Netherlands 0.0023 0.0025 0.0002 0.765 0.0064 0.0061 -0.0003 0.829 
Portugal 0.0043 0.0027 -0.0016 0.064* 0.0047 0.0018 -0.0029 0.002*** 
Spain 0.0033 0.0025 -0.0008 0.284 0.0068 0.0037 -0.0031 0.016*** 
Non euro zone         
Denmark 0.0025 0.0034 0.0009 0.275 0.0037 0.0033 -0.0004 0.612 
Norway 0.0039 0.0034 -0.0005 0.587 0.0059 0.0042 -0.0017 0.176 
Sweden 0.0034 0.0060 0.0026 0.033** 0.0063 0.0031 -0.0032 0.003*** 
Switzerland 0.0022 0.0012 -0.001 0.009* 0.0124 0.0043 -0.0081 .0000*** 
United 
Kingdom 
0.0009 0.0015 0.0006 0.061* 0.0045 0.0038 -0.0007 0.472 
 
Panel B: Estimation of idiosyncratic risk  
Non banking sector     Banking sector 
 Pre euro Post euro Difference F-test Pre euro Post euro Difference F-test 
Euro zone         
Austria 0.0010 0.0014 0.0004 0.2087 0.0031 0.0024 -0.0007 0.3482 
Belgium 0.0006 0.0008 0.0002 0.2453 0.0021 0.0020 -0.0001 0.9080 
Finland 0.0032 0.0060 0.0028 0.0197*** 0.0079 0.0032 -0.0047 0.0003*** 
France 0.0006 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0004*** 0.0037 0.0021 -0.0016 0.0197*** 
Germany 0.0006 0.0006 0 0.7465 0.0017 0.0020 0.0003 0.4521 
Greece 0.0047 0.0039 -0.0008 0.4933 0.0119 0.0054 -0.0065 0.0014*** 
Ireland 0.0009 0.0023 0.0014 0.0009*** 0.0029 0.0015 -0.0014 0.0045*** 
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Italy 0.0025 0.0011 -0.0014 0.0009*** 0.0028 0.0041 0.0013 0.1334 
Netherlands 0.0005 0.0005 0 0.9579 0.0025 0.0020 -0.0005 0.3944 
Portugal 0.0018 0.0016 -0.0002 0.5758 0.0024 0.0014 -0.001 0.0278** 
Spain 0.0012 0.0011 -0.0001 0.6514 0.0019 0.0010 -0.0009 0.0062*** 
Non euro 
zone 
        
Denmark 0.0009 0.0019 0.001 0.0043** 0.0018 0.0027 0.0009 0.1193 
Norway 0.0020 0.0016 -0.0004 0.3553 0.0037 0.0033 -0.0004 0.6347 
Sweden 0.0014 0.0018 0.0004 0.3000 0.0033 0.0018 -0.0015 0.0114*** 
Switzerland 0.0006 0.0004 -0.0002 0.1206 0.0057 0.0015 -0.0042 0.0000*** 
United 
Kingdom 
0.0002 0.0002 0 0.9779 0.0021 0.0019 -0.0002 0.7189 
 
Panel C: Estimation of systematic risk  
Non banking sector     Banking sector 
 Changes in β t- stats Changes in β t- stats 
Euro zone     
Austria -0.524 -4.090*** -0.454 -1.440 
Belgium -0.244 -2.160** 0.012 0.060 
Finland 0.255 0.880 -0.855 -3.030*** 
France 0.076 0.730 -0.943 -3.130*** 
Germany 0.269 2.610*** 0.035 0.170 
Greece -0.343 -1.240 -0.501 -1.300 
Ireland 0.114 0.670 -0.389 -1.740* 
Italy -0.296 -1.550 -0.283 -1.020 
Netherlands 0.014 0.140 -0.025 -0.090 
Portugal -0.393 -1.930** -0.642 -3.470*** 
Spain -0.203 -1.300 -0.433 -2.080** 
Non-euro zone     
Denmark -0.081 -0.630 -0.456 -2.300** 
Norway -0.056 -0.230 -0.396 -0.930 
Sweden 0.389 2.490*** -0.456 -2.430** 
Switzerland -0.311 -2.970*** -0.675 -1.580 
United Kingdom 0.183 2.350** -0.172 -0.840 
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Table A5.6 
Banks versus non-financial sector risk – Europe wide analysis 
The table presents the Europe wide analysis of the change in country bank equity risk and non-bank equity risk. Pre-EMU period along with the change in total risk, idiosyncratic 
risk and systematic risk that occurred with EMU are reported in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C respectively. Total risk is defined: 2
1
2 )(/1 RRN tNtri −∑= =σ  where 2riσ  is the variance 
of the return for bank i, Ri return of bank i and R  average bank i return. Idiosyncratic risk is defined as 2222
rmri σβσσ ε −=  where 2riσ  is the total risk for bank i , 2εσ  bank 
return idiosyncratic risk and 22
rmσβ  reflects the impact of systematic risk. The standard market model is used to measure systematic risk: itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  (see equation 
(4)) where, 
itR  is the return on security i at time period t, mtR  is the return on an equity market index at time period t. The systematic risk estimate for each bank or portfolio of 
banks is 
iβ (systematic risk) and itε  is a random shock term. The market model is extended by introducing a dummy variable to capture the structural changes in systematic risk. 
The dummy variable (D) takes on a value of zero (0) for the months of January 1995 to December 1998 and a value of one (1) from January 1999 to April 
2006. ( ) ( ) ittmtprepostmtpretprepostpreit DRRDR εβββααα +−++−+=   
*** significant at 1% significance level.** significant at 5% significance level.  
 
Total risk   Idiosyncratic risk  Systematic risk 
MSCI Indexes Pre-EMU Post-EMU Difference F test Pre-EMU Post-EMU Difference F test Changes 
in β 
t-stats 
Europe Index           
Non Financial Sector 0.0014 0.0023 0.0009 0.054** 0.0003 0.0005 0.0002 0.261 0.205 2.66*** 
Banking sector 0.0039 0.0032 -0.007 0.372 0.0010 0.0009 -0.0001 0.790 -0.198 -1.28 
World Index           
Non Financial Sector 0.0014 0.0023 .0009 0.054** 0.0006 0.0007 0.0001 0.645 0.287 2.68*** 
Banking sector 0.0039 0.0032 -0.007 0.370 0.0019 0.0012 -0.0007 0.052** -0.040 -0.210 
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Table A5.7 
Bank equity risk excluding Italian savings banks 
This table reports results of tests for change in bank equity total and idiosyncratic risk. The average of individual bank 
total risk estimates for pre EMU and post EMU periods for each country are reported in Panel A along with counts of 
the number of statistically significant individual bank total risk estimate changes. F tests is used to estimate the change 
in variance. Similar results are reported in Panel B for individual bank idiosyncratic risk estimates. N is the total 
number of banks that are included in risk calculations for the country. N* is the number of banks with a decrease in 
total risk. N** is the total number of banks with a statistically significant decrease in risk. N+ is the number of banks 
with an increase in total risk and N++ is the number of banks with a statistically significant increase in total risk at the 
5% level of significance. Total risk is defined: 2
1
2 )(/1 RRN tNtri −∑= =σ  where 2riσ  is the variance of the return for bank 
i, Ri return of bank i and R  average bank i return.  Idiosyncratic risk is defined as 2222
rmri σβσσ ε −=  where 2riσ  
is the total risk for bank i , 2
εσ  bank return idiosyncratic risk and 
22
rmσβ  reflects the impact of systematic risk. Panel C 
presents the average individual bank systematic risk estimates (β) are reported by country for both the euro-zone and 
the non euro-zone countries. The β estimates are reported for total sample period and pre-EMU period along with the 
change in systematic risk that occurred with EMU in Panel A. These estimates are calculated using country equity 
market indices for individual banks. Panel D presents the estimates of equity risk for equally weighted (equal wgt.) and 
market value weighted (MV wgt.) portfolios. + Statistically significant at the 10% level of significance, * statistically 
significant at the 5% level of significance.  
Panel A Estimates of total risk for individual banks using country index 
 Pre EMU 
(avg.) 
Post 
EMU 
(avg.) 
N N* N** N+ N++ 
Austria  0.004 0.002 5 4 3 0 0 
Belgium  0.005 0.006 3 1 0 2 1 
Finland  0.027 0.033 6 5 4 1 0 
France  0.010 0.004 7 5 5 1 1 
Germany  0.044 0.013 11 1 0 9 6 
Greece  0.023 0.018 9 8 4 2 1 
Ireland  0.005 0.006 4 0 0 4 0 
Italy  0.012 0.007 22 18 15 4 - 
Netherlands 0.008 0.007 4 3 1 0 0 
Portugal 0.009 0.004 6 5 4 0 0 
Spain  0.007 0.003 14 14 11 0 0 
Total   91 64 47 23 9 
 
Panel B Estimates of idiosyncratic risk for individual banks using country index 
 Pre EMU 
(avg.) 
Post 
EMU 
(avg.) 
N N* N** N+ N++ 
Austria  0.002 0.001 5 5 2 0 0 
Belgium  0.003 0.003 3 2 1 0 0 
Finland  0.024 0.032 6 4 2 2 0 
France 0.006 0.003 7 5 5 2 1 
Germany  0.003 0.010 11 2 1 9 7 
Greece  0.013 0.001 9 5 3 4 2 
Ireland  0.003 0.004 4 0 0 4 0 
Italy  0.007 0.005 22 16 12 6 3 
Netherlands  0.004 0.004 4 2 1 2 0 
Portugal 0.005 0.003 6 4 3 1 0 
Spain  0.004 0.002 14 13 11 1 1 
Total   91 58 41 31 14 
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Panel C Estimates of systematic risk for individual banks using country index 
 
 
Full period 
Average β 
Pre-EMU 
period 
Average β 
 
Average 
changes in β 
 
N N* N** N+ N++ 
Austria  0.25 0.31 -0.12 5 4 2 1 0 
Belgium  0.94 1.01 -0.11 3 1 1 2 0 
Finland  0.17 0.49 -0.34 6 4 3 2 0 
France  0.63 0.93 -0.48 7 5 4 2 0 
Germany  0.56 0.56 0.01 11 7 3 4 1 
Greece  1.11 0.99 0.22 9 3 1 6 1 
Ireland  0.94 1.10 -0.23 4 4 0 0 0 
Italy 0.82 0.80 0.04 22 12 8 10 5 
Netherlands  0.99 0.86 0.03 4 3 0 1 0 
Portugal  0.64 0.90 -0.45 6 6 3 0 0 
Spain  0.51 0.62 -0.21 14 11 4 3 0 
Total listed 
bank shares 
   91 60 29 31 7 
 
Panel D Excluding Italian bank portfolios 
 
Total risk    Idiosyncratic risk    Systematic risk 
 
Pre 
EMU 
Post 
EMU 
Difference F test Pre 
EMU 
Post 
EMU 
Difference F test Changes t- stats 
EW 
wgt. 
0.006 0.003 -0.003 0.0118** 0.002 0.0008 -0.0008 0.003*** 0.0702 0.540 
MV 
wgt. 
0.009 0.005 -0.004 0.013** 0.001 0.0011 0.0000 0.990 -0.000 -
0.0003 
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Table A6.1 
Determinants of bank risk-Asia-Pacific region 
The table represents the cross-country results for the determinants of bank equity risk and credit risk. Panel A through 
to Panel E reports the results. The standard market model is used to measure systematic 
risk:
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  where, itR  is the return on security i at time period t, mtR  is the return on an equity 
market index at time period t. The systematic risk estimate for each bank is 
iβ (systematic risk) and itε  is a random 
shock term. The table presents the pooled-OLS regression, pooled-OLS regression with lagged value of bank capital 
and lagged value of bank charter value  and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression results to estimate the model of 
bank risk. 
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The explanatory variables such as 
tjiUD ,,
is the natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at period t , 
tjiCV ,,  is the natural log of charter value for bank i , country j in period t tjiBC ,,  is the natural log of bank capital for 
bank i , in country j  in period t , tjiBC ,,2  is the natural log of bank capital squared for bank i , in country j  in period t , 
tjiOBS ,,  is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiLTA ,, is the loan to total 
assets for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiSize ,, is the natural log of market value of equity for bank i , in country j , 
in period t and 
tjEFI ,
 is the economic freedom index for country j  at period t . jD1  = bank specialization dummy 
where jD1 =1 if commercial banks or otherwise 0; jD2  = legal origin variable where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 
2 if French civil law countries, 3 if German civil-law countries and 4 if Scandinavian civil law countries; tjBNC,  = 
Bank concentration for country j  at period t ; 
tjNIM .  = Net interest margin for country j  at period t ; tjSTurn .  = 
Stock market turnover ratio for country j  at period t ;  
tjDIN .  = explicit deposit insurance dummy =1, otherwise=0; 
tjMB .  = market based country dummy =1, otherwise=0; tjHI .  = High income country dummy =1, otherwise=0; Finally, 
ti,ε  is the random error term. The joint F-test for the year dummies are statistically significant for all risk measures. All 
results are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † indicates the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
Panel A Determinants of Systematic Risk 
    Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag  2SLS 
Intercept -1.161 
(0.219) 
-0.174 
(0.262) 
-0.266 
(0.244) 
-0.043 
(0.390) 
-0.205 
(0.290) 
0.576 
(0.919) 
Bank capital -0.014 -0.036 0.004 0.369 0.029 1.362 
 (0.064) (0.257) (0.068) (0.412) (0.095) (1.334) 
Bank capital squared - -0.008 - 0.140 - 0.526 
 - (0.098) - (0.146) - (0.509) 
Charter value -1.311*** -1.309*** -0.185 -0.180 -0.819 -0.902 
 (0.474) (0.474) (0.427) (0.421) (1.711) (1.763) 
Off balance sheet items -0.011 -0.011 -0.024 -0.024 -0.020 -0.015 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
Market discipline 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Size 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.061*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.015) 
Loan to total assets -0.254** -0.255** -0.326*** -0.309*** -0.322*** -0.243 
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 (0.121) (0.123) (0.128) (0.130) (0.143) (0.177) 
Bank concentration -0.048 -0.048 -0.088 -0.091 -0.043 -0.050 
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.111) 
Net interest margin -11.292*** -11.28*** -9.597*** -9.826*** -11.208*** -11.830*** 
 (1.577) (1.588) (1.359) (1.411) (1.730) (1.981) 
Stock market turnover 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.127*** 0.131*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Deposit insurance dummy 0.277** 0.277** 0.309*** 0.310*** 0.296*** 0.298*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.052) (0.052) (0.070) (0.071) 
Economic freedom index 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Market based dummy 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.147*** 0.145*** 0.141*** 0.132*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.054) 
Common law dummy 0.501*** 0.500*** 0.506*** 0.511*** 0.508*** 0.525*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.037) (0.041) 
Commercial bank dummy -0.186*** -0.187*** -0.145*** -0.137*** -0.135*** -0.108 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.069) 
High income economy dummy 0.029 0.029 0.044 0.047 0.023 0.028 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.067) (0.067) (0.070) (0.071) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.33 
F(25,1831)=40 
F(10,1831)=30 
- 
- 
1857 
0.33 
F(26,1830)=38 
F(10,1830)=30 
- 
- 
1857 
0.34 
F(25,1740)=39 
F(10,1740)=28 
- 
- 
1766 
0.34 
F(26,1739)=39 
F(10,1739)=28 
- 
- 
1766 
0.34 
F(26,1730)=39 
λ2(10)=270 
0.685 
0.681 
1756 
0.33 
F(26,1729)=36 
λ2(10)=266 
0.099* 
0.095* 
1756 
 
Panel B Determinants of Idiosyncratic Risk  
Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag   2SLS 
Intercept -3.340*** 
(0.227) 
-3.110*** 
(0.284) 
-3.404*** 
(0.225) 
-3.021*** 
(0.308) 
-3.605*** 
(0.256) 
-2.125*** 
(0.521) 
Bank capital -0.248*** 0.125 -0.313*** 0.314 -0.411*** 2.115*** 
 (0.063) (0.286) (0.063) (0.391) (0.083) (0.837) 
Bank capital squared - 0.144 - 0.241 - 0.997*** 
 - (0.109) - (0.155) - (0.339) 
Charter value -0.079 -0.109 0.247 0.257 1.511 1.352 
 (0.685) (0.677) (0.624) (0.616) (3.363) (3.415) 
Off balance sheet items 0.042* 0.043* 0.040* 0.040 0.040* 0.048* 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) 
Market discipline -0.019 -0.020 -0.023 -0.024 -0.026 -0.030* 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Size 0.012 0.013 0.006 0.008 0.000 0.009 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.026) (0.027) 
Loan to total assets -0.226* -0.208 -0.239* -0.211 -0.286 -0.136 
 (0.130) (0.133) (0.132) (0.134) (0.182) (0.205) 
Bank concentration 0.201* 0.198 0.133 0.127 0.152 0.139 
 (0.122) (0.122) (0.115) (0.115) (0.120) (0.121) 
Net interest margin 7.704*** 7.456*** 8.536*** 8.142*** 9.129*** 7.954*** 
 (1.768) (1.763) (1.500) (1.484) (2.209) (2.298) 
Stock market turnover 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.074*** 0.076*** 0.083*** 0.091*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) 
Deposit insurance dummy 0.107** 0.107*** 0.099*** 0.101* 0.139 0.142 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.054) (0.054) (0.111) (0.112) 
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Economic freedom index -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market based dummy -0.097** -0.100** -0.086** -0.090** -0.088*** -0.106** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.047) (0.046) 
Common law dummy -0.015 -0.010 -0.017 -0.008 -0.016 0.017 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.035) (0.035) (0.048) (0.052) 
Commercial bank dummy -0.181*** -0.173*** -0.142*** -0.128*** -0.164*** -0.112*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.050) (0.050) (0.057) (0.062) 
High income economy dummy -0.343*** -0.341*** -0.334*** -0.330*** -0.315*** -0.305*** 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.080) (0.080) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.32 
F(25,1830)=52 
F(10,1830)=11 
- 
- 
1856 
0.33 
F(26,1829)=50 
F(10,1829)=11 
- 
- 
1856 
0.34 
F(25,1739)=56 
F(10,1739)=13 
- 
- 
1765 
0.34 
F(26,1738)=54 
F(10,1738)=13 
- 
- 
1765 
0.32 
F(25,1729)=50 
λ2(10)=114*** 
4*** 
9*** 
1755 
0.30 
F(26,1728)=46 
λ2(10)=99*** 
5*** 
15*** 
1755 
 
Panel C Determinants of Total Risk  
    Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag   2SLS 
Intercept -3.806*** 
(0.220) 
-3.550*** 
(0.274) 
-3.945*** 
(0.220) 
-3.551*** 
(0.295) 
-4.119*** 
(0.252) 
-2.632*** 
(0.547) 
Bank capital -0.199*** 0.214 -0.276*** 0.368 -0.362*** 2.171*** 
 (0.061) (0.277) (0.060) (0.362) (0.084) (0.853) 
Bank capital squared  0.160  0.247*  0.999*** 
  (0.105)  (0.143)  (0.341) 
Charter value -0.381 -0.415 0.224 0.229 1.065 0.914 
 (0.491) (0.484) (0.627) (0.622) (2.607) (2.649) 
Off balance sheet items 0.015 0.016 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.019 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
Market discipline -0.009 -0.010 -0.014 -0.015 -0.016 -0.021 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Size 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.031 0.040* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.021) (0.022) 
Loan to total assets -0.287** -0.267** -0.338*** -0.309*** -0.384** -0.233 
 (0.132) (0.135) (0.134) (0.136) (0.183) (0.207) 
Bank concentration 0.243** 0.240** 0.172 0.166 0.203* 0.190 
 (0.122) (0.122) (0.115) (0.115) (0.119) (0.121) 
Net interest margin 4.379*** 4.102** 5.653*** 5.246*** 5.785*** 4.588** 
 (1.795) (1.788) (1.536) (1.520) (2.218) (2.319) 
Stock market turnover 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.128*** 0.136*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
Deposit insurance dummy 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.216*** 0.217*** 0.245*** 0.249*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.053) (0.053) (0.094) (0.095) 
Economic freedom index 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market based dummy -0.028 -0.031 -0.009 -0.013 -0.010 -0.029 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) 
Common law dummy 0.190*** 0.195*** 0.191*** 0.200*** 0.191*** 0.224*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.034) (0.034) (0.046) (0.050) 
Commercial bank dummy -0.166*** -0.158*** -0.127*** -0.112*** -0.143*** -0.091 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.054) (0.054) (0.058) (0.062) 
High income economy dummy -0.371*** -0.369*** -0.353*** -0.349*** -0.342*** -0.332*** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.075) (0.075) 
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R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.32 
F(25,1845)=47 
F(10,1845)=9 
 
- 
- 
1871 
0.32 
F(26,1844)=45 
F(10,1844)=9 
 
- 
- 
1871 
0.34 
F(25,1750)=50 
F(10,1750)=11 
 
- 
- 
1776 
0.34 
F(26,1749)=48 
F(10,1749)=11 
 
- 
- 
1776 
0.32 
F(25,1740)=46 
λ2(10)=98 
 
4*** 
9*** 
1766 
0.30 
F(26,1739)=42.6 
λ2(10)=84 
 
5*** 
15*** 
1766 
 
Panel D Determinants of Credit Risk (LLP)  
Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag   2SLS 
Intercept -2.326*** 
(0.276) 
-1.573*** 
(0.411) 
-2.061*** 
(0.293) 
-1.939*** 
(0.375) 
-2.004*** 
(0.329) 
-0.261*** 
(0.821) 
Bank capital -0.418*** 0.847 -0.283*** -0.083 -0.284*** 2.654** 
 (0.086) (0.543) (0.088) (0.377) (0.117) (1.227) 
Bank capital squared - 0.485*** - 0.077 - 1.152*** 
 - (0.214) - (0.140) - (0.471) 
Charter value -0.039 -0.102 -0.558** -0.555** -2.187** -2.356** 
 (0.273) (0.274) (0.292) (0.290) (1.148) (1.185) 
Off balance sheet items 0.066*** 0.069*** 0.063** 0.063** 0.068*** 0.078*** 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) 
Market discipline -0.017 -0.020 -0.022 -0.023 -0.020 -0.025 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
Size -0.017** -0.013* -0.022*** -0.021** -0.008 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) 
Loan to total assets 0.698*** 0.761*** 0.786*** 0.796** 0.814*** 1.008*** 
 (0.167) (0.166) (0.166) (0.168) (0.168) (0.186) 
Bank concentration -0.230** -0.243** -0.344*** -0.346** -0.214* -0.232** 
 (0.117) (0.116) (0.124) (0.123) (0.121) (0.121) 
Net interest margin 6.053*** 5.225*** 10.074*** 9.948*** 5.606*** 4.274** 
 (1.727) (1.739) (2.150) (2.201) (1.759) (1.906) 
Stock market turnover -0.012 -0.009 -0.003 -0.002 -0.012 -0.002 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
Deposit insurance dummy 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.177*** 0.177*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.050) (0.050) (0.054) (0.055) 
Economic freedom index -0.003 -0.003 -0.005** -0.005** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Market based dummy 0.056 0.043 0.089*** 0.087** 0.094** 0.066 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044) 
Common law dummy -0.093*** -0.077*** -0.108*** -0.105*** -0.081** -0.045 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.042) (0.045) 
Commercial bank dummy -0.205*** -0.176*** -0.215*** -0.210*** -0.194*** -0.125* 
 (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.058) (0.068) 
High income economy dummy -0.182*** -0.177*** -0.133** -0.132** -0.180*** -0.171*** 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.065) (0.065) (0.063) (0.065) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.24 
F(25,1843)=23 
F(10,1843)=16 
- 
- 
1869 
0.25 
F(26,1842)=22 
F(10,1842)=16 
- 
- 
1869 
0.27 
F(25,1667)=23 
F(10,1667)=17 
- 
- 
1693 
0.27 
F(26,1666)=22 
F(10,1666)=17 
- 
 
1693 
0.24 
F(25,1657)=23 
λ2(10)=136 
2.84** 
5.755** 
1683 
0.23 
F(26,1656)=22 
λ2(10)=119 
2.1* 
6.52* 
1683 
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Panel E Credit Risk (LLR) 
Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag    2SLS 
Intercept -1.843*** 
(0.205) 
-0.707* 
(0.417) 
-2.061*** 
(0.213) 
-1.237*** 
(0.372) 
-1.937*** 
(0.251) 
0.668 
(0.749) 
Bank capital -0.112* 1.750*** -0.161*** 1.208** -0.167* 4.345*** 
 (0.066) (0.681) (0.069) (0.555) (0.095) (1.287) 
Bank capital squared - 0.721*** - 0.528*** - 1.788*** 
 - (0.278) - (0.222) - (0.510) 
Charter value 1.107** 1.006** 0.183 0.231 2.088 1.840 
 (0.540) (0.507) (0.321) (0.318) (3.381) (3.437) 
Off balance sheet items -0.002 0.002 -0.012 -0.011 -0.005 0.011 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) 
Market discipline -0.001 -0.004 -0.006 -0.008 -0.009 -0.017 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Size -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.004 -0.012 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.023) (0.025) 
Loan to total assets 0.284*** 0.373*** 0.256** 0.321** 0.169 0.443*** 
 (0.113) (0.109) (0.129) (0.127) (0.156) (0.192) 
Bank concentration 0.301*** 0.287*** 0.248*** 0.235*** 0.277*** 0.261*** 
 (0.098) (0.094) (0.102) (0.102) (0.115) (0.109) 
Net interest margin 4.499*** 3.270*** 7.818*** 6.935*** 5.094*** 3.068* 
 (1.345) (1.292) (1.635) (1.784) (1.530) (1.724) 
Stock market turnover -0.018 -0.016 -0.023* -0.020 -0.024 -0.012 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) 
Deposit insurance dummy 0.309*** 0.308*** 0.311*** 0.312*** 0.357*** 0.357*** 
 (0.042) (0.040) (0.043) (0.042) (0.089) (0.090) 
Economic freedom index -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market based dummy 0.107*** 0.092*** 0.154*** 0.141*** 0.129*** 0.092** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) (0.036) (0.046) (0.042) 
Common law dummy 0.098*** 0.120*** 0.107*** 0.126*** 0.091*** 0.142*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.038) (0.043) 
Commercial bank dummy -0.032 0.005 -0.017 0.013 -0.037 0.054 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.038) (0.039) (0.053) (0.069) 
High income economy dummy 0.029 0.034 0.056 0.060 0.056 0.064 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.055) (0.056) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.27 
F(25,1859)=28 
F(10,1859)=20 
 
 
 
1885 
0.30 
F(26,1858)=28 
F(10,1858)=21 
 
 
 
1885 
0.29 
F(25,1690)=25 
F(10,1690)=18 
 
 
 
1716 
0.31 
F(26,1689)=25 
F(10,1689)=17 
 
 
 
1716 
0.27 
F(25,1679)=23 
λ2(10)=112 
0.822 
1.671 
 
 
1705 
0.22 
F(26,1678)=23 
λ2(10)=82 
9.158*** 
27.153*** 
 
 
1705 
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Table A6.2 
Determinants of bank risk-Eastern European countries 
The table represents the cross-country results for the determinants of bank equity risk and credit risk. Panel A through 
to Panel E reports the results. The standard market model is used to measure systematic 
risk:
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  where, itR  is the return on security i at time period t, mtR  is the return on an equity 
market index at time period t. The systematic risk estimate for each bank is 
iβ (systematic risk) and itε  is a random 
shock term. The table presents the pooled-OLS regression, pooled-OLS regression with lagged value of bank capital 
and lagged value of bank charter value  and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression results to estimate the model of 
bank risk. 

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          (1) 
The explanatory variables such as 
tjiUD ,,
is the natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at period t , 
tjiCV ,,  is the natural log of charter value for bank i , country j in period t tjiBC ,,  is the natural log of bank capital for 
bank i , in country j  in period t , tjiBC ,,2  is the natural log of bank capital squared for bank i , in country j  in period t , 
tjiOBS ,,  is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiLTA ,, is the loan to total 
assets for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiSize ,, is the natural log of market value of equity for bank i , in country j , 
in period t and 
tjEFI ,
 is the economic freedom index for country j  at period t . jD1  = bank specialization dummy 
where jD1 =1 if commercial banks or otherwise 0; jD2  = legal origin variable where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 
2 if French civil law countries, 3 if German civil-law countries and 4 if Scandinavian civil law countries; tjBNC,  = 
Bank concentration for country j  at period t ; 
tjNIM .  = Net interest margin for country j  at period t ; tjSTurn .  = 
Stock market turnover ratio for country j  at period t ;  
tjDIN .  = explicit deposit insurance dummy =1, otherwise=0; 
tjMB .  = market based country dummy =1, otherwise=0; tjHI .  = High income country dummy =1, otherwise=0; Finally, 
ti,ε  is the random error term. The joint F-test for the year dummies are statistically significant for all risk measures. All 
results are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † indicates the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
Panel A Determinants of Systematic risk  
    Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag   2SLS 
Intercept -0.698 
(0.868) 
-0.589 
(1.492) 
-0.286 
(0.982) 
-0.810 
(1.401) 
-0.261 
(1.249) 
-3.283 
(4.057) 
Bank capital -0.079 0.178 0.053 -1.492 0.081 -6.499 
 (0.223) (2.302) (0.265) (1.996) (0.418) (7.743) 
Bank capital squared - 0.121 - -0.729 - -3.038 
 - (1.035) - (0.878) - 3.549 
Charter value -0.047 -0.077 0.258 0.479 0.427 1.084 
 (1.126) (1.086) (1.335) (1.436) (2.231) (2.192) 
Off balance sheet items -0.035 -0.035 -0.003 -0.006 0.002 -0.006 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.032) (0.032) (0.038) (0.038) 
Market discipline -0.032 -0.032 -0.043 -0.044 -0.042 -0.038 
 (0.099) (0.099) (0.108) (0.110) (0.090) (0.095) 
Size 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.012 0.017 -0.003 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.029) (0.028) (0.034) (0.036) 
Loan to total assets -0.092 -0.088 0.173 0.148 0.172 0.121 
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 (0.380) (0.386) (0.404) (0.422) (0.366) (0.411) 
Bank concentration 0.230 0.232 0.519 0.519 0.511 0.549 
 (0.454) (0.456) (0.394) (0.395) (0.375) (0.409) 
Net interest margin 3.160 3.172 -2.702 -3.405 -2.856 -3.573 
 (4.999) (4.992) (6.096) (5.959) (5.774) (5.638) 
Stock market turnover -0.211 -0.203 -0.132 -0.186 -0.136 -0.252 
 (0.251) (0.245) (0.218) (0.231) (0.255) (0.303) 
Economic freedom index 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.010 0.005 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) 
Market based dummy 0.306 0.307 0.069 0.053 0.049 0.007 
 (0.191) (0.191) (0.198) (0.197) (0.231) (0.221) 
Commercial bank dummy 0.100 0.094 -0.056 -0.018 -0.046 0.033 
 (0.244) (0.233) (0.315) (0.301) (0.281) (0.256) 
High income economy dummy -0.105 -0.112 -0.027 0.035 0.006 0.121 
 (0.204) (0.191) (0.196) (0.177) (0.218) (0.230) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.19 
F(23,118)=3 
F(10,118)=2 
- 
- 
142 
0.19 
F(24,117)=2 
F(10,117)=2 
- 
- 
142 
0.25 
F(23,104)=2 
F(10,104)=3 
- 
- 
128 
0.25 
F(24,103)=3 
F(10,103)=3 
- 
- 
128 
0.24 
F(23,104)=3 
chi2(10)=34 
0.337 
0.841 
128 
0.22 
F(24,103)=2 
chi2(10)=32 
0.29 
1.1 
128 
 
Panel B Determinants of Idiosyncratic risk  
Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag  2SLS 
Intercept -2.076*** 
(0.794) 
-0.007 
(0.891) 
-1.809** 
(0.847) 
-0.853 
(1.077) 
-1.692 
(1.050) 
3.509 
(2.900) 
Bank capital 0.152 5.028*** 0.091 2.911* 0.152 11.475* 
 (0.220) (1.381 (0.256) (1.744) (0.388) (5.574) 
Bank capital squared - 2.303*** - 1.330* - 5.228* 
 - (0.622) - (0.783) - (2.496) 
Charter value 1.153 0.574 0.047 -0.358 0.031 -1.100 
 (0.795) (0.773) (0.902) (0.930) (1.455) (1.451) 
Off balance sheet items 0.009 0.020 0.004 0.010 0.004 0.016 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.046) 
Market discipline 0.055 0.055 0.103 0.105 0.107 0.101 
 (0.079) (0.076) (0.074) (0.074) (0.067) (0.064) 
Size -0.059*** -0.038* -0.037* -0.022 -0.038 -0.004 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.027) 
Loan to total assets -0.462* -0.389 -0.377 -0.330 -0.381 -0.293 
 (0.271) (0.260) (0.299) (0.282) (0.273) (0.253) 
Bank concentration 0.698 0.737 0.880* 0.880* 0.850 0.785 
 (0.493) (0.469) (0.542) (0.517) (0.532) (0.534) 
Net interest margin -1.935 -1.708 -1.077 0.205 -1.297 -0.063 
 (3.343) (2.801) (4.071) (3.910) (3.928) (3.502) 
Stock market turnover 0.158 0.311 0.197 0.296 0.166 0.365 
 (0.235) (0.221) (0.244) (0.245) (0.278) (0.270) 
Economic freedom index -0.005 0.001 -0.009 -0.002 -0.009 -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Market based dummy -0.123 -0.112 -0.065 -0.035 -0.069 0.004 
 (0.159) (0.147) (0.172) (0.166) (0.187) (0.190) 
Commercial bank dummy -0.202** -0.236** -0.333** -0.403** -0.326** -0.462*** 
 (0.101) (0.120) (0.169) (0.182) (0.166) (0.179) 
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High income economy 
dummy 
0.222 0.084 0.123 0.009 0.146 -0.052 
 (0.206) (0.197) (0.225) (0.208) (0.245) (0.248) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.49 
F(23,118)=7 
F(10,118)=6 
 
- 
- 
142 
0.53 
F(24,117)=8 
F(10,117)=6 
 
- 
- 
142 
0.48 
F(23,104)=8 
F(10,104)=4 
 
- 
- 
128 
0.49 
F(24,103)=7 
F(10,103)=4 
 
- 
- 
128 
0.48 
F(23,104)=7 
λ2(10)=63 
 
1.012 
2.142 
128 
0.45 
F(24,103)=7 
λ2(10)=46 
 
0.833 
3.121 
128 
 
Panel C Determinants of Total risk  
Pooled-OLS      Pooled with lag   2SLS 
Intercept -2.103* 
(0.796) 
-0.057 
(0.883) 
-1.805** 
(0.848) 
-0.871 
(1.070) 
-1.649 
(1.047) 
3.396 
(2.854) 
Bank capital 0.155 4.975*** 0.116 2.873* 0.193 11.177** 
 (0.216) (1.376) (0.251) (1.718) (0.381) (5.495) 
Bank capital squared - 2.277*** - 1.300* - 5.071** 
 - (0.623) - (0.773) - (2.462) 
Charter value 1.134 0.562 0.021 -0.375 -0.029 -1.127 
 (0.790) (0.768) (0.893) (0.923) (1.441) (1.438) 
Off balance sheet items 0.008 0.019 0.004 0.010 0.003 0.015 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039) (0.045) 
Market discipline 0.056 0.056 0.105 0.107 0.111* 0.105* 
 (0.080) (0.077) (0.075) (0.075) (0.068) (0.065) 
Size -0.056*** -0.035 -0.033 -0.018 -0.033 0.019+ 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.027) 
Loan to total assets -0.494* -0.421 -0.393 -0.348 -0.399 -0.314 
 (0.275) (0.264) (0.301) (0.285) (0.275) (0.254) 
Bank concentration 0.723 0.761* 0.903* 0.903* 0.864* 0.800 
 (0.492) (0.467) (0.538) (0.514) (0.526) (0.529) 
Net interest margin -1.418 -1.194 -0.872 0.381 -1.147 0.050 
 (3.390) (2.852) (4.117) (3.977) (3.960) (3.547) 
Stock market turnover 0.145 0.297 0.181 0.277 0.138 0.331 
 (0.237) (0.223) (0.246) (0.247) (0.279) (0.269) 
Economic freedom index -0.005 0.000 -0.009 -0.002 -0.009 -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Market based dummy -0.105 -0.094 -0.058 -0.028 -0.060 0.011 
 (0.159) (0.147) (0.173) (0.168) (0.187) (0.189) 
Commercial bank dummy -0.210** -0.241** -0.351** -0.419** -0.343** -0.475*** 
 (0.107) (0.123) (0.179) (0.192) (0.169) (0.189) 
High income economy dummy 0.212 0.077 0.119 0.007 0.145 -0.047 
 (0.203) (0.195) (0.222) (0.206) (0.241) (0.244) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.48 
F(23,118)=6.99 
F(10,118)=5.87 
 
- 
- 
142 
0.52 
F(24,117)=7.9 
F(10,117)=6.0 
 
- 
- 
142 
0.47 
F(23,104)=7.4 
F(10,104)=4.7 
 
- 
- 
128 
0.49 
F(24,103)=7.2 
F(10,103)=4.0 
 
- 
- 
128 
0.47 
F(23,104)=7.28 
λ2(10)=60.49 
 
0.663 
1.643 
128 
0.44 
F(24,103)=6.71 
λ2(10)=42.77 
 
0.854 
3.196 
128 
Panel D Determinants of Credit risk –loan loss provision 
Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag  2SLS 
Intercept -3.565*** 
(0.963) 
-1.549 
(1.712) 
-3.357*** 
(1.003) 
-3.045*** 
(1.086) 
-4.666*** 
(1.105) 
-1.348 
(2.871) 
Bank capital -0.569 3.954** -0.666** 0.213 -1.154*** 6.132 
 (0.388) (1.923) (0.312) (1.885) (0.384) (6.534) 
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Bank capital squared - 2.113** - 0.410 - 3.382 
 - (0.897) - (0.877) - (3.008) 
Charter value 0.129 -0.304 2.344** 2.255** 4.080** 4.457*** 
 (0.885) (1.006) (1.030) (0.985) (1.922) (1.892) 
Off balance sheet items 0.037 0.054 0.032 0.036 0.073** 0.100*** 
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.045) (0.045) (0.032) (0.042) 
Market discipline -0.052 -0.045 -0.003 -0.002 -0.043 -0.029 
 (0.073) (0.072) (0.074) (0.075) (0.082) (0.085) 
Size 0.059** 0.076*** 0.045 0.049 0.021 0.028 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.029) (0.032) (0.033) (0.035) 
Loan to total assets 1.109*** 1.214*** 1.260*** 1.277*** 1.258*** 1.386*** 
 (0.336) (0.330) (0.364) (0.367) (0.342) (0.348) 
Bank concentration 0.586 0.614 0.771 0.763 1.024* 0.970* 
 (0.545) (0.533) (0.571) (0.568) (0.602) (0.583) 
Net interest margin 1.997 2.027 -2.137 -1.816 -0.174 -0.065 
 (3.569) (3.380) (4.541) (4.626) (4.230) (4.129) 
Stock market turnover -0.478** -0.369* -0.645*** -0.620*** -0.258** -0.262** 
 (0.232) (0.228) (0.211) (0.218) (0.131) (0.118) 
Economic freedom index 0.020** 0.025*** 0.022** 0.024** 0.030*** 0.039*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) 
Market based dummy 0.216 0.187 0.254 0.254 0.124 0.067 
 (0.195) (0.181) (0.206) (0.206) (0.189) (0.181) 
Commercial bank dummy -0.596*** -0.713*** -0.691** -0.712** -0.641** -0.733*** 
 (0.213) (0.217) (0.288) (0.294) (0.274) (0.273) 
High income economy dummy -0.311 -0.391* -0.283 -0.308 -0.274 -0.281 
 (0.249) (0.237) (0.276) (0.287) (0.283) (0.261) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.48 
F(23,103)=5.66 
F(10,103) =3.33 
 
- 
- 
127 
0.51 
F(24,102)=5.5 
F(10,102)=3.32 
 
- 
- 
127 
0.52 
F(23,88)=6.5 
F(10,88)=3.02 
 
- 
- 
112 
0.52 
F(24,87)=6.2 
F(10,87)=2.93 
 
- 
- 
112 
0.43 
F(23,88)=6.9 
λ2(10)=30.42 
 
3.860** 
9.227*** 
112 
0.45 
F(24,87)=6.9 
λ2(10)=36.07 
 
3.273** 
11.723*** 
112 
Panel E Determinants of Credit risk-loan loss reserve 
Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag  2SLS 
Intercept 2.719 
(1.778) 
3.299 
(2.347) 
2.118 
(2.062) 
4.170* 
(2.352) 
2.499 
(1.924) 
13.500 
(8.666) 
Bank capital 1.513*** 2.662 0.428 5.355* 0.797 22.238 
 0.465 2.949 0.598 3.049 0.945 16.922 
Bank capital squared - 0.545 - 2.334* - 9.907 
 - 1.387 - 1.434 - 8.059 
Charter value -1.190 -1.329 0.103 -0.593 -0.383 -3.041 
 1.302 1.273 1.529 1.582 2.791 2.879 
Off balance sheet items 0.098* 0.101* 0.101* 0.113* 0.092 0.102 
 0.058 0.059 0.061 0.062 0.064 0.077 
Market discipline 0.198 0.198 0.061 0.063 0.101 0.116 
 0.132 0.132 0.122 0.122 0.139 0.141 
Size 0.081** 0.086** 0.040 0.064 0.043 0.107* 
 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.043 0.052 0.062 
Loan to total assets -0.629 -0.622 -0.422 -0.382 -0.404 -0.401 
 0.507 0.509 0.504 0.504 0.429 0.459 
Bank concentration -1.237 -1.250 -1.263 -1.328 -1.423 -1.916** 
 1.021 1.023 1.184 1.118 1.121 0.906 
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Net interest margin -10.270 -10.534 -14.600 -14.044 -13.717 -12.462 
 7.036 7.032 10.587 10.260 10.154 8.578 
Stock market turnover -1.174*** -1.160*** -1.091** -0.998* -1.253** -1.132* 
 0.433 0.432 0.524 0.516 0.567 0.639 
Economic freedom index -0.022 -0.022 -0.034* -0.026 -0.033** -0.025* 
 0.016 0.016 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.015 
Market based dummy -0.149 -0.158 -0.521 -0.539 -0.374 -0.161 
 0.394 0.396 0.451 0.435 0.616 0.575 
Commercial bank dummy -0.055 -0.078 0.222 0.116 0.236 0.051 
 0.329 0.335 0.313 0.331 0.283 0.316 
High income economy dummy 0.708 0.692 1.045* 0.925* 1.016* 0.644 
 0.484 0.484 0.550 0.555 0.577 0.584 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.25 
F(23,109)=2.1 
F(10,109)=0.65 
 
- 
- 
133 
0.25 
F(24,108)=2.0 
F(10,108)=0.66 
 
- 
- 
133 
0.19 
F(22,94)=1.9 
F(10,94)=0.50 
 
- 
- 
118 
0.21 
F(23,93)=1.7 
F(10,93)=0.56 
 
- 
- 
118 
0.25 
F(23,94)=5.9 
λ2(10)=5.32 
 
0.814 
2.052 
118 
0.040 
F(24,93)=4.58 
λ2(10)=6.48 
 
0.938 
3.578 
118 
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Table A6.3 
Determinants of bank risk-Middle-East and Africa  
The table represents the cross-country results for the determinants of bank equity risk and credit risk. Panel A through 
to Panel E reports the results. The standard market model is used to measure systematic 
risk:
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  where, itR  is the return on security i at time period t, mtR  is the return on an equity 
market index at time period t. The systematic risk estimate for each bank is 
iβ (systematic risk) and itε  is a random 
shock term. The table presents the pooled-OLS regression, pooled-OLS regression with lagged value of bank capital 
and lagged value of bank charter value  and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression results to estimate the model of 
bank risk. 
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          (1) 
The explanatory variables such as 
tjiUD ,, is the natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at period t , 
tjiCV ,,  is the natural log of charter value for bank i , country j in period t tjiBC ,,  is the natural log of bank capital for 
bank i , in country j  in period t , tjiBC ,,2  is the natural log of bank capital squared for bank i , in country j  in period t , 
tjiOBS ,,  is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiLTA ,, is the loan to total 
assets for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiSize ,, is the natural log of market value of equity for bank i , in country j , 
in period t and 
tjEFI ,
 is the economic freedom index for country j  at period t . jD1  = bank specialization dummy 
where jD1 =1 if commercial banks or otherwise 0; jD2  = legal origin variable where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 
2 if French civil law countries, 3 if German civil-law countries and 4 if Scandinavian civil law countries; tjBNC,  = 
Bank concentration for country j  at period t ; 
tjNIM .  = Net interest margin for country j  at period t ; tjSTurn .  = 
Stock market turnover ratio for country j  at period t ;  
tjDIN .  = explicit deposit insurance dummy =1, otherwise=0; 
tjMB .  = market based country dummy =1, otherwise=0; tjHI .  = High income country dummy =1, otherwise=0; Finally, 
ti,ε  is the random error term. The joint F-test for the year dummies are statistically significant for all risk measures. All 
results are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † indicates the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
Panel A Determinants of Systematic risk  
    Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag  2SLS 
Intercept -0.105 
(0.635) 
-0.874 
(1.013) 
-0.508 
(0.634) 
-0.635 
(1.082) 
-0.277 
(0.786) 
-0.068 
(1.707) 
Bank capital -0.317** -1.730 -0.533*** -0.780 -0.438** -0.041 
 (0.160) (1.524) (0.221) (1.698) (0.212) (2.842) 
Bank capital squared - -0.674 - -0.118 - 0.190 
 - (0.708) - (0.825) - (1.369) 
Charter value -1.883** -1.753* -1.975** -1.954** -3.742** -3.763** 
 (0.928) (0.955) (0.990) (1.024) (1.895) (1.855) 
Off balance sheet items 0.190** 0.180** 0.197** 0.196** 0.231** 0.234** 
 (0.091) (0.090) (0.093) (0.093) (0.100) (0.104) 
Market discipline -0.103** -0.106** -0.112** -0.112** -0.091** -0.092** 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.056) (0.055) (0.046) (0.046) 
Size 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 
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 (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.025) (0.025) 
Loan to total assets -0.036 -0.059 0.066 0.064 0.103 0.105 
 (0.203) (0.207) (0.268) (0.269) (0.258) (0.259) 
Bank concentration -1.022*** -1.006*** -0.888** -0.885** -1.081** -1.080** 
 (0.418) (0.421) (0.458) (0.457) (0.468) (0.468) 
Net interest margin -1.108 -1.279 0.191 0.156 0.070 0.121 
 (2.694) (2.669) (2.698) (2.761) (2.514) (2.616) 
Stock market turnover 0.517*** 0.520*** 0.369** 0.367** 0.520** 0.521** 
 (0.189) (0.189) (0.175) (0.173) (0.225) (0.225) 
Economic freedom index 0.013** 0.014** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Market based dummy -0.039 -0.041 -0.170 -0.169 -0.156 -0.156 
 (0.223) (0.226) (0.227) (0.228) (0.220) (0.220) 
Common law dummy -0.138 -0.131 -0.085 -0.083 -0.084 -0.086 
 (0.112) (0.114) (0.121) (0.122) (0.113) (0.114) 
High income economy dummy -0.347** -0.332** -0.401*** -0.397*** -0.452*** -0.457*** 
 (0.158) (0.158) (0.168) (0.167) (0.164) (0.169) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.34 
F(23,198)=5 
F(10,198)=3 
 
- 
- 
222 
0.34 
F(24,197)=5 
F(10,197)=3 
 
- 
- 
222 
0.38 
F(23,183)=5 
F(10,183)=3 
 
- 
- 
207 
0.38 
F(24,182)=4 
F(10,182)=3 
 
- 
- 
207 
0.35 
F(23,183)=5 
λ2(10)=36 
 
2.44* 
5.42* 
207 
0.35 
F(24,182)=4 
λ2(10)=36 
 
1.59 
5.37 
207 
Panel B Determinants of Total risk  
    Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag  2SLS 
Intercept -1.385 
(1.390) 
4.480 
(3.187) 
-3.306** 
(1.457) 
0.453 
(3.109) 
0.359 
(2.676) 
6.465 
(4.859) 
Bank capital 0.361 11.131** -0.370 6.306 1.099 12.575* 
 (0.547) (5.040) (0.582) (5.513) 1.184 (6.857) 
Bank capital squared - 5.138** - 3.192 - 5.496* 
 - (2.314) - (2.489) - (3.056) 
Charter value -2.012*** -2.087*** -2.544*** -2.213*** -3.034*** -3.102*** 
 (0.805) (0.826) (0.901) (0.905) (0.910) (0.925) 
Off balance sheet items 0.246** 0.231** 0.267* 0.270* 0.279** 0.363** 
 (0.116) (0.116) (0.152) (0.162) (0.142) (0.162) 
Market discipline -0.417** -0.405** -0.546** -0.560** -0.470** -0.493** 
 (0.192) (0.195) (0.250) (0.255) (0.214) (0.223) 
Size 0.122** 0.145** 0.045 0.057 0.184** 0.206** 
 (0.060) (0.067) (0.090) (0.096) (0.090) (0.092) 
Loan to total assets 0.480 0.663 0.650 0.709 0.927* 0.990* 
 (0.394) (0.429) (0.574) (0.618) (0.541) (0.543) 
Bank concentration -2.744** -2.849** -1.634 -1.714 -3.591** -3.580** 
 (1.316) (1.337) (1.285) (1.309) (1.507) (1.506) 
Net interest margin -9.973** -8.554* -9.052* -8.008 -8.196* -6.497 
 (4.451) (4.519) (4.991) (5.025) (5.065) (5.374) 
Stock market turnover 1.561*** 1.565*** 0.683 0.744 1.838** 1.889** 
 (0.563) (0.553) (0.691) (0.730) (0.754) (0.762) 
Economic freedom index 0.009 0.003 0.011 0.009 -0.002 -0.009 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) 
Market based dummy 1.243* 1.253* 1.118 1.096 1.510* 1.504* 
 (0.733) (0.725) (0.834) (0.828) (0.833) (0.819) 
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Common law dummy -0.444 -0.511 -0.489 -0.527 -0.593* -0.666* 
 (0.335) (0.343) (0.369) (0.379) (0.345) (0.352) 
High income economy dummy -0.486 -0.602 -0.318 -0.432 -0.441 -0.596 
 (0.379) (0.403) (0.440) (0.489) (0.457) (0.460) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.35 
F(23,195)=2 
F(10,195)=2 
 
- 
- 
219 
0.38 
F(24,194)=3 
F(10,194)=2 
 
- 
- 
219 
0.24 
F(23,180)=3 
F(10,180)=2 
 
- 
- 
204 
0.25 
F(24,179)=3 
F(10,179)=2 
 
- 
- 
204 
0.34 
F(23,180)=2 
λ2(10)=18 
 
1.496 
3.373 
204 
0.34 
F(24,179)=2 
λ2(10)=19 
 
1.209 
4.119 
204 
Panel C Determinants of Idiosyncratic risk  
    Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag  2SLS 
Intercept -1.448 
(1.392) 
4.900 
(3.161) 
-2.862** 
(1.454) 
0.789 
(3.104) 
0.606 
(2.675) 
6.901 
(4.795) 
Bank capital 0.394 12.050*** -0.252 6.734 1.247 13.078** 
 (0.550) (4.985) (0.582) (5.501) (1.181) (6.729) 
Bank capital squared - 5.561*** - 3.340 - 5.666* 
 - (2.289) - (2.482) - (2.992) 
Charter value -2.707*** -2.860*** -2.610* -2.309* -1.298*** -2.399*** 
 (0.956) (0.952) (0.936) (0.740) (0.444) (0.937) 
Off balance sheet items 0.246** 0.200** -0.014 0.025 0.308** 0.339** 
 (0.119) (0.102) (0.268) (0.271) (0.132) (0.170) 
Market discipline -0.416** -0.402** -0.533** -0.547** -0.459** -0.483** 
 (0.193) (0.197) (0.247) (0.252) (0.216) (0.225) 
Size 0.109** 0.133** 0.033 0.046 0.173** 0.196** 
 (0.055) (0.064) (0.090) (0.096) (0.089) (0.091) 
Loan to total assets 0.510 0.708* 0.685 0.747 0.969* 1.034* 
 (0.402) (0.437) (0.573) (0.617) (0.551) (0.553) 
Bank concentration -2.411* -2.525* -1.364 -1.447 -3.345** -3.334** 
 (1.318) (1.337) (1.278) (1.301) (1.512) (1.513) 
Net interest margin -9.287** -7.751* -8.797* -7.705 -7.860 -6.108 
 (4.407) (4.461) (4.925) (4.938) (5.055) (5.347) 
Stock market turnover 1.532*** 1.536*** 0.688 0.751 1.851** 1.904*** 
 (0.561) (0.548) (0.689) (0.729) (0.749) (0.757) 
Economic freedom index 0.006 -0.001 0.007 0.005 -0.006 -0.013 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) 
Market based dummy 1.225* 1.236* 1.141 1.118 1.541* 1.536* 
 (0.731) (0.723) (0.832) (0.825) (0.833) (0.819) 
Common law dummy -0.434 -0.507 -0.489 -0.530 -0.598* -0.673** 
 (0.334) (0.341) (0.364) (0.373) (0.342) (0.349) 
High income economy dummy -0.438 -0.564 -0.261 -0.381 -0.378 -0.538 
 (0.377) (0.402) (0.438) (0.487) (0.457) (0.459) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.39 
F(23,195)=3 
F(10,195)=1.57 
- 
- 
219 
0.39 
F(24,194)=3 
F(10,194)=1.67 
- 
- 
219 
0.35 
F(23,180)=3 
F(10,180)=2 
- 
- 
204 
 
0.35 
F(24,179)=3 
F(10,179)=2 
- 
- 
204 
0.36 
F(23,180)=2 
λ2 (10)=17 
1.686 
3.794 
204 
0.36 
F(24,179)=2 
λ2(10)= 18 
1.321 
4.492 
204 
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Panel D Determinants of Credit risk (LLP) 
    Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag  2SLS 
Intercept 0.147 
(0.598) 
-1.328 
(1.446) 
0.135 
(0.595) 
-0.988 
(1.529) 
0.710 
(0.756) 
-1.425 
(2.261) 
Bank capital 0.614** -1.761 0.633** -1.184 0.892*** -2.603 
 (0.262) (2.158) (0.256) (2.284) (0.356) (3.511) 
Bank capital squared - -1.066 - -0.795  -1.558 
 - (0.985) - (1.002)  (1.557) 
Charter value -1.460** -1.221** -0.899* -0.797* -2.330** -2.472** 
 (0.658) (0.615) (0.528) (0.471) (1.165) (1.250) 
Off balance sheet items -0.013 -0.022 -0.027 -0.025 -0.017 -0.017 
 (0.08) (0.068) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.067) 
Market discipline -0.059 -0.057 -0.078 -0.070 -0.090 -0.074 
 (0.064) (0.066) (0.088) (0.091) (0.080) (0.088) 
Size 0.015 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.013 0.011 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020) 
Loan to total assets 0.435* 0.390 0.224 0.180 0.363 0.290 
 (0.237) (0.249) (0.434) (0.457) (0.446) (0.486) 
Bank concentration -0.331 -0.318 -0.046 -0.028 -0.234 -0.245 
 (0.340) (0.340) (0.352) (0.350) (0.339) (0.341) 
Net interest margin 1.540 0.937 1.634 1.196 2.353 1.533 
 (2.144) (2.214) (2.338) (2.450) (2.315) (2.638) 
Stock market turnover 0.288** 0.289** 0.301* 0.289 0.355* 0.369* 
 (0.148) (0.149) (0.184) (0.183) (0.198) (0.199) 
Economic freedom index -0.028*** -0.024*** -0.030*** -0.028*** -0.034*** -0.029*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) 
Market based dummy 0.045 0.022 0.029 0.015 0.077 0.045 
 (0.185) (0.184) (0.199) (0.199) (0.197) (0.188) 
Common law dummy -0.041 -0.032 -0.055* -0.057 -0.064 -0.060 
 (0.100) (0.101) (0.097) (0.097) (0.093) (0.094) 
High income economy dummy 0.015 0.000 0.044 0.034 0.082 0.049 
 (0.125) (0.126) (0.138) (0.139) (0.146) (0.143) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.35 
F(23,185)=7 
F(10,185)=4 
 
- 
- 
209 
0.36 
F(24,184)=7 
F(10,184)=3 
 
- 
- 
209 
0.33 
F(23,162)=6 
F(10,162)=4 
 
- 
- 
186 
0.34 
F(24,161)=5 
F(10,161)=4 
 
- 
- 
186 
0.32 
F(23,162)=5 
λ2(10)=37 
 
0.706 
1.628 
186 
0.30 
F(24,161)=5 
λ2(10)=35 
 
1.501 
5.155 
186 
 
Panel E Determinants of Credit risk (LLR) 
    Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag   2SLS 
Intercept 1.0821* 
(0.665) 
-0.1667 
(1.263) 
0.779 
(0.702) 
-0.093 
(1.378) 
1.405* 
(0.832) 
-0.170 
(1.829) 
Bank capital 0.787*** -1.509 0.563 -1.090 0.853** -2.106 
 (0.229) (2.058) (0.248) (2.179) (0.370) (3.287) 
Bank capital squared - -1.098 - -0.790 - -1.424 
 - (1.010) - (1.091) - (1.651) 
Charter value -2.177** -1.925** -1.078** -0.902 -3.174** -2.910** 
 (0.949) (0.869) (0.934) (0.892) (1.615) (1.477) 
Off balance sheet items -0.010 -0.025 -0.059 -0.068 -0.028 -0.046 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.085) (0.087) (0.083) (0.088) 
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Market discipline 0.183** 0.183** 0.191*** 0.194*** 0.186*** 0.195*** 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.075) (0.076) (0.072) (0.075) 
Size 0.052** 0.047** 0.053** 0.050** 0.067** 0.063** 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.027) 
Loan to total assets -1.088*** -1.139*** -1.165*** -1.165*** -1.121*** -1.135*** 
 (0.337) (0.337) (0.346) (0.352) (0.324) (0.331) 
Bank concentration -0.743 -0.683 -0.435 -0.408 -0.679 -0.658 
 (0.537) (0.526) (0.525) (0.523) (0.525) (0.510) 
Net interest margin 1.345 1.221 1.511 1.298 2.075 1.779 
 (2.996) (2.999) (3.170) (3.216) (2.958) (2.998) 
Stock market turnover 0.036 0.035 0.039+ -0.018 0.099 0.082 
 (0.237) (0.240) (0.245) (0.240) (0.254) (0.247) 
Economic freedom index -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.038*** -0.037*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Market based dummy -0.150 -0.163 -0.330 -0.329 -0.253 -0.258 
 (0.283) (0.285) (0.293) (0.297) (0.289) (0.289) 
Common law dummy 0.169 0.181 0.194 0.204 0.172 0.192 
 (0.128) (0.130) (0.131) (0.133) (0.129) (0.128) 
High income economy dummy 0.076 0.105 0.030 0.057 0.066 0.111 
 (0.160) (0.167) (0.161) (0.169) (0.165) (0.180) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.46 
F(23,190)=11 
F(10,190)=0.63 
 
- 
- 
214 
0.47 
F(24,189)=11 
F(10,189)=0.64 
 
- 
- 
214 
0.47 
F(23,172)=12 
F(10,172)=0.48 
 
- 
- 
196 
0.47 
F(24,171)=12 
F(10,171)=0.49 
 
- 
- 
196 
0.46 
F(23,172)=10 
λ2(10)=4 
 
1.432 
3.247 
196 
0.46 
F(24,171)=10 
λ2(10)=4 
 
0.983 
3.383 
196 
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Table A6.4 
Determinants of bank risk-North America 
The table represents the cross-country results for the determinants of bank equity risk and credit risk. Panel A through 
to Panel E reports the results. The standard market model is used to measure systematic 
risk:
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  where, itR  is the return on security i at time period t, mtR  is the return on an equity 
market index at time period t. The systematic risk estimate for each bank is 
iβ (systematic risk) and itε  is a random 
shock term. The table presents the pooled-OLS regression, pooled-OLS regression with lagged value of bank capital 
and lagged value of bank charter value  and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression results to estimate the model of 
bank risk. 

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          (1) 
The explanatory variables such as 
tjiUD ,,
is the natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at period t , 
tjiCV ,,  is the natural log of charter value for bank i , country j in period t tjiBC ,,  is the natural log of bank capital for 
bank i , in country j  in period t , tjiBC ,,2  is the natural log of bank capital squared for bank i , in country j  in period t , 
tjiOBS ,,  is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiLTA ,, is the loan to total 
assets for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiSize ,, is the natural log of market value of equity for bank i , in country j , 
in period t and 
tjEFI ,
 is the economic freedom index for country j  at period t . jD1  = bank specialization dummy 
where jD1 =1 if commercial banks or otherwise 0; jD2  = legal origin variable where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 
2 if French civil law countries, 3 if German civil-law countries and 4 if Scandinavian civil law countries; tjBNC,  = 
Bank concentration for country j  at period t ; 
tjNIM .  = Net interest margin for country j  at period t ; tjSTurn .  = 
Stock market turnover ratio for country j  at period t ;  
tjDIN .  = explicit deposit insurance dummy =1, otherwise=0; 
tjMB .  = market based country dummy =1, otherwise=0; tjHI .  = High income country dummy =1, otherwise=0; Finally, 
ti,ε  is the random error term. The joint F-test for the year dummies are statistically significant for all risk measures. All 
results are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † indicates the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
Panel A Determinants of Systematic risk  
Pooled-OLS   Pooled with lag   2SLS 
Intercept -4.560* 
(2.796) 
-4.462 
(2.864) 
-4.212 
(2.805) 
-4.132 
(2.853) 
-4.087 
(2.763) 
-3.900 
(3.014) 
Bank capital 0.124 0.322 0.292* 0.490 0.359* 0.753 
 (0.173) (1.928) (0.173) (1.924) (0.222) (2.921) 
Bank capital squared - 0.094 
- 
0.094 
- 
0.187 
 - (0.908) 
- 
(0.897) 
- 
(1.369) 
Charter value 1.152** 1.162** 0.788* 0.790* 1.094** 1.097** 
 (0.470) (0.471) (0.488) (0.491) (0.527) (0.530) 
Off balance sheet items 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Market discipline -0.041** -0.042** -0.034 -0.035 -0.032** -0.032** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.024) (0.025) (0.015) (0.016) 
Size 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Loan to total assets -0.285* -0.281* -0.299* -0.296* -0.345** -0.338** 
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 (0.153) (0.159) (0.167) (0.169) (0.167) (0.174) 
Bank concentration 8.415*** 8.421*** 8.266*** 8.276*** 8.308*** 8.318*** 
 (1.373) (1.382) (1.370) (1.380) (1.345) (1.3550 
Net interest margin 11.409 11.470 11.882* 11.965* 12.208* 12.330* 
 (7.172) (7.235) (7.118) (7.181) (7.080) (7.1460 
Stock market turnover 0.182 0.182 0.178 0.177 0.190 0.189 
 (0.125) (0.125) (0.124) (0.124) (0.122) (0.123) 
Economic freedom 
index 
0.025 0.025 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) 
Commercial bank 
dummy 
-2.155*** -2.161*** -2.080*** -2.085*** -2.056*** -2.067*** 
 (0.377) (0.383) (0.374) (0.378) (0.371) (0.380) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.41 
F(21,1071)=30 
F(10,1071)=14 
 
- 
- 
1093 
0.41 
F(22,1070)=28 
F(10,1070)=14 
 
- 
- 
1093 
0.38 
F(21,1036)=30 
F(10,1036)=12 
 
- 
- 
1058 
0.38 
F(22,1035)=28 
F(10,1035)=12 
 
- 
- 
1058 
0.39 
F(21,1036)=30 
λ2(10)=142 
 
1.601 
3.267 
1058 
0.39 
F(22,1035)=28 
λ2(10)=142 
 
1.038 
3.182 
1058 
Panel B Determinants of Total risk  
Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag   2SLS 
Intercept -1.525 
(1.746) 
-0.996 
(1.790) 
-1.627 
(1.768) 
-0.842 
(1.823) 
-1.677 
(1.733) 
-0.109 
(1.985) 
Bank capital -0.340*** 0.736 -0.340*** 1.595 -0.453*** 2.732 
 (0.116) (1.184) (0.121) (1.337) (0.160) (2.203) 
Bank capital squared - 0.511 - 0.917 - 1.508 
 - (0.577) - (0.642) - (1.061) 
Charter value 0.425** 0.445** 0.526** 0.547** 0.690** 0.714** 
 (0.210) (0.222) (0.263) (0.274) (0.345) (0.363) 
Off balance sheet items 0.021** 0.022** 0.016** 0.018** 0.017** 0.020** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Market discipline 0.006 0.004 0.016 0.012 0.019 0.015 
 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 
Size -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 
 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 
Loan to total assets -0.358*** -0.340*** -0.354*** -0.322** -0.341** -0.286* 
 0.122 0.130 0.134 0.144 0.140 0.157 
Bank concentration 1.176 1.206 1.245 1.337 1.247 1.329 
 0.883 0.892 0.899 0.923 0.873 0.906 
Net interest margin -6.525** -6.194** -6.931** -6.129** -7.231** -6.237** 
 (3.279) (3.021) (3.300) (3.000) (3.616) (3.048) 
Stock market turnover 0.102** 0.100** 0.089* 0.084 0.092** 0.083** 
 (0.052) (0.049) (0.055) (0.054) (0.045) (0.040) 
Economic freedom 
index 
-0.023 -0.023 -0.022 -0.020 -0.023 -0.022 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
Commercial bank 
dummy 
-0.647*** -0.678*** -0.679*** -0.731*** -0.708*** -0.798*** 
 (0.206) (0.216) (0.210) (0.223) (0.207) (0.234) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
0.39 
F(21,1070)=42 
F(10,1070)=14 
 
- 
- 
0.39 
F(22,1069)=40 
F(10,1069)=14 
 
- 
- 
0.38 
F(21,1035)=44 
F(10,1035)=17 
 
- 
- 
0.37 
F(22,1034)=41 
F(10,1034)=17 
 
- 
- 
0.39 
F(21,1035)=43 
λ2(10)=173.88 
 
1.578 
3.218 
0.39 
F(22,1034)=41 
λ2(10)=165.97 
 
1.175 
3.603 
332 
NOBS 1092 1092 1057 1057 1057 1057 
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Panel C Determinants of Idiosyncratic risk  
Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag   2SLS 
Intercept -0.132 
(1.657) 
0.641 
(1.728) 
-0.189 
(1.696) 
0.694 
(1.771) 
-0.225 
(1.653) 
1.564 
(1.976) 
Bank capital -0.332*** 1.239 -0.351*** 1.828 -0.474*** 3.163 
 0.132 1.230 0.135 1.398 0.179 2.334 
Bank capital squared - 0.747 - 1.032 - 1.722 
 - 0.609 - 0.681 - 1.135 
Charter value 0.757** 0.786** 0.807*** 0.831*** 1.072*** 1.101*** 
 0.359 0.365 0.316 0.321 0.405 0.409 
Off balance sheet items 0.017** 0.019** 0.012** 0.014** 0.014** 0.017** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Market discipline 0.031** 0.019** 0.031** 0.035** 0.036** 0.031** 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) 
Size -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.067*** -0.067*** 
 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 
Loan to total assets -0.208 -0.181 -0.204 -0.169 -0.197 -0.134 
 0.143 0.152 0.157 0.168 0.163 0.182 
Bank concentration -0.753 -0.708 -0.763 -0.659 -0.751 -0.656 
 0.785 0.787 0.808 0.823 0.777 0.800 
Net interest margin -5.091 -4.608 -5.456 -4.553 -5.744 -4.611 
 3.786 3.740 3.852 3.908 3.745 3.874 
Stock market turnover 0.096** 0.079** 0.070** 0.064** 0.076** 0.086** 
 (0.045) (0.039) (0.033) (0.029) (0.035) (0.042) 
Economic freedom 
index 
-0.035* -0.034* -0.034* -0.031 -0.035* -0.034* 
 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.020 
Commercial bank 
dummy 
-0.087 -0.133 -0.102 -0.161 -0.133 -0.236 
 0.182 0.191 0.188 0.199 0.183 0.210 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.45 
F(21,1070)=48 
F(10,1070)=12 
 
- 
- 
1092 
0.45 
F(22,1069)=47 
F(10,1069)=13 
 
- 
- 
1092 
0.41 
F(21,1035)=51 
F(10,1035)=15 
 
- 
- 
1057 
0.41 
F(22,1034)=49 
F(10,1034)=15 
 
- 
- 
1057 
0.42 
F(21,1035)=50 
λ2(10)=151 
 
1.819 
3.709 
1057 
0.42 
F(22,1034)=48 
λ2(10)=145.53 
 
1.313 
4.025 
1057 
 
Panel D Determinants of Credit risk (LLP) 
Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag  2SLS 
Intercept -1.705 
(1.989) 
-2.765 
(2.329) 
-3.972* 
(2.313) 
-4.175 
(2.609) 
-4.272* 
(2.252) 
-4.852 
(3.032) 
Bank capital -0.632*** -2.865 -0.493*** -0.987 -0.598*** -1.773 
 0.162 2.283 0.175 2.815 0.223 4.049 
Bank capital squared - -1.059 - -0.233 - -0.555 
 - 1.065 - 1.302 - 1.885 
Charter value -2.476*** -2.517*** -2.230*** -2.236*** -3.082*** -3.094*** 
 0.475 0.482 0.446 0.448 0.484 0.486 
Off balance sheet items 0.006 0.003 0.021 0.020 0.014 0.013 
 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 
Market discipline -0.057*** -0.053** -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.073*** -0.071*** 
 0.023 0.022 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.023 
Size 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
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 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Loan to total assets 1.204*** 1.168*** 1.129*** 1.121*** 1.233*** 1.214*** 
 0.158 0.160 0.169 0.172 0.171 0.177 
Bank concentration 0.031 -0.056 1.289 1.265 1.163 1.133 
 1.054 1.053 1.207 1.201 1.182 1.181 
Net interest margin 4.889 3.995 1.783 1.576 1.774 1.295 
 5.610 5.757 5.397 5.582 5.306 5.631 
Stock market turnover -0.117* -0.113 -0.230*** -0.228*** -0.258*** -0.255*** 
 0.073 0.074 0.069 0.069 0.067 0.068 
Economic freedom index -0.023 -0.024 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.012 
 0.025 0.025 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.028 
Commercial bank dummy -0.399 -0.335 -0.729** -0.717** -0.751*** -0.721** 
 0.282 0.281 0.298 0.294 0.294 0.295 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.30 
F(21,1072)=16 
F(10,1072)=9 
 
- 
- 
1094 
0.30 
F(22,1071)=15 
F(10,1071)=9 
 
- 
- 
1094 
0.30 
F(21,993)=16 
F(10,993)=8 
 
- 
- 
1015 
0.31 
F(22,992)=15 
F(10,992)=8 
 
- 
- 
1015 
0.34 
F(21,993)=17 
λ2(10)=91 
 
0.242 
0.495 
1015 
0.34 
F(22,992)=17 
λ2(10)=90 
 
0.199 
0.613 
1015 
Panel E Determinants of Credit risk (LLR) 
Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag  2SLS 
Intercept -0.536 
(0.739) 
-1.224 
(0.778) 
-0.711 
(0.987) 
-0.875 
(1.019) 
-0.725 
(0.992) 
-1.112 
(1.107) 
Bank capital -0.046** -1.442*** -0.049** -0.429 -0.063** -0.751 
 (0.023) (0.516) (0.022) (0.707) (0.020) (1.054) 
Bank capital squared - -0.684*** - -0.191 - -0.346 
 - (0.243) - (0.338) - (0.501) 
Charter value -0.466*** -0.490*** -0.547*** -0.552*** -0.746*** -0.752*** 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.128) (0.128) (0.168) (0.167) 
Off balance sheet items -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Market discipline -0.009 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Size 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Loan to total assets 0.914*** 0.890*** 0.905*** 0.899*** 0.922*** 0.910*** 
 0.049 0.052 0.046 0.049 0.047 0.053 
Bank concentration 0.323 0.267 0.442 0.423 0.422 0.403 
 0.366 0.365 0.471 0.470 0.472 0.470 
Net interest margin 8.342*** 7.907*** 7.895*** 7.728*** 7.842*** 7.615*** 
 2.636 2.593 2.602 2.618 2.614 2.599 
Stock market turnover -0.049 -0.045 -0.043 -0.042 -0.050 -0.048 
 0.032 0.032 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 
Economic freedom index -0.023** -0.024*** -0.021* -0.022* -0.020* -0.020* 
 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
Commercial bank 
dummy 
-0.242 -0.197 -0.276** -0.265 -0.277 -0.256 
 0.099 0.097 0.116 0.117 0.117 0.118 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.40 
F(21,1118)=34 
F(10,1118)=3 
 
- 
- 
1140 
0.41 
F(22,1117)=34 
F(10,1117)=3 
- 
- 
 
1140 
0.41 
F(21,1037)=34 
F(10,1037)=3 
 
- 
- 
1059 
0.41 
F(22,1036)=34 
F(10,1036)=3 
 
- 
- 
1059 
0.40 
F(21,1037)=34 
λ2(10)=36 
 
8.751*** 
17.609*** 
1059 
0.41 
F(22,1036)=34 
λ2(10)=35 
 
5.600 
16.947 
1059 
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Table A6.5 
Determinants of bank risk-South America 
The table represents the cross-country results for the determinants of bank equity risk and credit risk. Panel A through 
to Panel E reports the results. The standard market model is used to measure systematic 
risk:
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  where, itR  is the return on security i at time period t, mtR  is the return on an equity 
market index at time period t. The systematic risk estimate for each bank is 
iβ (systematic risk) and itε  is a random 
shock term. The table presents the pooled-OLS regression, pooled-OLS regression with lagged value of bank capital 
and lagged value of bank charter value  and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression results to estimate the model of 
bank risk. 
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The explanatory variables such as 
tjiUD ,,
is the natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at period t , 
tjiCV ,,  is the natural log of charter value for bank i , country j in period t tjiBC ,,  is the natural log of bank capital for 
bank i , in country j  in period t , tjiBC ,,2  is the natural log of bank capital squared for bank i , in country j  in period t , 
tjiOBS ,,  is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiLTA ,, is the loan to total 
assets for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiSize ,, is the natural log of market value of equity for bank i , in country j , 
in period t and 
tjEFI ,
 is the economic freedom index for country j  at period t . jD1  = bank specialization dummy 
where jD1 =1 if commercial banks or otherwise 0; jD2  = legal origin variable where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 
2 if French civil law countries, 3 if German civil-law countries and 4 if Scandinavian civil law countries; tjBNC,  = 
Bank concentration for country j  at period t ; 
tjNIM .  = Net interest margin for country j  at period t ; tjSTurn .  = 
Stock market turnover ratio for country j  at period t ;  
tjDIN .  = explicit deposit insurance dummy =1, otherwise=0; 
tjMB .  = market based country dummy =1, otherwise=0; tjHI .  = High income country dummy =1, otherwise=0; Finally, 
ti,ε  is the random error term. The joint F-test for the year dummies are statistically significant for all risk measures. All 
results are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † indicates the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
Panel A Determinants of Systematic risk  
Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag   2SLS 
Intercept 0.992 
(0.635) 
0.813 
(0.547) 
2.223*** 
(0.761) 
3.470*** 
(1.027) 
2.222* 
(1.291) 
3.470** 
(1.700) 
Bank capital 0.323 -0.141 0.808*** 3.209*** 0.809** 3.597 
 (0.204) (1.024) (0.308) (1.076) (0.400) (2.604) 
Bank capital Sq - -0.251 - 1.114*** - 1.392 
 - (0.582) - (0.413) - (1.290) 
Charter value 2.610*** 2.560*** 7.222*** 8.097*** 11.546*** 12.089*** 
 (0.964) (0.972) (2.218) (2.187) (4.764) (4.991) 
Off balance sheet items -0.042 -0.043 -0.054 -0.051 -0.046 -0.044 
 (0.142) (0.144) (0.095) (0.087) (0.127) (0.128) 
Market discipline 0.062 0.065 0.099** 0.111** 0.077** 0.062** 
 (0.047) (0.049) (0.048) (0.047) (0.039) (0.025) 
Size 0.015 0.014 -0.025 -0.021 -0.084 -0.076 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.022) (0.021) (0.055) (0.056) 
Loan to total assets 0.035 -0.012 0.216 0.370 0.400 0.687 
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 (0.231) (0.233) (0.249) (0.253) (0.407) (0.513) 
Bank concentration -0.584 -0.609 -0.433 -0.184 0.219 0.457 
 (0.409) (0.384) (0.413) (0.425) (0.705) (0.801) 
Net interest margin 0.432 0.345 -0.469 -0.825 -1.029 -0.887 
 (0.984) (1.062) (1.099) (1.080) (1.527) (1.500) 
Stock market turnover -0.114 -0.129 0.064 0.146 0.510** 0.625** 
 (0.433) (0.446) (0.295) (0.276) (0.255) (0.312) 
Economic freedom index 0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.005 0.002 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Market-based dummy -0.133 -0.122 -0.092 -0.120 -0.401** -0.465** 
 (0.152) (0.139) (0.125) (0.122) (0.200) (0.225) 
Commercial-bank dummy 0.035 0.024 -0.013 0.066 -0.131 -0.070 
 (0.075) (0.085) (0.105) (0.106) (0.141) (0.132) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.26 
F(22,176)=4.81 
F(10,176)=2.00 
 
- 
 
- 
199 
0.26 
F(23,175)=5 
F(10,175)=2 
 
- 
 
- 
199 
0.49 
F(22,157)=8 
F(10,157)=2 
 
- 
 
- 
180 
0.52 
F(23,156)=7 
F(10,156)=2 
 
- 
 
- 
180 
0.032 
F(22,156)=4 
λ2(10)=13 
 
30.72*** 
 
61.05*** 
179 
0.020 
F(23,155)=3 
λ2(10)=12.4 
 
30.00*** 
 
66.57*** 
179 
 
Panel B Determinants of Idiosyncratic risk  
Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag  2SLS 
Intercept -2.019** 
(0.730) 
-1.921** 
(0.861) 
-2.459*** 
(0.854) 
-1.794* 
(1.006) 
-2.435** 
(1.011) 
-2.600 
(1.800) 
Bank capital 0.230 0.485 0.059 1.336 0.086 -0.280 
 (0.290) (1.360) (0.305) (0.951) (0.504) (3.455) 
Bank capital squared - 0.138 - 0.593 - -0.183 
 - (0.721) - (0.377) - (1.742) 
Charter value 2.479* 2.507* 2.245 2.713 3.766 3.694 
 (1.558) (1.558) (1.643) (1.713) (2.831) (2.899) 
Off balance sheet items -0.153 -0.152 -0.045 -0.043 -0.044 -0.044 
 (0.129) (0.129) (0.130) (0.129) (0.128) (0.129) 
Market discipline 0.171* 0.170* 0.118 0.123 0.125 0.128 
 (0.096) (0.097) (0.098) (0.098) (0.092) (0.102) 
Size -0.043 -0.042 -0.017 -0.015 -0.037 -0.038 
 (0.051) (0.052) (0.054) (0.054) (0.056) (0.058) 
Loan to total assets -1.123*** -1.097*** -1.220*** -1.138*** -1.186*** -1.224*** 
 (0.365) (0.382) (0.363) (0.357) (0.382) (0.505) 
Bank concentration 0.211 0.224 0.113 0.246 0.354 0.323 
 (0.574) (0.573) (0.579) (0.611) (0.616) (0.722) 
Net interest margin 3.719** 3.766** 3.354* 3.153* 3.120* 3.103* 
 (1.668) (1.733) (1.793) (1.811) (1.769) (1.770) 
Stock market turnover 0.235 0.244 0.399 0.445 0.552 0.537 
 (0.426) (0.423) (0.411) (0.417) (0.401) (0.439) 
Economic freedom index -0.017 -0.017 -0.014 -0.015 -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
Market based dummy -0.167 -0.174 -0.088 -0.102 -0.189 -0.181 
 (0.207) (0.212) (0.225) (0.227) (0.243) (0.270) 
Commercial bank dummy 0.017 0.023 -0.055 -0.013 -0.088 -0.096 
 (0.127) (0.138) (0.123) (0.121) (0.137) (0.140) 
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R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.25 
F(22,173)=4.54 
F(10,173)= 2.57 
 
- 
- 
196 
0.25 
F(23,172)=4.42 
F(10,172)=2.48 
 
- 
- 
196 
0.25 
F(22,154)=3.89 
F(10,154)=2.16 
 
- 
- 
177 
0.25 
F(23,153)=3.82 
F(10,153)=2.08 
 
- 
- 
177 
0.22 
F(22,153)=3.85 
λ2(10)=25.24 
 
0.962 
2.215 
176 
0.22 
F(23,152)=3.85 
λ2(10)=23.52 
 
0.705 
2.464 
176 
 
Panel C Determinants of Total risk  
Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag   2SLS 
Intercept -2.850*** 
(0.929) 
-2.643*** 
(0.936) 
-2.541*** 
(0.823) 
-1.661* 
(0.958) 
-2.507** 
(1.062) 
2.407 
(1.878) 
Bank capital 0.425 0.965 0.226 1.915** 0.248 0.472 
 (0.293) (1.522) (0.303) (0.920) (0.527) (3.608) 
Bank capital squared - 0.292 - 0.784** - 0.112 
 - (0.781) - (0.366) - (1.815) 
Charter value 4.089*** 4.150*** 3.589** 4.207*** 5.896** 5.940** 
 (1.519) (1.527) (1.498) (1.517) (2.836) (2.922) 
Off balance sheet items -0.182 -0.180 -0.012 -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.138) (0.138) (0.127) (0.125) (0.128) (0.128) 
Market discipline 0.185** 0.181** 0.178** 0.109** 0.105** 0.103** 
 (0.096) (0.090) (0.085) (0.055) (0.050) (0.052) 
Size -0.051 -0.049 -0.012 -0.010 -0.044 -0.043 
 (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.056) (0.059) 
Loan to total assets -0.915** -0.859** -1.184*** -1.077*** -1.120*** -1.097** 
 (0.400) (0.436) (0.363) (0.354) (0.395) (0.528) 
Bank concentration 0.261 0.290 -0.040 0.135 0.318 0.337 
 (0.595) (0.599) (0.575) (0.602) (0.620) (0.729) 
Net interest margin 5.292** 5.392** 3.580** 3.310* 3.199* 3.209* 
 (2.220) (2.339) (1.790) (1.801) (1.822) (1.827) 
Stock market turnover 0.913 0.931 0.567 0.627 0.803** 0.813* 
 (0.614) (0.627) (0.401) (0.407) (0.397) (0.443) 
Economic freedom index 0.034+ 0.031+ -0.008 -0.009 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Market based dummy -0.427* -0.440* -0.179 -0.197 -0.335 -0.340 
 (0.253) (0.263) (0.221) (0.222) (0.242) (0.270) 
Commercial bank 
dummy 
-0.001 0.013 -0.026 0.030 -0.080 -0.075 
 (0.146) (0.154) (0.127) (0.125) (0.144) (0.146) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.22 
F(22,175)=4.77 
F(10,175)=2.64 
- 
- 
198 
0.22 
F(23,174)=4.66 
F(10,174)=2.52 
- 
- 
198 
0.27 
F(22,155)=3.77 
F(10,155)=1.84 
- 
- 
178 
0.28 
F(23,154)=3.78 
F(10,154)=1.79 
- 
- 
178 
0.23 
F(22,154)=3.66 
λ2(10)=23.89 
1.671 
3.809 
177 
0.23 
F(23,153)=3.59 
λ2(10)=21.40 
1.280 
4.417 
177 
 
Panel D Determinants of Credit risk (LLP) 
Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag   2SLS 
Intercept -2.049*** 
(0.540) 
-2.167*** 
(0.722) 
-2.723*** 
(0.651) 
-2.702*** 
(0.970) 
-2.790*** 
(1.006) 
-3.470* 
(2.047) 
Bank capital 0.149 -0.138 -0.162 -0.126 -0.178 -1.543 
 (0.258) (1.197) (0.238) (0.992) (0.474) (3.058) 
Bank capital squared - -0.151 - 0.016 - -0.667 
 - (0.599) - (0.375) - (1.425) 
Charter value 1.176 1.137 -0.182 -0.167 -0.269 -0.651 
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 (0.872) (0.859) (1.596) (1.704) (2.659) (3.034) 
Off balance sheet items -0.141** -0.141** -0.150** -0.150** -0.149** -0.148** 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.068) (0.068) (0.075) (0.076) 
Market discipline 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.011 
 (0.069) (0.071) (0.070) (0.071) (0.069) (0.073) 
Size -0.023* -0.023* -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) 
Loan to total assets 1.077*** 1.050*** 1.212*** 1.213*** 1.213*** 1.124** 
 (0.381) (0.408) (0.433) (0.436) (0.457) (0.570) 
Bank concentration -0.138 -0.147 0.296 0.297 0.346 0.308 
 (0.359) (0.357) (0.424) (0.428) (0.429) (0.432) 
Net interest margin 2.972*** 2.909** 3.959*** 3.950*** 3.954*** 3.905*** 
 (1.144) (1.187) (1.288) (1.345) (1.326) (1.298) 
Stock market turnover 0.924*** 0.919*** 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.023*** 1.010*** 
 (0.301) (0.303) (0.324) (0.325) (0.353) (0.354) 
Economic freedom index 0.008* 0.008* 0.009* 0.009 0.009 0.010 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Market based dummy -0.225** -0.220** -0.254** -0.254** -0.262** -0.248* 
 (0.114) (0.110) (0.124) (0.124) (0.136) (0.137) 
Commercial bank dummy -0.235** -0.244** -0.264** -0.262*** -0.261** -0.288*** 
 (0.117) (0.115) (0.112) (0.104) (0.106) (0.091) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.34 
F(22,193)=5.28 
F(10,193)=2.07 
 
- 
- 
216 
0.34 
F(23,192)=5.05 
F(10,192)=2.06 
 
- 
- 
216 
0.38 
F(22,162)=5.41 
F(10,162)=2.22 
 
- 
- 
185 
0.38 
F(23,161)=5.54 
F(10,161)=2.21 
 
- 
- 
185 
0.37 
F(22,161)=4.61 
λ2(10)= 25.58 
 
1.25 
2.86 
184 
0.38 
F(23,160)=4.45 
λ2(10)=25.27 
 
0.83 
2.86 
184 
 
Panel E Determinants of Credit risk (LLR) 
Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag   2SLS 
Intercept -1.655*** 
(0.253) 
-1.724*** 
(0.416) 
-1.900*** 
(0.300) 
-1.073*** 
(0.325) 
-1.052*** 
(0.303) 
-1.164 
(0.858) 
Bank capital 0.651*** 0.480 0.342** 1.992*** 0.638*** 1.388 
 (0.112) (0.789) (0.158) (0.353) (0.181) (1.795) 
Bank capital squared - -0.091 - 0.774*** - 0.373 
 - (0.403) - (0.152) - (0.886) 
Charter value 2.150*** 2.127*** 1.729*** 2.294*** 2.923*** 3.063*** 
 (0.385) (0.380) (0.526) (0.590) (0.670) (0.613) 
Off balance sheet items -0.114*** -0.114*** -0.114*** -0.110*** -0.131*** -0.131*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.032) (0.033) (0.028) (0.029) 
Market discipline 0.034** 0.034** 0.045* 0.051** 0.048** 0.044** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
Size -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.031*** -0.028*** -0.043*** -0.042*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
Loan to total assets 0.333*** 0.315** 0.381*** 0.475*** 0.376*** 0.447** 
 (0.121) (0.139) (0.139) (0.130) (0.128) (0.183) 
Bank concentration 0.616*** 0.607*** 0.719*** 0.890*** 0.853*** 0.918*** 
 (0.169) (0.176) (0.182) (0.191) (0.180) (0.224) 
Net interest margin 2.201*** 2.167*** 2.841*** 2.564*** 2.273*** 2.318*** 
 (0.592) (0.592) (0.739) (0.707) (0.665) (0.679) 
Stock market turnover 0.596*** 0.591*** 0.672*** 0.734*** 0.684*** 0.709*** 
 (0.137) (0.140) (0.161) (0.159) (0.164) (0.172) 
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Economic freedom index 0.006** 0.006** 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Market based dummy -0.180*** -0.176*** -0.204*** -0.232*** -0.234*** -0.250*** 
 (0.055) (0.058) (0.064) (0.064) (0.070) (0.075) 
Commercial bank 
dummy 
0.011 0.007 -0.080 -0.026 -0.061 -0.044 
 (0.057) (0.056) (0.071) (0.059) (0.066) (0.077) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.53 
F(22,220)=14 
F(10,220)=7.69 
 
- 
- 
243 
0.53 
F(23,219)=14 
F(10,219)=7.29 
 
- 
- 
243 
0.49 
F(22,187)=10 
F(10,187)=6.68 
 
- 
- 
210 
0.53 
F(23,186)=12 
F(10,186)=0.22 
 
- 
- 
210 
0.54 
F(22,186)=12 
λ2(10)=80.19 
 
0.50 
1.130 
209 
0.54 
F(23,185)=12 
λ2(10)=72.50 
 
0.54 
1.83 
209 
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Table A6.6 
Determinants of bank risk–Western Europe 
The table represents the cross-country results for the determinants of bank equity risk and credit risk. Panel A through 
to Panel E reports the results. The standard market model is used to measure systematic 
risk:
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  where, itR  is the return on security i at time period t, mtR  is the return on an equity 
market index at time period t. The systematic risk estimate for each bank is 
iβ (systematic risk) and itε  is a random 
shock term. The table presents the pooled-OLS regression, pooled-OLS regression with lagged value of bank capital 
and lagged value of bank charter value  and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression results to estimate the model of 
bank risk. 
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The explanatory variables such as 
tjiUD ,,
is the natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at period t , 
tjiCV ,,  is the natural log of charter value for bank i , country j in period t tjiBC ,,  is the natural log of bank capital for 
bank i , in country j  in period t , tjiBC ,,2  is the natural log of bank capital squared for bank i , in country j  in period t , 
tjiOBS ,,  is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiLTA ,, is the loan to total 
assets for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiSize ,, is the natural log of market value of equity for bank i , in country j , 
in period t and 
tjEFI ,
 is the economic freedom index for country j  at period t . jD1  = bank specialization dummy 
where jD1 =1 if commercial banks or otherwise 0; jD2  = legal origin variable where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 
2 if French civil law countries, 3 if German civil-law countries and 4 if Scandinavian civil law countries; 
tjBNC,  = Bank 
concentration for country j  at period t ; 
tjNIM .  = Net interest margin for country j  at period t ; tjSTurn .  = Stock 
market turnover ratio for country j  at period t ;  
tjDIN .  = explicit deposit insurance dummy =1, otherwise=0; tjMB .  = 
market based country dummy =1, otherwise=0;
tjHI .  = High income country dummy =1, otherwise=0; Finally, ti,ε  is 
the random error term. The joint F-test for the year dummies are statistically significant for all risk measures. All 
results are corrected for heteroscedasticity. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. † indicates the coefficients of the explanatory variables and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
Panel A Determinants of Systematic Risk  
    Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag  2SLS 
Intercept 0.952*** 
(0.244) 
0.835*** 
(0.265) 
1.013*** 
(0.272) 
0.944*** 
(.278) 
1.007*** 
(0.275) 
0.803*** 
(0.283) 
Bank capital -0.041 -0.225 -0.045 -0.171 -0.081 -0.429* 
 (0.054) (0.207) (0.054) (0.152) (0.064) (0.228) 
Bank capital squared 
- 
-0.061 - -0.045 
- 
-0.115* 
 
- 
(0.056) - (0.043) 
- 
(0.063) 
Charter value 0.269* 0.297* 0.472*** 0.484*** 0.786*** 0.856*** 
 (0.154) (0.175) (0.169) (0.172) (0.283) (0.300) 
Off balance sheet items 0.127*** 0.129*** 0.127*** 0.129*** 0.118*** 0.123*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) 
Market discipline -0.100*** -0.104*** -0.099*** -0.101*** -0.104*** -0.110*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
Size 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.108*** 0.107*** 0.103*** 0.100*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Loan to total assets -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.038*** -0.037*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Bank concentration 0.186** 0.181* 0.177* 0.174* 0.172* 0.163* 
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 (0.098) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.100) 
Net interest margin -0.480 -0.394 -0.594 -0.582 -0.627 -0.524 
 (0.846) (0.843) (1.048) (1.046) (1.047) (1.033) 
Stock market turnover 0.068* 0.069* 0.073* 0.074* 0.092** 0.094** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Deposit insurance dummy 0.250** 0.255** 0.203* 0.204* 0.281** 0.291** 
 (0.111) (0.111) (0.115) (0.115) (0.118) (0.119) 
Economic freedom index -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Market based dummy -0.254*** -0.245*** -0.239*** -0.234*** -0.231*** -0.213*** 
 (0.043) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.048) (0.051) 
Common law dummy -0.036 -0.036 -0.053 -0.053 -0.052 -0.053 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.090) (0.090) (0.089) (0.089) 
Commercial bank dummy 0.179*** 0.180*** 0.173*** 0.174*** 0.167*** 0.169*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.041) 
High income economy dummy -0.523*** -0.528*** -0.547*** -0.555*** -0.595*** -0.610*** 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.109) (0.109) (0.117) (0.118) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.50 
F(25,1172)=66 
F(10,1172)= 5 
 
- 
- 
1196 
0.51 
F(26,1172)=68 
F(10,1172)=5 
 
- 
- 
1196 
0.51 
F(25,1131)=64 
F(10,1131)=6 
 
- 
- 
1160 
0.51 
F(26,1131)=64 
F(10,1131)=6 
 
- 
- 
1160 
0.50 
F(25,1133)=63 
λ2(10)=55 
 
4.93*** 
10.02*** 
1159 
0.50 
F(26,1133)=65 
λ2(10)=54 
 
3.42** 
10.44** 
1159 
Panel B Determinants of Idiosyncratic Risk  
    Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag   2SLS 
Intercept -2.149*** 
(0.336) 
-3.187*** 
(0.346) 
-2.344*** 
(0.373) 
-2.727*** 
(0.414) 
-2.385*** 
(0.345) 
-3.167*** 
(0.374) 
Bank capital -0.166** -1.378*** -0.148** -0.838*** -0.208** -1.539*** 
 (0.084) (0.211) (0.072) (0.299) (0.100) (0.296) 
Bank capital squared 
- 
-0.405*** - -0.244*** - -0.441*** 
 
- 
0.061 - 0.091 - 0.091 
Charter value 1.297*** 1.484*** 0.632*** 0.695*** 1.046*** 1.316*** 
 0.194 0.204 0.178 0.214 0.210 0.228 
Off balance sheet items 0.127*** 0.142*** 0.146*** 0.154*** 0.139*** 0.155*** 
 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.025 
Market discipline 0.096*** 0.069** 0.094*** 0.086** 0.091*** 0.066** 
 0.033 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.035 
Size -0.049*** -0.057*** -0.039*** -0.043*** -0.046*** -0.058*** 
 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 
Loan to total assets -0.088*** -0.084*** -0.092*** -0.093*** -0.088*** -0.084*** 
 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.020 0.017 0.017 
Bank concentration 0.096 0.062 0.111 0.098 0.101 0.067 
 0.086 0.085 0.090 0.090 0.085 0.085 
Net interest margin -0.894 -0.329 -1.303 -1.235 -1.232 -0.839 
 1.004 0.898 1.180 1.149 1.159 1.058 
Stock market turnover -0.005 -0.011 0.034 0.028 0.016 0.011 
 0.038 0.038 0.040 0.042 0.038 0.038 
Deposit insurance dummy 0.276 0.308 0.078 0.085 0.181 0.219 
 0.221 0.221 0.263 0.266 0.233 0.233 
Economic freedom index 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.002 
 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Market based dummy -0.358*** -0.302*** -0.342*** -0.316*** -0.331*** -0.263*** 
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 0.046 0.044 0.047 0.047 0.049 0.047 
Common law dummy 0.326*** 0.321*** 0.358*** 0.354*** 0.361*** 0.359*** 
 0.061 0.062 0.065 0.067 0.062 0.063 
Commercial bank dummy -0.104*** -0.095** -0.113*** -0.106*** -0.123*** -0.115*** 
 0.041 0.042 0.040 0.041 0.040 0.041 
High income economy dummy -1.174*** -1.209*** -1.013*** -1.059*** -1.072*** -1.131*** 
 0.101 0.100 0.104 0.106 0.105 0.105 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.34 
F(25,1172)=29 
F(10,1172)=6 
 
- 
- 
1196 
0.36 
F(26,1172)=35 
F(10,1172)=6 
 
- 
- 
1196 
0.30 
F(25,1131)=25 
F(10,1131)=6 
 
- 
- 
1160 
0.31 
F(26,1131)=26 
F(10,1131)=6 
 
- 
- 
1160 
0.33 
F(25,1133)=24 
λ2(10)=60 
 
1.690 
3.455 
1159 
0.35 
F(26,1133)=26 
λ2(10)=58 
 
1.410 
4.328 
1159 
 
Panel C Determinants of Total Risk  
    Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag  2SLS 
Intercept -2.484*** 
(0.328) 
-3.057*** 
(0.350) 
-2.310*** 
(0.373) 
-2.570*** 
(0.414) 
-2.365*** 
(0.341) 
-3.002*** 
(0.375) 
Bank capital -0.228*** -1.131*** -0.199** -0.667** -0.280*** -1.365*** 
 0.081 0.216 0.085 0.293 0.105 0.299 
Bank capital squared - -0.302*** - -0.165* - -0.360*** 
 - 0.061 - 0.090 - 0.090 
Charter value 1.382*** 1.521*** 0.828*** 0.871*** 1.378*** 1.598*** 
 0.204 0.218 0.195 0.224 0.238 0.264 
Off balance sheet items 0.172*** 0.183*** 0.189*** 0.195*** 0.178*** 0.192*** 
 0.027 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.026 
Market discipline 0.034** 0.035** 0.033** 0.027** 0.034** 0.036** 
 0.017 (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) 
Size -0.006 -0.012 0.002 -0.001 -0.007 -0.016* 
 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010 
Loan to total assets -0.092*** -0.089*** -0.098*** -0.099*** -0.092*** -0.088*** 
 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.021 0.017 0.017 
Bank concentration 0.196** 0.170* 0.214** 0.205** 0.202** 0.174* 
 0.093 0.093 0.097 0.098 0.092 0.092 
Net interest margin -0.425 -0.005 -1.206 -1.160 -1.065 -0.745 
 0.932 0.908 1.178 1.169 1.160 1.117 
Stock market turnover -0.023 -0.027 0.015 0.012 -0.011 -0.015 
 0.039 0.040 0.042 0.043 0.040 0.040 
Deposit insurance dummy 0.355 0.378* 0.134 0.139 0.270 0.301 
 0.224 0.224 0.270 0.272 0.231 0.231 
Economic freedom index 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Market based dummy -0.472*** -0.430*** -0.448*** -0.430*** -0.433*** -0.378*** 
 0.046 0.046 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.049 
Common law dummy 0.239** 0.235*** 0.267*** 0.264*** 0.269*** 0.268*** 
 0.065 0.065 0.069 0.070 0.065 0.066 
Commercial bank dummy -0.042** -0.043** -0.040** -0.041** -0.035** -0.033** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) 
High income economy dummy -1.462*** -1.488*** -1.335*** -1.366*** -1.411*** -1.460*** 
 0.102 0.102 0.105 0.108 0.110 0.111 
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R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.45 
F(25,1172)=53 
F(10,1172)=8 
 
- 
- 
1196 
0.46 
F(26,1172)=62 
F(10,1172)=8 
 
- 
- 
1196 
0.42 
F(25,1133)=45 
F(10,1133)=8 
 
- 
- 
1160 
0.42 
F(26,1133)=49 
F(10,1133)=8 
 
- 
- 
1160 
0.44 
F(25,1133)=42 
chi2(10)=85 
 
0.509 
1.043 
1159 
0.44 
F(26,1132)=47 
chi2(10)=84 
 
0.715 
2.199 
1159 
 
Panel D Determinants of Credit Risk (loan loss provision) 
    Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag   2SLS 
Intercept -3.197*** 
(0.720) 
-2.116*** 
(0.729) 
-3.306*** 
(0.790) 
-2.589*** 
(0.851) 
-3.344*** 
(0.795) 
-2.245*** 
(0.879) 
Bank capital 0.038 1.722*** 0.115 1.381** 0.160 2.006*** 
 0.156 0.517 0.173 0.664 0.204 0.793 
Bank capital squared 
- 
0.558*** - 0.433** - 0.605*** 
 
- 
0.149 - 0.197 - 0.228 
Charter value -0.214 -0.438 -0.832** -1.037*** -1.356** -1.695** 
 0.417 0.415 0.414 0.411 0.713 0.712 
Off balance sheet items 0.260*** 0.242*** 0.299*** 0.286*** 0.318*** 0.297*** 
 0.064 0.064 0.065 0.066 0.067 0.068 
Market discipline 0.126 0.161** 0.155* 0.174** 0.169** 0.201** 
 0.082 0.083 0.083 0.084 0.083 0.084 
Size -0.103*** -0.092*** -0.103*** -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.079*** 
 0.019 0.020 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.025 
Loan to total assets 0.380*** 0.371*** 0.360*** 0.354*** 0.360*** 0.352*** 
 0.062 0.063 0.060 0.061 0.058 0.060 
Bank concentration -1.006*** -0.975*** -0.924*** -0.904*** -0.904*** -0.875*** 
 0.207 0.208 0.215 0.215 0.218 0.218 
Net interest margin 12.379*** 11.559*** 12.838*** 12.547*** 13.042*** 12.456*** 
 2.607 2.501 3.023 2.943 3.195 3.186 
Stock market turnover -0.216** -0.209** -0.191** -0.174** -0.160* -0.153 
 0.090 0.091 0.092 0.092 0.096 0.096 
Deposit insurance dummy 0.212 0.166 0.346* 0.331* 0.215 0.159 
 0.183 0.184 0.191 0.190 0.218 0.224 
Economic freedom index -0.034*** -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.029*** 
 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 
Market based dummy 0.445*** 0.362*** 0.386*** 0.332*** 0.372*** 0.273*** 
 0.100 0.103 0.110 0.114 0.112 0.121 
Common law dummy 0.396*** 0.400*** 0.473*** 0.489*** 0.469*** 0.467*** 
 0.152 0.155 0.158 0.158 0.162 0.165 
Commercial bank dummy 0.162 0.144 0.143 0.126 0.151 0.136 
 0.129 0.129 0.131 0.130 0.130 0.132 
High income economy dummy 0.905*** 0.947*** 0.930*** 1.026*** 0.994*** 1.070*** 
 0.274 0.277 0.286 0.294 0.302 0.305 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.35 
F(25,1129)=19 
F(10,1129)=5 
 
- 
- 
1155 
0.35 
F(26,1129)=21 
F(10,1129)=5 
 
- 
- 
1085 
0.35 
F(25,1059)=20 
F(10,1059)=5 
 
- 
- 
1085 
0.36 
F(26,1059)=20 
F(10,1059)=5 
 
- 
- 
1085 
0.34 
F25,1059)=19 
λ2(10)=40 
 
3.672** 
7.492** 
1085 
0.35 
F(26,1059)=20 
λ2(10)=40 
 
3.137** 
9.597** 
1085 
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Panel E Determinants of Credit risk (loan loss reserve) 
    Pooled-OLS  Pooled with lag   2SLS 
Intercept -1.629** 
(0.619) 
-0.831 
(0.677) 
-2.111*** 
(0.670) 
-1.525** 
(0.754) 
-2.109*** 
(0.697) 
-1.247 
(0.826) 
Bank capital -0.228* 1.038** -0.254* 0.774 -0.256** 1.219 
 0.123 0.530 0.137 0.545 (0.129) 0.807 
Bank capital squared - 0.405*** - 0.340** - 0.464** 
 - 0.147 - 0.153 - 0.219 
Charter value 0.133 -0.045 -0.694** -0.858*** -1.293** -1.581*** 
 0.298 0.304 0.299 0.300 0.589 0.600 
Off balance sheet items 0.170*** 0.163*** 0.166*** 0.161*** 0.194*** 0.184*** 
 0.054 0.054 0.053 0.054 0.055 0.056 
Market discipline -0.324*** -0.305*** -0.277*** -0.267*** -0.261*** -0.246*** 
 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086 
Size -0.111*** -0.100*** -0.107*** -0.099*** -0.104*** -0.086*** 
 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.029 
Loan to total assets 0.841*** 0.840*** 0.952*** 0.955*** 0.946*** 0.951*** 
 0.153 0.157 0.150 0.152 0.148 0.149 
Bank concentration -0.927*** -0.913*** -0.931*** -0.926*** -0.916*** -0.904*** 
 0.210 0.210 0.211 0.211 0.211 0.210 
Net interest margin 2.307 1.924 6.245** 6.185** 6.059* 5.949* 
 2.631 2.646 3.164 3.124 3.221 3.239 
Stock market turnover -0.101 -0.100 -0.115 -0.104 -0.057 -0.060 
 0.086 0.086 0.091 0.091 0.094 0.094 
Deposit insurance dummy -0.071 -0.095 0.032 0.026 -0.093 -0.122 
 0.174 0.176 0.190 0.190 0.203 0.208 
Economic freedom index -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.038*** 
 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
Market based dummy 0.868*** 0.820*** 0.796*** 0.763*** 0.817*** 0.754*** 
 0.108 0.110 0.109 0.110 0.111 0.119 
Common law dummy 0.623*** 0.627*** 0.600*** 0.612*** 0.634*** 0.632*** 
 0.174 0.176 0.178 0.178 0.183 0.184 
Commercial bank dummy -0.052 -0.067 -0.039 -0.053 -0.037 -0.052 
 0.112 0.114 0.111 0.112 0.111 0.114 
High income economy 
dummy 
1.326*** 1.389*** 1.471*** 1.570*** 1.599*** 1.700*** 
 0.289 0.292 0.289 0.297 0.311 0.315 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.29 
F(25,922)=20 
F(10,922)=2 
- 
- 
- 
948 
0.29 
F(26,921)=21 
F(10,921)=1.8 
 
- 
- 
948 
0.32 
F(25,860)=23 
F(10,860)=1.70 
 
- 
- 
886 
0.32 
F(26,859)=23. 
F(10,859)=1.80 
 
- 
- 
886 
0.31 
F(25,860)=22. 
λ2(10)=45.23 
 
4.418** 
8.492** 
886 
0.31 
F(26,859)=23 
λ2(10)=42 
 
2.813** 
8.657** 
886 
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Table A6.7 
Determinants of bank risk- excluding Japanese banks 
The table represents the cross-country results for the determinants of bank equity risk and credit risk. Panel A through 
to Panel E reports the results. The standard market model is used to measure systematic 
risk:
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  where, itR  is the return on security i at time period t, mtR  is the return on an equity 
market index at time period t. The systematic risk estimate for each bank is 
iβ (systematic risk) and itε  is a random 
shock term. The table presents the pooled-OLS regression, pooled-OLS regression with lagged value of bank capital 
and lagged value of bank charter value  and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression results to estimate the model of 
bank risk. 
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The explanatory variables such as 
tjiUD ,,
is the natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at period t , 
tjiCV ,,  is the natural log of charter value for bank i , country j in period t tjiBC ,,  is the natural log of bank capital for 
bank i , in country j  in period t , tjiBC ,,2  is the natural log of bank capital squared for bank i , in country j  in period t , 
tjiOBS ,,  is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiLTA ,, is the loan to total 
assets for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiSize ,, is the natural log of market value of equity for bank i , in country j , 
in period t and 
tjEFI ,
 is the economic freedom index for country j  at period t . jD1  = bank specialization dummy 
where jD1 =1 if commercial banks or otherwise 0; jD2  = legal origin variable where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 
2 if French civil law countries, 3 if German civil-law countries and 4 if Scandinavian civil law countries; tjBNC,  = 
Bank concentration for country j  at period t ; 
tjNIM .  = Net interest margin for country j  at period t ; tjSTurn .  = 
Stock market turnover ratio for country j  at period t ;  
tjDIN .  = explicit deposit insurance dummy =1, otherwise=0; 
tjMB .  = market based country dummy =1, otherwise=0; tjHI .  = High income country dummy =1, otherwise=0; Finally, 
ti,ε  is the random error term. The joint F-test for the year dummies are statistically significant for all risk measures. All 
results are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † indicates the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
 
Panel A Determinants of systematic risk 
Pooled OLS   Pooled-OLS with lag   2SLS 
Intercept -0.086 0.090 -0.019 0.197 -0.106 0.125 
 (0.131) (0.151) (0.141) (0.181) (0.148) (0.221) 
Bank Capital  -0.146*** 0.153 -0.109** 0.275*** -0.155*** 0.240 
 (0.042) (0.128) (0.046) (0.174) (0.057) (0.245) 
Bank Capital Squared - 0.116*** - 0.152 - 0.152** 
 - (0.042) - (0.059) - (0.080) 
Charter Value 0.234 0.214 0.585** 0.588** 1.230** 1.200** 
 (0.231) (0.229) (0.273) (0.270) (0.560) (0.563) 
Off balance Sheet 
Activities 
0.126*** 0.125*** 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Market Discipline 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
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 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
Size  0.040*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Loan to total assets  -0.184*** -0.180*** -0.192*** -0.184*** -0.189*** -0.182*** 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.037) 
Bank Concentration -0.236*** -0.237*** -0.254*** -0.254*** -0.241*** -0.242*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
Net Interest Margin -0.632 -0.749* -1.060** -1.170** -0.845* -0.974** 
 (0.428) (0.436) (0.465) (0.473) (0.482) (0.505) 
Stock market turnover 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Deposit insurance 0.097*** 0.099*** 0.103*** 0.105*** 0.109*** 0.112*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Economic freedom 
Index 
0.028+ 0.037+ 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market based dummy 0.045** 0.040* 0.036* 0.030 0.035* 0.028 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Common law  
country  
0.281*** 0.285*** 0.281*** 0.286*** 0.279*** 0.284*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) 
Commercial bank  
dummy 
0.006 0.008 0.017 0.019 0.024 0.026 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
High income  
country dummy 
0.034 0.037 0.017 0.020 -0.003 0.013+ 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.25 
F(25,3808)=57 
F(10,3808)=15 
- 
- 
- 
3834 
0.25 
F(26,3807)=56 
F(10,3807)=15 
- 
- 
- 
3834 
0.26 
F(25,3637)=63 
F(10,3637)=15 
- 
- 
- 
3663 
0.26 
F(26,3636)=61 
F(10,3636)=14 
 
- 
- 
3663 
0.26 
F(24,3624)=61 
chi2(10)=129 
 
6.60*** 
13.25*** 
3650 
0.26 
F(26,3623)=62 
chi2(10)=129 
 
5.22*** 
15.71*** 
3650 
 
Panel B Determinants of Idiosyncratic risk 
Pooled OLS   Pooled-OLS with lag   2SLS 
Intercept -3.264*** -3.503*** -3.353*** -3.484*** -3.356*** -3.594*** 
 (0.197) (0.224) (0.212) (0.253) (0.218) (0.269) 
Bank Capital  -0.199*** -0.604*** -0.240*** -0.470** -0.276*** -0.684*** 
 (0.050) (0.153) (0.056) (0.196) (0.068) (0.225) 
Bank Capital Squared - -0.157*** - -0.091  -0.157** 
 - (0.053) - (0.073)  (0.079) 
Charter Value 0.266 0.293 0.072 0.070 0.226 0.256 
 (0.491) (0.490) (0.435) (0.437) (0.916) (0.917) 
Off balance Sheet Activities -0.048*** -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.044*** -0.042*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Market Discipline -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.062*** -0.062*** 
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 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Size  0.004 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
Loan to total assets  -0.154*** -0.161*** -0.149*** -0.154*** -0.143*** -0.150*** 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) 
Bank Concentration -0.007 -0.006 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
Net Interest Margin 2.092*** 2.251*** 2.259*** 2.325*** 2.202*** 2.336*** 
 (0.495) (0.486) (0.549) (0.553) (0.573) (0.574) 
Stock market turnover 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Deposit insurance 0.116*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.107*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) 
Economic freedom Index -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market based dummy -0.217*** -0.210*** -0.218*** -0.214*** -0.211*** -0.203*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
Common law  
country  
0.099*** 0.093*** 0.098*** 0.095*** 0.097*** 0.092*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Commercial bank  
dummy 
-0.049** -0.051** -0.048** -0.049** -0.052** -0.054** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) 
High income  
country dummy 
-0.425*** -0.429*** -0.416*** -0.418*** -0.416*** -0.420*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.039) (0.039) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.28 
F(25,3800)=76 
F(10,3800)=24 
 
- 
- 
3826 
0.28 
F(26,3799)=75 
F(10,3799)=23 
 
- 
- 
3826 
0.28 
F(25,3629)=72 
F(10,3629)=25 
 
- 
- 
3655 
0.28 
F(26,3628)=72 
F(10,3628)=25 
 
- 
- 
3655 
0.27 
F(25,3616)=69 
chi2(10)=227 
 
1.25 
2.51 
3642 
0.27 
F(26,3615)=69 
chi2(10)=224 
 
1.29 
3.88 
3642 
 
Panel C Determinants of total risk 
Pooled OLS   Pooled-OLS with lag   2SLS 
Intercept -3.622*** -3.627*** -3.616*** -3.558*** -3.651*** -3.650*** 
 (0.206) (0.231) (0.211) (0.250) (0.215) (0.267) 
Bank Capital  -0.262*** -0.272* -0.293*** -0.190 -0.342*** -0.342 
 (0.042) (0.145) (0.050) (0.179) (0.059) (0.214) 
Bank Capital Squared - -0.004 - 0.041 - 0.021+ 
 - (0.048) - (0.065) - (0.073) 
Charter Value 0.222 0.222 0.119 0.120 0.317 0.317 
 (0.445) (0.444) (0.419) (0.419) (0.852) (0.852) 
Off balance Sheet Activities -0.011 -0.011 -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Market Discipline -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.048*** 
348 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Size  0.021*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Loan to total assets  -0.205*** -0.205*** -0.203*** -0.201*** -0.195*** -0.195*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) 
Bank Concentration 0.013 0.013 -0.020 -0.020 -0.018 -0.018 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
Net Interest Margin 2.418*** 2.422*** 2.347*** 2.317*** 2.362*** 2.362*** 
 (0.493) (0.502) (0.558) (0.565) (0.577) (0.590) 
Stock market turnover 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Deposit insurance 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) 
Economic freedom Index 0.001 0.001 0.037+ 0.036+ 0.020+ 0.020+ 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market based dummy -0.208*** -0.208*** -0.206*** -0.208*** -0.201*** -0.201*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
Common law  
country  
0.165*** 0.164*** 0.160*** 0.162*** 0.158*** 0.158*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Commercial bank  
dummy 
-0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.014 -0.018 -0.018 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
High income  
country dummy 
-0.430*** -0.430*** -0.422*** -0.421*** -0.423*** -0.423*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.038) (0.039) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.29 
F(25,3818)=86 
F(10,3818)=24 
 
- 
- 
3844 
0.29 
F(25,3818)=82 
F(10,3818)=24 
 
- 
- 
3844 
0.30 
F(25,3641)=86 
F(10,3641)=29 
 
- 
- 
3667 
0.30 
F(26,3640)=82 
F(10,3640)=29 
 
- 
- 
3667 
0.30 
F(25,3628)=83 
λ2(10)=261 
 
1.92 
3.87 
3654 
0.30 
F(26,3627)=80 
λ2(10)=260 
 
2.05 
6.21 
3654 
 
Panel D Determinants of Credit risk (LLP) 
Pooled OLS   Pooled-OLS with lag   2SLS 
Intercept -1.500*** -1.276*** -1.553*** -1.501*** -1.352*** -1.187*** 
 (0.135) (0.162) (0.152) (0.181) (0.147) (0.203) 
Bank Capital  0.039 0.340** 0.065 0.153 0.123** 0.396** 
 (0.045) (0.144) (0.047) (0.160) (0.057) (0.200) 
Bank Capital Squared - 0.116** - 0.035 - 0.104 
 - (0.047) - (0.054) - (0.069) 
Charter Value -0.624*** -0.638*** -0.830*** -0.831*** -1.654*** -1.669*** 
 (0.189) (0.189) (0.233) (0.233) (0.336) (0.337) 
Off balance Sheet Activities 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
Market Discipline -0.025** -0.025** -0.036** -0.036** -0.026** -0.026** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) 
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Size  -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.009** -0.008** -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Loan to total assets  0.446*** 0.449*** 0.442*** 0.443*** 0.446*** 0.450*** 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) 0.060 0.061 
Bank Concentration -0.211*** -0.213*** -0.212*** -0.212*** -0.223*** -0.226*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.053) (0.053) 0.053 0.053 
Net Interest Margin 0.912*** 0.800* 1.408** 1.380** 0.697 0.610 
 (0.460) (0.477) (0.576) (0.579) 0.544 0.548 
Stock market turnover -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.052*** -0.052*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Deposit insurance 0.014 0.015 0.024 0.024 0.017 0.018 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Economic freedom Index -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Market based dummy 0.096*** 0.091*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.091*** 0.085*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) 
Common law  
country  
-0.091*** -0.087*** -0.088*** -0.087*** -0.080*** -0.077*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Commercial bank  
dummy 
0.093*** 0.095*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.078*** 0.080*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
High income  
country dummy 
-0.213*** -0.210*** -0.229*** -0.228*** -0.199*** -0.196*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.30 
F(25,3726)=51 
F(10,3726)=29 
 
- 
- 
3752 
0.30 
F(26,3725)=49 
F(10,3725)=29 
 
- 
- 
3752 
0.30 
F(25,3427)=51 
F(10,3427)=29 
 
- 
- 
3453 
0.30 
F(26,3426)=49 
F(10,3426)=32 
 
- 
- 
3453 
0.31 
F(25,3414)=49 
λ2(10)=284 
 
6.98*** 
14.02*** 
3440 
0.31 
F(26,3413)=47 
λ2(10)=285 
 
5.33*** 
16.04*** 
3440 
 
Panel E Determinants of Credit risk (LLR) 
Pooled OLS    Pooled-OLS with lag   2SLS 
Intercept -0.713*** -0.214 -0.853*** -0.518*** -0.668*** -0.168 
 (0.119) (0.138) (0.136) (0.169) (0.133) (0.173) 
Bank Capital  0.226*** 1.045*** 0.156*** 0.728*** 0.214*** 1.033*** 
 0.042 0.129 0.043 0.166 0.052 0.184 
Bank Capital Squared - 0.315***  0.223*** - 0.311*** 
 - 0.047  0.059 - 0.064 
Charter Value 0.508*** 0.471** 0.014 0.009 0.046 -0.013 
 0.201 0.197 0.176 0.175 0.402 0.400 
Off balance Sheet Activities 0.019*** 0.017** 0.014* 0.012 0.019** 0.016** 
 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
Market Discipline -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.024** -0.025** 
 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 
Size  -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.013*** 
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 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Loan to total assets  0.394*** 0.428*** 0.449*** 0.477*** 0.431*** 0.472*** 
 0.070 0.070 0.076 0.075 0.076 0.075 
Bank Concentration 0.130*** 0.132*** 0.119*** 0.120*** 0.113*** 0.115** 
 0.047 0.046 0.048 0.048 0.047 0.047 
Net Interest Margin -0.052 -0.327 0.765* 0.618 0.290 0.061 
 0.353 0.350 0.420 0.424 0.381 0.384 
Stock market turnover -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.081*** 
 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 
Deposit insurance 0.035 0.040* 0.037 0.040* 0.033 0.038 
 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 
Economic freedom Index -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Market based dummy 0.078*** 0.067*** 0.073*** 0.065*** 0.092*** 0.079*** 
 0.019 0.019 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.020 
Common law  
country  
0.011 0.021 0.005 0.012 0.007 0.017 
 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.018 
Commercial bank  
dummy 
0.049*** 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.058*** 0.050** 0.057*** 
 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 
High income  
country dummy 
-0.154*** -0.145*** -0.146*** -0.140*** -0.136*** -0.127*** 
 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.025 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.25 
F(25,3602)=63 
F(10,3602)=11 
 
- 
- 
3628 
0.25 
F(26,3601)=63 
F(10,3601)=11 
 
- 
- 
3628 
0.26 
F(25,3321)=62.07 
F(10,3321)=10 
 
- 
- 
3347 
0.26 
F(26,3320)=61 
F(10,3320)=10 
 
- 
- 
3347 
0.27 
F(25,3307)=63 
λ2(10)=90 
 
5.77*** 
11.59*** 
3347 
0.28 
F(26,3306)=62 
λ2(10)=91 
 
3.16** 
9.53** 
3347 
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Table A6.8 
Analysis of risk for developed economies 
The table represents the cross-country results for the determinants of bank equity risk and credit risk. Panel A through 
to Panel E reports the results. The standard market model is used to measure systematic 
risk:
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  where, itR  is the return on security i at time period t, mtR  is the return on an equity 
market index at time period t. The systematic risk estimate for each bank is 
iβ (systematic risk) and itε  is a random 
shock term. The table presents the pooled-OLS regression, pooled-OLS regression with lagged value of bank capital 
and lagged value of bank charter value  and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression results to estimate the model of 
bank risk. 
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          (1) 
The explanatory variables such as 
tjiUD ,,
is the natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at period t , 
tjiCV ,,  is the natural log of charter value for bank i , country j in period t tjiBC ,,  is the natural log of bank capital for 
bank i , in country j  in period t , tjiBC ,,2  is the natural log of bank capital squared for bank i , in country j  in period t , 
tjiOBS ,,  is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiLTA ,, is the loan to total 
assets for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiSize ,, is the natural log of market value of equity for bank i , in country j , 
in period t and 
tjEFI ,
 is the economic freedom index for country j  at period t . jD1  = bank specialization dummy 
where jD1 =1 if commercial banks or otherwise 0; jD2  = legal origin variable where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 
2 if French civil law countries, 3 if German civil-law countries and 4 if Scandinavian civil law countries; tjBNC,  = 
Bank concentration for country j  at period t ; 
tjNIM .  = Net interest margin for country j  at period t ; tjSTurn .  = 
Stock market turnover ratio for country j  at period t ;  
tjDIN .  = explicit deposit insurance dummy =1, otherwise=0; 
tjMB .  = market based country dummy =1, otherwise=0; tjHI .  = High income country dummy =1, otherwise=0; Finally, 
ti,ε  is the random error term. The joint F-test for the year dummies are statistically significant for all risk measures. All 
results are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † indicates the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables and standard errors are scaled by 1000. 
Panel A Determinants of systematic risk: 
 Pooled OLS  Pooled-OLS with lag  2SLS 
Intercept 2.043*** 2.123*** 2.040*** 2.179*** 2.120*** 2.281*** 
 (0.215) (0.234) (0.230) (0.236) (0.231) (0.258) 
Bank capital 0.064 0.191 0.087** 0.323** 0.076 0.341* 
 (0.043) (0.157) (0.043) (0.132) (0.051) (0.206) 
Bank capital squared - 0.045 - 0.086** - 0.094 
 - (0.047) - (0.041) - (0.066) 
Charter value 0.756** 0.728** 0.849** 0.827** 1.708*** 1.647*** 
 (0.330) (0.334) (0.380) (0.373) (0.489) (0.492) 
Off balance sheet items 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Market discipline 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Size 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 
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 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Loan to total assets  -0.139*** -0.140*** -0.133*** -0.132*** -0.134*** -0.135*** 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Bank concentration 0.104* 0.107* 0.100 0.104* 0.082 0.088 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
Net interest margin 1.571* 1.495* 1.228 1.144 0.873 0.748 
 (0.844) (0.851) (1.010) (1.014) (1.028) (1.045) 
Stock market turnover 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.125*** 0.127*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Deposit insurance  -0.138*** -0.137*** -0.139*** -0.137*** -0.135*** -0.131*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) 
Economic freedom index -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Market based dummy  -0.020 -0.024 -0.008 -0.014 -0.007 -0.015 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) 
Common law dummy 0.429*** 0.433*** 0.425*** 0.432*** 0.407*** 0.416*** 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) 
Commercial bank  -0.178*** -0.178*** -0.165*** -0.165*** -0.161*** -0.161*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
High income dummy -0.053 -0.047 -0.063 -0.046 -0.136 -0.120 
 (0.086) (0.087) (0.090) (0.090) (0.094) (0.094) 
R-squared 
Model test  
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.39 
115.48 
43.51*** 
 
- 
- 
3195 
0.39 
110.92 
43.42*** 
 
- 
- 
3195 
0.39 
118.06 
46*** 
 
- 
- 
3101 
0.40 
113 
45*** 
 
- 
- 
3101 
0.39 
120 
413*** 
 
4.27*** 
8.59*** 
3099 
0.39 
114*** 
413*** 
 
3.48*** 
10.50*** 
3099 
Panel B Determinants of idiosyncratic risk  
Pooled OLS  Pooled-OLS with lag  2SLS 
Intercept -1.998*** -2.397*** -2.203*** -2.433*** -2.201*** -2.613*** 
 (0.202) (0.232) (0.210) (0.248) (0.210) (0.263) 
Bank capital -0.176*** -0.815*** -0.200*** -0.592*** -0.248*** -0.928 
 (0.063) (0.188) (0.064) (0.209) (0.079) (0.260) 
Bank capital squared - -0.225*** - -0.143*** - -0.242*** 
 - (0.067) - (0.076) - (0.093) 
Charter value 1.513*** 1.650*** 0.454** 0.491*** 0.908*** 1.067*** 
 (0.301) (0.305) (0.230) (0.247) (0.330) (0.340) 
Off balance sheet items -0.003 0.000 0.006 0.008 0.004 0.008 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Market discipline 0.015 0.013 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.011 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Size -0.019*** -0.022*** -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.021*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Loan to total assets  -0.130*** -0.127*** -0.126*** -0.128*** -0.117*** -0.114*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) 
Bank concentration -0.127*** -0.140** -0.098* -0.105* -0.111** -0.125** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) 
Net interest margin -3.330*** -2.950*** -3.271*** -3.131*** -3.561*** -3.240*** 
 (0.959) (0.907) (1.123) (1.105) (1.129) (1.078) 
Stock market turnover 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.067*** 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.065*** 
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 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Deposit insurance  0.075* 0.067* 0.093*** 0.089** 0.091** 0.083** 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) 
Economic freedom index -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market based dummy  -0.280*** -0.260*** -0.275*** -0.265*** -0.263*** -0.242*** 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) 
Common law dummy 0.210*** 0.189*** 0.241*** 0.230*** 0.227*** 0.204*** 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) 
Commercial bank dummy -0.076*** -0.074*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.070*** -0.068** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
High income dummy -1.035*** -1.065*** -0.933*** -0.961*** -0.954*** -0.996*** 
 (0.081) (0.078) (0.082) (0.080) (0.085) (0.082) 
R-squared 
Model test  
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.19 
35.17*** 
21*** 
 
- 
- 
3194 
0.19 
37*** 
20.79*** 
 
- 
- 
3195 
0.18 
29*** 
20*** 
 
- 
- 
3100 
0.18 
31*** 
20*** 
 
- 
- 
3100 
0.18 
30*** 
214*** 
 
6.11*** 
12.28*** 
3098 
0.39 
32*** 
212*** 
 
4.21*** 
12.70*** 
3098 
Panel C Determinants of total risk  
Pooled OLS  Pooled-OLS with lag  2SLS 
Intercept -1.544*** -1.735*** -1.683*** -1.759*** -1.665*** -1.853*** 
 (0.199) (0.230) (0.214) (0.243) (0.212) (0.262) 
Bank capital -0.169*** -0.474*** -0.173*** -0.303* -0.223*** -0.535** 
 (0.053) (0.174) (0.054) (0.183) (0.066) (0.247) 
Bank capital squared - -0.108 - -0.047 - -0.111 
 - (0.059) - (0.065) - (0.087) 
Charter value 1.622*** 1.688*** 0.653** 0.665** 1.310*** 1.383*** 
 (0.307) (0.314) (0.293) (0.300) (0.359) (0.370) 
Off balance sheet items 0.016 0.017 0.025** 0.026** 0.022* 0.023** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Market discipline 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.014 0.013 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Size 0.009** 0.008* 0.012*** 0.011** 0.009** 0.008* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Loan to total assets  -0.198*** -0.197*** -0.194*** -0.195*** -0.186*** -0.184*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) 
Bank concentration 0.002 -0.004 0.030 0.027 0.012 0.006 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) 
Net interest margin -2.482*** -2.301*** -2.889*** -2.843*** -3.204*** -3.058*** 
 (0.903) (0.900) (1.129) (1.127) (1.135) (1.116) 
Stock market turnover 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.110*** 0.109*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Deposit insurance  0.045 0.041 0.062 0.061 0.062 0.058 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Economic freedom index -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Market based dummy  -0.309*** -0.300*** -0.300*** -0.297*** -0.289*** -0.280*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Common law dummy 0.322*** 0.312*** 0.350*** 0.346*** 0.331*** 0.321*** 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) 
Commercial bank dummy -0.105*** -0.104*** -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.100*** -0.099*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
High income dummy -1.186*** -1.201*** -1.112*** -1.121*** -1.149*** -1.169*** 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.080) (0.079) (0.083) (0.082) 
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R-squared 
Model test  
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.24 
54*** 
17*** 
 
- 
- 
3195 
0.24 
57*** 
17*** 
 
- 
- 
3195 
0.23 
46*** 
17*** 
 
- 
- 
3100 
0.23 
48*** 
17*** 
 
- 
- 
3100 
0.24 
47*** 
177*** 
 
3.33** 
6.70** 
3098 
0.24 
51*** 
176*** 
 
2.22* 
6.70* 
3098 
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Panel D Determinants of credit risk –loan loss provision  
Pooled OLS  Pooled-OLS with lag 2SLS 
Intercept -2.792*** -2.377*** -2.641*** -2.371*** -2.749*** -2.337*** 
 (0.222) (0.246) (0.243) (0.278) (0.248) * (0.307) 
Bank capital -0.172*** 0.470*** -0.104** 0.339 -0.104 0.557** 
 (0.049) (0.180) (0.053) (0.219) (0.063) (0.281) 
Bank capital squared - 0.225*** - 0.158** - 0.233*** 
 - (0.058) - (0.068) - (0.087) 
Charter value -0.933*** -1.042*** -0.770** -0.830** -1.622*** -1.755*** 
 0.261 0.260 0.345 0.369 0.412 0.410 
Off balance sheet items 0.070*** 0.067*** 0.073*** 0.071*** 0.078*** 0.075*** 
 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 
Market discipline -0.012 -0.010 -0.019 -0.018 -0.018 -0.016 
 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
Size -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.009** 
 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Loan to total assets  0.540*** 0.534*** 0.513*** 0.509*** 0.519*** 0.514*** 
 0.075 0.077 0.075 0.076 0.075 0.076 
Bank concentration -0.421*** -0.414*** -0.450*** -0.446*** -0.426*** -0.418*** 
 0.065 0.064 0.067 0.067 0.068 0.068 
Net interest margin 6.477*** 6.059*** 6.821*** 6.603*** 7.280*** 6.923*** 
 0.913 0.908 1.106 1.091 1.170 1.146 
Stock market turnover -0.105*** -0.104*** -0.118*** -0.115*** -0.106*** -0.105*** 
 0.023 0.022 0.024 0.023 0.024 0.023 
Deposit insurance  0.078* 0.084* 0.066 0.069 0.062 0.069 
 0.043 0.042 0.045 0.044 0.045 0.045 
Economic freedom index 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Market based dummy  0.037 0.016 0.016 0.002 0.014 -0.008 
 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.032 0.034 
Common law dummy -0.235*** -0.216*** -0.229*** -0.216*** -0.210*** -0.189*** 
 0.032 0.032 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.036 
Commercial bank dummy 0.121*** 0.119*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.120*** 0.118*** 
 0.033 0.032 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 
High income dummy 0.245*** 0.273*** 0.196** 0.226** 0.269*** 0.307*** 
 0.093 0.095 0.098 0.101 0.101 0.104 
R-squared 
Model test  
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.27 
44*** 
21*** 
 
- 
- 
3206 
0.27 
45*** 
21*** 
 
- 
- 
3206 
0.27 
41*** 
20*** 
 
- 
- 
2971 
0.27 
41*** 
20*** 
 
- 
- 
2971 
0.27 
41*** 
190*** 
 
2.95** 
5.95** 
2969 
0.28 
42*** 
194*** 
 
2.21* 
6.68* 
2969 
Panel E Determinants of credit risk –loan loss reserves  
Pooled OLS  Pooled-OLS with lag 2SLS 
Intercept -1.762*** -1.217*** -2.005*** -1.592*** -2.008*** -1.451*** 
 (0.194) (0.210) (0.214) (0.255) (0.223) (0.264) 
Bank capital -0.004 0.851*** -0.016 0.667*** -0.004 1.031*** 
 (0.043) (0.142) (0.047) (0.206) (0.057) (0.238) 
Bank capital squared     - 0.295***     - 0.239***     - 0.358*** 
     - (0.044)     - (0.063)     - (0.075) 
Charter value -0.003 -0.168 -0.534*** -0.634*** -1.171*** -1.418*** 
 (0.175) (0.177) (0.116) (0.125) (0.406) (0.401) 
Off balance sheet items 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.048*** 0.044*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Market discipline -0.019** -0.018** -0.016* -0.015* -0.015* -0.013 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Size -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.010** 
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 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Loan to total assets  0.893*** 0.897*** 0.973*** 0.978*** 0.969*** 0.978*** 
 (0.093) (0.095) (0.083) (0.085) (0.083) (0.084) 
Bank concentration -0.076 -0.063 -0.091 -0.083 -0.074 -0.056 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.063) (0.063) 
Net interest margin 3.406*** 2.964*** 5.377*** 5.130*** 5.893*** 5.501*** 
 (0.988) (0.991) (1.118) (1.099) (1.189) (1.140) 
Stock market turnover -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.108*** -0.106*** -0.101*** -0.101*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Deposit insurance  0.089* 0.099** 0.080 0.087* 0.077 0.090* 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) 
Economic freedom index -0.003 -0.003 0.005+ 0.040+ 0.002+ 0.050+ 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market based dummy  0.065** 0.046 0.040 0.027 0.039 0.016 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) 
Common law dummy -0.201*** -0.182*** -0.216*** -0.203*** -0.204*** -0.179*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) 
Commercial bank dummy 0.056** 0.055*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
High income dummy 0.232*** 0.286*** 0.271*** 0.329*** 0.331*** 0.414*** 
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.093) (0.093) (0.102) (0.103) 
R-squared 
Model test  
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.26 
41*** 
9.21*** 
 
- 
- 
3060 
0.27 
46*** 
8.64*** 
 
- 
- 
3206 
0.29 
46*** 
6.76*** 
 
- 
- 
2830 
0.30 
48*** 
6.62*** 
 
- 
 
2830 
0.28 
45*** 
60.19*** 
 
10.3*** 
20.62*** 
2828 
0.29 
47*** 
58*** 
 
7.31*** 
22*** 
2828 
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Table A6.9  
Analysis of risk for developing economies 
The table represents the cross-country results for the determinants of bank equity risk and credit risk. Panel A through 
to Panel E reports the results. The standard market model is used to measure systematic 
risk:
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  where, itR  is the return on security i at time period t, mtR  is the return on an equity 
market index at time period t. The systematic risk estimate for each bank is 
iβ (systematic risk) and itε  is a random 
shock term. The table presents the pooled-OLS regression, pooled-OLS regression with lagged value of bank capital 
and lagged value of bank charter value  and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression results to estimate the model of 
bank risk. 

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          (1) 
The explanatory variables such as 
tjiUD ,,
is the natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at period t , 
tjiCV ,,  is the natural log of charter value for bank i , country j in period t tjiBC ,,  is the natural log of bank capital for 
bank i , in country j  in period t , tjiBC ,,2  is the natural log of bank capital squared for bank i , in country j  in period t , 
tjiOBS ,,  is the natural log of off-balance sheet activities for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiLTA ,, is the loan to total 
assets for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiSize ,, is the natural log of market value of equity for bank i , in country j , 
in period t and 
tjEFI ,
 is the economic freedom index for country j  at period t . jD1  = bank specialization dummy 
where jD1 =1 if commercial banks or otherwise 0; jD2  = legal origin variable where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 
2 if French civil law countries, 3 if German civil-law countries and 4 if Scandinavian civil law countries; tjBNC,  = 
Bank concentration for country j  at period t ; 
tjNIM .  = Net interest margin for country j  at period t ; tjSTurn .  = 
Stock market turnover ratio for country j  at period t ;  
tjDIN .  = explicit deposit insurance dummy =1, otherwise=0; 
tjMB .  = market based country dummy =1, otherwise=0; tjHI .  = High income country dummy =1, otherwise=0; Finally, 
ti,ε  is the random error term. The joint F-test for the year dummies are statistically significant for all risk measures. All 
results are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † indicates the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
Panel A Determinants of systematic risk  
Pooled OLS  Pooled-OLS with lag  2SLS 
Intercept 0.154 0.116 0.197 0.277 0.155 0.308 
 (0.233) (0.314) (0.258) (0.519) (0.302) (0.945) 
Bank capital -0.015 -0.083 0.001 0.148 -0.002 0.280 
 (0.070) (0.397) (0.079) (0.691) (0.111) (1.442) 
Bank capital squared    - -0.028    - 0.061  - 0.118 
    - (0.167)    - (0.268)  - (0.573) 
Charter value -0.723* -0.718** -0.237 -0.234 -0.742 -0.750 
 (0.363) (0.363) (0.489) (0.482) (1.227) (1.248) 
Off balance sheet items 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.108*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.034) 
Market discipline 0.050** 0.050** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Size 0.010 0.010 0.015** 0.015** 0.018* 0.019* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012) 
Loan to total assets  -0.233** -0.236** -0.292*** -0.284** -0.268** -0.249 
 (0.101) (0.102) (0.109) (0.118) (0.115) (0.164) 
Bank concentration -1.049*** -1.049*** -1.006*** -1.006*** -1.052*** -1.053*** 
 (0.131) (0.131) (0.124) (0.124) (0.129) (0.130) 
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Net interest margin 1.607 1.604 0.430 0.423 1.371 1.405 
 (1.569) (1.570) (1.316) (1.321) (1.564) (1.558) 
Stock market turnover 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.021 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Deposit insurance  -0.086* -0.086* -0.054 -0.055 -0.080 -0.081 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.061) (0.061) 
Economic freedom index 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market based dummy  0.252*** 0.253*** 0.228*** 0.227*** 0.230*** 0.228*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) 
Common law dummy 0.405*** 0.404*** 0.401*** 0.403*** 0.409*** 0.411*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.036) 
Commercial bank dummy 0.154*** 0.153*** 0.170*** 0.171*** 0.183*** 0.185*** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) 
High income dummy -0.222*** -0.222*** -0.210*** -0.210*** -0.222*** -0.221*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) 
R-squared 
Model test  
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.34 
34*** 
2.40*** 
 
- 
- 
1136 
0.34 
32*** 
2.40*** 
 
- 
- 
1136 
0.37 
32*** 
1.63* 
 
- 
- 
1061 
0.37 
31*** 
1.63* 
 
- 
- 
1061 
0.37 
32*** 
15 
 
0.045 
0.101 
1051 
0.37 
31*** 
15 
 
0.252 
0.778 
1051 
Panel B Determinants of idiosyncratic risk  
Pooled OLS Pooled-OLS with lag  2SLS 
Intercept -3.418*** -3.219*** -3.440*** -3.181*** -3.533*** -2.887*** 
 (0.363) (0.429) (0.387) (0.490) (0.408) (0.602) 
Bank capital -0.298*** 0.063 -0.382*** 0.093 -0.441*** 0.748 
 (0.089) (0.426) (0.103) (0.467) (0.128) (0.763) 
Bank capital squared - 0.150 - 0.197 - 0.497* 
 - (0.169) - (0.178) - (0.306) 
Charter value -2.033 -2.057 -0.500 -0.489 -1.191 -1.230 
 (1.794) (1.793) (1.365) (1.361) (3.600) (3.618) 
Off balance sheet items -0.031 -0.028 -0.052 -0.049 -0.039 -0.029 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.049) (0.050) 
Market discipline -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.105*** -0.106*** -0.103*** -0.107*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
Size 0.012 0.013 -0.006 -0.005 0.003 0.006 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.029) (0.030) 
Loan to total assets  -0.244* -0.225 -0.301** -0.276** -0.299* -0.217 
 (0.137) (0.141) (0.140) (0.143) (0.163) (0.181) 
Bank concentration 0.334* 0.333* 0.239 0.237 0.259 0.257 
 (0.183) (0.183) (0.204) (0.204) (0.190) (0.191) 
Net interest margin 1.318 1.333 2.697 2.678 1.921 2.073 
 (1.764) (1.761) (1.714) (1.709) (1.950) (1.931) 
Stock market turnover 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.105*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) 
Deposit insurance  0.298*** 0.297*** 0.350*** 0.349*** 0.322*** 0.317*** 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.098) (0.098) (0.137) (0.138) 
Economic freedom index -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Market based dummy  -0.192*** -0.194*** -0.177*** -0.180*** -0.191*** -0.200*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Common law dummy -0.049 -0.045 -0.072 -0.068 -0.066 -0.056 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.052) 
Commercial bank dummy -0.224*** -0.220*** -0.223*** -0.218*** -0.238*** -0.227*** 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.062) (0.063) 
High income dummy -0.029 -0.028 0.046 0.047 0.021 0.022 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.078) (0.100) (0.100) 
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R-squared 
Model test  
Joint test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.18 
17*** 
4.93*** 
 
- 
- 
1132 
0.18 
17*** 
4.90*** 
 
- 
- 
1132 
0.19 
20*** 
6.27*** 
 
- 
- 
1057 
0.19 
19*** 
6.26*** 
 
- 
 
1057 
0.18 
18*** 
53*** 
 
1.09 
2.24 
1047 
0.18 
17*** 
50*** 
 
1.50 
4.61 
1047 
 
Panel C Determinants of total risk  
Pooled OLS  Pooled-OLS with lag 2SLS 
Intercept -3.666*** -3.462*** -3.766*** -
3.501*** 
-3.859*** -3.209*** 
 (0.353) (0.410) (0.384) (0.479) (0.407) (0.590) 
Bank capital -0.240*** 0.128 -0.348*** 0.138 -0.401*** 0.794 
 (0.086) (0.388) (0.101) (0.436) (0.125) (0.715) 
Bank capital squared     - 0.153     - 0.202     - 0.500* 
     - (0.154)     - (0.165)     - 0.284 
Charter value -1.689 -1.708 -0.550 -0.542 -1.136 -1.171 
 (1.244) (1.243) 1.304 1.300 2.750 2.763 
Off balance sheet items -0.010 -0.007 -0.028 -0.025 -0.017 -0.007 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.044) (0.044) 
Market discipline -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.080*** -0.08*** -0.078*** -0.081*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
Size 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.016 0.018 0.024 0.027 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.025) 
Loan to total assets  -0.281** -0.261** -0.374*** -0.35*** -0.365*** -0.282 
 (0.128) 0.132 0.134 0.136 0.160 0.177 
Bank concentration 0.078 0.077 0.004 0.002 0.017 0.016 
 (0.186) (0.186) (0.203) (0.204) (0.189) (0.190) 
Net interest margin 1.455 1.470 2.680 2.660 2.136 2.285 
 (1.717) (1.714) (1.688) (1.680) (1.930) (1.909) 
Stock market turnover 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.107*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) 
Deposit insurance  0.256*** 0.255*** 0.299*** 0.297*** 0.274*** 0.270*** 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.098) (0.099) (0.114) (0.114) 
Economic freedom index 0.002+ 0.002+ 0.002+ 0.001++ 0.040+ 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Market based dummy  -0.061 -0.063 -0.041 -0.044 -0.055 -0.064 
 (0.045) (0.054) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Common law dummy 0.144*** 0.147*** 0.120*** 0.124*** 0.128*** 0.138*** 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) 
Commercial bank dummy -0.064 -0.060 -0.054 -0.049 -0.067 -0.056 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.058) (0.059) 
High income dummy -0.107 -0.105 -0.047 -0.046 -0.070 -0.068 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.076) (0.076) (0.088) (0.088) 
R-squared 
Model test  
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.18 
17*** 
6.24*** 
 
- 
- 
1147 
0.18 
17*** 
6.20*** 
 
- 
- 
1147 
0.19 
21*** 
7.52*** 
 
- 
- 
1068 
0.19 
21*** 
7.54*** 
 
- 
 
1068 
0.19 
19*** 
68*** 
 
1.323 
2.711 
1058 
0.18 
18*** 
65*** 
 
1.64 
5.041 
1058 
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Panel D Determinants of credit risk-loan loss provision  
Pooled OLS  Pooled-OLS with lag 2SLS 
Intercept -1.032*** -0.733* -1.080*** -1.296*** -0.601* 0.095 
 (0.294) (0.412) (0.310) (0.403) (0.344) (0.873) 
Bank capital 0.003 0.543 0.008 -0.392 0.201 1.456 
 (0.096) (0.573) (0.099) (0.509) (0.150) (1.352) 
Bank capital squared - 0.223 - -0.168 - 0.521 
 - (0.239) - (0.216) - (0.531) 
Charter value -0.398 -0.411 -1.096*** -1.112*** -3.068*** -3.040*** 
 (0.325) (0.322) (0.419) (0.428) (1.360) (1.313) 
Off balance sheet items 0.037 0.040 0.045 0.044 0.058 0.066* 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) 
Market discipline -0.077*** -0.078*** -0.085*** -0.084*** -0.074*** -0.078*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) 
Size -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.005 -0.003 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) 
Loan to total assets  0.596*** 0.627*** 0.623*** 0.600*** 0.761*** 0.861*** 
 (0.151) (0.155) (0.159) (0.162) (0.157) (0.196) 
Bank concentration -0.389*** -0.388*** -0.547*** -0.547*** -0.399*** -0.401*** 
 (0.123) (0.123) (0.143) (0.143) (0.127) (0.127) 
Net interest margin 0.089 0.107 4.342*** 4.364*** -0.480 -0.319 
 (1.593) 1.585 2.191 2.187 1.595 1.614 
Stock market turnover -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.052*** -0.049*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
Deposit insurance  0.019 0.018 0.008 0.009 -0.031 -0.034 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.046) (0.046) (0.057) (0.058) 
Economic freedom index -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Market based dummy  0.086** 0.082** 0.091** 0.095** 0.113** 0.101** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.051) (0.048) 
Common law dummy -0.111*** -0.105*** -0.123*** -0.127*** -0.101*** -0.089** 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.046) 
Commercial bank dummy -0.132** -0.126** -0.132** -0.136** -0.119* -0.105 
 (0.062) (0.063) (0.059) (0.059) (0.071) (0.076) 
High income dummy -0.029 -0.028 -0.006 -0.006 -0.042 -0.040 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) 
R-squared 
Model test  
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.18 
8.35*** 
8.05*** 
 
- 
- 
1084 
0.18 
8.08*** 
7.95*** 
 
- 
- 
1084 
0.21 
8.89*** 
9.05*** 
 
- 
- 
980 
0.22 
8.58*** 
9.07*** 
 
- 
- 
980 
0.13 
8.34*** 
70.93*** 
 
6.25*** 
12.71*** 
970 
0.13 
8.07*** 
68.75*** 
 
4.12*** 
12.61*** 
970 
 
Panel E Determinants of credit risk-loan loss reserves  
Pooled OLS  Pooled-OLS with lag 2SLS 
Intercept -0.765*** 0.464 -1.019*** -0.076 -0.740*** 1.026* 
 (0.204) (0.288) (0.232) (0.324) (0.261) (0.625) 
Bank capital 0.277*** 2.569*** 0.165** 1.944*** 0.248** 3.588*** 
 (0.070) (0.367) (0.075) (0.390) (0.126) (1.017) 
Bank capital squared - 0.959*** - 0.746*** - 1.408*** 
 - (0.153) - (0.157) - (0.403) 
Charter value 0.928** 0.849* 0.289 0.386 1.600 1.722 
 (0.479) (0.458) (0.368) (0.369) (2.566) (2.586) 
Off balance sheet items 0.008 0.022 0.012 0.021 0.010 0.035 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.037) 
Market discipline -0.024 -0.032* -0.039* -0.046** -0.037* -0.051*** 
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 (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) 
Size -0.002 0.004 0.000 0.005 -0.009 -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.019) (0.020) 
Loan to total assets  0.006 0.150 -0.078 0.035 -0.083 0.173 
 (0.108) (0.106) (0.120) (0.122) (0.123) (0.157) 
Bank concentration 0.098 0.106 -0.090 -0.087 0.085 0.097 
 (0.107) (0.106) (0.125) (0.126) (0.109) (0.109) 
Net interest margin -2.085* -2.007* 1.915 1.801 -1.935 -1.485 
 (1.259) (1.222) (1.780) (1.829) (1.271) (1.252) 
Stock market turnover -0.094*** -0.092*** -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.101*** -0.096*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
Deposit insurance  -0.016 -0.019 -0.063 -0.065 0.013 0.009 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.098) (0.101) 
Economic freedom index -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.017*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market based dummy  0.189*** 0.172*** 0.217*** 0.201*** 0.202*** 0.169*** 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.051) (0.049) 
Common law dummy 0.126*** 0.147*** 0.131*** 0.148*** 0.109*** 0.135*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.037) (0.040) 
Commercial bank dummy 0.148*** 0.167*** 0.201*** 0.215*** 0.155*** 0.180*** 
 (0.042) (0.041) (0.045) (0.045) (0.066) (0.071) 
High income dummy -0.092* -0.086 -0.071 -0.070 -0.044 -0.042 
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.075) (0.076) 
R-squared 
Model test  
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.24 
18*** 
8.18*** 
 
- 
- 
1090 
0.27 
20*** 
8.21*** 
 
- 
- 
1090 
0.23 
16*** 
7.01*** 
 
- 
- 
999 
0.25 
18*** 
6.71*** 
 
- 
 
999 
0.25 
16*** 
60.19*** 
 
0.096 
0.197 
988 
0.27 
17*** 
56.31*** 
 
2.13* 
6.55* 
988 
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Table A6.10  
Analysis of risk for transition economies 
The table represents the cross-country results for the determinants of bank equity risk and credit risk. Panel A through to Panel E 
reports the results. The standard market model is used to measure systematic risk:
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  where, itR  is the 
return on security i at time period t, 
mtR  is the return on an equity market index at time period t. The systematic risk estimate for 
each bank is 
iβ (systematic risk) and itε  is a random shock term. The table presents the pooled-OLS regression, pooled-OLS 
regression with lagged value of bank capital and lagged value of bank charter value  and two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regression results to estimate the model of bank risk. 

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(1) 
The explanatory variables such as 
tjiUD ,, is the natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at period t , tjiCV ,,  is the 
natural log of charter value for bank i , country j in period t tjiBC ,,  is the natural log of bank capital for bank i , in country j  in 
period t , tjiBC ,,2  is the natural log of bank capital squared for bank i , in country j  in period t , 
tjiOBS ,,  is the natural log of off-
balance sheet activities for bank i , in country j  at period t ,
tjiLTA ,, is the loan to total assets for bank i , in country j  at period t , 
tjiSize ,, is the natural log of market value of equity for bank i , in country j , in period t and tjEFI ,  is the economic freedom index 
for country j  at period t . jD1  = bank specialization dummy where jD1 =1 if commercial banks or otherwise 0; jD2  = legal 
origin variable where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 2 if French civil law countries, 3 if German civil-law countries and 4 if 
Scandinavian civil law countries; tjBNC,  = Bank concentration for country j  at period t ; tjNIM .  = Net interest margin for 
country j  at period t ;
tjSTurn .  = Stock market turnover ratio for country j  at period t ;  tjDIN .  = explicit deposit insurance 
dummy =1, otherwise=0; 
tjMB .  = market based country dummy =1, otherwise=0; tjHI .  = High income country dummy =1, 
otherwise=0; Finally, 
ti,ε  is the random error term. The joint F-test for the year dummies are statistically significant for all risk 
measures. All results are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † indicates the coefficients of the explanatory variables 
and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
Panel A Determinants of systematic risk 
Pooled OLS   Pooled-OLS with lag   2SLS 
Intercept 0.531 0.500 0.930** 1.127 0.893 0.024 
 (0.393) (0.433) (0.509) (0.611) (0.531) (1.084) 
Bank capital 0.199 0.125 0.281* 0.683 0.293 -1.621 
 (0.130) (0.686) (0.157) (0.697) (0.248) (2.285) 
Bank capital squared - -0.039 - 0.193  -0.948 
 - (0.341) - (0.295)  (1.081) 
Charter value 1.760*** 1.758*** 3.302** 3.327*** 4.730** 4.689** 
 (0.489) (0.493) (1.441) (1.445) (2.304) (2.252) 
Off balance sheet items -0.002 -0.003 -0.015 -0.014 -0.007 -0.012 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.045) 
Market discipline 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.041 0.044 0.058 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) (0.042) (0.047) 
Size 0.012 0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.041 -0.044 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.037) (0.038) 
Loan to total assets -0.263* -0.268* -0.254* -0.235 -0.220 -0.344 
 (0.161) (0.159) (0.153) (0.152) (0.167) (0.221) 
Bank concentration -0.456** -0.458** -0.640*** -0.629*** -0.729*** -0.802*** 
 (0.202) (0.207) (0.225) (0.228) (0.268) (0.309) 
Net interest margin 0.057 0.048 -0.033 -0.060 0.725 0.660 
 (0.820) (0.842) (0.858) (0.860) (1.046) (1.061) 
Stock market turnover -0.466*** -0.468*** -0.564*** -0.566*** -0.588*** -0.612*** 
 (0.155) (0.159) (0.216) (0.217) (0.238) (0.247) 
Economic freedom index 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.009** 0.009* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
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Market based dummy -0.051 -0.050 0.006 0.008 -0.008 -0.003 
 (0.060) (0.058) (0.062) (0.063) (0.066) (0.067) 
Commercial bank dummy 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.013 0.037 0.010 
 (0.069) (0.070) (0.080) (0.083) (0.094) (0.101) 
High income dummy 0.258** 0.260** 0.362*** 0.357*** 0.496*** 0.527*** 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.112) (0.113) (0.168) (0.184) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test  
for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 
test 
NOBS 
0.16 
F(23,317)=3 
F(10,317)=2 
 
 
- 
- 
 
341 
0.16 
F(24,316)=3 
F(10,316)=2 
 
 
- 
- 
 
341 
0.24 
F(23,284)=4 
F(10,284)=3 
 
 
- 
- 
 
308 
0.24 
F(23,283)=4 
F(10,283)=3 
 
 
- 
- 
 
308 
0.10 
F(23,283)=3 
chi2(10)=27 
 
 
15.44*** 
30.40*** 
 
307 
0.10 
F(24,282)=3 
chi2(10)=27 
 
 
11.042*** 
32.58*** 
 
307 
 
Panel B Determinants of idiosyncratic risk 
Pooled OLS  Pooled-OLS with lag  2SLS 
Intercept -2.087*** -1.785*** -2.142*** -1.706*** 1.985*** -2.341** 
 (0.468) (0.518) (0.515) (0.593) (0.794) (0.988) 
Bank capital 0.170** 0.897 0.060 0.947 0.173 -0.865 
 (0.085) (0.821) (0.165) (0.622) (0.129) (811) 
Bank capital squared 
- 0.381 - 0.427 - 0.500 
 
- (0.432) - (0.287) - (0.652) 
Charter value 1.959** 1.983** 1.281** 1.336** 2.020*** 2.123** 
 (0.851) (0.847) (0.640) (0.643) (0.808) (1.050) 
Off balance sheet items -0.028 -0.025 -0.005 -0.003 -0.023 -0.001 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.045) (0.045) (0.034) (0.021) 
Market discipline 0.096 0.092 0.088 0.089 0.081 0.084 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.065) (0.065) (0.060) (0.064) 
Size -0.055** -0.055** -0.038 -0.037 -0.052** -0.051** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.026) (0.026) 
Loan to total assets  -1.220*** -1.170*** -1.210*** -1.166*** -1.268*** -1.300*** 
 (0.234) (0.234) (0.242) (0.237) (0.237) (0.261) 
Bank concentration 0.224 0.248 0.271 0.296 0.022 -0.020 
 (0.227) (0.230) (0.251) (0.257) (0.200) (0.210) 
Net interest margin 2.162** 2.249** 1.865** 2.154** 2.624** 2.598** 
 (1.094) (1.116) (0.932) (1.077) (1.312) (1.289) 
Stock market turnover 0.130 0.144 0.263 0.258 0.125 0.124 
 (0.217) (0.220) (0.205) (0.206) (0.162) (0.160) 
Economic freedom index -0.012** -0.012** -0.013** -0.014** -0.010*** -0.013** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.006) 
Market based dummy  -0.076 -0.083 -0.017 -0.012 -0.089 -0.029 
 (0.097) (0.097) (0.109) (0.109) (0.111) (0.111) 
Commercialbank dummy -0.023 -0.011 -0.143* -0.128* -0.102 -0.121 
 (0.088) (0.091) (0.080) (0.070) (0.115) (0.085) 
High income dummy 0.200** 0.189** 0.127** 0.129** 0.195** 0.210** 
 (0.100) (0.094) (0.063) (0.063) (0.095) (0.105) 
R-squared 
Model test  
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.24 
F(23,314)=6.19 
F(10,314)=4.49 
 
- 
- 
338 
0.24 
F(23,313)=5.81 
F(10,313)=4.36 
- 
 
- 
338 
0.24 
F(23,281)=5.44 
F(10,281)=3.17 
 
- 
- 
306 
0.24 
F(24,280)=5.44 
F(10,280)=3.17 
 
- 
- 
306 
0.23 
F(24,281)=5 
chi2(10)=25 
 
0.222 
1.37 
305 
0.23 
F(24,280)=4.89 
chi2(10)=25 
 
0.102 
1.45 
305 
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Panel C Determinants of total risk 
Pooled OLS  Pooled-OLS with lag  2SLS 
Intercept -2.777*** -2.416*** -2.236*** -1.771*** -2.089*** -2.576*** 
 (0.745) (0.678) (0.520) (0.606) (0.548) (1.009) 
Bank capital 0.263* 0.457 0.150 1.094* 0.269 -0.803 
 (0.149) (0.466) (0.170) (0.645) (0.260) (2.011) 
Bank capital squared - 1.134 - 0.455* - -0.531 
 - (0.899) - (0.298) - (0.994) 
Charter value 2.943*** 2.972*** 1.867** 1.925** 2.674*** 2.651** 
 (0.954) (0.959) (0.799) (0.820) (1.257) (1.233) 
Off balance sheet items -0.033 -0.030 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.000 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.045) (0.045) (0.043) (0.045) 
Market discipline 0.095 0.090 0.077 0.077 0.089 0.097 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.066) (0.065) (0.063) (0.065) 
Size -0.060** -0.059** -0.035 -0.033 -0.050 -0.051* 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032) 
Loan to total assets  -1.225*** -1.165*** -1.257*** -1.211*** -1.268*** -1.338*** 
 (0.232) (0.236) (0.241) (0.237) (0.237) (0.271) 
Bank concentration 0.104 0.132 0.082 0.108 0.025 -0.016 
 (0.236) (0.243) (0.254) (0.259) (0.257) (0.282) 
Net interest margin 3.397** 3.502** 2.245* 2.177* 2.424* 2.388* 
 (1.434) (1.480) (1.303) (1.291) (1.327) (1.334) 
Stock market turnover 0.266 0.283 0.185 0.180 0.143 0.129 
 (0.294) (0.301) (0.203) (0.205) (0.206) (0.213) 
Economic freedom index 0.001 0.002 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Market based dummy  -0.168 -0.177 -0.062 -0.057 -0.048 -0.046 
 (0.112) (0.114) (0.111) (0.111) (0.108) (0.108) 
Commercial bank dummy -0.058 -0.044 -0.132 -0.115 -0.099 -0.114 
 (0.103) (0.103) (0.086) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) 
High income dummy 0.187 0.173 0.121 0.109 0.203 0.220 
 (0.136) (0.136) (0.127) (0.129) (0.137) (0.145) 
R-squared 
Model test  
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.19 
F(23,316)=6.02 
F(10,316)=4.01 
 
- 
- 
340 
0.19 
F(24,315)=5.67 
F(10,315)=3.89 
 
- 
- 
340 
0.23 
F(23,282)=5.38 
F(10,282)=2.92 
 
- 
- 
306 
0.23 
F(24,281)=5.05 
F(10,281)=2.75 
 
- 
- 
306 
0.22 
F(23,281)=5.69 
chi2(10)=32.52 
 
0.647 
1.407 
305 
0.22 
F(24,280)=5.79 
chi2(10)=33.74 
 
0.439 
1.443 
305 
 
Panel D Determinants of credit risk-LLP  
Pooled OLS   Pooled-OLS with lag   2SLS 
Intercept -2.662*** -2.530*** -2.900*** -2.814*** -3.167*** -3.131** 
 (0.416) (0.576) (0.471) (0.679) (0.560) (1.279) 
Bank capital -0.305 0.159 -0.367*** -0.209 -0.514** -0.437 
 (0.196) (0.576) (0.162) (0.816) (0.256) (2.347) 
Bank capital squared - 0.005 - 0.074 - 0.038 
 - (1.121) - (0.335) - (1.113) 
Charter value 0.116 0.126 -0.176 -0.162 -0.390 -0.384 
 (0.465) (0.459) (0.781) (0.773) (1.022) (1.023) 
Off balance sheet items 0.007 0.008 0.016 0.016 0.020 0.020 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) 
Market discipline -0.105* -0.106* -0.099* -0.099 -0.110* -0.110* 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) 
Size 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.012 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) 
Loan to total assets  0.587** 0.603** 0.648*** 0.650*** 0.716*** 0.719*** 
 (0.237) (0.254) (0.250) (0.250) (0.258) (0.276) 
365 
Bank concentration -0.086 -0.080 0.020 0.018 0.098 0.098 
 (0.198) (0.201) (0.221) (0.222) (0.246) (0.247) 
Net interest margin 1.429 1.467 1.930* 1.906* 2.200** 2.204** 
 (1.024) (1.052) (1.131) (1.140) (1.112) (1.110) 
Stock market turnover 0.057 0.062 0.107 0.104 0.147 0.148 
 (0.151) (0.154) (0.194) (0.195) (0.189) (0.189) 
Economic freedom index 0.009** 0.009** 0.010** 0.010** 0.011** 0.011** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Market based dummy  0.075 0.073 0.032 0.034 0.006 0.006 
 (0.068) (0.070) (0.076) (0.078) (0.082) (0.082) 
Commercial bank dummy -0.273*** -0.266*** -0.262** -0.259** -0.275*** -0.274*** 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.106) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) 
High income dummy -0.084 -0.088 -0.118 -0.119 -0.154 -0.154 
 (0.128) (0.129) (0.141) (0.141) (0.145) (0.146) 
R-squared 
Model test  
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.25 
F(23,319)=5.05 
F(10,319)=3.57 
 
- 
- 
343 
0.26 
F(24,318)=4.86 
F(10,318)=3.46 
 
- 
- 
343 
0.27 
F(23,273)=5.63 
F(10,273)=3.37 
 
- 
- 
297 
0.27 
F(24,272)=5.97 
F(10,272)=3.34 
 
- 
- 
297 
0.26 
F(23,272)=4.79 
chi2(10)=36.69 
 
0.404 
0.884 
296 
0.26 
F(24,271)=4.59 
chi2(10)=36.13 
 
0.265 
0.876 
296 
 
Panel E  Determinants of credit risk-LLR  
Pooled OLS   Pooled-OLS with lag   2SLS 
Intercept -1.659*** -2.130*** -2.057*** -1.427*** -1.929*** -1.254 
 (0.304) (0.483) (0.334) (0.441) (0.379) (1.071) 
Bank capital 0.584*** -0.513 0.104 1.366** 0.213 1.673 
 (0.174) (0.920) (0.177) (0.548) (0.256) (2.335) 
Bank capital squared - -0.574 - 0.611** - 0.728 
 - (0.489) - (0.248) - (1.207) 
Charter value 1.289** 1.259** 1.173** 1.245* 1.680** 1.697** 
 (0.579) (0.563) (0.618) (0.668) (0.865) (0.877) 
Off balance sheet items 0.021 0.018 0.028 0.031 0.029 0.031 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) 
Market discipline -0.014 -0.008 -0.005 -0.003 0.003 -0.005 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) 
Size -0.020* -0.020** -0.014 -0.012 -0.022* -0.020 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) 
Loan to total assets 0.026 -0.048 0.131 0.186 0.110 0.198 
 (0.170) (0.196) (0.172) (0.172) (0.171) (0.250) 
Bank concentration -0.078 -0.117 -0.081 -0.046 -0.126 -0.070 
 (0.152) (0.157) (0.164) (0.165) (0.165) (0.198) 
Net interest margin 1.925*** 1.787*** 2.456*** 2.370*** 2.449*** 2.512*** 
 (0.518) (0.538) (0.607) (0.581) (0.608) (0.657) 
Stock market turnover 0.034 0.021 0.141 0.125 0.102 0.113 
 (0.149) (0.151) (0.166) (0.166) (0.167) (0.172) 
Economic freedom index 0.006* 0.006* 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Market based dummy 0.145*** 0.157*** 0.122* 0.127** 0.135** 0.131* 
 (0.055) (0.057) (0.065) (0.064) (0.067) (0.070) 
Commercial bank dummy 0.087 0.068 0.056 0.078 0.080 0.101 
 (0.070) (0.072) (0.083) (0.079) (0.086) (0.088) 
High income dummy 0.343*** 0.352*** 0.250** 0.241** 0.289** 0.270** 
 (0.119) (0.123) (0.120) (0.120) (0.124) (0.133) 
R-squared 
Model test 
Joint F-test for year dummies 
Test of Endogeneity: 
Wu-Hausman F test 
Durbin-Wu-HausmanChi2 test 
NOBS 
0.19 
F(23,352)=5.41 
F(10,352)=1.93 
 
- 
- 
376 
0.20 
F(24,351)=5.26 
F(10,351)=1.98 
 
- 
- 
376 
0.17 
F(23,304)=4.33 
F(10,304)=2.24 
 
- 
- 
328 
0.18 
F(24,303)=4.84 
F(10,303)=2.16 
 
- 
- 
328 
0.19 
F(23,303)=4.30 
chi2(10)=22.24 
 
2.771* 
5.913* 
327 
0.19 
F(24,302)=4.14 
chi2(10)=21.20 
 
2.849** 
9.087** 
327 
366 
 
367 
 
Table A6.11 
Determinants of bank risk-world analysis: base model  
The table represents the cross-country results for the determinants of bank equity risk and credit risk. Panel A and Panel B reports 
the results under random effects panel technique for equity risk and credit risk respectively. The standard market model is used to 
measure systematic risk:
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  where, itR  is the return on security i at time period t, mtR  is the return on an 
equity market index at time period t. The systematic risk estimate for each bank is 
iβ (systematic risk) and itε  is a random shock 
term.  
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The explanatory variables such as 
tjiUD ,,
is the natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at period t , 
tjiCV ,,  is the 
natural log of charter value for bank i , country j in period t tjiBC ,,  is the natural log of bank capital for bank i , in country j  in 
period t , tjiBC ,,2  is the natural log of bank capital squared for bank i , in country j  in period t , 
tjiOBS ,,  is the natural log of off-
balance sheet activities for bank i , in country j  at period t ,
tjiLTA ,,
is the loan to total assets for bank i , in country j  at period t , 
tjiSize ,, is the natural log of market value of equity for bank i , in country j , in period t and tjEFI ,  is the economic freedom index 
for country j  at period t . jD1  = bank specialization dummy where jD1 =1 if commercial banks or otherwise 0; jD2  = legal 
origin variable where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 2 if French civil law countries, 3 if German civil-law countries and 4 if 
Scandinavian civil law countries; tjBNC,  = Bank concentration for country j  at period t ; tjNIM .  = Net interest margin for 
country j  at period t ;
tjSTurn .  = Stock market turnover ratio for country j  at period t ;  tjDIN .  = explicit deposit insurance 
dummy =1, otherwise=0; 
tjMB .  = market based country dummy =1, otherwise=0; tjHI .  = High income country dummy =1, 
otherwise=0; Finally, 
ti,ε  is the random error term. The joint F-test for the year dummies are statistically significant for all risk 
measures. All results are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † indicates the coefficients of the explanatory variables 
and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
Panel A Determinants of equity risk –world analysis  
    Systematic risk   Idiosyncratic risk  Total risk 
Intercept -2.156*** -2.754*** -2.929*** -3.034*** -3.263*** -3.240*** 
 (0.191) (0.238) (0.233) (0.263) (0.251) (0.273) 
Bank capital  -0.011** -0.035 -0.122** -0.298 -0.106** -0.068 
 (0.005) (0.254) (0.059) (0.221) (0.051) (0.177) 
Bank capital squared - -0.009 - -0.068 - 0.015 
 - (0.103) - (0.082) - (0.057) 
Charter value -0.622** -0.621** 0.421 0.428 0.268 0.267 
 (0.252) (0.252) (0.998) (0.998) (0.957) (0.957) 
Off-balance sheet items 0.021** 0.022** -0.017** -0.017** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) 
Market discipline 0.016** 0.016** -0.033** -0.033** -0.030** -0.031** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Size  0.056*** 0.056*** 0.004 0.004 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Loan to total assets  -0.049 -0.049 -0.149** -0.150** -0.187*** -0.187*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.061) (0.062) (0.071) (0.071) 
368 
Bank concentration -0.166** -0.166** 0.074 0.074 0.163** 0.163** 
 (0.079) (0.079) (0.076) (0.076) (0.081) (0.081) 
Net interest margin -0.584** -0.581** 0.714** 0.700** 0.561** 0.547** 
 (0.278) (0.278) (0.332) (0.332) (0.241) (0.249) 
Stock market turnover 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Deposit insurance 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.143*** 0.142*** 0.187*** 0.187*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) 
Economic freedom Index -0.004* -0.004* -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Market based dummy 0.005 0.006 -0.157*** -0.154*** -0.144*** -0.145*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Common law country  0.314** 0.314*** 0.091*** 0.088*** 0.161*** 0.162*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.035) (0.036) (0.034) (0.035) 
Commercial bank dummy -0.062 -0.062 -0.103** -0.104** -0.061** -0.061** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.043) (0.044) (0.031) (0.030) 
High income country dummy 0.106** 0.105** -0.464*** -0.466*** -0.462*** -0.462*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.053) 
R-squared 
Joint F-test for year Dummies 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier  
NOBS 
0.45 
λ2(10)=292 
λ2(1)=2424 
4670 
0.45 
λ2(10)=292 
λ2(1)=2423 
4670 
0.35 
λ2(10)=213 
λ2(1)=1440 
4662 
0.35 
λ2(10)=213 
λ2(1)=1435 
4662 
0.37 
λ2(10)=196 
λ2(1)=1465 
4680 
0.37 
λ2(10)=196 
λ2(1)=1465 
4680 
 
Panel B Determinants of credit risk-world analysis  
     Credit risk LLP    Credit risk LLR   
Intercept -2.136*** -1.915*** -1.185*** -0.707*** 
 (0.196) (0.250) (0.191) (0.238) 
Bank capital  -0.264*** 0.099 -0.061 0.735*** 
 (0.065) (0.245) (0.072) (0.266) 
Bank capital squared 
- 
0.139 - 0.309*** 
 
- 
(0.094) - (0.112) 
Charter value -0.721*** -0.730*** 0.206 0.211 
 (0.241) (0.239) (0.187) (0.182) 
Off-balance sheet items 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.025** 0.023** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) 
Market discipline -0.016** -0.016** -0.012** -0.012** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Size  -0.010* -0.010* -0.023*** -0.022*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Loan to total assets  0.548*** 0.552*** 0.429*** 0.450*** 
 (0.179) (0.182) (0.103) (0.103) 
Bank concentration -0.243*** -0.245*** 0.044 0.041 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.084) (0.083) 
Net interest margin 1.389** 1.287** -0.451 -0.642 
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 (0.631) (0.631) (0.609) (0.603) 
Stock market turnover -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.044*** -0.045*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) 
Deposit insurance 0.032 0.033 0.015 0.017 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.049) (0.048) 
Economic freedom Index -0.003 -0.003 -0.007*** -0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market based dummy 0.062* 0.056 0.057 0.044 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.039) (0.038) 
Common law country  -0.114*** -0.108*** -0.066* -0.053 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.038) (0.037) 
Commercial bank dummy 0.113** 0.116** 0.077* 0.083** 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.041) (0.040) 
High income country dummy -0.276*** -0.271*** -0.193*** -0.183*** 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.046) (0.046) 
R-squared 
Joint F-test for year Dummies 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier 
NOBS 
0.32 
λ2(10)=287 
λ2(1)=1804 
4631 
0.32 
λ2(10)=286 
λ2(1)=1778 
4631 
0.27 
λ2(10)=160 
λ2(1)=4734 
4524 
0.27 
λ2(10)=159 
λ2(1)=4713 
4524 
 
370 
 
Table A6.12 
Determinants of bank risk–world analysis: extended model 
The table represents the cross-country results for the determinants of bank equity risk and credit risk. Panel A, Panel B, Panel C, 
Panel D and Panel E reports the results for equity risk and credit risk. The standard market model is used to measure systematic 
risk:
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  where, itR  is the return on security i at time period t, mtR  is the return on an equity market index 
at time period t. The systematic risk estimate for each bank is 
iβ (systematic risk) and itε  is a random shock term. The table 
presents the pooled-OLS regression, pooled-OLS regression with lagged value of bank capital and lagged value of bank charter 
value  and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression results to estimate the model of bank risk. 
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(1) 
The explanatory variables such as 
tjiUD ,, is the natural log of uninsured deposits for bank i , in country j at period t , tjiCV ,,  is the 
natural log of charter value for bank i , country j in period t tjiBC ,,  is the natural log of bank capital for bank i , in country j  in 
period t , tjiBC ,,2  is the natural log of bank capital squared for bank i , in country j  in period t , tjiOBS ,,  is the natural log of off-
balance sheet activities for bank i , in country j  at period t , tjiLTA ,, is the loan to total assets for bank i , in country j  at period t , 
tjiSize ,, is the natural log of market value of equity for bank i , in country j , in period t and tjEFI ,  is the economic freedom index 
for country j  at period t . jD1  = bank specialization dummy where jD1 =1 if commercial banks or otherwise 0; jD2  = legal 
origin variable where jD2 =1 if common-law countries, 2 if French civil law countries, 3 if German civil-law countries and 4 if 
Scandinavian civil law countries; 
tjBNC,  = Bank concentration for country j  at period t ; tjNIM .  = Net interest margin for 
country j  at period t ;
tjSTurn .  = Stock market turnover ratio for country j  at period t ; jCRI  = creditor rights index for country 
j , jSRI  = shareholder rights index for country j , tjDIN .  = explicit deposit insurance dummy =1, otherwise=0; tjMB .  = market 
based country dummy =1, otherwise=0;
tjHI .  = High income country dummy =1, otherwise=0; Finally, ti,ε  is the random error 
term. The joint F-test for the year dummies are statistically significant for all risk measures. All results are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. † indicates the coefficients of the explanatory variables and standard errors are scaled by 100. 
Panel A Determinants of systematic risk –world analysis  
    Pooled-OLS  lagged Pooled-OLS   2SLS 
Intercept 0.171 0.375** 0.192 0.438** 0.142 0.479** 
 (0.152) (0.172) (0.158) (0.193) (0.166) (0.245) 
Dividend Yield 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Operating leverage 0.038 0.032 0.038 0.031 0.040 0.030 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) 
Bank capital  -0.104*** 0.249 -0.082** 0.359** -0.103** 0.489** 
 (0.043) (0.156) (0.041) (0.183) (0.050) (0.244) 
Bank capital squared - 0.133*** - 0.169** - 0.223** 
 - (0.054) - (0.062) - (0.092) 
Charter value 0.547*** 0.578*** 0.278** 0.273** 0.335** 0.615** 
 (0.233) (0.230) (0.130) (0.130) (0.166) (0.250) 
Off-balance sheet items 0.113*** 0.111*** 0.104*** 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.100*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Market discipline 0.022** 0.022** 0.019*** 0.019** 0.016** 0.017** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
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Size  0.060*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Loan to total assets  -0.172*** -0.167*** -0.177*** -0.169*** -0.173*** -0.165*** 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033) 
Bank concentration -0.145*** -0.138*** -0.155*** -0.146*** -0.151*** -0.140*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) 
Net interest margin -1.574*** -1.713*** -1.948*** -2.076*** -1.843*** -2.036*** 
 (0.491) (0.499) (0.527) (0.536) (0.550) (0.580) 
Stock market turnover 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.115*** 0.117*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Deposit insurance 0.146*** 0.149*** 0.153*** 0.158*** 0.155*** 0.160*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Economic freedom Index -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market based dummy 0.003 -0.004 0.003 -0.005 0.001 -0.012 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
Common law country  0.327*** 0.334*** 0.318*** 0.326*** 0.315*** 0.327*** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031) 
Creditor rights -0.054*** -0.056*** -0.051*** -0.053*** -0.048*** -0.052*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 
Shareholder rights 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.008 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Commercial bank dummy 0.024 0.027 0.048* 0.052* 0.047* 0.052* 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) 
High income country dummy 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.061** 0.062** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) 
R-squared 
Joint F-test for year dummy 
Wu-Hausman F-test 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman λ2 test 
NOBS 
0.27 
33 
- 
- 
4429 
0.27 
33 
- 
- 
4429 
0.28 
32 
- 
- 
4245 
0.28 
32 
- 
- 
4245 
0.28 
λ2(10)=297 
0.052** 
0.053** 
4232 
0.28 
λ2(10)=297 
0.009*** 
0.009*** 
4232 
 
Panel B Determinants of total risk –world analysis  
    Pooled-OLS  lagged Pooled-OLS   2SLS 
Intercept -3.275*** -3.278*** -3.277*** -3.213*** -3.292*** -3.232 
 (0.246) (0.263) (0.240) (0.272) (0.239) (0.286) 
Dividend Yield -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Operating leverage 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.023 0.030 0.028 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) 
Bank capital  -0.201*** -0.205 -0.225*** -0.110 -0.268*** -0.163 
 (0.040) (0.140) (0.044) (0.168) (0.058) (0.233) 
Bank capital squared - -0.001 - 0.044 - 0.040 
 - (0.047) - (0.060) - (0.082) 
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Charter value 0.085 0.086 0.141 0.141 0.384 0.372 
 (0.547) (0.546) (0.466) (0.465) (1.046) (1.047) 
Off-balance sheet items 0.013** 0.013** 0.011** 0.011** 0.012** 0.012** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Market discipline -0.012** -0.012** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** -0.014** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Size  0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Loan to total assets  -0.207*** -0.207*** -0.198*** -0.196*** -0.192*** -0.191*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) 
Bank concentration 0.035 0.035 0.015 0.017 0.012 0.014 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.064) (0.063) (0.068) (0.068) 
Net interest margin 2.782*** 2.784*** 2.918*** 2.884*** 2.852*** 2.818*** 
 (0.543) (0.549) (0.607) (0.613) (0.625) (0.634) 
Stock market turnover 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.106*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Deposit insurance 0.089** 0.089** 0.087** 0.088** 0.081** 0.082** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) 
Economic freedom Index 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market based dummy -0.209*** -0.209*** -0.206*** -0.208*** -0.201*** -0.203*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Common law country  0.240*** 0.240*** 0.243*** 0.245*** 0.232*** 0.235*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.037) (0.038) 
Creditor rights -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.041*** -0.042*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
Shareholder rights -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.036*** -0.036*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Commercial bank dummy -0.042** -0.042** -0.027 -0.026 -0.029 -0.028 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
High income country dummy -0.453*** -0.453*** -0.451*** -0.451*** -0.449*** -0.449*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) 
R-squared 
Joint F-test for year dummy 
Wu-Hausman F-test 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman λ2 test 
NOBS 
0.26 
22 
- 
- 
4427 
0.26 
22 
- 
- 
4427 
0.28 
26 
- 
- 
4239 
0.28 
26 
- 
- 
4239 
0.28 
λ2(10)=247 
0.054** 
0.042** 
4226 
0.28 
λ2(10)=247 
0.041** 
0.043** 
4226 
Panel C Determinants of Idiosyncratic risk –world analysis  
    Pooled-OLS  lagged Pooled-OLS   2SLS 
Intercept -2.983*** -3.278*** -3.111*** -3.209*** -3.110*** -3.232*** 
 (0.222) (0.263) (0.238) (0.275) (0.238) (0.286) 
Dividend Yield -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Operating leverage 0.008 0.003 0.015 0.013 -0.011 -0.006 
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 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
Bank capital  -0.162*** -0.525*** -0.195*** -0.369** -0.235*** -0.544** 
 (0.047) (0.164) (0.051) (0.184) (0.068) (0.253) 
Bank capital squared - -0.137** - 0.067 - -0.116 
 - (0.060) - (0.072) - (0.093) 
Charter value 0.303 0.335 0.206 0.205 0.503 0.537 
 (0.540) (0.539) (0.466) (0.467) (1.063) (1.067) 
Off-balance sheet items -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.029** -0.028** -0.026** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Market discipline -0.018*** -0.019** -0.022** -0.022** -0.022** -0.022** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) 
Size  0.011** 0.009** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010** 0.009** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Loan to total assets  -0.149*** -0.154*** -0.136*** -0.139*** -0.131*** -0.135*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036) (0.037) 
Bank concentration 0.030 0.037 0.027 0.031 -0.034 -0.040 
 (0.070) (0.065) (0.062) (0.062) (0.067) (0.067) 
Net interest margin 2.699*** 2.842*** 3.142*** 3.192*** 3.033*** 3.133*** 
 (0.546) (0.538) (0.595) (0.599) (0.615) (0.615) 
Stock market turnover 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Deposit insurance 0.040** 0.044** 0.044** 0.044** 0.044** 0.044*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.015) 
Economic freedom Index -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market based dummy -0.204*** -0.197*** -0.203*** -0.199*** -0.196*** -0.189*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Common law country  0.131*** 0.124*** 0.139*** 0.136*** 0.126*** 0.119*** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.037) (0.038) 
Creditor rights index -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.025** -0.023** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
Shareholder rights index -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.025** -0.025*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Commercial bank dummy -0.086*** -0.089*** -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.074*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
High income country dummy -0.459*** -0.460*** -0.455*** -0.455*** -0.453*** -0.453*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) 0.036 
R-squared 
Joint F-test for year dummy 
Wu-Hausman F-test 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman λ2 test 
NOBS 
0.25 
25 
- 
- 
4421 
0.25 
25 
- 
- 
4421 
0.28 
26 
- 
- 
4239 
0.28 
26 
- 
- 
4239 
0.28 
λ2(10)=257 
0.024** 
0.022** 
4224 
0.28 
λ2(10)=257 
0.034** 
0.033** 
4224 
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Panel D Determinants of credit risk-loan loss provision –world analysis  
    Pooled-OLS  lagged Pooled-OLS  2SLS 
Intercept -1.333*** -1.191*** -1.411*** -1.442*** -1.242*** -1.217*** 
 (0.138) (0.177) (0.158) (0.183) (0.154) (0.212) 
Dividend Yield 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Operating leverage 0.229*** 0.225*** 0.216*** 0.217*** 0.229*** 0.228*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
Bank capital  -0.185*** 0.052 -0.118*** -0.172 -0.104** -0.061 
 (0.044) (0.183) (0.043) (0.141) (0.053) (0.224) 
Bank capital squared - 0.088 - -0.020 - 0.016 
 - (0.064) - (0.045) - (0.071) 
Charter value -0.274** -0.288** -0.538** -0.536** -1.267*** -1.271*** 
 (0.137) (0.137) (0.233) (0.233) (0.402) (0.406) 
Off-balance sheet items 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Market discipline -0.011** -0.011** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Size  -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.007** -0.007** -0.006** -0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Loan to total assets  0.509*** 0.511*** 0.494*** 0.494*** 0.495*** 0.495*** 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
Bank concentration -0.425*** -0.422*** -0.418*** -0.419*** -0.407*** -0.406*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) 
Net interest margin 1.342*** 1.247*** 1.935*** 1.954*** 1.190*** 1.176** 
 (0.460) (0.466) (0.579) (0.582) (0.521) (0.528) 
Stock market turnover -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.072*** -0.072*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Deposit insurance -0.027 -0.025 -0.016 -0.016 -0.019 -0.019 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Economic freedom Index -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market based dummy 0.155*** 0.150*** 0.135*** 0.136*** 0.153*** 0.152*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) 
Common law country  -0.195*** -0.191*** -0.172*** -0.172*** -0.160*** -0.159*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
Creditor rights index 0.068*** 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Shareholder rights index 0.008 0.009 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Commercial bank dummy 0.049** 0.051** 0.049** 0.049** 0.038** 0.039*** 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) 
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High income country dummy -0.124*** -0.123*** -0.142*** -0.142*** -0.120*** -0.120*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
R-squared 
Joint F-test for year dummy 
Wu-Hausman F-test 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman λ2 test 
NOBS 
0.30 
30 
- 
- 
4377 
0.30 
30 
- 
- 
4377 
0.32 
31 
- 
- 
4018 
0.32 
31 
- 
- 
4018 
0.31 
λ2(10)=286 
0.007*** 
0.006*** 
4005 
0.31 
λ2(10)=284 
0.004*** 
0.004*** 
4005 
 
Panel E Determinants of credit risk-loan loss reserve –world analysis  
    Pooled-OLS  lagged Pooled-OLS   2SLS 
Intercept -0.462*** 0.027 -0.597*** -0.278 -0.474*** -0.003 
 (0.127) 0.153 (0.144) (1.765) (0.143) (0.199) 
Dividend Yield 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Operating leverage 0.214*** 0.202*** 0.214*** 0.206*** 0.216*** 0.203*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) 
Bank capital  -0.093*** -0.906*** 0.048 0.591*** 0.065** 0.860*** 
 (0.036) (0.165) 0.038 (0.183) (0.032) (0.251) 
Bank capital squared - 0.303*** - 0.204*** - 0.294*** 
 - (0.063) - (0.066) - (0.095) 
Charter value -0.745*** -0.692*** 0.207 0.197 -0.427** -0.347** 
 (0.216) (0.209) (0.196) (0.192) (0.213) (0.173) 
Off-balance sheet items 0.007** 0.007** -0.006 -0.008 0.007** 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) 
Market discipline -0.013** -0.013** -0.015** -0.015** -0.012** -0.012** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Size  -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.007** -0.011*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Loan to total assets  0.488*** 0.517*** 0.522*** 0.545*** 0.514*** 0.550*** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.071) 
Bank concentration -0.091** -0.075** -0.090** -0.079** -0.113** -0.098** 
 (0.045) (0.037) (0.039) (0.038) (0.049) (0.049) 
Net interest margin -0.342 -0.628** 0.604 0.455 0.100 -0.124 
 (0.375) (0.299) (0.464) (0.471) (0.412) 0.420 
Stock market turnover -0.097*** -0.095** -0.095*** -0.094*** -0.100*** -0.098*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Deposit insurance 0.014 0.022 0.026 0.031 0.018 0.023 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Economic freedom Index -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Market based dummy 0.105*** 0.092** 0.105*** 0.096*** 0.118*** 0.103*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
Common law country  -0.044** -0.043** -0.024 -0.015 -0.040** -0.027 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.025) 
376 
Creditor rights index 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.053*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.047*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Shareholder rights index -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.033*** -0.032*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Commercial bank dummy 0.024 0.032 0.022 0.028 0.025 0.033** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) 
High income country dummy -0.078*** -0.074*** -0.069*** -0.068*** -0.063*** -0.061*** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
R-squared 
Joint F-test for year dummy 
Wu-Hausman F-test 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman λ2 test 
NOBS 
0.28 
15 
- 
- 
4283 
0.29 
15 
- 
- 
4377 
0.29 
12 
- 
- 
3934 
0.30 
12 
- 
- 
3934 
0.30 
λ2(10)=112 
0.005*** 
0.005*** 
3920 
0.31 
λ2(10)=112 
0.013** 
0.012** 
3920 
 
 
